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‘No pet’ covenants restrict or prohibit the keeping of companion animals in rented housing. 
They affect millions of tenants across the United Kingdom and yet have received very little 
consideration in the academic law literature. My research seeks to address this knowledge 
gap by understanding the lived experience of ‘no pet’ covenants for pet-owning tenants.  
By reference to different models of family including Morgan’s ‘family practices’ approach, my 
research shows how people construct companion animals as family members. I argue that 
the human-companion animal relationship falls within the meaning of ‘private life and family’ 
under Article 8, European Convention on Human Rights. The depth of analysis with which I 
examine human rights arguments in the context of ‘no pet’ covenants is an original 
contribution to the field.  
Embracing qualitative research methods, I conducted seven in-depth interviews with pet-
owning tenants adversely affected by ‘no pet’ covenants to assess the type and magnitude 
of the harm they endured. I used three methods of data analysis: firstly, thematic content 
analysis of the interviews; secondly, narrative analysis of stories I crafted from four of my 
interviews; thirdly, black letter law analysis of the current law affecting the use and 
enforcement of ‘no pet’ covenants in England.  
My findings provide a framework for Parliament to assess the need for legislation to regulate 
the use of ‘no pet’ covenants. The paucity of academic research makes it difficult for 
politicians to engage in an informed debate. My research provides understanding of how the 
covenants affect one of the key stakeholders, namely pet-owning tenants. Since companion 
animals are perceived as family members, the covenants can result in significant harm to 
tenants sometimes having life-changing consequences. I suggest a reconceptualization of 
‘no pet’ covenants from controllers of risk to contributors of harm. My empirical study 
constitutes a valuable exploratory pilot study that paths the way for a more comprehensive 
study to investigate the experience of all the stakeholders, including landlords. I present a 
Fair Housing framework to guide Parliament in balancing the disparate rights of all those 
affected. Drawing on Mill’s harm principle as developed by Feinberg, I propose a balancing 







Table of Contents 
1 CRITICAL COMMENTARY ................................................................................................................ 1 
1.1 Setting the scene: identifying ‘no pet’ covenants in residential leases as a social and legal 
problem ............................................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1.1 The scale of the use of ‘no pet’ covenants in England .................................................... 1 
1.1.2 Identifying ‘no pet’ covenants as a social problem ........................................................ 4 
1.1.3 Identifying ‘no pet’ covenants as a legal problem .......................................................... 6 
1.2 My theoretical assumptions as a social constructionist ......................................................... 8 
1.3 My research aim, questions and methodology .................................................................... 12 
1.3.1 The co(a)gency of multispecies tenancies .................................................................... 13 
1.4 My original contribution to the field..................................................................................... 18 
1.5 The nature of the human-companion animal relationship................................................... 20 
1.5.1 The history of the human-pet relationship: defusing conflict ...................................... 21 
1.5.2 Understanding the motivations for keeping pets ......................................................... 25 
1.5.2.1 Developing social relationships ................................................................................. 26 
1.5.2.2 The health benefits of the human-companion animal relationship ......................... 27 
1.6 The sociology of family: pets as family members ................................................................. 29 
1.6.1 My theoretical assumptions on constructing ‘family’ .................................................. 29 
1.6.2 Morgan’s theory of family practices ............................................................................. 34 
1.6.3 Pets as family: adapting theoretical tools from Child law ............................................ 38 
1.6.4 The expansion of the legal definition of family to include companion animals ........... 43 
1.6.5 Recognising pets as family under English housing law ................................................. 49 
1.7 The ambivalence surrounding human-animal relations ....................................................... 52 
1.8 The legal status of companion animals ................................................................................. 54 
1.8.1 The property versus legal personhood debate ............................................................. 55 
1.8.2 A relational approach for companion animals .............................................................. 58 
1.9 ‘No pet’ covenants in residential leases ............................................................................... 62 
1.10 My research findings ............................................................................................................. 65 
1.10.1 A Harm Assessment: an analysis of harm ..................................................................... 70 
1.10.1.1 The question of consent ....................................................................................... 71 
1.10.1.2 The nature of harm ............................................................................................... 73 
1.10.1.3 Assessing and comparing harms ........................................................................... 76 
1.11 My research findings on assessing the need for legislation ................................................. 83 
1.11.1 Changes in people’s perception of pets as family ........................................................ 83 
1.11.2 Changes in the availability of research on the benefits of pet ownership ................... 83 
1.11.3 Changes in the housing sector ...................................................................................... 84 
iv 
 
1.12 Future research ..................................................................................................................... 86 
2 PORTFOLIO COMPONENT 1 – my relevant publications .............................................................. 87 
2.1 For the Love of Darcie: Recognising the Human–Companion Animal Relationship in Housing 
Law and Policy ................................................................................................................................... 87 
2.2 Who Gets Charlie? The Emergence of Pet Custody Disputes in Family Law: Adapting 
Theoretical Tools from Child Law ................................................................................................... 102 
2.3 Challenges to the legal status of domestic and captive animals ........................................ 116 
2.4 Rook, D (2001) Property Law and Human Rights. Blackstone Press. .................................. 123 
 ........................................................................................................................................................ 123 
3 PORTFOLIO COMPONENT 2 – Understanding my research methods and methodology .......... 142 
3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 142 
3.2 The story of my DLaw research journey ............................................................................. 142 
3.3 My research aim and questions .......................................................................................... 146 
3.4 My literature review ........................................................................................................... 147 
3.5 My decision to use qualitative research methods .............................................................. 151 
3.6 My sampling technique ....................................................................................................... 154 
3.7 My interview technique ...................................................................................................... 158 
3.8 My methods of data analysis .............................................................................................. 163 
3.8.1 Phase one: Thematic content analysis of seven in-depth interviews using NVivo 12 167 
3.8.2 Phase two: Narrative analysis of four interviews ....................................................... 172 
3.8.3 Phase three – black letter law analysis ....................................................................... 176 
3.9 Research quality .................................................................................................................. 177 
3.10 Limitations of my empirical research .................................................................................. 180 
3.11 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 181 
4 PORTFOLIO COMPONENT 3 - Ethics ........................................................................................... 182 
4.1 Ethics process and documentation ..................................................................................... 182 
4.1.1 Informed consent ........................................................................................................ 182 
4.1.2 Data protection and storage ....................................................................................... 182 
4.1.3 My Northumbria University Ethics application form (2017) ....................................... 184 
4.1.4 Research information sheet ........................................................................................ 192 
4.2 Ethical considerations arising during the research ............................................................. 195 
5 PORTFOLIO COMPONENT 4 - Analysis of Interviews ................................................................. 196 
5.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 196 
5.2 Section 1, Part I Thematic Content Analysis- How people in the UK construct companion 
animals as family members in everyday practices ......................................................................... 197 
5.2.1 Conceptualising pets as family members ................................................................... 197 
v 
 
5.2.2 First Theme – AGENCY: Everyday Practices ................................................................ 201 
5.2.2.1 Agency: Influencing household decisions ............................................................... 204 
5.2.2.2 Agency: Detrimental Changes to Everyday Practices ............................................. 206 
5.2.3 First Theme - AGENCY: Anthropomorphic model ....................................................... 209 
5.2.4 First Theme - AGENCY: Affecting human-human interactions ................................... 210 
5.2.5 Conclusion to Agency theme ...................................................................................... 212 
5.2.6 Second theme: Social Support .................................................................................... 214 
5.2.7 Third theme: Ambivalence .......................................................................................... 217 
5.2.8 Conclusion to section 1, Part I..................................................................................... 218 
5.3 Section 1, Part II – Thematic Content Analysis: How people in the UK experience a ‘no pet’ 
covenant in their residential lease .................................................................................................. 220 
5.3.1 Theme one: Rental insecurity arising from hiding undeclared pets ........................... 220 
5.3.2 Theme two: Lack of Choice ......................................................................................... 222 
5.3.2.1 Lack of Choice: The poor quality of pet-friendly housing due to its low availability
 223 
5.3.2.2 Lack of Choice: The effect of ‘no pet’ covenants on tenants .................................. 225 
5.3.3 Theme three: Powerlessness in Negotiations and perceived Discrimination ............ 226 
5.3.4 Theme four: Adverse effect on tenant’s Mental Health ............................................. 229 
5.3.5 Theme five: Ambivalence to animals: a lack of understanding by housing officials .. 230 
5.3.6 Conclusion to section 1, Part II ................................................................................... 231 
5.4 Section 2: Narrative Analysis .............................................................................................. 233 
5.4.1 Bob – A story of sacrifice ............................................................................................. 233 
5.4.1.1 Additional understanding of Bob’s experience from a narrative analysis .............. 235 
5.4.2 Kate – a story of loss ................................................................................................... 240 
5.4.2.1 Additional understanding of Kate’s experience from a narrative analysis ............. 243 
5.4.3 Julia – a story of suffering ........................................................................................... 248 
5.4.3.1 Additional understanding of Julia’s experience from a narrative analysis ............. 251 
5.4.4 Lucy and Josh – a story of stealth ............................................................................... 255 
5.4.4.1 Additional understanding of Lucy and Josh’s experience from a narrative analysis
 257 
5.4.5 Key themes from the Narrative Analysis .................................................................... 258 
5.5 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 259 
6 PORTFOLIO COMPONENT 5 – Multi-species tenancies in England: a critical analysis of the 
current state of the law on ‘no pet’ covenants and recommendations for legal reform ................... 261 
6.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 261 
6.2 Relevant findings from my literature review and data analysis ......................................... 261 
6.3 Two legal questions ............................................................................................................ 263 
vi 
 
6.4 The first legal question: Is it fair and reasonable to include a ‘no pet’ covenant in a lease?
 265 
6.4.1 ‘No pet’ covenants as an unfair term under the Consumer Rights Act 2015 ............. 265 
6.4.2 The exclusion of dogs .................................................................................................. 267 
6.5 The second legal question: can a breach of a ‘no pet’ covenant be enforced in the courts?
 268 
6.5.1 Public sector housing: Secure tenancy (council tenant) and Assured tenancy (Housing 
Association tenant) ..................................................................................................................... 268 
6.5.1.1 The reasonableness test in repossession cases: identifying relevant circumstances
 269 
6.5.1.2 The approach of the court to a breach of a ‘no pet’ covenant: existing case law .. 271 
6.5.1.3 The reasonableness test and an assessment of harm ............................................ 274 
6.5.1.4 Summary of the reasonableness test as applied to ‘no pet’ covenants ................. 275 
6.5.2 Public sector housing: Introductory tenancy .............................................................. 275 
6.5.2.1 Does the human-companion animal relationship come within private life and family 
under Article 8 ECHR? ............................................................................................................. 276 
6.5.2.2 Should the court consider the human-companion animal relationship within the 
Article 8 defence in possession proceedings? ........................................................................ 280 
6.5.2.3 The wider application of bringing companion animals within Art.8 ECHR ............. 281 
6.6 Private sector housing: Assured Shorthold tenancy (AST) ................................................. 283 
6.7 Assessing the need for legislation in England to regulate the use of ‘no pet’ covenants .. 286 
6.7.1 Two Frameworks for Change ...................................................................................... 288 
6.7.1.1 Human Rights Framework ....................................................................................... 290 
6.7.1.2 Fair Housing framework .......................................................................................... 292 
6.7.2 Legislation in other jurisdictions ................................................................................. 297 
6.7.3 Positive pet policies in social housing in England and overseas ................................. 299 
6.8 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 300 
Appendices .......................................................................................................................................... 301 
Appendix 1: Scottish Parliament briefing paper ............................................................................. 301 
Appendix 2: Mother’s day card ....................................................................................................... 304 
Appendix 3: My process of coding – moving from codes to identifying key themes ..................... 305 
Appendix 4 - Interview Guide 2018 ................................................................................................ 310 





List of figures 
Figure 1 - How my theoretical assumptions underpin my research design ......................................... 11 
Figure 2 - The interrelationship between the four areas of my literature review ............................... 17 
Figure 3 - The Harm Assessment approach .......................................................................................... 82 
Figure 4 - How my DLaw evolved and developed over time in response to external influences ....... 145 
Figure 5 - My DLaw research process (years 2 and 3) demonstrating the links between my three 
methods of analysis ............................................................................................................................ 166 
Figure 6 - Examples of mind maps in my reflexive journal ................................................................. 169 
Figure 7 - AGENCY theme arising from research question 1: ‘How do people in the UK construct 
companion animals as family members in everyday practices?......................................................... 200 
Figure 8 – SOCIAL SUPPORT theme arising from research question 1: How do people in the UK 
construct companion animals as family in everyday practices? ......................................................... 216 
Figure 9 - AMBIVALENCE theme arising from research question 1: ‘How do people in the UK 
construct companion animals as family in everyday practices? ......................................................... 219 
Figure 10 – Map showing the links between the themes from tenants’ experiences of ‘no pet’ 
covenants ............................................................................................................................................ 232 
Figure 11 - The different themes arising from using content and narrative analysis: Bob and Darkie
 ............................................................................................................................................................ 238 
Figure 12 - The different themes arising from using content and narrative analysis: Kate, Roxie and 
Honey .................................................................................................................................................. 246 
Figure 13 - The different themes arising from using content and narrative analysis: Julia and Annie
 ............................................................................................................................................................ 253 
Figure 14 - The legal issues arising from the use of ‘no pet’ covenants ............................................. 264 
Figure 15 - ‘No pet’ covenants and the current law in England ......................................................... 285 
Figure 16 - Linking the law and theory and the significance of the Harm theme ............................... 287 
Figure 17 - Two Frameworks for Change ............................................................................................ 289 
Figure 18 - The application by courts and Parliament of a Harm Assessment to ‘no pet’ covenants 296 
 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1 - Academic articles (published in English) on ‘no pet’ covenants from my literature review 148 
Table 2 – My research participants and their companion animals ..................................................... 158 
Table 3 – Context of the interview and participant’s prior knowledge of my views .......................... 160 
Table 4 - The general format of my initial interviews ......................................................................... 162 





Table of Cases 
 
A.F.A.D.A about the chimpanzee ‘Cecilia’ – non-human individual. (2016) File No. P-
72.254/15, Mendoza, 3 November. Available at : 
https://www.nonhumanrights.org/content/uploads/Chimpanzee-Cecilia_translation-FINAL-
for-website-2.pdf  (Accessed: March 2017). 
Arrington v Arrington (1981) 613 S.W. 2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App). 
Association Union fédérale des consommateurs de l’Isère - Que Choisir v. Association 
Clévacances Isère - départementale des locations de vacances de l’Isère et autre. Arrêt 
n° 109 du 3 février 2011 (08-14.402) - Cour de cassation - Première chambre civile  
Bell London and Provincial Properties Ltd v Reuben [1947] 1 WLUK 3; [1947] KB 157 
BGH 20.3.2013 – VIII ZR 168/12, www.bundesgerichtshof.de  
City of London Corp v Prior (1996) (unreported)  
Civ. Liege 21 October 1986, J.L.M.B., 1987 
Corso v Crawford Dog and Cat Hospital (1979) 315 NYS 2d. 182 
Cossey v UK (1991) 13 EHRR 622 
Cresswell v Hodgson [1951] 1 All ER 710 
Cumming v Danson [1942] 2 All E.R. 653  
Expert Clothing Services & Sales Ltd v Hillgate House Ltd [1986] Ch. 340 
Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association [2001] 1 AC 27 
FJM v United Kingdom (2018), App.No 76202/16 
Gammans v Ekins [1950] 2 KB 328 
Ghaidan v Mendoza [2004] 3 All ER 411 
Gillow v UK (1989) 11 EHRR 335 
Goodwin v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 447 
Governors of Peabody Trust v Lawrence (2015) LAG 
Green v Sheffield City Council (1994) 26 HLR 349 
Hounslow London Borough Council v Powell [2011] 2 AC 186   
ix 
 
Houseman v Dare (2009) 966 A.2d 24, N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div 
Joseph v Nettleton Road Housing Co-operative Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 228 
Juelfs v Gough (2002) 41 P. 3d 593 
Manchester County Council v. Pinnock [2011] 2 AC 104 
Marckx v Belguim (1979) 2 EHRR 330 
McDonald v McDonald [2017] AC 273 
Moretti and Benedetti v Italy (2010) EHRR 16318/07 
Niemietz v Germany (1992) 16 EHRR 97  
Non-Human Rights Project, inc., on behalf of Tommy v Patrick C. Lavery et al [2015] 26 
NY3d 902 
P v Rochdale BC [2016] 7 WLUK 412 
Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy (2017) EHRR 25358/12 
Ploni v Plonit (2004) Ramat Gan Family Court. FC 32405/01 
Pretty v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 1 
Qazi v Harrow LBC [2001] EWCA Civ 1834 
R (Countryside Alliance) v A.G [2007] 3 WLR 922 
R v De Manneville (1804) 5 East 221 
Rees v UK (1987) 9 EHRR 56 
Sheffield City Council v Jepson (1993) 25 HLR 299  
Sheffield and Horsham v UK (1998) Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-V, 2021 
Shri Ajay Madhusudan Marathe v New Sarvodaya Co-operative Housing Society Ltd 
(No.160/2008, State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Mumbai) 
Smith and Grady v UK (2000) 29 EHRR 493 
Southend-on-Sea v Armour [2014] HLR 23 
Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35 




Victory Place Management Co Ltd v Kuehn [2018] EWHC 132 (Ch) 
Whitehouse v Lee (2009) EWCA Civ 375; [2010] H.L.R 11 
X v Iceland (1976) Application no.6825/74 
Table of Legislation  
Statutes 
An Act to Prevent the Cruel and Improper Treatment of Horses and Cattle 1822 
Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 
Animal Welfare Act 2006 
Article 10 of the Law of 9 July 1970 (France) 
Children and Families Act 2014 
Consumer Rights Act 2015 
Housing Act 1985 
Housing Act 1988 
Housing Act 1996 
Housing and Urban Development Department, 2000 (USA) 
Human Rights Act 1998 
Law of Property Act 1925 
Protection from Eviction Act 1977 
Rent Act 1977 
Residential Tenancies Act 2006 (Canada, Ontario) 
Tenant Fees Act 2019 
 
Treaties 
European Convention on Human Rights  
 
Bills 
Care Homes and Sheltered Accommodation (Domestic Pets) Bill 2009-10 
xi 
 
Care Homes (Domestic Pets) Bill 2008-2009 
Civil Partnership Act 2004 (Amendment) (Sibling Couples) Bill  
Dogs and Domestic Animals (Accommodation and Protection) Bill 2019-2020 
The Pets (Theft) Bill 2018 





Special thanks to Mr Bob Harvey and his dog, Darkie who were forced to leave their home of 
many years in order to live together. The adversity they endured was the inspiration for my 
research.  
 
I would like to express my thanks to my supervisors especially my principal supervisor, 
Professor Ray Arthur, who provided valuable support and encouragement over the years. 
 
Special thanks to my family, Chris, Ben and Stan (our greyhound adopted from the Retired 
Greyhound Trust) for their unwavering love and support. 
 








I declare that the work contained in this portfolio has not been submitted for any other award 
and that it is all my own work. I also confirm that this work fully acknowledges opinions, 
ideas and contributions from the work of others.  
 
Any ethical clearance for the research presented in this portfolio has been approved. 
Approval has been sought and granted by the University Ethics Committee on 17 January 
2017 with the amendment to my application approved on 9 November 2017.  
 
I declare that the Word Count of the Portfolio is 108,000 words (excluding copies of my 




Name: Deborah Jane Rook  
 
 
Signature:  D J Rook 
 
 
Date: 07 January 2021 
1 
 
1 CRITICAL COMMENTARY 
 
1.1 Setting the scene: identifying ‘no pet’ covenants in residential leases as a 
social and legal problem  
“Man prescribed emotional support dog faces eviction for having a pet”. 
(Brazell, E. (2019) The Metro, 29 November). 
 “Evicted family forced to live in a van after refusing to be parted from two dogs”.  
(Hind, S. (2019) Scottish Daily Record, 14 March). 
“Tenants ordered to give up their dogs or move out”. 
(Gedge, A. (2018) Cambrian News, 31 January). 
 
‘No pet’ covenants have received recent media coverage but are relatively unknown in 
academic legal research. By the end of 2017, when I started researching ‘no pet’ covenants, 
there were only three articles on the topic in peer reviewed academic law journals (Huss, 
2005; Campbell, 2009; Palluzi, 2013) all of which are specific to the federal and state laws of 
the United States of America (USA) or Canada. My research seeks to fill a significant gap in 
the law literature on ‘no pet’ covenants by providing the first in-depth analysis of the law in 
England relating to the use and enforcement of ‘no pet’ covenants. For my research project 
a ‘no pet’ covenant is defined as a leasehold covenant (or policy incorporated into the 
tenancy agreement) that prohibits or restricts the tenant from keeping companion animals in 
their rental housing accommodation. Some covenants exist as blanket bans and exclude all 
companion animals from the property, others exclude certain species commonly cats and 
dogs, and others are qualified covenants that permit pets only with the landlord’s prior 
consent. 
 
1.1.1 The scale of the use of ‘no pet’ covenants in England 
In England, the decision as to whether a tenant can keep a companion animal in a 
residential tenancy rests with the landowner and tenant; housing legislation is silent on the 
matter. Underpinning this approach are the legal principles of personal autonomy and 
freedom of contract; the personal autonomy of landowners to control the use of their land 
and the freedom of contract of the parties to negotiate a lease on terms acceptable to both.  
However, this laissez-faire approach needs to be set against the backdrop of a current 
housing shortage in the United Kingdom (UK) (Wilson and Barton, 2020) and the growth of 
the private rental sector which almost doubled in size between 2000 and 2012 (Beckett, 
2014). Britain’s post-homeownership society has seen the emergence of ‘generation rent’ 
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largely represented by young people excluded from owner-occupation (Ronald and Kadi, 
2018). The growth in the private rental sector has been accompanied by the growth of 
“small-time landlords” (middle-aged, relatively affluent people who own one or two properties 
to let), an increase of over one-million in the last decade (Ronald and Kadi, 2018 at p. 787). 
In consequence of this changing sector, the contractual freedom of tenants in the private 
rental housing market is illusory; the increased number of private tenants seeking scarce 
housing means tenants have no bargaining strength in negotiations with the landlord. As a 
result, the landlord is able to dictate the terms of the lease and can readily find another 
tenant if a prospective or current tenant is not happy with a ‘no pet’ covenant in the lease. A 
pet-owning tenant cannot simply move elsewhere when there is little or no choice in 
alternative pet-friendly housing in the desired location and price range (Smith, 2011), and 
therefore may feel there is no option but to accept the lease with its undesirable ‘no pet’ 
covenant.  
Companion animals are common across households in the UK (40% of households own 
pets the majority being dogs (25%) and cats (17%)) (PFMA, 2019). Many of these will live in 
owner-occupied homes but others live in rental housing and I refer to these as multi-species 
tenancies because the tenancy provides a living space for both humans and their companion 
animals. Despite the large percentage of pet-owning households, covenants that prohibit or 
restrict the keeping of companion animals in residential leases appear to be a common 
occurrence especially in the private rental sector. There are no official statistics on the 
number of rental properties with pets (whether public or private sector) so it is difficult to 
ascertain reliable data on the scale of the use of ‘no pet’ covenants. The National Landlords 
Association (NLA) have reported that 55% of private landlords exclude pets (NLA, 2017, p.3) 
and a recent online survey of 985 private landlords found that 58% exclude pets (Cats 
Protection, 2019) while research by Shelter Scotland suggests this figure is lower in 
Scotland at 48% (Shelter Scotland, 2018, p. 13). A recent government press release stated 
that  
“around 7% of landlords advertise homes as suitable for pets” (Ministry of Housing 
Communities and Local Government, MHCLG, 2020a). 
This figure seems inconsistent with the other sources because it only includes housing that 
is openly advertised as pet friendly. Of the 45% of private landlords that allow pets (NLA, 
2017) it appears that only 7% actually advertise as pet friendly. 
These figures suggest that over half of landlords in the private sector exclude pets but how 
many of these tenants are adversely affected by the inclusion of the ‘no pet’ covenant? 
Some tenants may want a ‘no pet’ covenant included in their lease giving reassurance that 
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animals have not previously lived in the property; others will be indifferent to the presence of 
the covenant. In a tenant survey conducted by the letting agent Homelet in which 20,388 
responses from tenants in the UK’s private sector were analysed, 44% of the tenants said 
that they did not have a pet in the property due to the terms of the tenancy, which prohibited 
it (Homelet, 2017). This compared to 33% of tenants who chose not to keep a pet by 
personal choice and 23% of tenants who lived with a pet. These statistics can be used to 
estimate the number of tenants adversely affected by ‘no pet’ covenants. In 2019 there were 
23.5 million dwellings in England of this 15 million were owner-occupied (64%) and 8.5 
million were rented housing (37%) (MHCLG, 2020b at p, 5). Within the rental sector, 4.6 
million dwellings are private rentals and 4 million are social rentals. If approximately half of 
private landlords in England exclude pets that affects 2.3 million households and if 
approximately 44% of those would like to own a pet (based on the findings of the Homelet 
survey) but are prevented from doing so by a ‘no pet’ covenant that affects over one million 
households. Taking into account the fact that many of these one million households include 
two or more persons and adding tenants in social housing into the equation, it is clear that 
‘no pet’ covenants are affecting millions of people in England every year and yet little is 
understood about the impact of these covenants on tenants, companion animals, landlords 
and wider society.   
Housing policy in the UK has traditionally promoted homeownership, positioning renting in 
the private sector as being short term and transitional, visualised as a ‘stepping stone’ to 
home ownership (Power, 2017). Government policy promotes homeownership by supporting 
first time buyers to get onto the property ladder, for example, the Help to Buy scheme 
launched in 2013 (HM Government, 2013). Owner occupation reached its peak in 2003 and 
has gradually declined since then to its current level of 64% (MHCLG, 2020). As home 
ownership declines, more and more people live in rented housing, so the scale of the 
problem caused by ‘no pet’ covenants is set to increase. Research in 2018 found that 40% 
of millennials in the UK – those born between 1980 and 1996 - rent privately at the age of 
thirty and up to 16% of them will rent for life never able to afford home ownership (Judge and 
Tomlinson, 2018). These people are denied the opportunity to live with a companion animal 
if the use of ‘no pet’ covenants continues to be unregulated.  
In the social housing sector landlords appear to be more tolerant of companion animals. A 
recent report by Cats Protection found that 82% of local authority and housing association 
landlords allow tenants to keep pets (Cats Protection, 2019, p. 14). This figure is significantly 
higher than in the private sector, but even within the social housing sector there are 
inconsistencies of approach. A report by Battersea Dogs Home on social housing in London 
found inconsistent policies on the keeping of dogs in flats: 64% of Housing Associations and 
4 
 
21% of Local Authorities in London banned dogs in flats with communal entrances and no 
private garden (Battersea, 2018, p. 6). 
1.1.2 Identifying ‘no pet’ covenants as a social problem 
In problematizing ‘no pet’ covenants my research seeks to demonstrate the harm that can be 
caused to tenants, animals and wider society. It is acknowledged, however, that the use of 
the covenants also provides benefits especially for landlords. Research by the National 
Landlords Association shows that the use of ‘no pet’ covenants by landlords and letting 
agents is driven by a desire to avoid harm in the form of damage to property or annoyance to 
neighbours (NLA, 2017). Harm is a dominant theme to emerge from my interviews with 
seven pet-owning and understanding the character and magnitude of this harm became a 
key focus of my research. My argument is that understanding the use of ‘no pet’ covenants 
and their enforcement at law through the lens of harm allows a revaluation of ‘no pet’ 
covenants and the adequacy of the law around them. Drawing, by analogy, on the work of 
Feinberg and his assessment of the legitimacy of state interference with individual liberty by 
reference to harm, I use the concept of harm to assess the appropriateness of legislation to 
regulate the use of ‘no pet’ covenants.  
The use of ‘no pet’ covenants flows from 
“rental policies and cultural norms that view pets as a property risk and that fail to 
recognise these significant others as key household members” (Power, 2017, p. 
356).  
Therefore, the cultural framing of pets through notions of risk specifically as a risk to property 
and investment (Carlisle-Frank, 2005) need to be revisited. Concentrating on the nature and 
significance of the human-companion animal relationship to tenants, animals and wider 
society shifts the focus of ‘no pet’ covenants away from the positively framed concept of a 
‘controller of risk’ to a more negatively framed notion of ‘contributor to harm’ highlighting the 
harmful effects of the covenant to people and animals. My purpose is to reveal the 
importance of the human-companion animal relationship to residential tenants, something 
which is at odds with the current legal status of domestic animals as property. Relegating a 
tenant’s forced separation from a companion animal to the realms of property loss 
understates the impact of the separation on the tenant’s life. Fox and Ray suggest that the 
forced separation of older people from their pets when they move into a care home is 
experienced as a “bereavement” akin to the loss of a family member (2019, p. 211). 
The legal status of pets as property promotes the idea of pets as disposable items permitting 
landlords to feel it is acceptable to request a tenant to surrender their companion animal in 
order to secure rental accommodation. Studies conducted in the UK, USA and Australia 
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investigating the reasons for relinquishing dogs to a shelter found that for owner-related 
reasons (as opposed to animal-related reasons such as behaviour) the most common 
reason given by owners was ‘moving home’ and the restrictions imposed by landlords were 
a key factor (Shore, Petersen and Douglas, 2003; Coe et al, 2014). The Dogs Trust reported 
that 848 dogs were surrendered to them for rehoming in 2018 due to the existence of a ‘no 
pet’ covenant in the dog owner’s lease which amounted to 8.7% of all dogs surrendered to 
them in that year (Dogs Trust Annual Review, 2018). Other research calculates the figure as 
10% of all dogs surrendered for rehoming (PFMA, 2017), which for Battersea equates to 200 
dogs a year (Battersea, 2018). Given the many animal rehoming centres across the country 
it is likely that the number of dogs needing to be rehomed due to ‘no pet’ covenants in leases 
runs into many thousands and this figure escalates substantially when cats are included. 
There is an economic cost to society when shelters and charities need to rehome companion 
animals so the fact that these animals already have families who want to keep them 
represents a waste of societal resources (Stavisky et al, 2012; Graham et al, 2018). At an 
individual level, the forced separation raises significant welfare concerns for the animals 
themselves who face the stress of being separated from their owners, living in kennels, 
adapting to a new home or, in some cases, euthanasia (Fox and Ray, 2019). This raises the 
question of the extent to which courts, policymakers and lawmakers in the housing arena 
take the welfare interests of companion animals into account. As property, their interests can 
be easily trumped by human interests however trivial (Francione, 1995; Wise, 2000) but 
categorising them as kin (Fox, 2004) opens the door to a different approach (Kymlicka, 
2017). Fox and Ray recognise this in the context of ‘no pet’ policies in residential homes for 
older people and identify the need 
 “to re-think the status of companion animals as property” (2019, p. 212). 
While statistics can demonstrate the scale of the problem of ‘no pet’ covenants, it is 
individual stories that demonstrate the depth of feeling it creates. One such example from 
2017 illustrates that vulnerable people are especially susceptible to be disadvantaged 
because of their lack of choice over where they live. The elderly, mentally ill and homeless 
are more likely than the average population to need to move into care or sheltered 
accommodation due to their health and care needs or their personal circumstances. If the 
accommodation prohibits pets, the vulnerable person is faced with the difficult choice of 
giving up their companion animal or giving up their housing place (Irvine, 2013a; Carr, 2016; 
Rook 2018). This was the dilemma faced by John Chadwick, a homeless man with mental 
health problems, who gave up his two small dogs and cat when the council found him 
accommodation that prohibited pets. If he refused the flat, he would make himself 
intentionally homeless and if he accepted it, he would have to give up his companion 
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animals for rehoming. Ten days after surrendering his companion animals, John committed 
suicide and at the subsequent inquest the coroner found that the loss of his companion 
animals was a ‘key factor’ in his death (Slater, 2017). John is not alone in developing close, 
socially supportive relationships with companion animals. A key focus for my research is 
understanding the nature of the human-companion animal relationship and its implications 
for housing law, policy and practice in the context of multi-species tenancies. Currently 
housing policy rarely considers companion animals as valued members of the household. 
Power recognises the need for policy to reflect the multi-species nature of households, 
“The enhanced spatial and emotional proximity of companion animals within 
contemporary households is typically ignored and sometimes directly challenged 
through tenancy policy that imagines household units as exclusively human” (2017, 
p. 342). 
My research adopts a function-based approach to theorising family drawing on Morgan 
(1996) to demonstrate how companion animals may constitute family in the everyday 
practices of the family home. Pets may also be defined as family through their provision of 
support and the quality of the relationship they share with their owners (Charles and Davies, 
2008; Charles, 2014). This raises the legal question of whether the human-companion 
animal relationship may come within ‘private life and family’ protected under Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as incorporated into domestic law under 
the Human Rights Act 1998 (Rook, 2018; Fox and Ray, 2019). Under the first paragraph of 
Article 8, 
“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence”.  
The second paragraph of Article 8 sets the boundaries for a legitimate interference with 
these rights by the state. This permits the interference with private life and family where it is 
in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society which includes the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. If the courts accept that the human-
companion animal relationship comes within Article 8, it will have implications for the use of 
‘no pet’ covenants under English law. 
1.1.3 Identifying ‘no pet’ covenants as a legal problem 
 
The use of ‘no pet’ covenants in residential leases raises a number of legal questions in 
English law (some of which will be affected by the decision on the relevancy of Art.8 ECHR 
to human-companion animal relationships): Firstly, does the inclusion of a ‘no pet’ covenant 
in a tenancy agreement constitute an unfair term under the Consumer Rights Act 2015?; 
Secondly, can a breach of a ‘no pet’ covenant be enforced in the courts?; Thirdly, is 
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legislation needed to regulate the use of ‘no pet’ covenants in residential leases in England? 
The idea of introducing legislation is not new and the incorporation of a review of ‘no pet’ 
covenants in Labour’s Animal Welfare Manifesto 2018 (Everall-Pettersen, 2018) may explain 
the recent increased research activity in this area by housing and animal welfare 
organisations (Shelter Scotland, 2018; Battersea, 2018; Cats Protection 2019; Simon 
Community Scotland, 2019). Labour’s Animal Welfare Manifesto 2018 stated its intention to 
consult with tenants and landlords, 
“so that tenants can keep pets as a default unless there is evidence that the animal is 
causing a nuisance, or its welfare is compromised” (2018, p. 5). 
In January 2020 the new Conservative Government announced its intention to overhaul the 
model tenancy agreement “to help end pet bans” by removing restrictions on keeping well-
behaved pets in the private sector (MHCLG, 2020a). This does not change the law and may 
have little practical impact on the content of tenancy agreements because private landlords 
are not required to use the model tenancy agreement. However, the proposed changes bring 
‘no pet’ covenants into the limelight and encourage public debate on their use. On 14 
October 2020 a Private Members’ Bill titled ‘Dogs and Domestic Animals (Accommodation 
and Protection) Bill 2019-21’ was introduced into Parliament by Andrew Rosindell MP to 
regulate the use of ‘no pet’ covenants in residential leases in England. He proposes 
prohibiting the use of ‘no pet’ covenants where tenants pass a test of responsible pet 
ownership, their animal is well-behaved, and the property is suitable for the pet. The Bill is 
still being prepared for publication and I have been asked to give feedback on the first draft. 
The Bill is listed for a second reading in Parliament on 26th February 2021.  
Labour’s Animal Welfare Manifesto 2018 proposed exploring ways in which the elderly, 
disabled and homeless can keep their pets with them when they move into care homes, 
hostels and sheltered accommodation. This has been the subject of a Private Members’ Bill 
in 2008-09 and again in 2010.  The Care Homes and Sheltered Accommodation (Domestic 
Pets) Bill 2009-10 received its second reading in the House of Commons in March 2010. 
This bill was preceded in 2009 by the Care Homes (Domestic Pets) Bill 2008-2009. Although 
both Bills enjoyed cross party support, and a consensus in the house, based on the 
acknowledged health benefits of pets for the elderly, especially as an antidote to loneliness, 
the progress of the 2010 Bill was halted in its tracks by a general election. The Bill sought to 
create a legal presumption that pets (of an authorised, non-dangerous, species) would be 
permitted in care homes and sheltered accommodation for the elderly and disabled unless 
their exclusion could be justified, for example, the safety of the other residents necessitated 
an exclusion or the welfare needs of the pet could not be met in the care home. The 
Secretary of State for Health stated that, 
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“The Government understand and very much share the sentiment behind the Bill, 
and are sympathetic to its aims… We do not want there to be any ban on pets in care 
homes or sheltered housing. However, … the parliamentary timetable will not allow 
the Bill to succeed” (Hansard, 5 March 2010). 
The tone of this statement suggests a sympathetic response to a call for legislation in 
England to regulate ‘no pet’ covenants but that may not now be the case. Recent events in 
Scotland demonstrate the difficulties in persuading Parliament to enact legislation. In 2018 
and 2019, the Scottish Parliament’s Public Petitions Committee considered public petition 
PE1706 to ‘Introduce a law to allow pets in rented and supported accommodation’. It 
subsequently closed the petition without further action on the basis that the Scottish 
Government and other stakeholders, including Shelter Scotland, felt that non-legislative 
measures were a more proportionate way to address the problem (Committee minutes, 21 
November 2019). The committee did however raise concerns about possible links between 
homelessness and pet ownership and a week later a report by the Simon Community 
Scotland (commissioned by the Scottish Government) confirmed these concerns. The report 
demonstrates the strength of the human-dog bond for homeless people and recommends 
practices and policies for ensuring more pet-friendly housing for the homeless (Simon 
Community, 2019). The problem of pets and homelessness received recent attention in 
England (May, 2019) due to a campaign, following the suicide of John Chadwick, which led 
to Maidstone Borough Council adopting a new policy on ‘Pets in Temporary Accommodation’ 
(Maidstone Borough Council housing policy, 2018). 
A number of countries have legislation regulating the use of ‘no pet’ covenants in residential 
leases, including, France, which passed legislation in the 1970s (Article 10 of the Law of 9 
July 1970), Canada (Ontario) under its Residential Tenancies Act 2006 (Rook, 2018) and 
recently, Australia (Victoria) amended its housing law which came into force in March 2020 
(Wahlquist, 2020). The fact that legislation already exists in European and Commonwealth 
countries is significant because it demonstrates how the problem of ‘no pet’ covenants can 
be addressed through legislative intervention. 
1.2 My theoretical assumptions as a social constructionist 
 
In recognising the importance of social theory for a qualitative researcher, I relate to 
O’Brien’s idea of the kaleidoscope.  
“We can see social theory as a sort of kaleidoscope – by shifting theoretical 
perspective the world under investigation also changes shape” (1993, p. 10, quoted 
in Mason, 2002).  
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I have a social constructionist worldview so the shape of the world I investigate will differ to 
that of a positivist. Social Construction falls within the broader category of Post Modernism – 
a theory that is critical of central modernist ideas of reason, objectivity, prediction and 
scientific truth. I reject a realist epistemology and do not believe that there is one objective 
truth out there for me, as a researcher, to find and investigate. Instead, I believe there are 
multiple realities that are relative, context dependent and socially constructed. These 
‘situational truths’ interest me as a researcher. Social Construction theory views reality as 
emerging from relationships. Things exist in the outside world, but their meanings are 
attributed by humans and constructed by language, which in itself is contextualised through 
a person’s culture and societal values (Gergen, 2015). A four-legged, furry creature with a 
tail exists and we can look at it and see it through our eyes and feel it with our sense of 
touch but what it ‘means’ i.e. the fact that it is called a dog and can live as a pet in our home, 
comes from our relationships with others. The dog becomes meaningful in our relationships; 
first, our relationships with other humans, where we learn what a dog is and second, through 
our relationship with the dog itself. We construct the dog’s meaning using traditions of 
construction, but these constructions can be many. What is a dog? For the owner it is one of 
the family; for the vet it is a source of income; for the scientist it is a subject for testing the 
effects of a new drug; for the blind person it is their eyes and for a deaf person it is their 
ears. No one reality is a true reflection of the world – there are multiple realities. A Social 
Construction approach is not just about studying subjective meanings but examines how 
people construct their behaviour in naturally occurring situations (Silverman, 2014). As such 
I seek to understand the interpretive process that happens when a person lives with a dog or 
cat in their home – how does the animal become a member of the family household? I am 
interested in the activities and everyday procedures that people use to make their 
experiences understandable.  
Language is central to the constructionist theory. Language is not a picture reflecting reality 
but rather a ‘game’ (Wittgenstein, 1978 cited in Gergen, 2015) in which understandings of 
the world are achieved through people negotiating and agreeing on fluid meanings. This is 
especially significant in my research because I use terminology, in particular the word 
‘family’ to make links between the human-companion animal relationship and housing law 
and policy. If pet-owning tenants use language based on the concept of family to try to 
explain their relationship with their dog or cat, does this have implications for housing law? If 
meanings of ‘family’ in everyday life are fluid and can change over time, does the law need 
to reflect this (bearing in mind that law is based on shared language and definitions)?  We 
define dogs using language (for example, my property, my companion, my child) and over 
time this can develop into tradition and culture so that social convention declares our 
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construction of the situation as more ‘true’ than any other construction. Therefore, words 
acquire a sense of being ‘true’ through continued use over a period of time within a 
community or group (Gergen, 2015). Garfinkel looked at the process of daily conversation as 
a means by which ‘reality making’ takes place (Garfinkel, 1967 cited in Gergen, 2015).  Daily 
conversation between people is reliant on ‘ethnomethods’ – practices of talking and acting – 
that are used to create a taken-for-granted order. Garfinkel claims that we ‘borrow’ words 
from other contexts and although the word does not relate exactly to how we picture it, we 
make do. If we consider the terminology that people use in relation to their pet dogs, it is 
common for people to call themselves ‘Mum’ and ‘Dad’ when talking to the pet. The dog may 
be thought of as ‘one of the family’, and words such as ‘my baby’ or ‘mummy’s boy’ are used 
to refer to the dog. These words are borrowed from the human family context. They do not fit 
perfectly because the dog is not a human child but nevertheless, we make do with the 
language we have. The choice of these words is significant to demonstrate a close bond 
between the human and the animal.  
Social Constructionism does not seek objective ‘truths’ because, 
“meanings are construed by human beings as they engage with the world they are 
interpreting” (Crotty, 1998, p. 43).  
A pet-owning tenant’s experience of ‘no pet’ covenants and the nature of the relationship 
with their pet are not ‘truths’ that exist out there waiting to be discovered. Instead, their 
experiences are dynamic and in recounting their stories to me, in a particular context and at 
a particular time, the reality of their experience is socially constructed. Thus, I believe that 
we cannot know the social world purely by measurement and quantification because 
meanings and understanding are dynamic and there are multiple interpretations of realities 
(Gergen, 2015). Figure 1 shows how my theoretical assumptions affect my research design 
and the methodology I use which is described in more detailed in Portfolio component 2 



















ONTOLOGY – what is the nature of reality? 
Multiple realities that are relative, context dependent and socially constructed 
 
EPISTEMOLOGY – how can I know the world? 
Knowledge is dynamic and is constructed through language                          
Meanings emerge from relationships 
People make sense of random experiences by imposing story structures 
 
 
RESEARCH METHOLOGY – qualitative research 
Seeks to generate ‘truth knowledge’ grounded in human experience by delving 
deep into the participants’ meaning of their experience. 
Semi-structured/ 
unstructured interviews 
that are flexible and 
sensitive to context and 
allow the participant 
freedom to tell their story 
in their own words 
 
Narrative analysis            
taking a holistic approach to 
the participant’s story to see 
the whole picture and explore 
underlying assumptions, 
thereby seeking to understand 
complexity, detail and context 
whilst being cognisant of the 
temporal notion of experience 
and the need for constant 
reinterpretation of 
experiences over time  
 
Reflexive             
recognising the role of the 
researcher (my values, 
assumptions and biases) in 
shaping the generation of 





1.3 My research aim, questions and methodology 
The overarching aim of my research is to fill a significant gap in the legal literature by  
• understanding the lived experience of ‘no pet’ covenants for pet-owning tenants in 
residential leases in the UK and  
• critically analyse the current law around ‘no pet’ covenants in England with a view to 
evaluating any need for changes in housing law, policy and practice. 
My preference is to use the term companion animal rather than pet as this better reflects the 
role of the animals in most people’s lives. I acknowledge that people keep animals for 
reasons other than companionship, for example, as a hobby. Bonas observes that 
“Companion animals are therefore seen as a sub-set of pets” (1998, p. 17). However, 
housing law and policy primarily uses the term ‘pet’ and in recognition of this I use the terms 
‘companion animal’ and ‘pet’ interchangeably throughout my research. I use the word 
‘owner’ rather than human ‘caretaker’ (Sanders, 2003; Fox and Ray, 2019) or ‘guardian’ 
(Favre, 2000) because this acknowledges the property status of pets in English law. People 
keep many different species as pets but in the UK the two most popular animals are dogs 
and cats (PFMA, 2019). In the context of ‘no pet’ covenants different issues may arise 
depending on whether a tenant is keeping a dog, a hamster, a snake or a goldfish so I have 
limited my research to the two most popular pet species, dogs and cats. These are also the 
species that are most likely to face opposition from landlords and neighbouring tenants due 
to the risk of property damage and/or nuisance (Battersea, 2018). My research is primarily 
focused on housing law in England, however, the social problem of ‘no pet’ covenants is not 
limited to England so it is helpful to make comparisons and analogies with Scotland as well 
as other countries (especially commonwealth countries). 
The research questions to achieve my aim are as follows: 
1. How do people in the UK construct companion animals as family members in 
everyday practices? 
2. What do the stories of pet-owning tenants in the UK reveal about their lived 
experience of ‘no pet’ covenants? 
3. How can the insights from these stories develop and enhance a deeper 
understanding of the harm ‘no pet’ covenants cause to tenants and companion 
animals? (Knowledge which can be used by those involved in residential lettings - 
landlords, letting agents, lawyers, courts). 
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4. If tenants perceive their cats and dogs as family members, can the human-
companion animal relationship come within ‘private life and family’ under Article 8, 
European Convention on Human Rights? 
5. In what ways, if any, does the existing law in England recognise and protect the 
human-companion animal relationship in the context of ‘no pet’ covenants in 
residential leases? 
6. Is there a need for change in housing law, policy and practice to regulate the use of 
‘no pet’ covenants in residential leases in England? 
My research questions are answered, in part, by reference to five portfolio components, 
which include my relevant publications. In research question 1, I use the word ‘family’ 
tentatively, aware of its limitations just as others have done in the context of research on 
lesbian, gay and bisexual relationships. The rise of the LGBT community led to new forms of 
relationships and the concept of ‘families we choose’ (Weston, 1991, cited in Westwood, 
2013). In her article ‘My Friends are my Family’, Westwood observes  
“We simply do not as yet have a vocabulary to describe these new relationship 
forms” (2013, p. 348)  
 
so she uses ‘friendship’ in her article whilst recognising its limitations. Similarly, with 
companion animals we can observe the strength of the relationship between an owner and 
their pet, one which many owners perceive as ‘family’ (Serpell, 1996; Franklin, 2006; Charles 
and Davies, 2008) for everyday living purposes, but acknowledge the limitations of labelling 
this relationship as family. This term is heavily laden with human associations and is not 
ideally suited for the unique relationship we share with companion animals but in the 
absence of alternative appropriate vocabulary, the terminology is borrowed. Westwood 
(2013) argues that for many people, particularly in later life, friendships can be the most 
significant relationships, more important than family relationships. Yet in key areas of law 
and social policy, such as welfare benefits and medical decision-making, friendship is not 
recognised by the law. She argues that the law needs to keep pace with changing 
relationship forms and considers how its failure to do so impacts on equality for older people. 
There are parallels here with the relationship people develop with their companion animal 
and the failure of the law to recognise this relationship in the key area of housing.  
 
1.3.1 The co(a)gency of multispecies tenancies 
 
The sociologist, Michael (2000) challenged some of the dichotomies through which we make 
sense of the world (such as human v non-human) and instead explored the complex process 
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of fabrication that occurs when new hybrid objects of study emerge out of relations between 
social, natural and technological actors. Michael suggests that 
“Instead of humans and non-humans we are beginning to think about flows, 
movements, arrangements, relations. It is through such dynamics that the human 
(and non-human) emerges” (2000, p. 1).  
I draw on Michael’s concept of the co(a)gent as a theoretical lens through which I can 
reimagine and define the parameters of my research subject. Michael seeks to show the 
connections between human, social, natural and technological actors. This heterogeneous 
ordering and disordering of the social world is a key feature of his concept of the co(a)gency. 
Michael explores how  
“specific technologies, bits of bodies, aspects of nature, parts of culture and traditions 
of discourse come together to produce a co(a)gent” (2000, p.118). 
In ‘Narrating co(a)gents: the case of the Hudogledog’, Michael considers a human walking 
their dog on a lead in a park. He argues that to understand the social and cultural 
interactions in the park, it is the hybrid (or co(a)gent) of the dog, the dog lead and the human 
that is relevant. He calls this hybrid the ‘Hudogledog’ to emphasise the distinctive nature of 
this entity as separate from its constituent parts and proposes that this hybrid should be 
studied, and not the objects acting separately. In focusing on the Hudogledog, Michael 
hopes to “step past” its component entities and the fundamental dichotomies we use to 
make sense of the social world – human/nonhuman, subject/object – and instead create a 
vocabulary that accommodates these divisions. He draws on Haraway’s feminist analysis of 
distributedness and heterogeneity. Heterogeneity is closely linked to the concept of 
‘Distributedness’, the idea that what an entity is depends on what and how distributed 
entities and relations have come together. Haraway defined humans as “cyborgs” (Haraway, 
1991) to illustrate how humans are caught in a network of natures and technologies that 
shape the co-construction of humans and animals. Michael uses the mundane technology of 
a dog-lead to question the dichotomies of human-nonhuman and subject-object in the 
human-dog dyad. Significantly, the dog-lead is a conduit of communication within the dyad 
that allows for the blurring of agency. Many people may see the dog-lead as a means for a 
dog owner to exercise agency and control the dog but the dog can also act as a social agent 
and use the lead to control the owner by pulling on the lead and taking the owner in another 
direction. In this way, the dog-lead serves as a channel of communication between the 
human and the dog that allows mutuality of action between them. Michael shows how 
treating co(a)gents seriously as objects of study can 




I draw on Michael’s concept of the co(a)gent to define the parameters of my research 
subject. If I consider my research participant, Julia, and her dog, Annie, they are living 
together in a flat that Julia leases from the local authority. As separate entities I have a 
human, an animal, a home and a lease but to understand the social problem of ‘no pet’ 
covenants in residential leases, it is the hybrid or co(a)gency of the 
human+animal+home+lease that is relevant – in a similar vein to Michael’s Hudogledog, 
using the constructed phrase ‘Huanihomse’ emphasizes the distinctiveness of the multi-
species tenancy as a separate entity. It is the liaison between these four entities that is 
relevant and not each entity on its own. Humans and animals and homes can all exist 
separately without any need to consider tenancies and leasehold covenants. A human can 
live in their own home with a companion animal without any concern for ‘no pet’ covenants. It 
is only where the four entities of human+animal+home+lease combine as a new hybrid, a 
Huanihomse, that ‘no pet’ covenants become relevant and problematic to pet owners. Using 
a hybrid as the research subject in this way aids thinking about how the entities come 
together and relate and their relative values. Michael shows how even such a trivial 
co(a)gent as the Hudogledog can have consequences and impact upon the actors. Michael 
uses the example of a scientist with a dog. We may have taken-for-granted assumptions 
about a scientist and perceive a scientist as an unproblematized unit of analysis but the 
Hudogledog shows complexity and illuminates otherwise hidden pathways. Similarly, we 
may have taken-for-granted assumptions about a good tenant which is seen as an 
unproblematized unit of analysis, for example, a good tenant is someone who does not 
deliberately breach a covenant in the lease, but through the Huanihomse the complexity of 
this taken-for-granted assumption emerges. My research participant, Kate, would consider 
herself a good tenant who always pays her rent on time and keeps the house in immaculate 
condition. To understand why she breached the ‘no pet’ covenant in the lease we need to 
consider the heterogeneous and distributed role of nature, culture and mundane 
techonologies in the ordering and disordering of her everyday life as a pet-owning tenant 
living in a tenancy subject to a ‘no pet’ covenant. It is the interweaving of the human 
(landlord and tenant), nature (the companion animal), technology (house; arguably a lease) 
and culture (a lease clearly falls within culture as do ‘no pet’ covenants; pets as family is a 
cultural concept as is the legal construct of pets as property) that is relevant.  
Therefore, the co(a)gent of a multi-species tenancy, a tenancy where humans and 
companion animals live in close spatial and emotional proximity, is the object of study in my 
research in understanding the effect of ‘no pet’ covenants on pet-owning tenants.  
Adopting Michael’s concept of the hybrid, Franklin argues that  
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“co(a)gency is operating in the constitution of contemporary homes, household and 
families” (2006, p. 147).  
Our homes are heterogenous assemblages of humans, companion animals, technology and 
laws. Franklin observes how modern homes are changing as they become multispecies 
households. This can affect housing choice, housing design, types of furnishings and the 
use of space in the home. For example, housing choices are influenced by the needs of a 
companion animal to have a garden or be near a park that is good for dog walks. He 
suggests that the sociology of the family and the sociology of housing both need “a new 
post-humanist makeover” as neither are exclusively human domains and each are co-
constructed by humans and companion animals (2006, p. 137). 
For both Michael and Haraway, culture and history are a part of the heterogeneity that 
constitutes the human-dog dyad. This is significant for my research because the human-
companion animal relationship entails a large body of historical, cultural and sociological 
literature which is relevant to understanding the hybrid of the multi-species tenancy, but to 
which I cannot hope to do justice. Michael says that in exploring the technologies of the dog-
lead, the car and the TV remote control, his review of the literature must sacrifice depth to 
breadth because of the large quantity of literature relating to each entity. However, he 
argues that the limitations of his literature review do not make his efforts futile because his 
purpose is to show the connectivity of the literatures to one another. In a similar way my 
literature review illustrates the interconnectedness of the divergent bodies of literature on 
human-companion animal relations, pets as family, ‘no pet’ covenants and the legal status of 
companion animals (as demonstrated in figure 2 – The interrelationship between the four 
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Michael considers how culture (such as the literature on animals as subjects and objects) 
and legislation (such as the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991) fashion the human-dog dyad by 
making the dog-lead a significant part of the dyad. He argues that in studying dog-leads, he 
is simultaneously exploring cultural representations of animals, the relationship between 
humans and dogs, the environment, local government and the body. Similarly, multi-species 
tenancies are fashioned by history, culture and legislation relating to human-companion 
animal relations, concepts of family, the idea of home and private life, housing legislation 
and power relations between landlord and tenants. Multi-species tenancies are the bearers 
of this rich heterogeneity and distributedness. For this reason, sections 1.5 – 1.9 of my 
commentary review the literature on the nature of the human-companion animal relationship 
(exploring the history of the relationship, motivations for keeping pets and the nature of the 
socially supportive relationship); also the small body of literature on pets as family members 
within the wider context of the sociology of family (including shared traits with the parent-
child relationship explored within the context of pet custody disputes); as well as provide a 
comprehensive review of the scant literature on ‘no pet’ covenants and give some 
consideration to the extensive literature on the legal status of companion animals. I may only 
review a fraction of the massive body of literature that surrounds the moral and legal status 
of companion animals but to exclude it altogether would be to lose sight of a key facet in the 
human-companion animal relationship. Just as Michael acknowledges the limitations of his 
diverse and expansive literature review and instead aims to show the connectivity of the 
literatures to each other, so too does my literature review emphasize the interrelationship of 
literatures. It is the entanglement of the diverse range of disciplines within multi-species 
tenancies that makes the flow and relations between them a key aspect of my research.  
1.4 My original contribution to the field 
My research goes further than the existing literature and my commentary and portfolio 
provide an original contribution to knowledge in the following ways: 
(i) When I commenced my research on ‘no pet’ covenants in 2017 there was no 
published research on ‘no pet’ covenants and the law in England. Since then 
there have been two articles (my article, Rook, 2018; Fox and Ray, 2019). Prior 
to 2018 the existing literature on ‘no pet’ covenants and the law were limited to 
the USA and Canada and their specific statutory provisions (Huss, 2005; 
Campbell, 2009; Palluzi, 2013). My research is the first study to critically analyse 
the law on the inclusion and enforcement of ‘no pet’ covenants in residential 
leases in England and to evaluate the need for new legislation. This constitutes 
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an original contribution to a neglected area of law that affects the lives of millions 
of tenants. 
(ii) There is very little existing academic literature on the effect of ‘no pet’ covenants 
on the lives of tenants in the UK. It is limited to my own article (Rook, 2018, 
Portfolio component 1, 2.1) and a recent publication by Fox and Ray, 2019. My 
DLaw research contributes the first empirical study of pet-owning tenants’ lived 
experience of ‘no pet’ covenants in the UK. The existing literature is based on 
empirical studies in Australia (Power, 2017), Canada (Graham et al, 2018) and 
the USA (Carlisle et al, 2005). Fox and Ray are currently undertaking an 
empirical study on ‘no pet’ covenants in the UK but their study relates specifically 
to housing for older persons (Fox and Ray, 2019) whereas my research relates to 
tenants of all ages. 
(iii) While existing literature links the human-companion animal relationship with Art.8 
ECHR (Fox and Westwood, 2017; Rook, 2018; Fox and Ray, 2019), one of my 
work’s original contributions is the depth with which this link is considered. By 
critically engaging with the sociology of family, and theorising on how to define 
family using a function-based approach, my research is better able to inform the 
application of the human-companion animal relationship to Art.8 ECHR. 
(iv) There is existing empirical research on ‘pets as family’ (Franklin, 2006; Power, 
2008; Charles and Davies, 2008) and there is existing empirical research on the 
effect of ‘no pet’ covenants (Power, 2017; Graham et al, 2018). My research is 
original because it combines these two related areas into one empirical study that 
questions the research participants on both the character of their relationship with 
their companion animals and their lived experience of ‘no pet’ covenants. 
Drawing on Michael’s (2000) concept of the co(agency), I study the hybrid or 
assemblage of human+animal+home+lease. This is an original aspect of my 
research and acknowledges that only by understanding the character of the 
human-companion animal relationship and the strength of the bond, can the full 
impact of ‘no pet’ covenants on tenants and companion animals be appreciated.  
(v) My research gives a voice to a group of people that the law has previously largely 
ignored: pet-owning tenants. This in itself is an original contribution to the field. 
(vi) Given the extensive use of stories in the law (clients telling lawyers their story 
and lawyers using stories to explain the events to the courts) it is surprising that 
narrative analysis has rarely been used in legal research in housing law. Stories 
are an extremely valuable resource for understanding meanings and 
relationships and I believe these are the relevant ontological properties of the 
social world for socio-legal research. That my research uses narrative analysis to 
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craft and analyse four narratives of pet-owning tenants in the UK provides a 
valuable contribution to legal research. 
Ultimately my research (both the critical commentary and the Portfolio components) provides 
a theoretical approach to critically analyse the use of ‘no pet’ covenants through the lens of 
harm. For landlords, letting agents and the courts my research offers a detailed 
understanding of the character and magnitude of harm caused to pet-owning tenants by ‘no 
pet’ covenants. For Parliament, my work offers a framework, based on a Harm Assessment 
(drawing on the work of Feinberg in criminal law and applied here by analogy), through 
which to balance the disparate rights of all those affected by ‘no pet’ covenants – landlords, 
tenants, companion animals and wider society – and thereby assess the need for new 
legislation.  
1.5 The nature of the human-companion animal relationship  
The subject of the human-animal relationship is essentially a painful one and  
“has been systemically evaded by our whole culture, because it makes fearful 
trouble” (Midgley, 1994, p. 190).  
Our relationship with animals is plagued by conflict, contradictions and anomalies. It is not 
surprising then that the scholarly discipline of human-animal studies (HAS), which studies 
the interactions and relationships between human and nonhuman animals, has only 
emerged in the last twenty years (DeMello, 2012). HAS seeks to understand how animals 
are socially constructed. Once an animal is incorporated into the human social world, it is 
assigned a category, usually based on how it is used by humans. This social category is 
more important than the biology of the animal in determining the status and treatment of the 
animal both morally and legally (Fox, 2004). For example, a rabbit’s biology classifies it as a 
member of the species Oryctalygus cuniculus, but the treatment of the rabbit under English 
Law depends upon its use: is it a pet rabbit? (protected by the Animal Welfare Act 2006 
(AWA 2006)); or a rabbit bred for meat? (in which case the Welfare of Farmed Animals 
(England) Regulations 2007 also apply); or is it a rabbit used in scientific procedures as an 
experimental test subject? (which would exclude the AWA 2006 and instead apply the 
Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986); or is it a wild rabbit? (which is deemed a pest and 
generally excluded from the protection of the law unless under the permanent or temporary 
control of a person). Consequently, it is the social category bestowed upon the rabbit that 
determines its treatment under the law.  As DeMello observes, 
“Animals’ physical identity is less important to their status and treatment than their 
symbolic identification and their social meaning” (2012, p. 10).  
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A dog can transition from a cherished companion and family member to a stray if an elderly 
owner is forced to relinquish their pet when moving into a residential home (Fox and Ray, 
2019) and in this act the dog loses the protection of s.9, AWA 2006 of having someone 
responsible for meeting his/her welfare needs.   
DeMello (2012) uses the spatial distribution of animals as a means of understanding how we 
incorporate animals into our society. In this way, pets are those animals that have been 
incorporated into the human domestic space, our homes. The link between homes and pets 
is vital, however, this may be too wide a definition as not all animals living in the domestic 
space may be seen as pets. Working dogs may spend time in the home but are mainly kept 
to work and contribute economically. According to Serpell and Paul, 
“The word pet is generally applied to animals that are kept primarily for social or 
emotional reasons rather than economic purposes” (1994, p. 129)  
and it is to these animals that my research relates. 
Two key themes arose in my literature review of the human-animal relationship - conflict and 
social construction. Firstly, the conflicts and contradictions that underpin the human 
relationship with animals, arising from our desire to use animals as utilitarian objects whilst 
simultaneously recognising them as sentient beings. I traced the history of this conflict and 
explored the defence mechanisms and coping strategies developed over time to defuse or 
hide the conflict and assuage any feelings of guilt or discomfort. This is important in 
understanding the origins of the current legal status of domestic animals as property 
(Francione, 1995) and the ambivalent attitude towards animals (Serpell, 1996; Irvine and 
Cilia, 2017). The second theme is the social construction of animals whereby the biology of 
the animal is less important than its allocated social category when assessing the human 
treatment of the animal and the legal protection it enjoys. This is especially evident with 
companion animals. 
1.5.1 The history of the human-pet relationship: defusing conflict 
The origin of the legal status of animals as property is thought to lie in the domestication of 
animals and the move from hunter-gatherers to pastoralists. The beginnings of livestock 
husbandry is dated approximately 9000 years ago starting with sheep and goats (Clutton-
Brock, 1994) but our relationship with dogs is much older.  The conventional view is that 
humans first domesticated their hunting partner, wild wolves, 10-20,000 years ago (Davis 
and Valla, 1978; Beck and Katcher, 1996), however some suggest that it was much earlier, 
approximately 100,000 years ago (Morell, 1997). Using selective breeding to encourage the 
characteristics we desired - playfulness, subservience, dependence – dogs are the creation 
of humans. Beck and Katcher suggest that, 
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“Our affection for dogs may simply be a way of expressing the love that a creator has 
for his or her creation” (1996, p. 171).  
They hypothesize that  
“the relationship between dogs and people is rooted in the evolution of both” (1996, 
p. 176).  
Given the long history we have with dogs it is not surprising that dogs are the most popular 
pet in the UK (PFMA, 2019). The first evidence that a dog may have been a pet was found in 
Israel in 1978. A grave contained two skeletons buried together 12,000 years ago: an elderly 
human and a 5-month old domestic dog. The person presiding over the burial had  
“carefully arranged the dead person’s left hand so that it rested, in a timeless and 
eloquent gesture of attachment, on the puppy’s shoulder” (Davis and Valla, 1978, p. 
609).  
Studies of pets in primitive societies hint at a significant paradigm shift as humans 
progressed from hunter-gatherers to agriculturists. Ingold (1994) adopted an ‘indigenous 
perspective’ to understand our domestication of wild animals. He sought to shed the 
dichotomies of ‘wild versus domestic’ and ‘nature versus humanity’ traditionally used in the 
West to tell the story of the history of our relationship with animals, and instead sought to 
understand the nature of the relationship between hunter-gatherers and animals from the 
perspective of the indigenous people themselves. From their perspective, the natural world 
is not separate from, and inferior to, the human world. It does not have to be conquered or 
controlled. Instead, animals are fellow inhabitants of the same world as humans. Serpell 
(2000) observes that there is much consistency in how hunter-gatherer societies view 
animals as rational, sentient and intelligent beings with spirits or souls that can survive the 
body after death. For example, the Cree Indians of Northern Canada believe that animals 
intentionally present themselves to the hunter to be killed and on death the soul of the 
animal is released to become flesh again (Ingold 1994; Tanner 1979 cited in Serpell, 1996). 
The hunter must be respectful and not wasteful, or the animal will remember the 
transgression and not present itself in the future. This means that the success of the hunter 
depends on establishing a continuing relationship with the animals. A relationship, Ingold 
advocates, based on trust. For him, 
“The essence of trust is a peculiar combination of autonomy and dependency” 
(1994, p. 13).  
The hunter is dependent on the animal and takes a risk that the animal, as an autonomous 
being, will act in the interests of the hunter and present itself to be killed. In return, the hunter 
is respectful of the animal. However, this egalitarian moral ideology was clearly incompatible 
with the shift to agriculture and the domestication of farm animals for meat. According to 
Ingold the relationship the pastoralist has with animals is based on domination not trust. The 
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animals are selectively bred to be dependent on humans and therefore are unable to 
exercise their own free will to present themselves to die. The animals have no control over 
their lives. This significant change created a moral dilemma for early farmers and Serpell 
suggests that coping strategies were developed,  
“but perhaps the most pervasive and durable was the idea that humans are both 
morally separate from and superior to all other animals” (2000, p. 116).  
Serpell agrees with Ingold (1994) that the  
“ideological difference between hunters and herdsmen primarily involves a shift from 
human-animals relations based on trust to those based on domination” (2000, p. 
116). 
This shift necessitated seeing animals as objects as opposed to subjects worthy of respect. 
Ingold argues that, 
“Domestication can be said to exist when living animals are integrated as objects into 
the socio-economic organisation of the human group” (1994, p. 6).  
Thus, the advent of domestication of animals was dependent not just on biology but also on 
culture. Biology enabled us to adopt artificial selective breeding techniques to modify 
animals into what we wanted, and culture enabled us to own the animals as property through 
the development of law and government.  
Arluke (1994) has explored the conflict in the treatment of animals in contemporary society – 
the fact that we shower our pets with love and treat them as one of the family but exploit and 
kill other domestic animals as utilitarian objects. He observes that,  
“As with any cultural contradiction, these attitudes are built into the normative order, 
itself perpetuated by institutions that provide ways out of contradictions by supplying 
myths to bridge them and techniques to assuage troubled feelings” (1994, p. 145).   
Thus, our legal institutions, that objectify domestic animals as property on a par with 
inanimate things, serve to justify our use of animals, especially the animals we eat, and 
relieve any associated guilt. Arluke used interviews with animal shelter workers to 
understand how they developed coping strategies to maintain an identity as an ‘animal 
person’ and ‘pet lover’ while simultaneously having to euthanize healthy but unwanted 
animals at the shelter often of the same species as their pet. In a similar way, but on a much 
larger scale, the legal status of animals as property may be seen as a societal coping 
strategy to defuse the conflict we feel in exploiting sentient beings especially farm animals. 
Erikson (2000) studied the social significance of pet-keeping among Amazonian Indians for 
whom the concept of reciprocity is vitally important. He argues that pet keeping is a strategy 
for coping with the imbalance in reciprocity caused by hunting. Unlike modern Western 
society, pets and hunted animals usually belong to the same species but most Amazonians 
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do not eat their pets. Caring for pets, especially the young of a killed prey, can be seen to 
cancel out the destructive effects of hunting. Rather than being seen as a first step towards 
domestication of animals for food, Erikson suggests that pet-keeping demonstrates a 
continued allegiance to hunting as a way of life. This is an interesting idea but only applies 
where a society holds the concept of reciprocity dear. This concept had little relevance in the 
highly stratified systems of Western Europe. Ancient Greek philosophy, and especially the 
work of Aristotle, was influential in emphasising the idea of animals as inferior to humans 
and existing to serve them. Aristotle was one of many views about our relationship with 
animals in the ancient world, for example, Pythagoreans were vegetarian believing that 
animals had souls (Kelch, 2012). However, early Christianity adopted Artistotle’s version of 
the debate and this view was transmitted through the writings of St. Augustine and became 
the accepted view in the West (Brooman and Legge, 1997). In Medieval times the church in 
Europe enjoyed a powerful position and it had an open aversion to pet-keeping (Thomas, 
1983). In fact, all monotheistic religions, not just Christianity, recognise humans as being 
superior to animals. Therefore, the move to domesticated farm animals and agriculture, 
together with Ancient Greek philosophy and major religious teachings all promoted the 
concept of the supremacy of humans over animals. From this background Menache asks,  
“When and how did Medieval people abandon their comfortable status of absolute 
ruler over nature – which was accorded to them by divine will – and, exercising their 
free choice and acting in open defiance of theological tenets, place themselves close 
to dogs, to the point that they turned canines into their ‘best friends’?” (2000, p. 45).  
Menache argues that hunting in the late Middle Ages was an important step in the evolution 
of keeping dogs as pets. She identifies the ‘ennoblement’ of hunting that differentiated the 
nobility from the lower classes, as a key influence. Laws were used to restrict hunting and 
the ownership of hunting dogs to the nobility, for example, in 1066 the Council at Winchester 
made it a crime for commoners to keep greyhounds. Hunting was linked to the noble virtues 
of courage and bravery. Menache suggests that,  
“This new social meaning created a solid basis for a fresh approach to dogs, 
especially hunting dogs, which were transformed into a symbol of the knightly class. 
When this transition was made, dogs began to be treated with tenderness, devotion, 
one may say even brotherhood” (2000, p. 52). 
However, the concept of pet keeping suffered a significant setback in England during the 
16th and 17th centuries when witchcraft hunts made keeping pets dangerous. Legislation was 
passed in England creating the crime of ‘necromancy’ and the concept of a witch’s familiar 
(in the form of animals, usually cats and dogs) was introduced (Hole, 1977 cited in Serpell 
and Paul, 1994). Serpell and Paul observe,  
 “it was claimed that people were debased or dehumanized by the act of co-habiting 
on such egalitarian and intimate terms with animals, especially since the animals in 
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such relationships often tended to be elevated to the status of persons” (1994, p. 
134).  
A relationship with domestic animals based on domination and superiority was acceptable, 
for example, working horses or pigs kept for meat, but a relationship with a domestic animal 
such as a cat based on trust and equality was perceived as dangerous and consequently 
demonised. 
Religious authorities discouraged people from keeping pets and up until the 18th century 
there were few pets except amongst the nobility (Serpell, 1996). However, England 
underwent a transformation of its human-animal relationship in the 19th century. It went from 
being a nation that normalised visible cruelty to animals in popular forms of mass 
entertainment like bull baiting, dog fighting and cock-fighting, to being a nation of animal 
lovers initiating the first major piece of animal welfare legislation in the world (An Act to 
Prevent the Cruel and Improper Treatment of Horses and Cattle 1822) and creating The 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (later to become the RSPCA due to Royal 
patronage) in 1824 to fund the enforcement of this new law. Ritvo’s (1994) analysis of 
attitudes to animals in 19th century England highlights the difficulty of seeking to understand 
human-animal relations using a single narrative. Even today, there is much complexity and 
diversity in our attitudes to animals including companion animals. Blouin’s (2013) typology of 
orientations towards pet dogs (humanistic, dominionistic and protectionistic) demonstrates 
the wide variations in people’s attitudes to dogs from the humanistic owner who treats their 
dog like a human, usually a child, to the dominionistic owner who adopts a hierarchical 
approach to their dog. Such differences are evident in contemporary England where some 
pet owners construct their dogs as “fur babies” fuelling the marketing of expensive life style 
accessories and dog care services (Fox, 2010, p. 42) while others inflict cruelty on their pets 
as evidenced by the RSPCA securing 1,341 convictions for cruelty under the Animal Welfare 
Act 2006 in 2019 (RSPCA Annual Report, 2019, p.30). 
1.5.2 Understanding the motivations for keeping pets 
There are many disadvantages of pet ownership including: the significant financial costs of 
food, veterinary care and insurance; time spent caring for the pet which can be significant for 
dogs who need to be walked at least twice a day; cleaning up after the pet; concern arising 
from the destructive or anti-social behaviour of pets; emotional distress when the pet is ill or 
dies; risks of bites, allergic reactions or other illnesses carried by the pet (Plaut, Zimmerman 
and Goldstein, 1996) meaning pets can be a source of stress (Connell et al, 2007). Pets 
usually provide no economic benefit, so given the significant disadvantages associated with 
pet-keeping, what motivates people to acquire a pet and what does this tell us about the 
nature of the human-companion animal relationship? 
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1.5.2.1 Developing social relationships 
There is support for the view that obtaining a pet provides an opportunity to form a new 
social relationship and is a means of extending a person’s network of relationships. Harker, 
Collis and McNicholas (2000) applied Weiss’ theory of relational provisions to understand 
motivations for acquiring a pet. Weiss (1974) identified six categories of relational provision 
that ensure a person has an adequate social life and sense of well-being: Attachment; Social 
integration; Opportunity for nurturance; Reassurance of worth; a sense of Reliable alliance 
and Obtaining of guidance. Weiss advocated that individuals need to maintain a number of 
different social relationships to ensure all the relational provisions are met. Harker, Collis and 
McNicholas (2000) used a pet ownership questionnaire to examine Network of Relationship 
Inventory ratings from two groups of adults: those who were seeking to obtain a pet and 
those who were not. The study found that participants seeking to acquire a pet had 
expectations of positive relationship-like provisions - such as companionship, friendship, 
affection – which they believed would result from keeping a companion animal. This 
suggests that people acquire a pet in order to extend their network of relationships. 
However, what is the motivation to extend the network? Could pets be compensating for 
inadequacies in human-human relationships? Bonas, McNicholas and Collis (2000) used a 
similar type of survey (based on the Network of Relationships Inventory and Weiss’ theory of 
relational provisions) and found no evidence to support the idea that pets are used to ‘plug 
the gap’ where social provisions are lacking in human-human relationships. Harker, Collis 
and McNicholas (2000) suggest that those who are socially isolated are more likely to own a 
pet but this does not appear to be supported by the reality of pet ownership as figures 
indicate there are higher frequencies of owning pets among couples and families with 
children, than single or elderly people (Serpell, 1996). This may be for practical reasons, for 
example, single people may have less money and smaller accommodation. There is 
considerable support for the view that pets do not just substitute human relationships but 
complement and augment them (Serpell, 1996; Beck and Katcher, 1996).  
Bonas, McNicholas and Collis’ (2000) study to investigate whether pet ownership can be 
usefully conceptualized as a social relationship gathered data on the participant’s 
relationship with their immediate human family as well as their relationship with their pets so 
that the data between the human-human relationship and human-companion animal 
relationship could be compared. They found striking similarities in the nature of the 
relationships which adds  
“empirical weight to the view that human-pet relationships are similar in nature to 
human-human relationships and, perhaps more specifically, that the supportive 
aspects of the two kinds of relationships are broadly similar” (2000, p. 219).  
27 
 
Although the general social supportive aspects are similar, the human-dog relationship gave 
higher scores for the attachment, nurturance and reliable alliance sub-scales of Weiss’ social 
support index than human-human relationships where the scores were higher for 
instrumental aid, affection and admiration indicating a subtle distinction in the needs met by 
companion dogs compared to those met by fellow humans. Weiss advocated that individuals 
need a range of different social relationships for their well-being and it appears that 
relationships with companion animals can play a valuable role in contributing to this variety. 
Other similar studies have focussed on specific population groups. For example, one study 
which examined the bond between the elderly and their pets identified the most important 
social provision derived from the relationship as ‘attachment, emotional closeness’, followed 
by the ‘opportunity for nurturance’ and ‘reassurance of worth’ (Enders-Slegers, 2000). 
Another study which examined the human-pet relationship amongst people living with HIV in 
Australia demonstrated that pets benefit the emotional, physical and social life of their HIV 
owner (Hutton, 2015). That pets fulfil one or more of Weiss’ six relational provisions for 
psychological well-being is especially important for vulnerable groups such as the elderly 
(Enders-Slegers, 2000; McNicholas and Murray, 2005), women suffering domestic abuse 
(Flynn, 2000; Fitzgerald, 2007) and homeless people (Irvine, 2013a; Carr 2016). Irvine’s 
study of homeless pet owners in the USA identified four dominant narrative themes: the 
companion animal as ‘friend and family’; ‘Pack of Two’ (in which the animal is described as 
meaning “everything”); animal as ‘Protector’ and finally animal as ‘Life Changer and Life 
Saver’ (2013a, p. 87). In these ways the animals are constructed as respected significant 
others who bestow a sense of self-worth, provide a buffer against isolation and in some 
instances become redemptive figures who keep their owners alive or turn their lives around 
(Irvine, 2013a).  
These studies suggest that it is the social relationship with the companion animal that 
motivates people to acquire a pet and in anticipation of enjoying positive relationship-like 
benefits, such as companionship, they tolerate the expense, time and inconveniences of 
living with a companion animal. 
1.5.2.2 The health benefits of the human-companion animal relationship  
Since Friedmann et al’s ground breaking research in 1980 that discovered that pet owners 
had better survival and recovery rates one year after discharge from a coronary unit than 
non-pet owners (Friedmann et al, 1980), there have been many studies attempting to 
measure the effects of pet ownership on health (Serpell, 1991; Anderson, Reid and 
Jennings, 1992; Friedmann, Thomas and Eddy, 2000; Allen, 2003; McNicholas et al, 2005; 
Wells, 2009; Freidmann et al, 2013). A recent example comes from a comprehensive study 
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in Sweden, involving 3.4 million people over a 12-year period, which found that owning a dog 
lowered the risk of dying from cardiovascular disease, especially for single people (Mubanga 
et al, 2017). The authors suggest that it is the relationship people have with their pets, and 
the social support that emanates from this close bond, that is significant to any physiological 
and psychological health benefits. This growing body of research is relevant to wider society 
and not just to the individuals affected. It is estimated that the health benefits of pet 
ownership in the UK may save the National Health Service up to £2.45 billion per year (Hall 
et al, 2017), for example, through reduced visits to the doctor (Siegel, 1990). 
In contrast to this body of research, Herzog observes that those studies in which pet owners 
have been found to be more likely to have specified health problems, have been little 
publicised thereby over-inflating the actual significance of what he calls “the pet effect” which 
is at best inconclusive (Herzog, 2011). However, if it is the relationship people have with 
their pet that is significant to any health benefits, mere pet ownership alone is not sufficient 
to test the validity of the claim that pets bring health benefits to their owners; the strength of 
the bond between the owner and the companion animal, as perceived by the owner, also 
needs to play into the equation. Hutton argues that it is the owner’s perception of support 
that matters, 
“a person’s belief in their animal’s supportive presence may be sufficient to “buffer” 
negative life challenges” (2015, p. 211). 
Someone who owns a pet but has a distant, functional relationship with the animal is unlikely 
to reap any health benefits that come from a close human-companion animal relationship. 
According to Beck and Katcher  
“It is possible that pet animals can protect our health and sustain our emotional 
balance because we treat them like people” (1996, p. 10).  
Siegel suggests that it would be more useful for researchers to focus on understanding the 
circumstances in which the human-pet relationship may facilitate health benefits rather than 
examining whether benefits exist per se (Siegel, 2011). Therefore, the evidence that the 
human-companion animal relationship provides physical, mental, emotional and social 
benefits to individuals is strong but even where the strength of the medical evidence is 
disputed (Herzog, 2011), the individual pet-owner’s perception of the benefits remains 
significant.  
The socially supportive nature of the human-companion animal relationship and the health 
benefits arising from this are significant contributory factors in advocating that the 




1.6 The sociology of family: pets as family members 
 
1.6.1 My theoretical assumptions on constructing ‘family’ 
 
Defining family membership is infused with complexity and controversary. There is a set of 
relationships based on blood ties, such as mother and child, and recognised legal ties, such 
as husband and wife, where there is consensus; but beyond these formal categories there is 
uncertainty. In recent decades there has been a move away from defining family as a 
heterosexual conjugal unit based on marriage and co-residence engaged in raising children 
(the traditional nuclear family) towards embracing the diversity of families, for example, 
single-parent families, homosexual families and families living across households. In some 
cases, familial relationships may be based on religious or moral ties. This diversity is not a 
decline or disintegration of family but simply a change to reflect evolving patterns in society 
such as shifting gender relations and sexual orientations (Silva and Smart, 1999). Silva and 
Smart observe, 
“the family is not expected to remain unchanged and unchanging. It is seen as 
transforming itself in relation to wider social trends and sometimes it is seen as a 
source of change itself which prompts changes to occur in public policy” (1999, p.1). 
This model of family advocates the need for fluidity and change in family arrangements to be 
taken seriously and supported by appropriate policy and law (Morgan, 1996; Silva and 
Smart, 1999). There is extensive research to show that many people consider their 
companion animals as family members (Cain, 1983; Fox, 2006; Franklin, 2006; Charles and 
Davies, 2008; Power, 2008; Shir-Vertesh, 2012; Irvine and Cilia, 2017) and my own findings 
from my interview data support this. If wider social trends show the diversity of family to have 
crossed the species boundary to incorporate companion animals, then what are the 
implications for the use of ‘no pet’ covenants in multi-species tenancies? If pet-owning 
tenants are increasingly treating their companion animals as family members could this be 
the “source of change” Silva and Smart refer to that prompts changes in housing policy, 
practice and law?  
Research carried out in Wales at the start of the twenty-first century on family formation and 
kinship networks demonstrates this complexity in defining family. Some of the research 
participants continued to define family using traditional categories of blood relations, 
marriage or adoption, while others took an alternative approach basing it on the quality of the 
relationship and support offered and received by others (Charles and Davies, 2008). This 
shift from blood and marriage ties to a focus on the “subjective meaning of intimate 
connections” is a “major change” in the concept of family (Silva and Smart, 1999, p.7). 
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Research on step-kin demonstrates the way in which feelings and emotions towards 
individuals can be more significant in defining who is a family member than blood or legal 
links (Bornat et al, 1999). The “Cultural Construction of Kinship” emerged as a key theme 
from the Welsh research data (Charles and Davies, 2008, p. 9.1). However, within the 
context of the changing definition of family, the core functions of caring, loving and 
responsibility remain constant. In this way the functions of a family (what it does in practice) 
is intrinsically linked to what a family is. For some scholars the central function of a family is 
caring,  
“’For me, ‘family’ is one way to describe forms or expressions of intimate or private 
living based upon care and interdependence” (Diduck, 2011, p. 289). 
This cultural construction of kinship through caring practices is significant to the idea of pets 
as family; if family is socially constructed, and is defined by its functions, the species barrier 
may be crossed because caring is a function that can readily be applied to pets as both 
care-receivers and care-givers (Irvine, 2013a; 2013b).  
The literature provides a wealth of examples, across countries, of pets being constructed as 
family members. For example, a nation-wide survey in Australia that specifically focused on 
the human-animal relationship found that 88% of pet owners think of their companion 
animals as members of their family (Franklin, 2006) and similar findings exist in the USA 
(Cain, 1985; Carlisle-Frank, 2005). The study on families and kinship networks in Wales 
found that many interviewees spontaneously included their pets as part of their kinship 
networks (Charles and Davies, 2008). Since these interviews were not designed to ask 
about pets, the authors felt confident that the findings were robust and unaffected by any 
preconceptions of family membership on the part of the interviewers. A qualitative study in 
Australia involving twenty-two new dog owners found that all but one described their dogs as 
family members (Power, 2008, p. 539) and a study on pet-ownership in Britain found that 
many of the participants viewed their pets as immediate family (Fox, 2006, p. 532).  
While there is evidence that people perceive their pets as family members, it is less certain 
what ‘being family’ means in this context and whether there is a straightforward equivalence 
to human family (Charles, 2014). Bonas, McNicholas and Collis suggest that we borrow 
terminology from human-human relationships because we lack specific terminology to 
categorise the relationship, 
“if we had evolved new processes to deal with human-pet relationships, it would be 
likely that we would have also developed a different vocabulary to distinguish them” 
(2000, p. 211).  
This may be true, but the word ‘family’ is infused with cultural and symbolic meaning that 
makes it difficult to ignore. Although marginalised groups such as same-sex couples were 
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initially denied official recognition as family, they nevertheless deployed the language of 
family within the LGBT community and created ‘families of choice’ (Weston, 1991; Weeks, 
Donovan and Heaphy, 1999). That the concept of family was stretched to include 
arrangements such as step-children, sperm donors and homosexual partners rather than 
creating a new vocabulary for these relationships (Silva and Smart, 1999), demonstrates the 
elasticity of the concept to reflect changes in societal attitudes to new relationships. People 
anthropomorphise companion animals by endowing them with human qualities (Fox, 2006) 
and use vocabulary from human-human social relationships such as ‘family member’ (Voith, 
1985) and ‘surrogate child’ (Sanders, 1990). The majority of participants in Power’s study of 
new dog owners described their dogs as ‘children’ but Power argues this is not “naive 
anthropomorphism” but functioned to  
“emphasise the intensive nature of the relationship” (2008, p. 541).  
That owners self-identify their pets as family members demonstrates their perception of the 
character and significance of the human-companion animal relationship. In recognising this 
“hybridization of the family”, Franklin observes that this is “not a one-way human-
orchestrated attribution” but rather a two-way process with the animals themselves 
contributing to the construction (2006, p. 142). In thinking about people and their dogs, 
Haraway (2003) prefers the word ‘relatings’ which recognises the fluid character of the 
human-companion animal relationship. Significantly, ‘relatings’ acknowledges a more 
symmetrical pattern of agency between humans and companion animals in which animals 
play an active part. Haraway states  
“Dogs are about the inescapable, contradictory story of relationships – co-constitutive 
relationships in which none of the partners pre-exist the relating, and the relating is 
never done once and for all” (2003, p. 12).  
My research participant, Julia, lived with her dog Annie for over 11 years. The relating that 
existed between them developed over that 11-year period, it was not static and fixed, nor did 
it exist before Julia took Annie into her life. Both were altered by the experience of their co-
habitation. Franklin expresses these relatings with companion animals as having  
“an open-ended experimental becoming rather than a fixed, behaviourally given and 
limited nature” (2006, p. 145).  
The literature identifies a number of contrasting and overlapping models for understanding 
how pets come to be recognised as family members (Fox, 2006; Power, 2008; Shir-Vertesh, 
2012). Fox (2006) looks more generally at the ways that pet owners come to understand 
their pets in everyday life and does not specifically focus on pets as family members, 
nevertheless her findings of two contradictory models existing side by side with pets seen as 
both ‘human’ (the anthropomorphic model) and ‘animal’ (the animal instinct model) provide 
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valuable insights. Under the ‘animal instinct’ model people try to understand their pets 
through popular animal psychology, based on studies of ‘natural’ animal behaviours in their 
ancestors in the wild. In this way pet owners see, and react to, their animals as animals 
rather than as little humans, but sometimes this approach can underplay the agency and 
autonomy of the individual animal by essentializing behaviour as pure instinct. At other 
times, the pet owners recognise the individual personality of the animal as a subjective being 
and attribute human-like intentions and emotions to them such as disappointment or 
jealousy. This use of anthropomorphism gives the animals a more active role in the human-
companion animal relationship. Fox found that pet owners can switch between the animal 
instinct model and anthropomorphic model in their relations with their pets. 
Anthropomorphism is often criticised in the literature on animals as it is seen as unscientific 
to give animals human-like characteristics (Serpell, 1996). However, Fox challenges this 
view in a post-humanist world,   
“If the aim of post-humanism is to destabilize the categories of ‘human’ and ‘animal’ 
themselves, seeing these as interconnected and made up of a complex network of 
associations, then the problematic nature of ‘anthropomorphic’ interpretations is also 
questioned, because particular qualities can no longer be seen as distinctly human” 
(2006, p. 532).  
In a post-humanist world jealously is not specifically a human trait. 
Power’s (2008) research was specifically about pets as family and focused on the way in 
which ‘more-than-human’ families are co-constituted through everyday practices in the 
home. From her interviews with people who had recently acquired a dog, she identifies three 
themes: Caring; Rules and Behaviours; Dog Agency and from these themes she deduces 
three models of human-companion dog relationship: Parent-Child, Pack and the ‘Agency of 
Animal’ model. In the Parent-Child model participants responded to the care needs of their 
dogs and perceived them as child-like. In the Pack model participants emphasized the 
importance of creating and maintaining behavioural rules, such as restricted access to parts 
of the house or furniture, to establish dominance, set boundaries and help dogs understand 
their role in the pack. In some respects, this is similar to boundary setting rules parents 
establish for their children so overlaps with the parent-child model but is distinct as the 
parent-child model is based on human-provided care relations. Pack relations exist as an 
interaction between humans and dogs-as-a-species, however, the Agency of the Animal 
model, developed from the ‘dog agency’ theme, involves a more individual engagement with 
a specific dog. In this model, the human and dog are both active partners in shaping family 
and everyday routines. 
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Power’s “Pack” model is a reconceptualization of the family as a pack similar to a pack of 
wolves. This model emphasises a dominance/submission hierarchical relationship with the 
human adopting the role of the leader of the pack (something that Fox also witnessed in her 
research of British pet owners and was acknowledged in her “animal instinct model”, 2006, 
p. 530). This pack relation is performed in everyday life through the owner’s hierarchical 
coding of the home spaces and furnishings, for example, restricting the dog’s access to 
certain rooms or items of furniture such as the sofa. Under this model owners assert the 
importance of treating the dogs as dogs and trying to view family relations as they think a 
dog would. This model was prevalent in Power’s data which was not surprising given that 
many of the research participants were new dog owners and were recruited from a dog 
training class which taught ‘pack’ dominance techniques for training the dogs but proved to 
have little relevance to my participants (see Portfolio component, 2, 3.5). 
Power’s “Agency of animal” model proved most relevant to my research participants. This 
model recognises how the family is shaped by the agency and activity of the dog. Charles 
and Davies (2008) also found evidence of animal agency in social relationships between 
owners and their pets and identified this as a key theme in their research. In both their 
research and Power’s, the perceived needs and preferences of the dogs were incorporated 
into the family routines by the owners. At other times the dogs themselves asserted their 
own activities, for example, instigating games that took their owners out of their own 
activities forcing them to engage in an activity they did not initiate nor control. Recognising 
the dogs as social agents, Power observes, 
“Here dogs were not just ‘little hairy people’ that needed to fit within existing routines, 
but instead participants’ plans and activities were altered and extended to incorporate 
the needs, preferences and pleasures of dogs. In these ways dogs began defining 
their own role within the family and shaped the rules and practices of family living” 
(2008, p. 549).  
Power notes how in practice her three models of understanding relationships with 
companion animals as family are complex and entangled. Taken together the models 
indicate two approaches to multi-species families that are simultaneous and conflicting. 
Firstly, a humanist approach of shaping and moulding the dog to fit within the pre-existing 
human family and owner expectations of how the dog should behave in the home. Secondly, 
a post-humanist approach of extending family belonging to include dogs-as-dogs and 
allowing dogs as social agents to shape the everyday routines of ‘doing family’.  
Some scholars are sceptical of the idea of a post-human family model.  Post-humanism 
challenges notions of human superiority and disrupts human-animal binary but Irvine and 
Cilia (2017) note our cultural ambivalence to animals and the fact that humans control and 
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dominate relations with their pets and can choose to surrender them to a shelter for 
rehoming. On this basis, they suggest that  
“the emergence of a truly post-human family remains doubtful” (2017, p. 8).  
Instead they favour the ‘more-than-human’ approach for understanding family which 
encapsulates the more contemporary ideas of family as an active process and rejects the 
concept of family as a pre-constituted entity. A ‘more-than-human’ family embraces the 
notion of ‘becoming with’ (2017, p. 8). Becoming family is contingent on a cast of nonhuman 
characters including companion animals (Haraway, 2003). Significantly, their concept of a 
‘more-than-human’ family acknowledges the way in which companion animals are actively 
“doing” family as animals and not pretend humans,  
“Pets can actively constitute family as animals, not as surrogate children or furry 
human beings. Considering families as more-than-human reveals the intertwining of 
humans and animals without decentering humans, who maintain responsibilities, 
establish rules, and provide care for other beings” (Irvine and Cilia, 2017, p. 8). 
Therefore, existing literature demonstrates that companion animals are regularly categorised 
as family members by owners who adopt the language of family, not merely from an 
absence of alternative vocabulary, but intentionally and symbolically to show the importance 
of the relationship. I sought to engage with a model of family that embraces fluidity and 
change to explore how people construct their companion animals as family members. I 
believe that a function-based approach to family is especially useful for theorising pets as 
family. This approach focuses on the way a relationship functions rather than on its form. In 
this way, family is a verb, an active process, something that members do. To better 
understand how residential tenants and their companion animals ‘do’ family through 
everyday practices in the home, I draw on Morgan’s theory of ‘family practices’. 
1.6.2 Morgan’s theory of family practices 
 
Morgan draws upon feminist and postmodernist approaches in developing the concept of 
‘family practices’ as a way to express the de-institutionalisation of the family and the mutual 
interconnectedness of family with other social institutions such as work and employment, 
gender, home, body, care, food (Morgan, 1996, 1999, 2011). In response to the dangers of 
the reification of ‘the family’, and in recognition of the complex realities of family living, his 
notion of family practices sees family as a verb rather than a noun. ‘Family’ is not a reified 
collectivity but a looser, fluid concept. Family is therefore a quality and not a thing, it is  
“a constructed quality of human interaction or an active process” (1999, p. 16).   
This means that it is possible to see a family dimension in most areas of social inquiry and 
not just in family studies, for example, in work and employment. He chooses to retain the 
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vocabulary of ‘family’, which has been criticised for reproducing heteronormative models of 
human relationships and thereby limiting diversity (Roseneil, 2005), in recognition of the 
importance with which social actors assign the language of family in everyday life.  
A significant feature of Morgan’s work is his rewriting of ‘the family’ to be fluid and flexible. 
Fluidity expresses the way in which sets of practices can be viewed through different lenses. 
For example, if we consider a mother feeding a toddler cereal for breakfast. This regular and 
repeated practice may be viewed as ‘feeding children’ or as a ‘gendered practice’ (as it is the 
mother rather than the father doing the feeding) or as a ‘consumptive practice’ or as a 
‘consumer practice’ (as the toddler or mother chose a particular brand of cereal). One social 
actor may view the situation differently to another and describing it in one way does not 
invalidate the other descriptions. Similarly, my research participant Josh feeds his cat, 
Simba, breakfast each morning and this practice can be described in a number of ways: as 
‘feeding the cat’ or as a ‘hierarchical expression of dominance’ (as the human has control of 
the food and decides when the cat will be fed) or as a ‘caring practice’ (meeting the cat’s 
welfare needs as a dependent) or as a ‘consumer practice’ (Josh said Simba liked a 
particular brand of cat treats called ‘Dreamies’). In this way, family denotes a 
“particular way of viewing sets of practices which could be described in other ways” 
(Morgan, 1996, p. 191). 
Therefore, food and feeding are not simply things family do, but the act of doing them 
constitutes family. Many families share Sunday lunch together as part of a weekend routine 
which will include ‘family talk’ (Cheal, 2002 cited in Morgan, 2011 at p. 3.4) based on shared 
past experiences and implied assumptions. This weekly, routine activity is likely to be seen 
by the social actors as a family practice distinguishable from the act of eating lunch alone at 
work. In both instances lunch is being eaten but one is a family practice and the other is not. 
A key feature of family practices, evident from this example, is that the everyday actions in 
which people are ‘doing’ family have some effect on another family member. Thus, in 
sharing Sunday lunch together, family connections are reaffirmed and given significance. 
This is significant for my research because Morgan shows how someone becomes a family 
member through everyday practices,  
“these practices are orientated to another family member. More than this, in enacting 
these practices, the other is defined as a family member” (2011, p. 3.4).  
This illustrates “the circularity between practices and membership” and illuminates a way in 
which companion animals can become family through the “complex, improvised dance” in 
which practice and family relationships are engaged (Morgan, 2011, p. 3.4). In carrying out 
the everyday practicalities of family life, for example, the bedtime routines and sleeping 
arrangements that include companion animals as described by my research participants 
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(see Portfolio component 4 “Analysis of Interviews” 5.2.2 Agency: Everyday Practices), the 
social actors (human and animal alike) are reproducing the relationship within which this 
activity is carried out and from which it derives its meaning. The French bulldog, Anton, 
sleeps on my research participant, Emma’s, bed at night and in the daily routine of this 
sleeping practice of sharing a bed, a practice that is orientated to other family members, 
Anton’s family membership is endorsed. This ordinary, everyday action of sharing a bed is 
an intimate activity infused with symbolic meaning that is orientated to family members and 
in its act reproduces the familial relationship. My research participants did not share their 
bed with their companion animal because there was nowhere else for the dog/cat to sleep 
but because allowing the animal to sleep on the bed signifies a close, intimate relationship of 
mutual-interdependence and thereby defines the animal as a family member and reproduces 
that familial relationship in everyday life. This demonstrates the circularity Morgan (1996) 
identifies between family practices and family membership. 
Morgan uses the term ‘practices’ to convey a sense of flow, fluidity, regularity, the active and 
the everyday. Fluidity shows the open-ended character of practices; the way they can be 
described in two or more ways as illustrated with Josh feeding Dreamies to Simba. Morgan 
sees this fluidity as a core strength of the practices approach. One consequence being that, 
“We do not need to start with ‘family’ in order to consider these practices and 
relationships. We may begin, say, with food, leisure or transport systems and find 
ourselves considering family relationships” (Morgan, 2011, p.3.17). 
In this way, we may begin with housing and the use of ‘no pet’ covenants in residential 
leases and find ourselves considering family relationships that exist in the human-companion 
animal bond. Flow relates to the varying perspectives of observer and observed; Josh may 
see feeding Simba as a caring practice whereby he meets the welfare needs of his cat while 
an observer, such as Tuan (2004), may see it as an act of human dominance over an 
animal. The term ‘practices’ conveys the sense of activity; a parent-child relationship is not 
static and thing-like, nor is a human-companion animal relationship. These relationships are 
dynamic and active, each party influencing the behaviour of the other. Practices are regular 
and repeated activities, not one-off events and they convey the sense of everyday, being 
fragments of taken-for-granted daily existence, for example, eating breakfast each morning. 
Everyday life is a key concept for Morgan’s family practices because what matters in 
understanding social life are the day to day practices of “real people in real situations” 
(Morgan, 2011 at p. 2.2) rather than formal prescriptions of family. Everyday life is also 
relevant to Michael’s concept of co(a)gency. Michael observed, 
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“Everyday life is never purely social, it is always heterogeneously made up of 
technology, humans and nature” (Michael, 2000, p. 124).  
Everyday life is a conceptually complex realm embracing fluctuating relations between 
humans (pet owners, other members of the family), nature (companion animals) and 
technology (home, furniture, dog-lead). It is within this heterogenous domain that companion 
animals are constructed as family members. My research shows how my research 
participants constructed their companion animals as family members through the agency of 
the animals in everyday practices in their homes (see Portfolio component 4, “Analysis of 
Interviews” 5.2.2 Agency: Everyday Practices). 
Just as Michael emphasised the importance of culture and history in contributing to the 
heterogeneity and distributedness of co(a)gents, Morgan also highlights how family practices 
are historically and culturally shaped. The nature of the human-companion animal 
relationship is situated knowledge, peculiar to a particular time and place, that can only be 
understood within its cultural context and with reference to the historical background of pet 
keeping hence my consideration of key aspects of the history of the human-pet relationship 
in section 1.5.1 of the commentary. The current approach of seeing cats and dogs as family 
members is very recent in the long history of the human relationship with these animals 
spanning thousands of years. For most of this time, cats and dogs lived outside and earned 
their keep by doing work such as hunting, guarding or rat catching (Menache, 2000). It is 
relatively recent that they have moved into our homes and became valued family members 
(Franklin, 2006; Fox, 2010). Recent years have seen the growth of pet services such as pet-
sitting and walking, grooming and even dog parties (Duke, 2018; Huss, 2003) and Mother’s 
Day cards from the pet dog/cat are common in high street card shops (see Appendix 2 for an 
example of a Mother’s Day card from the pet dog which categorises the human-dog 
relationship in terms of mother-child). Business is recognising this shift with some companies 
now offering pet related benefits such as “paw-ternity leave” for when an employee brings a 
new dog into their home (Dodgson, 2019). These changes in societal attitudes both 
contribute to, and reflect, pet owners’ perceptions of their pets as family. 
Morgan recognises that whilst family practices are private portraits of everyday domestic life, 
they also describe wider society, 
“The Janus-faced character of everyday life – looking to both self and society at the 
same time – is seen or constructed in its clearest form in the case of family practices” 
(1996, p. 193).  
The autobiographical accounts of my research participants describing their everyday 
practices that are shaped by the agency of their companion animals are clearly personal 
narratives. However, they also describe the values of the wider society within which these 
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everyday practices took place; a society that both permits and encourages the construction 
of companion cats and dogs as family members.  
Morgan (1999) states that social and cultural institutions are active agents in constructing 
family practices. Drawing on historical, moral and political accounts, abstract agencies such 
as professionals, religious leaders, legislators and journalists make representations about 
what constitutes family and set standards of normality against which people monitor their 
own practices. Therefore, on the one hand cultural influences normalise the concept of pets 
as family, such as the Mother’s Day card from the pet dog, but on the other hand encourage 
the ambivalence of animals in society (Arluke and Sanders, 1996; Serpell, 1996). Some 
scholars believe that this ambivalence towards animals in general can affect the human-
companion animal relationship in the home (Charles and Davies, 2008; Power, 2008; Irvine 
and Cilia, 2017) and this is discussed further in section 1.7. This ambivalence can manifest 
itself where an owner relinquishes a pet, formerly seen as a family member, because 
circumstances change and the animal no longer fits with the new situation for example, a 
young couple have their first baby (Power, 2008; Shir-Vertesh, 2012). The legal status of 
domestic animals as property reflects this ambivalence and encourages the idea of pets as 
disposable items of property (Fox, 2004; Francione,1995). The unregulated use of ‘no pet’ 
covenants reflects wider society’s contradictory values towards companion animals whom 
exist on the boundaries of the human/non-human and legal person/property dichotomies 
simultaneously existing as both family member and personal property. While Morgan’s 
theory of ‘family practices’ helps show how companion animals become family members, 
other theoretical tools can be adopted to analyse the type of familial relationship that exists 
within the human-companion animal relationship. Franklin observes that pets are not just a 
family member “but a very close intimate member” (2006, p. 145). 
1.6.3 Pets as family: adapting theoretical tools from Child law 
A number of studies have found similarities between people’s relationship with pets and with 
children (Beck and Katcher, 1996; Serpell, 1996; Paul 2000). Over the years, dogs have 
been selectively bred to show an increasingly neotenous appearance, thereby sharing some 
of the ‘cute’ features of human babies that elicit feelings of nurturance and protection 
(Serpell, 1996). Research shows a similarity between the way mothers talk to their infants 
(known as ‘Motherese’) and the way pet owners talk to their pets (Hirsh-Pasek and 
Treimann, 1982 cited in Serpell, 1996). Beck and Katcher observe that, 
“Pets are usually not just any member of the family, however. They are children, a 
designation partly reflecting the realities of our treatment of pets” (1996, p. 41).  
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Like children, pets can be touched and stroked at will, require their basic needs of food and 
water to be met, have their freedom of movement restricted for their own protection and 
have their sexual expression controlled. 
Power identified the “Parent-Child” model as one of her three models of the human-
companion dog relationship (2008, p.541). Her Parent-Child model sees dogs as 
dependents, similar to children, with the owner adopting a parenting role performed through 
relations of care in everyday interaction such as feeding, grooming and walking in order to 
meet the dog’s unique needs. This model indicates the intense nature of the close bond 
between the human and dog. The anthropologist, Shir-Vertesh (2012), adopted a similar 
parent-child model in her research exploring the boundaries and inconsistencies in the 
human-pet relationship in Israel. Of the 52 couples she interviewed, 39 of them said that 
their pet was similar to a young child or baby. Using this model she proposed four categories 
that depict the different ways her interviewees saw their pet: the animal as a “prechild”, the 
animal as a child substitute, the animal as a “semichild”, and the animal as significantly 
different from a child (2012, p. 423). These categories are not static; perceptions shift and 
change over time following life changes in the family. The categories should therefore be 
viewed as  
“a flexible continuum, a spectrum of the various ways animals are attributed 
personhood” (2012, p. 423).  
The “prechild” category sees pet-keeping as a preliminary stage for a human baby allowing 
young couples who plan to have children in the future to gain something akin to parenting 
experience. The child substitute category was relevant to those couples who did not want to 
have children and instead saw their pet as the child of the family. The “semichild” category 
referred to those couples who wanted children but did not see their pet as a preparatory 
stage, instead viewing it as a ‘childlike creature’ who needed love and care. Finally, some 
owners perceived their pet as significantly different from a child; sometimes defined as a 
friendship, other times as something distinct from human-human relationships but always 
seen as part of the family. One of Shir-Vertesh’s research participants describes this 
category, 
“I am always told I probably love the dog less now that I have a daughter. And I say: 
you can love a girl and a dog, differently but simultaneously. She is not my daughter; 
she has four legs, not two. But she has another place in my heart. A special, 
important one” (2012, p. 424). 
My research participants Emma, Isabel, Kate and Lucy all couched their relationship with 
their companion animal in terms of a parent-child relationship (see Portfolio component 4, 
“Analysis of Interviews” 5.2.1 Conceptualising pets as family members). Like children, pets 
are dependent and vulnerable relying on their owners to satisfy their basic needs. This 
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shared dependency and vulnerability of children and pets means that caring is a central 
feature in both parent-child and owner-pet relationships. 
In my article in the International Journal of Law, Policy and Family (Rook, 2014; Portfolio 
component 1, 2.2) I drew on theoretical concepts in child law to justify resolving pet custody 
disputes using a more diverse test than one based on pure property law principles alone. I 
argued that the special nature of pets as living and sentient property requires consideration 
of factors that do not apply to other types of property, factors more applicable to disputes 
involving child residency. Pet custody disputes arise when a couple decide to separate, and 
each wants the family pet to reside with them in their new home. If the couple cannot reach 
an agreement, the question of where the family pet will live may fall to the family courts. 
Since pets are personal property at law, such disputes between married couples fall within 
divorce financial proceedings with the court likely to award custody of the pet to whomever 
can prove better title to the pet, for example, by a receipt of purchase. That pets can be 
perceived as both property and family blurs the traditional narratives and legitimising 
discourses of the human/animal and subject/object dichotomies and has led to some lawyers 
(presumably those acting for the party with a weaker property claim to the pet) to seek to 
persuade the court to adopt a ‘best interests of the animal’ test. With no reported cases in 
England, my article examines the approach taken in countries with reported cases: the USA 
and Israel. My review of the case law concluded that, 
“the majority of the cases share the same underlying inconsistency between the 
courts’ insistence that animals are personal property and their reluctance to rely on 
property principles alone to resolve the dispute” (Rook, 2014, p.180). 
In Arrington v Arrington (1981) 613 S.W. 2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App) a Texas trial court insisted 
that pets are property and refused to apply a ‘best interest of the pet’ test. Despite this, the 
court awarded custody to the wife and visitation rights to the husband. This is at odds with 
the judge’s insistence that pets are property since visitation rights are not awarded in relation 
to personal property. The judge clearly struggled with using a pure property law test to 
resolve the dispute and consequently awarded visitation rights to the husband in recognition 
of the strong emotional bond existing between him and the dog. 
In Juelfs v Gough (2002) 41 P.3d 593, the Alaska Supreme Court upheld the award of sole 
custody of the family dog to the husband even though the wife had a stronger title claim. The 
dog was at risk of serious physical injury at the wife’s residence due to other dogs living with 
her which were a threat to the dog. Therefore, the interest of the dog in avoiding physical 
injury prevailed over the application of a pure property law test. 
In response to the  inadequacies of a pure property law test, my article seeks to devise a 
more appropriate test to resolving pet custody disputes; a test that falls within the existing 
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property paradigm (as this is unlikely to change for companion animals in the foreseeable 
future) but which better recognises the unique character of this property as living and 
sentient. There are important consequences that flow from this recognition that the property 
is living and sentient: first, strong emotional bonds can develop between the property and its 
owner (a relevant factor in Arrington v Arrington); second, as a sentient being the animal has 
an interest in avoiding pain and suffering (a relevant factor in Juelfs v Gough).  
The existing literature drew analogies with child residency cases (Britton, 2006, Huss, 2003, 
Lerner, 2010) and since children’s rights and ‘the best interest of the child’ test have been 
extensively analysed (Mnookin, 1975; Eekelaar, 1986; Eekelaar, 1994; Herring, 2005; Fortin, 
2009), I sought to draw upon these well researched theoretical models to devise a test for 
resolving pet custody disputes. The fact that the parent-child model has been successfully 
applied to the human-dog relationship based on concepts of dependency, vulnerability and 
relations of care (Power, 2008; Shir-Vertesh, 2012) demonstrates the suitability of this 
approach. Mnookin’s seminal article on child residency cases from the 1970s sought to 
overcome the inadequacies of the then applicable ‘best interest of the child’ test by devising 
two intermediate rules to partially replace it. I found Mnookin’s two rules to have relevance to 
pet custody cases because of the character of the human-companion animal relationship. 
Eekelaar explained these rules in the following terms: 
“One was that no action should be taken which would pose an immediate and 
substantial threat to the child’s physical health and the other that, in disputes 
between parents, the court should prefer the adult ‘who has a psychological 
relationship with the child from the child’s perspective” (Eekelaar, 1986, p. 45).  
What is particularly interesting is the underlying justifications for Mnookin’s two intermediate 
rules; firstly, that society seeks to prevent physical harm to children; and secondly, the 
recognition that children are capable of strong emotional relationships with others. There are 
clear parallels here to companion animals as society seeks to prevent unnecessary suffering 
to domestic animals (for example, the cruelty offence under section 4, Animal Welfare Act 
2006) and companion animals are capable of strong emotional bonds with their owners. 
Given the similarity, I sought to apply Mnookin’s intermediate rules by analogy in pet custody 
disputes to propose a more suitable test that recognises pets as living and sentient property 
bound in relations of dependency and vulnerability with their human owners. The pet custody 
cases from the USA showed how courts struggle to decide cases on property law principles 
alone and have been receptive to taking other considerations into account specifically the 
interest an animal has in avoiding physical injury (Juelfs v Gough) and the close emotional 
bond that can develop between a companion animal and a human (Arrington v Arrington).  
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Like children, pets are vulnerable and dependent beings but while children usually become 
independent and leave home or in some cases assume the caring role of the parent, pets 
remain dependents their whole life. In reference to the permanent dependency of domestic 
animals on humans, Satz observes, 
“Domestic nonhuman animals are, for this reason, perhaps the most vulnerable of all 
sentient beings” (2009, p. 80). 
Companion animals are completely dependent on their owners in the home to provide 
nourishment, medical care and a suitable environment in which to live. This responsibility is 
incorporated into English law by section 9, Animal Welfare Act 2006 (AWA 2006) which 
imposes a positive duty on those responsible for domestic animals, including pet owners, to 
meet the welfare needs of their animals. Section 9 incorporates the five freedoms of the 
Brambell report (Brambell, 1965) being a need for a suitable environment, a suitable diet, to 
exhibit normal behaviour patterns, to be housed with or apart from other animals and to be 
protected from pain, suffering, injury and disease (s.9, AWA 2006). This dependency, shared 
by children and animals, permits analogies to be drawn with the attempt to categorise 
children’s rights in the 1980s. Bevan’s broad categories of protective and self-assertive 
rights (Bevan, 1989) and Eekelaar’s three categories of basic, developmental and autonomy 
interests (Eekelaar, 1986) identify a category of fundamental rights arising from the innate 
dependence and vulnerability of children and 
“an obvious need for nurture, love and care, both physical and psychological” 
(Fontin, 2009, p. 17).  
A similar category of fundamental rights could be applied by analogy to pets given their 
dependency and vulnerability. Eekelaar observed how in nineteenth century England the 
outcome of a child residency case could take a very different turn if the basic interests of the 
child were at risk. At that time, the interests of a father generally prevailed over those of the 
child in residency cases but this approach was reversed if the basic interests of the child 
were threatened, for example, if the child was at risk of physical injury (R v De Manneville 
(1804) 5 East 221). Thus, society prioritised the fundamental rights of children, arising from 
their dependency, and these rights prevailed over the interests of their parent. A similar 
reversal in approach is seen in court decisions in pet custody disputes where the interest of 
a companion animal in avoiding physical harm prevails over the rights of the property owner. 
For example, in Juelfs v Gough where the dog’s interest in avoiding physical injury prevailed 
over the wife’s superior claim to property title of the dog. This approach of reversing priority 
evident in both cases of child residency and pet custody disputes demonstrates the 
underlying similarity of the position of children and pets as dependent and vulnerable beings. 
This adds credence to the argument that the human-companion animal relationship shares 
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traits with the parent-child relationship. Having examined theoretical models of pets as family 
based on everyday family practices as well as caring practices (arising from the dependency 
of the companion animal), it is appropriate to move to consider a possible expansion of the 
definition of family at law to include companion animals. 
1.6.4 The expansion of the legal definition of family to include companion animals 
 
Whilst there is no all-encompassing definition of family in English law, the term appears in 
numerous laws (for example, in housing, immigration and employment). Herring suggests 
that the term ‘family’ has “limited legal significance” and whilst there are many cases defining 
‘marriage’ and ‘parents’, there are relatively few cases on the meaning of ‘family’ (2019, p. 
2).  For some scholars, the key to defining family in law is to identify those persons intended 
to be covered by a specific law, 
“It is not that some groups are family and some are not, but that some family groups 
may need the benefits of a particular law and others not” (Herring, 2019, p. 5). 
In the context of housing law, it is those who reside with the tenant in the property as their 
home that need the protection of the law. A tenant may enjoy a large family with clear blood 
and/or legal ties spread across the world but it is only those persons who reside with the 
tenant (whether in a formal or de facto familial relationship) who will be concerned to come 
within the definition of family for the purposes of housing law. This is a significant point in the 
argument for defining pets as family within housing law. It is because companion animals 
live in close proximity to their owners in the home that questions about the familial character 
of the human-companion animal relationship arise in housing law. Reliance in housing 
disputes on human rights arguments under Article 8 ECHR to protect family life only 
encompass those living together in a home. 
“The essential ingredient of family life is the right to live together so that family 
relationships may develop normally (Marckx v Belgium, 31) and members of the 
family may enjoy other’s company” (European Court of Human Rights, 2019, p.58). 
Therefore, the examination of pets as family in this commentary is limited to the context of 
housing law and is not intended to extend beyond the need to protect those living together in 
a household as a family from forced separation.  
My approach in my article on pet custody disputes (Rook, 2014, Portfolio component 1, 2.2) 
was to explore debates on the cusp of legal changes in child law and see how underlying 
justifications for these past legal changes could apply by analogy to companion animals in 
pet custody disputes. Over 150 years there had been significant shifts in approach in child 
law in England; from protecting a father’s pecuniary interest in his child, to protecting the 
child in their own right first through a ‘best interest of the child’ test and then to the current 
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test that elevates the welfare of the child to the paramount consideration (with a rebuttable 
presumption of parental involvement enshrined in law that sees the involvement of both 
parents as beneficial to the child (s.1(2A), Children and Families Act 2014)). I reviewed the 
older literature, published at the point in time where shifts in the approach to child residency 
law were first analysed, and discovered valuable theoretical models for analysing pet 
custody disputes. For example, Mnookin’s two intermediate rules as discussed in the 
previous section. I here propose adopting a similar approach of exploring debates on the 
cusp of past legal change, in this instance, changes in the legal definition of family. The 
existing literature acknowledges that the definition of family within family law is ever-
changing to reflect changing societal attitudes (Dewar, 2000; Diduck, 2011; Herring, 2019). 
By reviewing arguments used at the time to expand the concept of family at law, for example 
to include same-sex couples, I can adopt similar arguments by analogy to better protect the 
human-companion animal relationship in housing law within the concept of family. A relevant 
example of the process of the evolution of the legal definition of family in English law is the 
recent acceptance of same-sex couples as family. This development occurred in a housing 
law case in the English Supreme Court (Fitzpatrick v Sterling House [2001] 1 AC 27). 
Examining the underlying justifications for this change in family law, allows me to identify and 
harness arguments for a further expansion of the legal definition of family within housing to 
include companion animals. This necessitates reviewing the relevant literature at the time 
(from the 1990s onwards) that preceded the change in the legal status of same-sex couples 
and legitimised and justified this change. These arguments may then be applied by analogy 
to further expand the definition of family within housing to include companion animals.  
Sociologists played a key role in scrutinising the lived experience of same-sex couples to 
understand the nature of their relationship (Weston, 1991; Weeks, Donovan and Heaphy, 
1996). This was significant because one of the key components of the debate to expand the 
definition of family to include same-sex couples was the character of the relationship 
between the couples. It was argued that as lesbians and gays now had the chance to freely 
construct relationships based on qualities attributed to ideal notions of the traditional 
heterosexual family, such as mutual inter-dependence and intimacy, deploying the language 
of family to same-sex couples was appropriate.  
It was argued that changes in society at that time saw the rise of individualism in 
relationships which prioritised individual choice in lifestyle and partners leading to what 
Giddens called “the transformation of intimacy”  and the rise of the “pure relationship” 
(Giddens, 1992, p.58). Giddens suggests that intimate partners stay together in a pure 
relationship only in so far as it provides sufficient satisfaction for each party to stay in the 
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relationship. This focus on individual choice, agency and autonomy through the emergence 
of the reflexive self transforms intimacy. 
“Intimacy, in its modern form, implies a radical democratization of the interpersonal 
domain” (Weeks, Donovan and Heaphy, 1999, p. 85). 
This change in relationship patterns cut across the heterosexual/homosexual dichotomy with 
the emergence of common patterns in lifestyle as people, whatever their sexual orientation, 
were driven by the search for a satisfactory intimate relationship. It is the relationship itself 
that is the defining factor within the private, intimate sphere of everyday life. This approach 
focuses on the importance of intimacy, relationships and individual choice in advocating 
change. Although sexual relations will be a part of intimacy in many cases, it is not an 
essential component. For example, the Private Members’ Bill, Civil Partnership Act 2004 
(Amendment) (Sibling Couples) Bill sought to expand the concept of civil partnership to 
unmarried siblings. This is an illuminating example of the fluidity of the concept of family and 
partnership. Intimacy is multi-dimensional and includes  
“close association and privileged knowledge” and “loving, caring and sharing” 
(Jamieson, 1998, p. 8).  
There are parallels here with the human-companion animal relationship which shares some 
of the traits of a partner in terms of intimacy, closeness, trust and inter-dependence in a 
sustained association but without any sexual relations. With the transformation of intimacy, 
couples exercise individual choice and enter into a relationship for its own sake to enjoy the 
benefits of a sustained association with another. There is no reason why individual choice 
may not cross the species barrier and extend to an intimate, close relationship with a 
nonhuman animal. 
This approach raises questions about the distinction between family relationships and other 
relationships, particularly friendship. Certainly, the line of demarcation between family and 
friends has blurred with the greater acceptance in society of individual choice and diversity. 
The ‘friends as family’ model (Westwood, 2013), represented by the concept of ‘families we 
choose’ (Weston, 1991) is especially relevant within the LGBT community. What was striking 
at the time was the fact that the language of family was not deployed in non-heterosexual 
relationships in wider society but was commonly used among lesbian and gay couples, in 
conjunction with the terms ‘choice’ or ‘created’ (Weeks, Donovan and Heaphy, 1999). This 
self-definition approach to family, recognising diversity in family forms on the basis of a 
group’s self-identification as a family, was acknowledged in the literature at the time 
(Eekelaar and Nhlapo, 1998). Research showed that homosexuals were not imitating 
heterosexual families nor trying to replace or substitute a family of choice for one of origin 
but instead adopted a broader definition of family, 
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“for many non-heterosexuals the term ‘family’ embraces a variety of selected 
relationships that includes lovers, possibly ex-lovers, intimate friends, as well as 
blood relatives, and is as real as the family of origin” (Weeks, Donovan and Heaphy, 
1999, p. 89-90). 
Current concepts of family in law and social policy exclude companion animals while the pet-
owners themselves commonly refer to their pets as part of the family, embracing a broad 
definition of family that can traverse the species barrier. Just as the law eventually caught up 
with the reality of homosexual couples living in familial relationships, it is possible that a 
similar shift will occur enabling the valued relationships pet-owning tenants have with their 
animals to be given full recognition as family within housing law. Self-definition alone will not 
be sufficient to persuade a court that a companion animal is a family member but 
comparisons with how the LGBT community deployed the language of family (with the 
qualifying words ‘of choice’) provide a valuable analogy. The concept of ‘family’ is infused 
with cultural and symbolic meaning and its importance is universally understood so the fact 
that pet-owning tenants self-define their pets as family elevates the standing of the human-
companion animal relationship in the eyes of others who may not appreciate its significance. 
The literature suggests that people distinguish between family and friends by way of 
obligation, responsibility and commitment, characteristics more prevalent in a familial 
relationship (Roberts and McGlone, 1997). Questions of obligation, responsibility and 
commitment arise within the context of the parent-child relationship and as discussed 
previously in section 1.6.3, give rise to parallels between the dependent and vulnerable 
status of young children and that of companion animals.  
Caselaw shows that courts are willing to accept a more expansive definition of family beyond 
the formal criteria of marriage, birth and adoption where there is proof that the relationship in 
question satisfies the attributes of traditional familial relations. Both the English Supreme 
Court and the European Court of Human Rights have adopted this alternative approach to 
defining de facto family relationships in the absence of formal legal status. In Fitzpatrick v 
Sterling Housing Association [2001] 1 AC 27 the Supreme Court held that a homosexual 
partner of a tenant, who resided for 18 years in the rental property with the tenant prior to the 
tenant’s death came within the meaning of “a member of the tenant’s family” in the Rent Act 
1977 and consequently was permitted to succeed to the deceased tenant’s tenancy. The 
majority decision relied on the character of the relationship between the two men and the 
fact that it had all the hallmarks of a familial relationship, 
“there should be a degree of mutual inter-dependence, of the sharing of lives, of 
caring and love, or commitment and support” (Lord Slynn, at p. 32). 
These characteristics are presumed to exist in legal relationships (such as between a 
husband and wife) but if proved to exist in de facto relationships may constitute family 
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membership. Although the court was unwilling to define the same-sex relationship as 
equivalent to husband and wife, it accepted its familial character. A few years later in 
Ghaidan v Mendoza [2004] 3 All ER 411 the Supreme Court went a step further in defining 
the same-sex relationship as being equivalent in character to a spouse. The court held that a 
homosexual couple who were living together in a long-term relationship could fall within 
para.2 of schedule 1 of the Rent Act 1977 which permits a “surviving spouse” or “a person 
who was living with the original tenant as his or her wife or husband” to succeed to the 
statutory tenancy of the deceased. Using the Human Rights Act 1998 to ensure the 
compatibility of the Rent Act 1977 with the ECHR, the Supreme Court interpreted the 
statutory words in para. 2 to include long-term same sex partners. As with the majority 
decision in Fitzpatrick, the court relied on the character of the same-sex relationship and its 
proximity to a traditional heterosexual nuclear family to justify its expansive interpretation of 
the statutory wording. 
The European Court of Human Rights has considered the definition of family within Art.8 
ECHR and said that the notion of family life is an autonomous concept (Marckx v Belgium 
(1979) at 31) and therefore it is a question of fact depending on  
“the real existence in practice of close personal ties” (Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy 
(2017) at 140).  
Therefore, in the absence of legally recognised family ties the court will examine de facto 
family ties such as cohabitation and commitment. This is a similar approach to defining 
‘home’ within the context of Art.8. Home is an autonomous concept that is independent of 
classification in domestic law. It depends on establishing “sufficient and continuous links” 
between the individual and the property and not on proving a legitimate proprietary or 
contractual interest. The domestic authority for this approach is Qazi v London Borough of 
Harrow [2001] All ER (D) 16 in which the Court of Appeal held that a tenant still inhabited 
property as his home within Art. 8 even though the tenancy had been terminated and he no 
longer lawfully resided there (this approach was later confirmed as correct by the Supreme 
Court). In reaching their decision the Court of Appeal used several academic texts including 
my book (Portfolio component 1, 2.4), Arden LJ stated: 
“The most detailed treatment of “home” for the purposes of Article 8 from the 
viewpoint of our domestic law is in Property Law and Human Rights by Deborah 
Rook. In a long passage dealing with recent authorities, she seems to accept that a 
squatter may be able to establish the applicability of Article 8” (Arden LJ, at para.30). 
Whilst not going as far as deciding the position for a squatter, the court did decide that a 
tenant who resided in property after the lease had been lawfully terminated could come 
within the protection of Art.8. A similar line of argument can be used in relation to the 
concept of family under Art.8. As with ‘home’ it is also an autonomous concept and, in this 
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case, depends on establishing “close personal ties” rather than proving legally recognised 
family ties. In Moretti and Benedetti v Italy (2010) the European Court of Human Rights held 
that family life existed between foster parents and a foster child in their temporary care on 
the basis of,  
“the close personal ties between them, the role played by the adults vis a vis the 
child, and the time spent together”. (at 48) 
These cases illustrate that in determining family membership in the context of specific laws, 
the courts will look beyond formal blood and legal bonds and examine the character of the 
relationship in question to assess its proximity to traditional family relationships. In identifying 
the hallmarks of the familial relationship, the relevant characteristics vary depending on 
whether it is a parent-child relationship (as in Moretti and Benedetti v Italy) or a couple 
relationship (as in Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association). Fitzpatrick identified the 
characteristics relevant to couples as mutual inter-dependence, caring and love, 
commitment and a sharing of lives. Many human-companion animal relationships bear these 
same traits of a familial relationship, especially in a sharing of everyday lives and providing 
mutual love and support over many years. For a parent-child relationship the hallmarks of a 
familial relationship give rise to other characteristics, emphasising responsibility, 
dependency and obligation. These traits are especially relevant to the human-companion 
animal relationship given the vulnerability and dependency of pets on their owners to meet 
their basic welfare needs. The human-companion animal relationship is a unique relationship 
within the family combining love, a sharing of lives, dependency, caregiving and receiving, 
vulnerability, emotional support, agency, commitment and continuity over time and 
otherness. It is here advocated that these traits demonstrate sufficient “close personal ties” 
to come within the autonomous concept of family life within the context of Art.8 of the ECHR. 
Reliance on an idealised image of the traditional nuclear family is seen as problematic for 
regulating the diversity of family forms and practices in contemporary society. The above 
case law demonstrates how same-sex relationships or quasi-parental relationships are 
recognised on the basis of their proximity to the nuclear family model (Bremner, 2019). Many 
scholars argue that an alternative model is needed, one that moves away from the concept 
of the idealised nuclear family and instead more fully embraces the diversity of family in 
twenty-first century England (Diduck, 2011; Brown, 2019). The function-based model of 
family is one such alternative and is particularly appropriate to extending family membership 
to companion animals. This model focuses on the function of a family, for example, its 
central function of caring. 
“What makes a relationship familial to me then is not necessarily a biological, legal, 
or conjugal connection, rather it is what people do in it, it is a relationship 
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characterized by some degree of intimacy, interdependence and care” (Diduck, 2011, 
p. 289). 
In response to claims that the role of family law is uncertain leading to a chaotic approach 
that is nevertheless normal given the ever-changing nature of family over time (Dewar, 
2000), Diduck argues that family law’s purpose has in fact remained consistent, 
“family law is about determining responsibility for responsibility” (2011, p. 292). 
In allocating and enforcing responsibilities for matters such as the care of children and 
housing, the purpose of family law remains constant. By examining English ancillary relief 
cases over a 15-year period, Diduck (2011) found distinctive shifts in the discursive 
frameworks used in the judgments from the language of paternalism/welfare (reinforcing the 
values of the traditional patriarchal family) to that of equality/rights (which resonated with the 
emerging social movements towards rights and equality in wider society at that time) and 
finally to that of individualism/autonomy (fitting with the increasing individualization of society 
noted by Giddens, 1992). However, she advocates that the law’s purpose in allocating 
responsibility for financial and care responsibilities remained constant over the 15-year 
period. It was the shifts in the discourses used to articulate that aim that led to variations in 
the outcomes of the cases and gave the impression of uncertainty in family law. The 
residency of children clearly falls within family law as it concerns allocating responsibility for 
the care and housing of children, but the residency of a family pet following divorce also falls 
under family law. Pet custody disputes are resolved as part of divorce financial provision in 
the English family courts (Rook, 2014). Whilst this could be seen as merely distributing 
family property, I suggest that the unique character of pets as living and sentient property 
requires the court to allocate responsibility for the care and housing of the pet, for example, 
not placing the pet in a home where it is at risk of physical injury (as in Juelfs v Gough). 
Therefore, for Diduck a relationship is familial if people ‘do’ caring and intimacy and are 
interdependent on each other within the relationship (all of which can apply to the human-
companion animal relationship) and the role of family law is to allocate and enforce 
responsibilities that are linked to that relationship. 
1.6.5  Recognising pets as family under English housing law 
 
The analysis in the preceding sections of the commentary show that there is a strong 
argument for recognising and protecting the human-companion animal relationship as a 
familial relationship within the context of housing law. The argument can be applied under 
alternative models of family which thereby increases its persuasiveness. Firstly, under a 
model of family that relies on the character of the relationship and its proximity to marital and 
50 
 
parent-child relationships in legally recognised families (the traditional nuclear family model). 
This approach has been used by the courts to expand the legal definition of family to include 
same-sex couples based on the similar traits of their relationship to that of legally recognised 
marital relationships between heterosexual couples, for example, to allow a surviving partner 
of a same-sex couple to succeed to a secure tenancy (Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing 
Association). Similarly, foster children have been defined as family because of their proximity 
to parent-child relationships (Moretti and Benedetti v Italy). Adopting this model of 
recognising similar traits, it is possible to show how the human-companion animal 
relationship shares sufficient traits with central family relationships to justify and legitimise 
protecting the relationship within housing law and practice. It shares traits associated with 
that of a partner (with the exclusion of sexual relations) as well as some of the hallmarks of a 
parent-young child relationship. There is both a sharing of lives and mutual inter-
dependence of a chosen partner as well as the dependency and vulnerability inherent in a 
parent-child relationship. Given these clear parallels it is difficult to legitimise counter 
arguments that exclude pets from family membership in housing law and practice, other than 
through speciesism, defined as discriminatory treatment on the basis of species membership 
alone, (Singer, 1995) or ambivalence to animals (the ambivalence surrounding human-
animal relations is examined in section 1.7 below).  
Secondly, the argument can be applied under a function-based model of family that 
encapsulates two elements: caring practices (Diduck, 2011) and everyday practices 
(Morgan, 1996). For Diduck,  
“the primary role allocated to ‘family’ in contemporary society is the care of 
dependents” (2011, p. 291). 
If companion animals were human, there is no doubt they would enjoy the protection of 
family membership in housing law under this model of caring practices. They are completely 
dependent on their owner to satisfy their basic needs of nourishment, health care and social 
interaction whilst living in the home. This vulnerability and dependency will continue for their 
whole life, but care giving is not a one-way process because many companion animals also 
provide care to their owners. The exclusion of companion animals from family membership 
under a caring practices model of family is therefore only possible on the basis of their 
species. The question is whether this speciesism is justified in housing law and policy. 
Reliance on Morgan’s family practices model of family reaches the same conclusion that 
companion animals are family members. In this case it is their active involvement in ‘doing’ 
family in the everyday routines of family life that is relevant. For Morgan, family is an active 
process, and the analysis of my interview data illustrates how my research participants’ 
companion animals were ‘doing’ family in everyday practices in the home (see Portfolio 
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component 4 “Analysis of Interviews”). For Morgan (1999) the themes of flux, fluidity and 
change are vital in understanding modern family life and ‘family practices’ are a way of 
conceptualising this.  
Until recently, seeing companion animals as family members was viewed through a 
humanist framework (Arluke and Sanders, 1996). Under this perspective, pets are 
incorporated into the family but the family itself remains unchanged. The pet is a passive 
body that is shaped and moulded to fit within a pre-existing human-centred family and home 
life. To explain pets as family members, Hickrod and Schmitt (1982) used symbolic 
interactionism and Goffman’s (1974) ‘frame analysis’ but they saw pets only as ‘pretend’ 
members of the family because it was viewed as a human institution (cited in Irvine and 
Cilia, 2017). More recently, these human-centred approaches are being challenged by 
studies showing that pet owners experience their companion animals as ‘minded social 
actors’ (Sanders, 1993; Fox, 2006; Power, 2008). These studies 
“urge a re-thinking of human-animal family relations that is attentive to the everyday, 
embodied encounters between people and animals and suggest that animals may 
actively shape the ways that family and home are lived in the everyday” (Power, 
2008, p. 537).   
In challenging pets as passive family members, Power’s “more-than-human families” 
describes 
“kinship where dogs and people are mutually entwined in unique, open-ended 
encounters” (2008, p. 537). 
Given my social constructionist worldview and my belief in the hybrid heterogeneity of ‘more-
than-human’ families and multi-species tenancies, it is not surprising that I see several 
interwoven strands in understanding how pets become family. These strands include: 
(i) Intimacy within the human-companion animal relationship with a sharing of lives, 
inter-dependence, love and trust as a long-term commitment; and 
(ii) Companion animals as social agents actively engaged in ‘doing’ family in the 
everyday practices within the home through active participation in family routines 
which can change through the agency of the animal; and 
(iii) Companion animals providing socially supportive relationships as givers and 
recipients of care; and 
(iv) Obligation, responsibility and commitment on the part of the pet-owner who 
assumes caring duties for the vulnerable and dependent animal for the duration 
of its life; and 
(v) The symbiotic and dynamic relationship existing between pets and other family 
members that act as a conduit of communication or enduring link between the pet 
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owner and others family members. For example, for my research participant, 
Bob, his dog was a final link to his deceased spouse (see Portfolio component 4, 
“Analysis of interviews”, 5.4 Narrative Analysis). 
Together these strands support recognising pets as family members within housing law and 
policy using various models of family based on the character and function of the human-
companion animal relationship.  
If fluidity and change in family arrangements is taken seriously and if policy and law is open 
to diversity and a willingness to change to reflect this, then there is a strong argument that 
housing law and policy within the residential rental sector should change to protect the 
human-companion animal relationship as a familial relationship. It is not without significance 
that Andrew Rosindell MP recently relied on family relationships to justify his Private 
Members’ Bill to prohibit the use of ‘no pet’ covenants in residential leases in England. In his 
Parliamentary speech introducing the Bill, he observed that, 
“Dogs are more than ‘man’s best friend’: they are equal members of the family and 
for most people, being separated from your dog is no different than being separated 
from a brother or sister” (Rosindell, 2020). 
That such emotive language can be used in Parliament illustrates the strength of feeling the 
human-companion animal relationship can arouse, however, this needs to be set within the 
wider context of human ambivalence to animals and the barriers such ambivalence may 
create to protecting companion animals in housing. 
1.7 The ambivalence surrounding human-animal relations 
Our relationship with animals has been described as ‘ambivalent’ (Serpell, 1996; Charles 
and Davies, 2008; Irvine and Cilia, 2017). The simultaneous existence of conflicting attitudes 
towards animals is not surprising given the history of our relationship with them and our need 
to dominate and control domestic animals (see section 1.5.1 The history of the human-pet 
relationship: defusing conflict).  There is a contradiction between, on the one hand, 
acknowledging the similarities between humans and nonhuman animals as sentient, living 
beings for whom close attachments can develop and, on the other, regarding them as 
human resources to be exploited and killed for our own ends (Francione, 2000). Western 
culture is divided on the moral status of animals (Singer, 1995; Cohen, 1997; Posner, 2004; 
Regan, 2004) and Francione’s (2000) concept of ‘moral schizophrenia’ refers to our 
inconsistent relations with animals that enables us to lavish some domestic animals, our 
pets, with love and affection while simultaneously supporting the ‘institutionalised 
exploitation’ of millions of other domestic animals through intensive farming, scientific 
experimentation and entertainment. In contemporary England this ambivalence is ever 
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present and visible in the differential treatment of a cherished pet dog compared to a pig 
raised in an intensive farm for meat, and embodies 
“two totally contradictory and incompatible sets of moral values” (Serpell, 1996, p. 
19). 
Some scholars believe this ambivalence permeates the human-companion animal 
relationship (Fox, 2006; Charles and Davies, 2008; Power, 2008) and it has been suggested 
that what it means for a pet to ‘be’ family varies greatly because of it (Irvine and Cilia, 2017). 
Shir-Vertesh’s (2012) research in Israel found that loving relationships between people and 
their pets did not always endure. Some owners initially treated their pets as members of their 
family, similar to small children, but later redefined or even terminated the relationship when 
changes in their life occurred especially the introduction of a new baby into the family. Shir-
Vertesh introduces the concept of ‘flexible personhood’ and argues that pets can be  
“viewed along a humanness-animality continuum, flexibly positioned at different parts 
of the gamut as changes occur in the family and in the lives of its members” (2012, p. 
428).  
That relationships can change within a family in response to life changing events is not 
surprising; it occurs in human-human familial relationships, for example, a couple may 
become distant from each other following the birth or death of a child. The precarious 
position of pets as property at law (examined in section 1.8 below) means that a change in 
their relationship within the family can result in their being unilaterally removed from it. 
Some scholars challenge Cartesian notions of binary divisions between humans and non-
human animals and advocate a post-humanist perspective in which boundaries between 
humans and animals are broken down (Fox, 2006). Fox’s ethnographic research in the field 
of human geography concerned pet owners in Britain and examined how people use the 
categories of ‘animal’ and ‘human’ to understand their pets. She used pet ownership as a 
case study to apply the theoretical concept of post-humanism to everyday life. Post-
humanism disrupts human-animal binaries and as pets occupy ‘a liminal position’ perceived 
as both ‘minded individuals’ and ‘disposable possessions’, they provided an ideal subject for 
her study (Fox, 2006, p. 526). She found that pet owners readily mix and match these two 
different interpretations of their animals in everyday practices, sometimes seeing them as 
human-like and other times as animal. Shir-Vertesh’s findings discovered a similar approach 
in Israel emphasising the fluidity in the category ‘pet’ thereby demonstrating  
“the possibility of flux between person and nonperson” (2012, p. 428).  
Fox (2006) suggests that the way in which people understand their pets as both ‘human’ and 
‘animal’ disrupts the traditional binary of human versus nonhuman and demonstrates how 
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post-humanism can exist in the lived reality of everyday living. Others, unpersuaded by this 
argument, suggest that Fox’s findings merely demonstrate how  
“a humanist category is used to construct how people view animals (Charles and 
Davies, 2008, p. 2.4).  
Fox acknowledges that in our relations with pets “humanity still remains the key reference 
point” (2006, p. 535) but nonetheless pet owners do challenge these Cartesian binaries. 
Shir-Vertesh suggests that her concept of flexible personhood, whereby pets can be flexibly 
incorporated into the family one day and rejected from it on another, preserves the 
prominence of humanity,  
“Flexibility in the treatment of animals shows that human boundaries are not 
becoming insignificant or blurred and that “the human” is not losing its distinction 
from “the other”” (2012, p. 429). 
Shir-Vertesh’s three case studies of dogs, once cherished as close family members being 
ignored or rehomed with the arrival of human babies, demonstrate flexible personhood. 
However, it is arguable that the frequency with which this occurs in her research may be 
explained by her sampling methods. Her research participants were all young middle to 
upper class Jewish couples from southern Israel an area where procreation and family is 
highly prized and where religion objects to strong emotional feelings towards animals and 
discourages pet keeping. In this environment, it is easy to see how a pet dog could be 
displaced from the family by the arrival of a new baby. Shir-Vertesh rejects her findings as 
an idiosyncratic Israeli phenomenon pointing out the high rates of companion animal 
abandonment and rehoming in the USA and Europe. The large numbers of companion 
animals relinquished to animal shelters each year appears to testify to the ambivalence in 
the human-companion animal relationship, although some of this is the result of pet-owning 
tenants being forced to rehome their dog or cat due to ‘no pet’ covenants. The legal status of 
domestic animals as property or ‘legal things’ encourages their conceptualisation as human 
resources and perpetuates ambivalence to animals. 
1.8 The legal status of companion animals 
There is extensive literature on the legal status of animals especially around the contentious 
debate of granting legal personhood to animals (Wise, 2002; Francione, 2007; Cupp, 2013; 
Rook, 2016). As discussed in section 1.3 above, time and space allows only a brief 
consideration of this large body of literature but to exclude it altogether would be to ignore a 
significant feature of the human-companion animal relationship. The law distinguishes 
between ‘persons’ and ‘things’ with all human beings benefiting from legal personhood, while 
all domestic and captive animals are legal things categorised as property (Wise, 2000). Such 
a simplistic division of humans and animals in law is problematic and arbitrary (Fox, 2004, p. 
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474). Many scholars have noted how the law has failed to keep pace with the cultural shift in 
how people in the Western world perceive pets as family members leaving the law out of 
touch with reality (Britton, 2006; Sullivan and Vietzke, 2008; Rook, 2014; Kymlicka, 2017). 
The contradictory status of companion animals as both family (in the eyes of their owners) 
and property (in the eyes of the law) makes their position unique. Fox and Ray observe,  
“This disjuncture between social and legal attitudes entails that companion animals 
occupy a particularly contested zone between object and living being” (2019, p. 213). 
Therefore, companion animals are “boundary animals” (Fox, 2004, p. 479) and “liminal 
beings” (Fox and Ray, 2019, p. 213) straddling the line of demarcation between human and 
animal and challenging the human/animal binary at law. Judges in two cases involving pets, 
one in the USA and one is Israel, have recognised this, 
 
“animals are not property, rather a unique construction existing somewhere between 
inanimate objects and humans” (Corso v Crawford Dog and Cat Hospital (1979) 315 
NYS 2d. 182; Ploni v Plonit, 2004, Ramat Gan Family Court FC 32405/01). 
The legal status of companion animals as property raises a number of concerns within the 
context of ‘no pet’ covenants: 
(i)  it is at odds with the reality of how many pet owning tenants construct their 
companion animals as family members (Fox, 2004; Charles and Davies, 2008; 
Charles, 2014); and 
(ii) it undermines the significance of the relationship to the pet owner and fails to 
appreciate the magnitude of the harm caused to the tenant by a forced 
separation; and 
(iii) it ignores the welfare interests of the companion animal in being able to maintain 
a stable relationship with the person to whom they are close; and 
(iv) it perpetuates the idea that a companion animal can be discarded if the tenancy 
agreement prohibits pets and thereby relegates a forced separation of the owner 
and their pet to the comfortable realms of mere property loss. 
 
This trivialises the enormity of what is being imposed upon a pet-owning tenant as illustrated 
by my research participant, Kate, who suffered significant loss after being forced to rehome 
her two dogs, whom she viewed as part of the family, due to a ‘no pet’ covenant (see 
Portfolio component 4, “Analysis of interviews”, 5.4 Narrative Analysis).  
1.8.1 The property versus legal personhood debate 
Legal personhood is not synonymous with being human; it identifies those entities that are 
capable of having legal rights (Schaffner, 2011). It includes all humans but historically it was 
a more restrictive category with legal personhood being denied to slaves, women and 
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indigenous people (Wise, 2000). In more recent times the category has been expanded to 
include nonhuman entities, for example, a private company is a legal person (Midgley, 1985) 
thereby allowing it to protect its property interests under the Human Rights Act 1998 (Rook, 
2001, Portfolio component 1, 2.4). In New Zealand, the Te Urewera Act 2014 granted legal 
personhood to a former national park, Te Urewera, granting it all the rights, powers, duties 
and liabilities of a legal person (Rousseau, 2016). Since 2000 there have been a number of 
court cases across the globe challenging the property status of specific captive animals 
including chimpanzees (in Brazil, Austria and the USA) and orca whales (in the USA) (for 
example, Non-Human Rights Project, inc., Tommy v Lavery [2015] 26 NY3d 902; Tilikum v. 
Sea World Parks & Entertainment, Inc, (2012) 842 F.Supp. 2d 1259). The cases rely on the 
cognitive abilities of the animals and their ‘sameness’ to humans. Whilst they have been 
unsuccessful to date, they have nevertheless raised awareness in academic circles of this 
contentious issue with numerous articles published in recent years (for example, Wise, 2007; 
Kerr et al, 2013; Cupp, 2017). My contribution to Bailey, D. (ed) (2016) Practical Veterinary 
Forensics on the challenges to the legal status of domestic and captive animals provides 
further evidence of this debate (Portfolio component 1, 2.3). In 2016, an Argentinian court 
granted a habeas corpus to a captive chimpanzee, Cecilia, declaring her a non-human legal 
person (A.F.A.D.A about the chimpanzee ‘Cecilia’, (2016) File No. P-72.254/15; Samuels, 
2016). Although a legal first, it has had little wider impact overseas because the case was 
decided using environmental legislation specific to Argentina. 
Many scholars are frustrated at the property status of domestic and captive animals and the 
arbitrariness of the “impenetrable legal wall” (Wise, 2000, p. 4) that exists between humans 
and all non-human animals (Fox, 2004; Satz, 2009; Kymlicka, 2017). In consequence of this 
legal wall, the legal framework to protect animals has been “largely impervious to meaningful 
reform” with any new animal welfare laws being described as “treading water” (Kymlicka, 
2017, pp. 124 and 125). Numerous rights theories exist based on an animal’s sentiency and 
rationality (Francione, 2000; Wise, 2000; Regan, 2004). For example, Wise advocates that 
any being (whatever species) with mental abilities adding up to “practical autonomy” should 
be entitled to legal rights of bodily integrity and bodily liberty (2002, p.32). Francione’s (2000) 
concept of “moral schizophrenia” demonstrates the contradictory nature of our relationship 
with domestic animals that sees people expend considerable time and money protecting 
their pets from pain and suffering whilst simultaneously condoning “the institutionalised 
exploitation” and suffering of millions of other domestic animals in intensive farms and 
scientific procedures. He sees the property status of animals as the root of the problem 
because it permits humans to use domestic animals as their own resources. Satz adopts the 
“interest-convergence” principle from critical race theory and applies it to animal law arguing 
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that far from protecting animals, animal welfare law actually asserts our right to use animals 
and thereby authorises the many ways in which we harm them (2009, p. 69). For Satz, 
animal welfare laws exist only as far as protecting animal interests converge with human 
interests. Therefore, to say that the purpose of these laws is the protection of animals is 
fundamentally misleading as the real purpose is to assert our right to use the animals.  
Some scholars advocate maintaining the current legal status of domestic animals (Cohen, 
1997; Favre, 2004; Posner, 2004). For example, Favre suggests that there are clear benefits 
to retaining property status since ownership entails responsibility for the care of the animal 
(Favre, 2000). Being a property lawyer, he adopts the concept of dual ownership from the 
English concept of a trust of land. The owner of a legal estate in land is a trustee who 
accepts certain duties and responsibilities over the land for the benefit of the beneficiary who 
enjoys the equitable ownership. Similarly, Favre suggests that living property (animals) can 
be divided into its legal and equitable components with the pet-owner as a trustee (or 
guardian) accepting certain responsibilities and duties while the animal itself enjoys 
“equitable self-ownership” (2000, p.497). In this way, Favre seeks to blend the previously 
separated categories of property and legal person to allow domestic animals direct access to 
the legal system to protect their interests in equity. While an owner of a pet is already subject 
to legislation that prohibits him/her from causing unnecessary suffering to their animal, (s.4, 
Animal Welfare Act 2006 under English law) this duty is rooted in criminal law and is owed to 
the State. By making animals equitable self-owners, the legal owner has obligations owed 
directly to the animal. According to Favre, the nature of these duties arises primarily from 
two sources: firstly, legislative provisions prohibiting cruelty to animals and secondly, legal 
concepts that define the relationship between parents and children and which can be applied 
by analogy. Favre observes:  
“Just as parents of the child must sort out what is in the best interests of their children, so 
the animal guardians must, in the first instance, decide what is in the best interests of the 
self-owned animal for whom they are responsible” (2000, p. 501).  
Favre prefers the term guardian over trustee because it better reflects the fact that the owner 
of the equitable title (the animal) is also the subject matter of the legal title (held by the 
human) resulting in a “blending of corpus and self-ownership” that does not exist for a non-
living asset trust (2000, p. 496). Whilst a trustee of property owes financial accountability to 
the beneficiary, the guardian of the animal has an accountability that is more in line with a 
parent-child relationship, based on ‘quality of life’ accountability. 
Recently there has been a backlash against the property versus legal personhood debate 
due to the frustration caused by its inability to bring forth practical change in the lives of 
animals. The political theorist, Kymlicka, argues that using the “property/personhood 
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dilemma” is futile because the debate has reached a political impasse (2017, p. 124). He 
agrees with Satz that legal scholarship is trapped 
“in a paralyzing debate about whether categorising animals as “persons” instead of 
“property” will improve their legal protections” (Satz, 2009, p. 66).  
An alternative approach is needed to address this paralysis and in the context of protecting 
the human-companion animal relationship in housing law, a relational approach is here 
recommended.  
1.8.2 A relational approach for companion animals 
A relational approach addresses the legal treatment of animals based on their relationship to 
humans, for example, as family members (Donaldson and Kymlicka, 2011; Kymlicka, 2017) 
or kin (Fox, 2004). Fox (2004) challenges the arbitrariness of the existing legal divide based 
as it is on the fundamentally unstable binary of human/animal that designates all humans as 
legal persons and all non-human animals as property. She observes that legal protections 
for animals, for example, greater protections for cats and dogs under the Animals (Scientific 
Procedures) Act 1986, are determined by “cultural and emotional attachment to certain 
species” as opposed to reasoned analysis based on scientific evidence (2004, p. 473). She 
argues that we need to radically re-think our relationship with animals “in ways which 
transcend property” (2004, p. 489) and instead recognise animals as our kin. There is a 
recent example of the use of kinship to grant legal personhood to a non-human entity, a 
river, in New Zealand. In 2017, the Whanganui river was granted legal personhood based on 
the relationship between the Maori tribe of Whanganui and the river. Media reports observed  
“hundreds of tribal representatives wept with joy when their bid to have their kin 
awarded legal status as a living entity was passed into law” (Ainge Roy, 2017). 
The tribe consider the river to be an ancestor and it is the significance of this special 
relationship between the people and the river that was recognised under the law. 
Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011) applied the political theory of group-differentiated citizenship 
to the debate shifting the focus from the intrinsic capacities of animals to their relationships 
to human political communities. They suggest that domesticated animals are co-citizens and 
as a matter of justice have rights to communal resources. Applying this political theory to law 
reform, Kymlicka calls for a  
“social recognition strategy: getting domesticated animals included into everyday 
legal categories of social membership” (2017, p. 125). 
He specifically identifies family membership as one of these legal categories. Therefore, 
companion animals would become family members at law without the need to change their 
property status nor declare them as legal persons. I concur with Kymlicka that implementing 
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a social recognition strategy is more politically feasible than pursuing legal personhood for 
companion animals in the foreseeable future. Whilst such an approach reinforces the 
objectification of animals by differentiating them on the basis of their use to humans, it is 
nevertheless a more politically feasible strategy for protecting the interests of companion 
animals. If judges are reluctant to extend legal personhood to great apes, nonhuman 
animals with cognitive capacity close to that of humans, it is unlikely that any such extension 
of legal personhood to cats and dogs will occur in the foreseeable future so arguments 
based on legal personhood for companion animals are “politically unfeasible” in the current 
climate (Kymlicka, 2017, p. 125). 
There is precedent for treating animals differently at law depending on the social category 
allocated to the animal. For example, a dog can be a cherished companion animal living in a 
home or a test subject in scientific procedures in a laboratory. Its treatment at law differs 
depending on which of these categories it is assigned. This legal construct, of treating 
animals differently depending upon their use to humans, or more specifically, the relationship 
a human has with the animal, can be invoked to protect the human-companion animal in 
housing law and policy. 
Section 1.5.1 of this commentary considered the origin of the legal status of domestic 
animals as property which is thought to lie in the domestication of animals and the move 
from hunter-gatherers to agriculturists. From his studies of hunter-gatherer societies Ingold 
(1994) theorised that hunters depend on establishing a continuing relationship with animals; 
a relationship, he suggests, based on trust. In contrast the agriculturist’s relationship with 
animals is based on domination. This shift from human-animal relations based on trust to 
those based on domination necessitated seeing animals as objects rather than as subjects 
worthy of respect. I am persuaded by Ingold’s theory and see this as providing the key to 
differentiating our relationship with companion animals from our relationship with other 
domestic animals and thereby justifying differential treatment at law. Statistically, in the USA, 
farm animals represent 98% of all animals with whom we interact (Wolfson and Sullivan, 
2004) and it is likely to be a similar figure in England. Thus, the majority of human-animal 
relationships rely on the need for humans to dominate and use animals for our own 
purposes with little, or no, benefit to the animal, for example, intensively farmed animals are 
denied a natural environment and are killed prematurely. However, our relationship with 
companion animals living in our homes, is very different – it is a relationship based on trust. 
Tuan (2004) disputes this, suggesting that our relationship with pets is based on dominance 
but I am not wholly persuaded by his argument. In most cases, companion animals benefit 
from their relationship with humans (although some pets are abused by their owners). 
Owners do not need to harm the welfare of their animals for human benefit. On the contrary, 
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people often reap social and health benefits from the very act of fulfilling the companion 
animal’s welfare needs. This is unique in the human relationship with animals and justifies a 
unique approach in law, one which both recognises and protects the human-companion 
animal relationship. 
 
The mismatch between the legal status of companion animals as property and the way in 
which people socially construct their pets as part of their family has created difficulties in the 
courts leading to judicial creativity to overcome the dilemma. For example, the divergence of 
law and reality is visible in pet custody disputes which arise following a separation or divorce 
of a couple where both parties want the family pet to live with them. The courts have 
struggled at times to apply pure property law tests given the strength of the bond between 
the human and the companion animal (Rook, 2014, Portfolio component 1, 2.2). In some 
countries this has led to legislative changes to resolve the problem, for example, in 2017 
Alaska amended its divorce law to require the courts to take the well-being of the pet into 
consideration in deciding pet custody disputes (Brulliard, 2017). Similar legal problems have 
arisen in the context of pet trusts and led to legislation in a number of US states to permit a 
companion animal to be a beneficiary under a trust (Favre, 2010; Aflatooni, 2011). Since 
property cannot be a beneficiary of a trust, this concession rests on relational justifications. 
These examples demonstrate changing judicial and legislature attitudes to inter-species 
relationality and show support for Kymlicka’s proposal that a new ethic of membership 
should exist in the context of animal law reform. In England there is legal precedent for 
treating cats and dogs differently from other animals at law based on our sentimental 
attachment to the species (Fox, 2010). Under the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 a 
project licence for scientific procedures using cats and dogs will be granted only where the 
purpose of the work cannot be achieved without their use or where it is not practicable to 
obtain other suitable animals (s.5C(4); Home Office, 2014, at p. 52). In England, dogs and 
cats are specifically bred for use in scientific procedures so have never been kept as pets. 
Nevertheless, they enjoy additional protection under the law based on “sentimental 
prejudices” (Fox, 2004, p. 493) arising from our longstanding relationship with the species as 
companion animals. My proposal that housing law should recognise and protect the human-
companion animal relationship is more restrictive than this legal exception because any 
additional protection under housing law would be dependent on the dog or cat having a 
current relationship with a tenant. Once that relationship ends, for example, the tenant dies, 
the particular human-companion animal relationship ends and no longer enjoys protection 
under housing law and policy. Whoever takes over responsibility for the animal after the 
death of its owner will be under a positive duty to meet the welfare needs of the animal, 
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under s.9, Animal Welfare Act 2006, but this is a separate and distinct consideration to that 
of housing law protecting the specific human-companion animal relationship. 
Fox argues for a radical change in the legal status of animals from property to kin (Fox, 
2004) and may be critical of my proposal to give preferential treatment to companion 
animals. Whilst sympathising with her frustration at the arbitrariness of the legal treatment of 
animals, and a need for a radical overhaul of the human-animal binary in law, I nevertheless 
propose the differential treatment of companion animals based on our emotional attachment 
to them. I believe this to be the most viable means to expedite changes in the law that will 
protect the human-companion animal relationship within the housing arena. I recognise that 
such an approach may be criticised as favouritism, according a privileged status to certain 
animals that does little to destabilise the human-animal binary at law. Fox observes that 
such an approach  
“runs the risk of entrenching [the boundary] more firmly” (2004, p. 480)  
but I think this is less so in respect of companion animals. My proposal for legislation to 
regulate the use of ‘no pet’ covenants in order to protect the human-companion animal 
relationship is rooted more in human rights and animal welfare than animal rights philosophy 
for which it will be criticised but it is arguable that by protecting this relationship the law 
transcends the human-animal binary.  The close, reciprocal bond, “bordering on co-
dependence” (Fox, 2010, p. 41) between the human and their dog/cat deconstructs the 
human-animal boundary and in doing so allows people to see the companion animal, with 
whom they share everyday family practices in the home, as a family member sometimes 
even an intimate family member such as a child. This closeness with a nonhuman animal 
may ultimately lead to greater empathy and understanding for all animals. 
Adopting a relational approach to companion animals has received support in the legal 
literature (Rook, 2014; Kymlicka, 2017; Rook 2018; Fox and Ray, 2019) with Fox and Ray 
(2019) advocating the use of human rights arguments arising from the recognition of 
companion animals as family members. Kymlicka (2017) provides a two-level model of 
animal rights based on justice for domesticated animals. This model incorporates relational 
or ‘group-differentiated’ rights, which vary depending on the animal’s relationship to humans 
and provide animals with positive rights to resources. My reliance on relational rights for 
companion animals does not go so far as to advocate positive rights to resources but does 
suggest that housing law, practice and policy should recognise and protect the human-
companion animal relationship. The significance of the relationship to both the human owner 
and their companion animal, and the consequent harm caused to both by a forced 
separation, needs to be acknowledged and given appropriate weight. Under a relational 
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approach, it is the relationship itself that justifies the protection, not the species of the animal 
nor its legal status so there is no risk of opening the floodgates to wider claims relating to 
domestic animals in general. ‘No pet’ covenants threaten that relationship but also have 
wider consequences as evident in the existing literature on ‘no pet’ covenants. 
1.9 ‘No pet’ covenants in residential leases 
‘No pet’ covenants that restrict or prohibit the keeping of companion animals in rental 
housing affect millions of tenants across the UK every year. Existing surveys suggest that 
approximately half of all private landlords exclude pets and whilst public authority landlords 
are generally more tolerant of pets, inconsistent policies exist across the social housing 
sector. Given the large numbers of the population affected by ‘no pet’ covenants, it is 
surprising to find so little academic research on the subject. There is a significant knowledge 
gap in the existing literature on ‘no pet’ covenants with very few articles published in peer 
reviewed academic journals and even fewer from a socio-legal perspective (see Portfolio 
component 2, 3.4, Table 1 Academic articles on ‘no pet’ covenants from my literature 
review). The majority of the articles focus on pet-owning tenants and explore the difficulties 
they face in finding rental housing that will allow them to live with their companion animal 
(Palluzi, 2013; Power, 2017; Graham et al, 2018; Graham and Rock, 2018). Rental 
insecurity was a key theme to emerge from the literature in addition to tenant perceptions of 
the low availability and poor quality of pet-friendly accommodation (Power, 2017; Graham et 
al, 2018; Graham and Rock, 2018). 
Power’s (2017) empirical research in Australia explored pet-owning tenants’ sense of 
housing security and the ways in which living with a pet shapes the degree of security 
experienced by the tenants. The online survey (attracting 679 responses) was not explicitly 
about pet ownership but had a wider objective of understanding the decisions tenants made 
when choosing rental housing. The impact of pet ownership emerged as a theme leading to 
twenty-eight semi-structured in-depth interviews with pet-owning tenants. Power’s findings 
highlight pet-owning tenants’ perceptions about the low availability and poor quality of 
housing advertised as pet-friendly. Landlord perceptions about the possible risks associated 
with pets such as property damage and nuisance, together with a state housing policy that 
prioritized investor value over rental security for tenants, meant that the majority of private 
landlords excluded pets from their property. Housing shortages meant that landlords enjoyed 
a large pool of possible tenants from whom to choose at any time thereby robbing tenants of 
any bargaining power in negotiations. The low availability of pet-friendly rentals meant some 
tenants had to compromise on quality, cleanliness, location or cost of housing accepting 
sub-standard property in undesirable or unsafe areas. She found that some tenants were 
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prepared to accept high levels of risk to their rental security by keeping pets without their 
landlord’s knowledge in breach of their tenancy agreement. In order to limit the number of 
visits from the landlord or letting agent, during which the pet had to be hidden, some tenants 
deferred reporting the need for property repairs jeopardizing the quality of the property and 
thereby disadvantaging both tenant as occupant and landlord as owner. The primary reason 
for failing to declare a pet was the perceived low availability and poor quality of pet-friendly 
housing and many of these tenants had experience of having being rejected for properties in 
the past due to living with a companion animal. Power concludes that pet ownership should 
be included as a relevant variable in future research on understanding rental security and a 
tenant’s capacity to create and maintain a sense of home. 
Graham et al (2018) interviewed 28 young adults with dogs to examine how dog owners 
navigate rental markets in Canada. The study confirmed the findings of Power’s earlier 
research and demonstrated that pet-owning tenants in Canada faced similar concerns over 
rental insecurity as their counterparts in Australia. The concept of a “cycle of rental 
insecurity” was devised to demonstrate the difficulties faced by dog owners in searching, 
settling and staying put in pet-friendly rental housing (2018, p. 4). In searching for housing 
advertised as ‘pets negotiable’ the dog owners felt powerless in negotiations and invariably 
found landlords unwilling to accept dogs. This led to feelings of discrimination, especially for 
those caring for larger dogs or certain breeds such as pit bulls. The ‘settling’ stage arose 
once the tenant had found somewhere willing to accept their dog. As with the tenants in 
Power’s study, the dog owners had to make “compromises” and accepted substandard 
quality housing in undesirable locations in order to secure housing with their dog (2018, p. 
6). Money was an important issue for the participants, which is not surprising as many were 
University students. They complained of having to pay non-refundable pet fees as well as 
security deposits and in some cases additional pet rent but “felt cornered to pay” because 
they felt they had no other options (2018, p. 5). In ‘staying put’ the dog owners worried about 
rental security and whether any of the neighbours would complain about the presence of 
their dog resulting in their eviction. 
Most research on ‘no pet’ covenants focuses on the experience of tenants, so Carlisle-
Frank, Frank and Neilsen’s (2005) study in the USA is significant because it explores the 
position of landlords and their reasons for seeing companion animals as undesirable 
occupants. Two-thirds of the respondents cited property damage as a concern with half 
citing noise nuisance. These concerns did not necessarily arise from direct experience of 
troublesome pets since 63% of the respondents had never allowed pets in their property 
(2005, p.69). That landlords frame pets as a risk is significant to understanding the 
prevalence of ‘no pet’ covenants in the private sector. A number of animal charities in the UK 
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including the Dog’s Trust and Cat’s Protection have sought to counteract this 
conceptualization of pet-owning tenants as a risk with campaigns such as ‘Lets for Pets’ and 
‘Purrfect landlords’ which seek to highlight the advantages that landlords with positive pet 
policies can enjoy, for example, longer stays by tenants thereby avoiding extra costs 
(Carlisle-Frank, Frank and Neilsen, 2005; Palluzi, 2013; Graham et al, 2018). Graham et al 
(2018) also sought the perspectives of landlords towards pets but this Canadian study was 
limited to the views of landlords who permitted pets in their property. Therefore, the 
American research (Carlisle-Frank, Frank and Neilsen, 2005) is the only academic study to 
obtain data on landlord perspectives towards pets and ‘no pet’ covenants from landlords who 
exclude pets although reports on this issue have recently been published in England by two 
leading animal charities (Cats Protection, 2018; Battersea, 2019). Using an online survey, 
Graham et al (2018) acquired data from thirty landlords/property managers of pet-friendly 
housing. Although the survey focused on the positive aspects of being pet-friendly, it also 
included an open-ended question that allowed negative experiences to be shared, for 
example, one participant spoke of having to evict a tenant after neighbours complained of 
nuisance barking by a pet dog left for long hours. Their findings show that pet-friendly 
property usually receives more applicants than listings that prohibit pets and that pet-owning 
tenants tend to stay longer in their rentals which is advantageous to landlords in avoiding 
extra costs associated with changing tenants. All of the landlords/property managers in the 
study were pet owners themselves and recognized the strength of the human-companion 
dog bond and its importance to people. One of the participants said, 
“We have always had pets; this in one reason we always rent to pet owners” (2018, 
p. 6). 
Another participant said that dogs are “part of the family” and acknowledged that it would be 
“devastating” to have to give up a dog to obtain housing (2018, p. 6). Such comments 
demonstrate the importance of educating landlords on the character of the human-
companion animal relationship as a familial relationship and the magnitude of the harm 
caused to tenants when asked to rehome their pets (this links to my third research question 
as set out in section 1.3). Landlords may be less willing to request that a companion animal 
be rehomed if they appreciate the significant harm that can ensue from such a request. 
The literature on ‘no pet’ covenants and the law is very sparse with three articles examining 
the law in the USA and Canada (Huss, 2005; Campbell, 2009; Palluzi, 2013) and only two 
considering the law in England (Rook, 2018; Fox and Ray, 2019). My article (Rook, 2018, 
Portfolio component 1, 2.1) explores how housing law and policy could better recognise and 
protect the human-companion animal relationship. Using housing legislation in Canada 
(Ontario) as a useful case study the article advocates the need for legislation in England to 
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regulate the use of ‘no pet’ covenants (2018, pp. 39-40). It employs human rights law to 
argue that the human-companion animal relationship needs greater protection, advocating 
that the relationship comes within ‘private life and family’ (especially private life) under Article 
8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (Rook, 2018, p.40). Fox and Ray (2019) 
also support a human rights approach and suggest reframing the definition of ‘family’ under 
human rights law to recognize the significance of the human-companion animal relationship 
and the role interspecies relations play in maintaining the health and well-being of older 
people. Their research focuses on the use of ‘no pet’ covenants/policies in residential and 
nursing homes for older people in the UK building on earlier research in this area from a 
psychology perspective (McNicholas, 2007). Fox and Ray apply vulnerability theory to show 
the precarious position of older people and their companion animals at the transitional 
moment of leaving their own home and moving into a residential or nursing home. The older 
person faces a loss of choice about whom to live with and a loss of autonomy, becoming a 
passive recipient of care services, while their companion animal, occupying “a liminal 
position between person and property” is vulnerable to rehoming or euthanasia (2019, p. 
211). They suggest that this shared vulnerability can break down barriers (including species 
differences) in liminal care settings such as care homes, presenting opportunities for growth 
and fulfilment. Using a human rights approach enables an older person forced to rehome 
their companion animal when moving into a care home, to frame the separation as a form of 
family breakdown thereby allowing the possibility of human rights litigation as a means for 
redress. 
My research is the first study to provide an in-depth critical analysis of the existing law in 
England affecting the use and enforcement of ‘no pet’ covenants. In recent years, several 
social media campaigns by pet-owning tenants highlighted ‘no pet’ covenants as a social 
problem and led to the submission of a public petition to the Scottish Parliament in 2018-19 
calling for legislation to prohibit the use of the covenants. However, the paucity of academic 
research makes it difficult for politicians to engage in an informed debate. Further knowledge 
is needed on the impact of ‘no pet’ covenants on the relevant stakeholders. My research 
contributes to an informed debate by providing a detailed understanding of the lived 
experience of ‘no pet’ covenants for seven pet-owning tenants in the UK.  
1.10 My research findings 
My research seeks to understand the familial character of the human-companion animal 
relationship and the implications for housing law and policy within the context of multi-
species tenancies in England. I use the term multi-species tenancy in recognition of humans 
and companion dogs/cats living together in rental housing constructing a shared family life 
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through the everyday practices within the home. I adopt the phrase ‘more-than-human’ 
family from the existing literature on pets as family (Power, 2008; Irvine and Cilia, 2017) to 
demonstrate how companion animals are actively engaged in doing family and are not 
merely passively moulded to fit a pre-existing human-centred family. I adopt a post-humanist 
approach that disrupts the traditional human-animal binary, to extend family to include dogs 
and cats as social agents but I am also conscious of the ever-present ambivalence that 
pervades human relations with animals. Companion animals are deemed family members by 
people but have a property status at law and thereby occupy a liminal position between 
minded persons and disposable objects. 
My social constructionist worldview shapes how I see the social world; reality emerges from 
relationships and there are multiple realities that are relative, context dependent and socially 
constructed. To understand the lived experience of ‘no pet’ covenants for pet-owning 
tenants, I therefore chose qualitative research methods and used in-depth unstructured and 
semi-structured interviews that allowed the participants an opportunity to tell their own story 
in their own words. My research aims to generate ‘truth knowledge’ grounded in experience 
by delving deep into the tenant’s meaning of their experience of ‘no pet’ covenants. To 
achieve this deep understanding, I conducted seven in-depth interviews with people who 
were or had been tenants of residential property in the UK and who had been adversely 
affected by ‘no pet’ covenants. I adopted a mixed analysis approach and analysed the 
interview data using thematic content analysis and, where appropriate, narrative analysis. 
The holistic nature of narrative analysis is especially useful in understanding complexity, 
context and temporality and led to additional findings from the interview data that were not 
evident from the initial thematic content analysis. A limitation of my research is that I only 
interviewed pet-owning tenants who were adversely affected by ‘no pet’ covenants and not 
landlords who benefit from the covenants. For this reason, my empirical research is best 
seen as a pilot study pathing the way for a more comprehensive study that recruits research 
participants from both sides of the debate on ‘no pet’ covenants. In the meantime, my 
research provides valuable understanding as to the character of the human-companion 
animal relationship and the magnitude of the harm ‘no pet’ covenants can cause to pet-
owning tenants. 
From my thematic content analysis, I identified three key themes: Agency; Social Support 
and Ambivalence (detailed in Portfolio component 4 “Analysis of interviews”, 5.2 Thematic 
Content Analysis: How people in the UK construct animals as family members in everyday 
practices). The Agency theme embraces the notion of companion animals as minded social 
actors who actively participate in doing family through everyday practices and who influence 
household decisions, instigate detrimental changes to everyday practices and affect human-
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human interactions (sometimes positively as a social lubricant and other times negatively as 
a source of conflict). My ‘Social Support’ theme encapsulates the animal as both caregiver 
and care-receiver and shows how companion animals are socially constructed as kin 
through the many ways in which they support the physical, mental and emotional well-being 
of their owners. The theme of Ambivalence recognises how the ambivalence that 
characterises our relations with animals in general may permeate our relations with 
companion animals. While the existing literature suggests that ambivalence may threaten 
the durability of the family status of a pet (Shir-Vertesh, 2012) my own findings found little 
evidence of this. Pet owners were willing to openly declare their companion animal as a 
family member and endured hardship to protect the relationship. Ambivalence to animals 
was at times evident in the words and actions of landlords and officials but this aroused 
feelings of anger and frustration in the tenants who felt entitled to have their relationship with 
their dog/cat taken seriously. 
Using thematic content analysis to understand the lived experience of ‘no pet’ covenants for 
pet-owning tenants, five themes emerge from my seven interviews: Rental Insecurity; Lack 
of Choice; Powerlessness in Negotiations and Perceived Discrimination; Mental Health and 
Ambivalence (detailed in Portfolio component 4 “Analysis of interviews”, 5.3 Thematic 
Content Analysis: How people in the UK experience a ‘no pet’ covenant in their residential 
lease). A particularly interesting finding from my research in the UK is the striking similarity in 
the experience of pet-owning tenants to those in Australia (Power, 2017) and Canada 
(Graham et al, 2018). All three studies found pet-owning tenants enduring similar forms of 
disadvantage and harm caused by ‘no pet’ covenants. All found evidence of tenants facing 
rental insecurity due to concealing their pets from their landlord in breach of a ‘no pet’ 
covenant and all found pet-owning tenants having to compromise on the substandard state 
of repair or poor location of the property due to the low availability of pet-friendly housing. 
These disadvantages, together with feelings of powerlessness in negotiations with the 
landlord over the question of pets, left pet-owning tenants feeling a sense of discrimination. 
The ‘mental health’ theme emerges as a significant theme in my research with many of the 
other themes linking to it. All my participants reported that the existence of the ‘no pet’ 
covenant in their lease had an adverse effect on their mental health causing stress, anxiety 
and in some cases, suffering and grief. 
I drew on Michael’s (2000) concept of a co(a)gency, thereby viewing the assemblage of 
human+animal+home+lease as the relevant subject for analysis. An original aspect of my 
research is the way in which it questions the research participants on both the role of 
companion animals in family practices and the effect of ‘no pet’ covenants. None of the 
existing empirical studies have taken this approach which I believe allows for a more 
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insightful understanding of the tenant’s lived experience of ‘no pet’ covenants by 
acknowledging the character of the relationship the tenant shares with their companion 
animal. My sub-theme of ‘Detrimental Changes to Everyday Practices’ (within the Agency 
theme) is not considered in the existing literature examining pets as family but arose from 
my interview data as a significant theme in the context of ‘no pet’ covenants. Pet-owners 
endure detrimental changes to their everyday routines, for example disturbed nights and 
sleep deprivation, for the sake of their relationship with their dog or cat. This resilience to 
hardship for the sake of their pet is evident when pet-owning tenants are faced with ‘no pet’ 
covenants and choose to endure hardship, such as poor-quality housing (part of the Lack of 
Choice theme), rather than relinquish their companion animal. The link between the themes 
of Detrimental Changes and Lack of Choice arose because I viewed the co(a)gency of 
human+animal+home+lease as my research subject. In contrast to Shir-Vertesh (2012) and 
her concept of flexible personhood to explain dogs losing their family status as life changes 
occur, my findings demonstrate a very different outcome of life changes. When life 
circumstances changed, my participants suffered detriment and endured hardship for the 
sake of their companion animal and in rationalising these detrimental changes to their lives, 
they emphasised the importance of their companion animal and thereby affirmed their 
kinship ties. This had the effect of strengthening rather than terminating the animal’s status 
as a family member. 
Three themes emerge from my narrative analysis of the four stories I crafted from four of my 
interviews: Symbiotic Relationships; Hierarchy of Family Members and Harm Assessment 
(detailed in Portfolio component 4 “Analysis of interviews”, 5.4 Narrative Analysis). My 
narrative analysis demonstrates how the human-companion animal relationship is a 
dynamic, symbiotic relationship that benefits both parties and can interconnect the owner 
with other humans (for example, other family members or even a deceased partner). Bob 
was married to Margaret for 57 years and they shared a life together with their dog, Darkie 
before her death. There is a complexity present in Bob’s relationship with Darkie that is 
indicative of a dynamic, reciprocal and social relationship that is intertwined with Bob’s 
relationship with Margaret. Ambivalence arose as a theme from the literature review and the 
thematic content analysis of my interview data. While ambivalence can be seen in the 
treatment of some pets, evident from the large numbers left by their owners at rehoming 
centres each year, the findings from my narrative analysis identifies the concept of a 
Hierarchy of Family Membership as an alternative explanation. This theme emerged directly 
from my interview data and is not identified in the existing literature on pets as family. My 
research participant, Kate, gave up her two dogs for rehoming and I found her actions 
difficult to reconcile with her claim that the dogs were family members. Her actions could be 
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interpreted as evidence of ambivalence similar to Shir-Vertesh’s (2012) research participants 
in Israel. However, the holistic approach of narrative analysis that recognises the importance 
of context and temporality, led me to interview Kate a second time, one year later, to discuss 
my interpretation of her experience and this resulted in understanding her actions as a 
hierarchical ranking of family members. The dogs were family members, but Kate positioned 
the welfare of her new-born baby and seven-year old child above the dogs, leading to her 
decision to rehome her dogs. Had the family consisted of just Kate, her husband and the 
dogs she would not have rehomed the dogs because she would have ranked the needs of 
the dogs above her own. Further research on how the concept of the Hierarchy of Family 
Membership applies to ‘more-than-human’ families is needed to test the efficacy of the 
concept. The final theme to emerge from my narrative analysis was Harm Assessment which 
proved to be an important finding in my empirical research because of its relevance to 
assessing the law (see section 1.10.1 below). In deciding to conceal their companion 
animals from their landlords, Kate, Lucy and Josh undertook a harm assessment of the 
situation. They judged that there was no harm to the landlord in keeping their pet in the 
property and thereby justified their decision to breach the ‘no pet’ covenant in their lease. 
My research develops the existing literature (Rook, 2018; Fox and Ray, 2019) on the 
application of human rights arguments to the use of ‘no pet’ covenants and the depth of 
analysis with which I examine this is an original contribution to the field. Many people socially 
construct their pets as members of their family through everyday practices in the home and 
enjoy a socially supportive relationship with their companion animal that resembles socially 
supportive human-human relationships. This raises significant questions about the relevancy 
of human rights arguments which are analysed in section 1.6 above and the Portfolio 
component 5, 6.5.2.1 Does the human-companion animal relationship come within private 
life and family under Article 8 ECHR?  In my commentary and portfolio, I construct a legal 
argument that the human-companion animal relationship comes within Art. 8, ECHR as 
either ‘family’ or ‘private life’ and consider the implications of this for housing law and policy. 
Portfolio component 5 includes a detailed analysis of the law in England relating to ‘no pet’ 
covenants. Housing law is silent on the matter and leaves it to the landlord and tenant to 
negotiate the question of pets living in the property. In reality, this freedom of contract 
enables landlords to determine whether their tenants can live with a cat or dog. My in-depth 
analysis of the law is an original contribution to the field and is divided into two sections. 
Firstly, whether ‘no pet’ covenants constitute unfair terms under the Consumer Rights Act 
2015 and secondly, whether landlords can terminate the lease and repossess the property 
where tenants are in breach of a ‘no pet’ covenant. My analysis found that a blanket ban on 
all pets is likely to be deemed unfair and consequently void, however, the current position is 
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uncertain and urgent clarification by the Competition and Markets Authority is needed. In 
respect of possession proceedings by public authority landlords, the application of the 
reasonableness test means that it is only in special cases that courts will refuse a 
possession order where a tenant is deliberately in breach of a ‘no pet’ covenant and intends 
to continue the breach by keeping their cat or dog. Case law shows that the socially 
supportive role of a companion animal can constitute a special case where expert medical 
evidence supports retaining the pet due to the tenant’s specific health problems. Using my 
findings from my literature review and analysis of my interview data which shows that 
companion animals provide valuable social support and improve the physical and mental 
health and well-being of pet owners, I suggest that it is appropriate for the courts to protect 
the human-companion relationship for any tenant facing eviction for breach of a ‘no pet’ 
covenant and not just those with severe mental health problems. This can be achieved 
through a Harm Assessment within the reasonableness test. 
1.10.1 A Harm Assessment: an analysis of harm 
 
Harm Assessment is a key concept to emerge from my narrative analysis (detailed in 
Portfolio component 4 “Analysis of interviews”, 5.4 Narrative Analysis). Kate, Lucy and Josh 
all carried out a harm assessment when deciding to conceal their pets from the landlord. My 
idea to critically analyse ‘no pet’ covenants through the lens of harm is an original 
contribution to the field and receives support from three relevant areas: 
(i) The analysis of my interview data from which harm emerges as a key theme. The 
fact that tenants perceive their companion animals as family members means 
they will endure hardship to protect that bond, such as living in poor quality 
housing, or face significant harm if forced to rehome their family member (see 
Portfolio component 4 “Analysis of interviews”); and  
(ii) The reasonableness test in possession proceedings in public sector housing in 
which harm is a relevant factor in the court’s assessment of the reasonableness 
of granting the landlord a possession order (see Portfolio component 5, 6.5.1.3 
‘The reasonableness test and an assessment of harm’); and 
(iii) The proportionality test in human rights arguments, as applied to Article 8 and 
Art.1, Prot.1 ECHR in which a fair balance must be struck between the 
convention rights of the respective parties so that one does not suffer a 




The fact that courts carry out an assessment of harm in the reasonableness test and the 
proportionality test, both of which may apply to the use of ‘no pet’ covenants, strengthens my 
recommendation that a Harm Assessment approach is the appropriate means to assess the 
need for legislation to regulate the use of ‘no pet’ covenants. The idea of assessing the 
legitimacy of state interference with people’s rights (in this case with a landowner’s property 
rights) by reference to harm receives widespread analysis in existing literature. John Stuart 
Mill’s ‘harm principle’ from 1859 continues to influence questions of legitimate state 
interference with a person’s liberty. In On Liberty, Mill states: 
“[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.” (Mill, 1859, p.223). 
Drawing on Mill’s ‘harm principle’ to examine the moral constraints on legislative action in the 
field of criminal law, Feinberg addresses the question “What sorts of conduct may the state 
rightly make criminal?” (1987, p. 3). Adopting a “presumptive case for liberty” (1987, p. 9) in 
which liberty is the norm and legal coercion must always to be justified, Feinberg identifies 
harm to others as a morally relevant reason for enacting criminal law. As a proponent of 
Liberalism and antipaternalism, Feinberg is keen to restrict liberty-limiting (or coercion-
legitimizing) principles to those circumstances where it can be justified by the need to 
prevent harm (or offense) to others. The limitation on the liberty of a landlord to control the 
use of his/her own property is in itself a harm. According to Feinberg the state is justified in 
invading citizens’ interests in liberty only where a greater harm would result from a failure to 
interfere. The interest in liberty is an interest in having as many “open options” as possible 
(1987, p.207), for example, the option of landlords to decide whether to allow pets in their 
property or not. Although this is a matter for negotiation with the tenant, in reality, the state of 
the housing shortage means that the tenant’s bargaining power is weak and any concept of 
negotiation between the two is illusory. If Parliament passes legislation to regulate the use of 
‘no pet’ covenants and prohibit blanket bans, landlords will no longer be at liberty to include 
‘no pet’ covenants – they lose their freedom to choose whether animals can live on their 
property or not but in doing so benefit pet-owning tenants who suffer harm from the use of 
‘no pet’ covenants. Thus, the harm principle must provide some way of grading different 
types of harms on the basis of their seriousness. Virtually all human behaviour can affect the 
interests of others to some degree, but it is only where harm is substantial and avoidable 
that state intervention can be justified. 
1.10.1.1 The question of consent 
 
Mill’s harm principle distinguishes between harm to others (later categorised as other-
regarding harm) and harm to the agent himself (known as self-regarding harm). The general 
rule being that other-regarding harm justifies interference by the state in the form of liberty-
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limiting legislation, whereas self-regarding harm does not. However, the concepts of other-
regarding and self-regarding action have proved problematic in practice especially as they 
are not mutually exclusive with some actions being both which has led Saunders (2016) to 
suggest that the more important distinction is between consensual and non-consensual 
harm. By focusing on the question of consent, Saunders contends that Mill could have 
defended all the conclusions he reached without creating the difficult problem of delineating 
a self-regarding sphere. Saunders advocates that as a general rule interference by the state 
can be justified to prevent non-consensual harms but not to prevent consensual harms 
(although exceptions do exist). Since consensual harm does not usually justify interference 
by the state, could landlords argue that a tenant consents to rehome their pets when they 
accept a lease with a ‘no pet’ covenant and therefore any consequent harm is consensual? 
This raises the question of what counts as valid consent? Mill refers to consent being 
 “free, voluntary, and undeceived” (Mill, 1859, p.225)  
and Feinberg identifies voluntary choice as being free from coercion or other manipulation, 
free from ignorance, mistaken belief and any temporary distorting circumstances (1987, p. 
115). Feinberg’s argument against the legality of voluntarily entering into a contract of 
slavery highlights the complexity around issues of consent, more recently examined by 
Shafer-Landau (2005) in relation to apotemnophiliacs (those who strongly desire to have 
their healthy limbs amputated). Whilst accepting that someone may consent to be a slave, 
there is a risk that such slavery contracts, if legal, may be abused, 
“if we allow the institution of “voluntary slavery” at all, then no matter how stringent 
our tests of voluntariness are, it is likely that a good many persons will be wrongly 
permitted” (Feinberg, 1987, p. 79-80). 
The safest option therefore is to presume non-voluntariness in cases of slavery contracts 
(and mutilation contracts, suggests Shafer-Landau). When considering the question of the 
voluntariness of a tenant’s consent to a ‘no pet’ covenant and the harm it causes to both 
tenants and their families, the significance of the housing crisis in England and the unequal 
bargaining power between the landlord and tenant cannot be ignored. Arguably a tenant’s 
consent to a ‘no pet’ covenant is illusory because the tenant has no real power to negotiate a 
lease that accepts their companion animal. The circumstances are such that there is no 
room for compromise in the negotiations about the pet – there is no half-way position that 
would satisfy both landlords who wants to exclude pets from their property and tenants who 
wants to live with their companion animal. Is there genuine consent to the ‘no pet’ covenant 
where a tenant feels he/she has no choice but to accept the covenant? My research 
participant, Kate, accepted the lease with a ‘no pet’ covenant because there were no other 
suitable properties in the area, and she did not want to uproot her young family or make 
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them homeless. The extensive use of ‘no pet’ covenants in the rental sector led her to see 
the covenant as a standard term in leases that would only be enforced if a pet actually 
caused damage or nuisance. Since her well-behaved dogs would not do this, she wrongly 
believed the covenant would not be enforced against her. Since her consent is borne from 
“ignorance” and “mistaken belief” and is the product of a housing shortage that constitutes a 
“temporary distorting circumstance” which distorts the lease negotiations, the question of the 
voluntariness of her consent is raised (Feinberg, 1987, p. 115). Is her apparent consent to 
the inclusion of the ‘no pet’ covenant genuine? The harm (in the form of having to relinquish 
her companion animals) is arguably not consensual since she did not believe that her 
consent to the covenant would lead to the loss of her dogs. Thus, the issue of consent is not 
simple. Shafer-Landau observed that the overall assessment of voluntariness is “much more 
of an art than a science” in which a variety of incommensurable factors are considered 
(2005, p. 190). 
1.10.1.2 The nature of harm 
 
Feinberg sought to placate the many critics of Mill’s “one simple principle” (1987, p. 25) by a 
more in-depth critical analysis of the nature of harm within the harm principle thereby 
acknowledging its many complexities. He acknowledges that the word harm is “both vague 
and ambiguous” (1987, p. 31). To better understand a harmed condition, he identifies three 
senses of harm: 
(i) First sense - a derivative or extended sense in which any kind of thing can be 
harmed such as harm caused to property by smashing a window. A building 
cannot in itself be harmed instead “our reference to their “harm” is elliptical for the 
harm done to those who have interests in the buildings” (1987, p. 31). If a window 
is smashed in a derelict building and no person has an interest in the building, we 
would not say that the building was harmed. 
(ii) Second sense - harm that is “conceived as the thwarting, setting back, or 
defeating of an interest” (1987, p. 33). Interests are all those things in which a 
person has a stake and which are “distinguishable components of a person’s 
well-being” (1987, p. 34). A person is harmed when their interest is setback by 
the invasion of another, for example, through the impairment of function.  
(iii) Third sense - this sense of harm is closely related to the second but is distinct 
and can sometimes be at variance with it. It refers to the way in which a person 
can harm another by treating them unjustly and thereby wronging them. Feinberg 
notes that,   
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“One person wrongs another when his indefensible (unjustifiable and 
inexcusable) conduct violates the other’s right, and in all but certain very special 
cases such conduct will also invade the other’s interest and thus be harmful in 
the [second] sense” (1987, p. 35).  
Applying this to ‘no pet’ covenants, it is first important to recognise that where a tenant 
perceives their companion animal as a family member their interest is setback if they are 
forced to relinquish their dog/cat. My empirical research illustrates other ways in which the 
interests of a pet-owning tenant may be thwarted, for example, Bob having to move out of 
the care home where he lived or David having to refuse shelter and sleep on the streets in 
order to continue living with their dogs (see Portfolio component 4, 5.3.2.2 The effect of ‘no 
pet’ covenants on tenants). Therefore, the tenant is harmed in Feinberg’s second sense of 
harm but what of the third sense of harm? Is the invasion of the tenant’s interest by the use 
of ‘no pet’ covenants wrong per se or can the use of the covenants be justified? Feinberg 
articulated the need for the priority ranking of conflicting interests in difficult situations such 
as this where some harm is unavoidable. Pet-owning tenants suffer harm from the use of ‘no 
pet’ covenants and landlords may suffer harm by the restriction of such covenants meaning 
that harm seems unavoidable. In cases like this, the legal system must assess the 
comparative importance of different kinds of interests and prevent invasions of interests of 
high priority to protect interests of low priority. Feinberg uses this concept of priority ranking 
to identify wrongs (his third sense of harm), 
“Legal wrongs then will be invasions of interests which violate established priority 
rankings” (1987, p. 35).  
In this way any invasion of the interests of another that are justified by the priority rules are 
not legal wrongs even though a person may suffer a setback of their interest. In the context 
of ‘no pet’ covenants it is therefore crucial to determine the priority ranking of thwarting an 
interest in the continuance of a successful human-companion animal relationship as against 
the thwarting of an interest in the protection of physical property against potential damage or 
the protection of a pleasant neighbourhood in which to live. 
“Invasions that are justified by the priority rules are not legal wrongs though they 
might well inflict harm in the nonnormative sense of simple setback of interest” 
(1987, p. 35).  
In this way, Feinberg distinguishes harms (in the second sense of a harm being a setback to 
an interest) from wrongs (in the third sense of a harm as involving a violation of rights). He 
argues that the notion of harm in the context of the criminal law must “represent the overlap 
of senses two and three” meaning that only setbacks to others’ interests that are also 
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wrongs are legal harms (1987, p. 36). Therefore, a harm occurs when morally indefensible 
conduct sets back a person’s interest and also violates their moral rights. This necessitates 
an examination of both the nature of interests and the nature of wrongs.  
According to Feinberg, the interests of others are differentiated into firstly, welfare interests 
and secondly, ulterior interests. Welfare interests are fundamental interests affecting 
physical health and social and emotional well-being whereas ulterior interests are more 
nebulous being a person’s individual goals and aspirations. Welfare interests are both 
extremely important as without them “a person is lost” but are also the more trivial being 
“grossly insufficient for a good life” (1987, p. 37). Ulterior interests, such as an aspiration to 
create a work of art, are generally not directly protected by the law. Research shows that 
companion animals can improve the welfare of their owners physically, emotionally and 
mentally due to the close bond between them (see section 1.5.2) therefore if a landlord is at 
liberty to exclude pets, the welfare interests of tenants may be adversely affected. Welfare 
interests are indispensable to the advancement of ulterior interests therefore ulterior 
interests can be harmed by invading one of the welfare interests needed as a pre-requisite 
for advancing the ulterior interest. Consequently, the fact that pets improve a tenant’s 
welfare interests in terms of better health and emotional stability also improves the prospects 
of the tenant’s ulterior interests. Thus, there is an integral link between the two. However, 
welfare interests are not violated unless they fall below a minimum level. As explained 
earlier, a legal harm is not simply something that causes a setback to the welfare or ulterior 
interests of others. Instead only wrongful harms can justify interference by the state. 
Feinberg advocates that a wrongful harm violates the moral rights of others in circumstances 
where there is no sufficient justification for that violation. Moral rights, such as the rights to 
life, health and economic sufficiency, arise from welfare interests because these interests 
are grounds for moral claims against others. Since Feinberg is concerned only with the 
criminal law, he restricts harm to that which is wrongful whereas Mill adopts a broader 
concept of harm that encapsulates harm where no rights are violated. My research relates to 
property law disputes which distinguishes it from Feinberg’s work in the criminal law. 
Arguably I could rely on Mill’s broader concept of harm without the need to establish that the 
tenant’s rights are violated (in Feinberg’s third sense of harm) but I argue that a tenant’s 
family and private life rights are violated when forced to rehome a companion animal due to 
a ‘no pet’ covenant. Therefore, the harm to the tenant is a wrongful harm which according to 
Feinberg’s stricter concept of harm would justify state interference in the form of legislation 
unless there is sufficient justification for this violation of the tenant’s rights. Is the use of ‘no 
pet’ covenants justified as a means to protect the interests of landlords and other tenants? If 
the type of interests ‘no pet’ covenants protect are deemed more important than the interest 
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of the pet-owning tenant, the landlord is justified in invading the pet-owning tenant’s interest. 
The tenant may have been harmed but not wronged in these circumstances. This 
reinterpreted harm principle means that legislators must rank interests in order of 
importance. 
Therefore, once it has been established that pet-owning tenants are harmed by the use of 
‘no pet’ covenants; harmed in the sense of suffering a detriment to their welfare and well-
being within the context of a violation of their rights protecting their private life and family, 
then the application of Feinberg’s theory necessitates assessing and comparing the differing 
harms to landlords and tenants since tenants may be harmed by the use of the covenants 
and landlords may be harmed by their prohibition.  
1.10.1.3 Assessing and comparing harms 
 
Feinberg devised “mediating maxims” (1987, p. 187) and “supplemental criteria” to help the 
hypothetical legislator employ a “sensibly mediated harm principle” (1987, p. 194) including: 
(i) the magnitude of the harm committed; and 
(ii) the probability of the harm occurring; and 
(iii) the relative importance of the harm; and 
(iv) the aggregative nature of the harm. 
Each of these are relevant to my Harm Assessment approach to ‘no pet’ covenants. 
(i) The magnitude of the harm 
The magnitude of the harm caused by ‘no pet’ covenants to pet-owning tenants is a key 
focus of my empirical research and led to my conceptualisation of ‘no pet’ covenants as 
contributors of harm. Feinberg asks, 
“how great must the harm be in order for the harm principle to warrant legal coercion 
to prevent it?” (1987, p. 188). 
There must be genuine harm and not mere annoyance and inconvenience, and any harm 
must not be mere trivia. My empirical research demonstrates the magnitude of harm caused 
to pet-owning tenants by ‘no pet’ covenants. My participants gave numerous examples of the 
type of harm ‘no pet’ covenants can cause: Bob was forced to give up the care, support and 
companionship he enjoyed at his care home and move to a property in the private sector 
where he felt isolated, lonely and struggled to find adequate home support; Julia lived in 
poor quality housing including something she described as a shed in a garden; David 
refused shelter that excluded his dog, forcing him to sleep on the streets and Isabel gave up 
lucrative university scholarships. The examples of harm experienced by my participants 
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illustrate the magnitude of harm pet-owning tenants may suffer which in some cases had life-
changing consequences for the tenant (see Portfolio component 4). The character of the 
human-companion animal relationship as a close, dynamic, supportive social bond that 
extends kinship ties (as discussed in section 1.6 above), means that pet-owning tenants 
suffer serious harm when they are forced to rehome their pets due to ‘no pet’ covenants. 
Kate experienced grief, guilt, regret, loss and anger when she had to rehome her dogs to 
avoid eviction (see Portfolio component 4, 5,4,2 Kate – a story of loss). The adverse impact 
on the mental health of pet-owning tenants emerged as a significant theme from my 
interviews. The legal status of domestic animals as property disguises the seriousness of the 
loss for the pet-owning tenant. Relegating the loss to mere property loss downplays the 
magnitude of the harm suffered by tenants.  
As with Mill’s ‘harm principle’, my Harm Assessment derives from a general utilitarian moral 
philosophy to maximize benefits and minimise harm, but Feinberg qualifies this simplified 
calculation to include considerations of fairness and wrongfulness. Justice requires that A be 
prevented from acting wrongfully towards B even though greater loss may ensue overall. 
According to Feinberg, 
“Other things being equal, wrongdoers are less deserving of protection from harm (or 
the loss of benefits) than the innocent are – a consideration of justice that 
utilitarianism does not take into account” (1987, p. 189). 
Although landlords do not act wrongfully in inserting a ‘no pet’ covenant in residential leases, 
is it fair to use blanket bans on pets thereby causing significant harm to responsible pet-
owning tenants with well-behaved pets? Thus, the probability of harm becomes relevant. 
(ii) The probability of the harm 
In respect of the probability of harm, Feinberg expresses the inverse variation between 
magnitude of harm and probability as a formula, 
“the greater the probability of harm, the less grave the harm need be to justify 
coercion; the greater the gravity of the envisioned harm, the less probable it need be” 
(1987, p.191). 
The compound of magnitude and probability is the degree of risk. What is the risk of 
landlords suffering harm if legislation dictates a positive pet policy as a default position for all 
residential leases? The legislator must consider the independent value of the risk-creating 
action, which in this case is the benefit that ‘no pet’ covenants provide to landlords and other 
tenants. There is little research on the harm to landlords that a positive pet policy would 
entail, and the importance of further research is apparent. Research by the National 
Landlords Association found potential property damage to be the main reason landlords 
include the covenant in the lease (41%), followed by concerns about tenants leaving the 
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property smelling of animals (26%) and concerns about animals causing annoyance to 
neighbours (22%) (NLA, 2017). Similar reasons are cited in the Cats Protection research 
with 63% of private landlords citing potential damage to property, contents and garden as 
the reason for excluding cats from their property (Cats Protection, 2019). It is reasonable for 
landlords to want to protect the value of their property and to avoid nuisance claims from 
neighbours but the probability of harm has to be considered, for example, the same research 
found that 89% of private landlords who allow cats had not experienced any damage to 
furniture or fittings belonging to the landlord (Cats Protection, 2019). Other research found 
that, in the preceding five-year period, very few pet-friendly local authority landlords in 
London had needed to take action against pet owning tenants because of their pets 
(Battersea, 2018). The existing research suggests that serious harm to property is unlikely 
(Carlisle-Frank, Frank and Neilsen, 2005). Neighbouring tenants want a pleasant 
environment in which to live and therefore may benefit from ‘no pet’ covenants that prevent 
other tenants from keeping animals that may cause a nuisance, such as noise disturbance 
or faeces been left in public areas. However, many pet-owning tenants are responsible pet 
owners with well-behaved pets. Therefore, many landlords and neighbouring tenants will not 
suffer any harm from a positive pet policy and more research is needed to better assess the 
probability of actual harm to their interests. If the probability of harm is small and the majority 
of pet-owning tenants are responsible pet owners with well-behaved pets, then the degree of 
risk to the landlord’s interests is small. In these circumstances, does the extensive use of ‘no 
pet’ covenants constitute a disproportionate harm to tenants? 
There may be alternative ways to counteract any risk to landlords, for example, the insertion 
of a covenant in the lease requiring tenants to pay for any property damage. The use of a 
pet deposit (which would need to be drafted as an exception to the Tenant Fees Act 2019) 
could be permitted in any new legislation. The Dogs and Domestic Animals (Accommodation 
and Protection) Bill 2019-21 proposes to reduce the risk of harm to others by introducing a 
system for certifying tenants as responsible pet owners with well-behaved animals. In 
contrast, the probability of harm is high where pet-owning tenants, who see their companion 
animals as family members, are forced to rehome them. Unlike the availability of alternative 
strategies to reduce any risk of harm to landlords, none exist for the tenant required to 
relinquish ownership of their dog or cat. Feinberg’s “balancing strategy” (Shafer-Landau, 
2005, p. 14) ensures the harm-principle is sensibly mediated in practice. He demonstrates 
this by using an example of restricting a person’s liberty to shoot a rifle randomly in the air, 
“Against that negligible value [the actor’s pleasure], the legislator must balance a 




On this basis he concludes that “The scales will surely tilt sharply away from liberty” (1987, 
p. 191). My Harm Assessment adopts a similar balancing strategy and my research findings 
on the type and magnitude of harm caused to pet-owning tenants suggests that on current 
evidence the scales tilt away from the liberty of landlords to control the use of their own 
property. 
(iii) The relative importance of the harm 
This links with Feinberg’s concept of the ‘priority ranking of conflicting interests’ discussed 
earlier. Both concepts apply to a category of cases that Feinberg identified as being 
genuinely problematic for legislators: 
“… to prevent A from harming B’s interest in Y would be to harm A’s interests in X” 
(1987, p. 203). 
The regulation of ‘no pet’ covenants falls within this category of problematic cases because 
to prevent landlords harming the interests of tenants in being able to live with their 
companion animals would be to harm the interest of landlords in being able to control the 
use of their own property. In hard cases such as this legislators must compare the relative 
importance of the conflicting interests. Interestingly, Feinberg provides an example that 
includes a dog barking and causing a nuisance, something clearly relevant to the use of ‘no 
pet’ covenants, 
“In nuisance law, there is a conflict between the plaintiff’s interest in the peaceful 
enjoyment of his land and the defendant’s interest in keeping a hogpen, or a howling 
dog” (1987, p. 204). 
However, the use of ‘no pet’ covenants does not guarantee an animal free neighbourhood 
as homeowners are free to live with companion animals and may keep cats or dogs that 
cause some annoyance to neighbours. Feinberg acknowledges that ultimately it is in the 
discretion of legislators to decide what weight to attach to conflicting interests as it is 
“impossible to prepare a detailed manual with the exact “weights” of all human 
interests” (1987, p. 203)  
detailing the extent and probability of their being affected by certain actions. However, he 
identifies certain “procedures for interest-balancing” (1987, p. 204) that supplement the use 
of the harm principle in these circumstances. Other things being equal, he argues, we 
should: 
(i) protect an interest that is certain to be harmed in preference to one where harm 
is conjectural; and 




These principles can be used to help balance the conflicting interests of landlords and 
tenants in the context of ‘no pet’ covenants. For example, it is more certain that a pet-owning 
tenant will be harmed if they are forced to relinquish their companion animal than the 
landlord’s property interests will be harmed if the animal is allowed to reside in the premises. 
Many dogs and cats are well-behaved and cause no damage to rental property nor 
neighbourhoods. 
Feinberg defines harm as the setback of an interest 
“but when interests of quite different kinds are invaded to the same degree, where is 
the greater harm? That depends, of course, on which of the two kinds of interest is 
the more important” (1987, p. 204). 
This is especially relevant to ‘no pet’ covenants because the relative importance of the 
interests (protection of the human-companion animal relationship perceived as a familial 
relationship as against protection of property) is very different in reality although not in law 
given that both the pet and the house are deemed property. Feinberg identifies three ways 
interests can differ in order to help legislators decide the relative importance of conflicting 
interests: firstly, interests differ in their “vitality”, secondly, in the degree to which they are 
reinforced by other interests and finally in their inherent moral quality (1987, p. 204). Vitality 
measures the extent of damage likely to be caused by harm to the interest. For example, 
damage to one’s heart causes more harm to a person’s health than an equal degree of 
damage to a less vital organ. Similarly, damage to a person’s health and well-being causes 
more harm than an equal degree of damage to a person’s property because welfare 
interests are usually the most vital ones. Feinberg’s formula to assist in assessing the 
relative importance of conflicting interests is as follows: 
“Where a standard person’s interest of high vitality in his system conflicts with 
another standard person’s interest of relatively low vitality in his system, then, other 
things being equal, the former interest can be deemed more important than the latter” 
(1986, p. 205).  
It is not an easy task to categorise interests as more or less vital. There is a simplicity in 
advocating that a person’s interest in protecting the human-companion animal relationship, a 
relationship that many owners perceive as family, is more vital than a landlord’s interest in 
protecting his property from potential damage. Whilst it is acknowledged that damage to 
property may cause considerable stress to landlords there is always risk of some damage to 
rental property whether a tenant has a pet or not (hence the use of deposits). It is likely that 
protecting family relationships between humans would always trump protecting property. 
Should not any relationship sharing the central traits of family relationships and carrying out 
family functions (examined in section 1.6) be deemed more vital than an interest in property? 
Reliant on Feinberg’s procedures for interest-balancing, I suggest that the human-
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companion animal relationship should exert a substantial weight on the scales tilting them in 
favour of liberty restricting intervention (in the form of legislation regulating the use of ‘no pet’ 
covenants).  
(iii) The aggregative nature of the harm 
Feinberg acknowledges further complexities in determining the question of vitality due to the 
way in which 
  “Interests tend to pile up and reinforce one another” (1987, p. 205).  
The fact that landlords are at liberty to exclude pets may make more property owners willing 
to let their property to tenants and thereby increase the housing stock available to the 
residential rental sector. There is also a community interest in not having dogs in the 
neighbourhood that act in a threatening manner or that leave faeces in public places. 
Conversely, dogs can increase social connectedness in local communities creating higher 
levels of social capital (Charles and Davies, 2014; Wood et al, 2017, Portfolio component 4, 
5.2.4 Affecting human-human interactions) and there are benefits to society from the 
significant cost savings to the National Health Service from pet ownership (see section 
1.5.2.2 above) and the boost to the economy from the lucrative pet industry. This 
demonstrates the complexity of the interest-balancing exercise caused by the build-up of 
reinforcing interests, both personal and societal interests. In a similar vein to Feinberg, my 
Harm Assessment includes reinforcing interests in the calculation of harm caused by ‘no pet’ 
covenants by taking into account the possible harm to tenants, companion animals, society 
and landlords. Figure 3 ‘The Harm Assessment Approach’ identifies possible harms from the 
use or prohibition of ‘no pet’ covenants and indicates alternative ways to respond to that 
harm. In my opinion, Figure 3 demonstrates that on the evidence of research to date, state 
intervention to regulate the use of ‘no pet’ covenants is justified on the basis of preventing 
significant harm to pet-owning tenants which outweighs any lesser harm to landlords or other 
tenants. Ultimately Parliament will need to assess the relative importance of these harm and 
therefore research on the character and magnitude of harm to all the stakeholders is vital to 




Figure 3 - The Harm Assessment approach 
  Harm Assessment 
Possible harm where ‘no pet’ 
covenants are used 
Possible harm where ‘no pet’ 
covenants are restricted by law 
HARM TO TENANTS 
Adverse impact on mental health, 
e.g., grief due to having to rehome 
pets; being denied the benefits of 
pets on mental well-being 
Rental insecurity  
Lack of choice - poor quality and 
poor availability of pet-friendly 
property  
Sacrifice – forced to move home or 
rehome companion animals 
Powerlessness in negotiations  
Perceived discrimination  
 
HARM TO LANDLORDS 
Risk of damage to property - (but 
property damage covenant can be 
used in lease) 
Risk of nuisance – (but nuisance 
covenant can be used in lease) 
Risk of allergic reaction – (can be 
included as an exception to the ban) 
HARM TO LANDLORDS 
Tenants hiding pets and not 
reporting property problems.  
HARM TO COMPANION ANIMALS 
Stress of separation and rehoming 
Euthanasia 
HARM TO SOCIETY 
Denies people the benefits of 
companion animals especially in 
combating loneliness and mental 
health problems. Associated costs 
to NHS as a result of this. 
 
 
HARM TO NEIGHBOURING 
TENANTS 
Risk of nuisance (e.g. barking dog, 
dog/cat faeces) (use nuisance 
covenant in lease) 
Risk of allergic reaction (an 
exception to the ban)  
Fear of dogs when present in 
common parts e.g. stairs/lifts 
 
HARM TO COMPANION ANIMALS 
If kept in unsuitable housing e.g. a 
large dog in a high rise flat (but s.9 
Animal Welfare Act 2006 protects 
welfare needs of pet including their 
environment) 
HARM TO SOCIETY 
Reduced availability of private 
sector housing? – research needed 
to identify if this is likely to occur. 
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1.11 My research findings on assessing the need for legislation 
My final research question examines whether a change in housing law and policy in England 
is needed to regulate the use of ‘no pet’ covenants in residential leases to allow all 
residential tenants to live with well-behaved pets with exclusions only permitted in 
exceptional circumstances. The Scottish Parliament public petitions committee felt that there 
was no need for such legislation (November 2019) but I disagree and suggest that there are 
a number of changes in society over recent decades that mean that an assessment of the 
use of ‘no pet’ covenants is more pertinent now than in previous years and Parliament is the 
appropriate body to do this. The Scottish Parliament public petitions committee did not 
consider these changes in its decision. These changes are: 
1.11.1 Changes in people’s perception of pets as family 
Many people now construct their companion animals as family members. This can be 
analysed through different models of family: firstly, one based on sharing similar traits to 
those existing in traditional nuclear family relationships; secondly, a function-based model of 
family that relies on the existence of everyday family practices in the home and/or caring 
practices (discussed in section 1.6 above). Therefore, there is a strong argument for 
recognising and protecting the human-companion animal relationship as a familial 
relationship within the context of housing law. In Portfolio component 5, 6.5.2.1 ‘Does the 
human-companion animal relationship come within private life and family under Article 8 
ECHR?’, I argue that the character of the human-companion animal relationship falls within 
the meaning of ‘private life and family’ under Art. 8 ECHR. This is significant because it 
demonstrates the worth of the relationship and elevates its importance in society, especially 
to the judiciary and politicians. If, as I suggest, the human-companion animal falls within 
Art.8 then the question of legislation to regulate the use of ‘no pet’ covenants can be 
examined within a Human Rights Framework, and involves balancing the competing 
convention rights of tenants under Art.8 and landlord property rights under Art.1, Prot.1 (as 
detailed in Portfolio component 5, 6.7.1 ‘Two Frameworks for Change’). It is for Parliament to 
strike the correct balance between these competing rights in a way that ensures 
proportionality so that no one party suffers disproportionate harm.  
1.11.2 Changes in the availability of research on the benefits of pet ownership 
There is now an extensive body of research on the benefits of pet ownership which was not 
available as little as 30 years ago (which in the history of pet ownership is very recent). This 
research demonstrates the health benefits for individuals as well as benefits to the local 
community and wider society. The human-companion animal relationship is a socially 
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supportive relationship that can provide physical and mental health benefits and promote 
emotional well-being due to the close bond between the human and animal. This is 
especially important for people who are vulnerable such as the elderly or homeless (Enders-
Slegers, 2000; Irvine, 2013a) or during difficult circumstances, such as lockdown during the 
coronavirus pandemic (Hunt, 2020). These health benefits have wider repercussions in 
terms of a reduced burden on health services, for example fewer visits to doctors (Siegel, 
1990), providing significant cost savings for the National Health Service (Hall et al, 2017). 
The thriving pet industry, providing products and services for pet owners, also contributes to 
a healthy economy. I propose that this body of research on the benefits of pet ownership 
should play a role in assessing the need to regulate the use of ‘no pet’ covenants in 
England. Recent legislative and policy changes on ‘no pet’ covenants in Australia (Victoria) 
and New Zealand respectively were as a result of governing bodies recognising the 
significant health benefits of pet ownership. If the question of pets is left to the landlord and 
tenant to negotiate, these important factors will be ignored. 
1.11.3 Changes in the housing sector  
Recent changes in the housing sector mean that more people are now renting in the private 
sector and for longer periods of time, sometimes for life. For many people in England renting 
in the private sector is no longer a transitional stepping-stone to home ownership. Those 
renting for life will be denied the opportunity to live with cats and dogs if their private landlord 
prohibits pets (which almost half of all private landlords do). Housing shortages and austerity 
measures mean that tenants have no bargaining power in negotiating the question of pets. A 
number of my participants experienced powerlessness in negotiations with landlords over 
the presence of pets. Landlords can dictate the terms of the lease knowing that if a pet-
owning tenant is not happy with the ‘no pet’ covenant in the lease, the landlord can simply 
find another tenant. There are more ‘small-time’ private landlords in England than ever 
before. These relatively affluent individuals own two or three houses for investment purposes 
which are let to tenants. These private individuals are motivated by protecting their 
investment and are unlikely to take into account the improved benefits to tenants’ well-being 
in living with a companion animal nor the benefits to wider society. It is for Parliament to take 
these wider considerations into account. In Portfolio component 5, 6.7.1 ‘Two Frameworks 
for Change’, I present a Fair Housing framework that embraces fairness between the parties 
within the context of a Harm Assessment. The framework guides Parliament in balancing the 
disparate rights of all those affected by ‘no pet’ covenants – tenants, landlords, companion 
animals and society – to ensure fairness between the parties. On the basis of current 
evidence, I envisage that such an assessment of harm will favour the enactment of 
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legislation to regulate the use of ‘no pet’ covenants that permits responsible pet-owning 
tenants to live with well-behaved pets. 
That tenants in the UK, Australia (Power, 2017) and Canada (Graham et al, 2018) all have a 
similar harmful experience of ‘no pet’ covenants is interesting, given that states in both 
Australia and Canada have enacted housing legislation to restrict and regulate the use of ‘no 
pet’ covenants. This legislation provides a useful example of the way legislation in England 
could be drafted to restrict the use of the covenants and thereby allow tenants to live with 
well-behaved pets while simultaneously protecting the interests of landlords and 
neighbouring tenants against property damage and nuisance. In doing this, any such 
legislation would be compliant with the Human Rights Act 1998 by preventing 
disproportionate harm to either landlords or tenants. 
The dominant cultural framing of ‘good pet ownership’ requires a lifelong commitment to the 
companion animal (with dogs living an average of 12 years and cats for longer) but the 
current law does nothing to prevent the use of ‘no pet’ covenants and thereby allows 
landlords to require pet-owning tenants to relinquish their companion animals. There are 
clearly conflicting messages at play between pets as disposable property in the field of 
housing and good pet ownership as a lifelong responsibility. By acknowledging the link 
between housing policies and responsible pet ownership policies the government is 
encouraged to address this conflict through regulating the use of ‘no pet’ covenants. 
My research suggests the need for a reconceptualization of ‘no pet’ covenants from 
controllers of risk to contributors of harm. Currently pets are conceptualised by landlords and 
their agents as a risk especially to property due to the potential damage pets may cause to 
fixtures and furnishings (Carlisle-Frank, Frank and Neilsen, 2005). Consequently, pet-owning 
tenants are perceived as problematic. Such views arise and perpetuate due to cultural 
conceptions of pets, especially dogs, as polluting, unhygienic, disruptive and unruly (Serpell, 
1995). Perceiving pets in this way justifies landlords in excluding them from their property 
through using ‘no pet’ covenants as a controller of risk. If pets are excluded the risk of 
damage by pets, however unlikely in practice, is eliminated. I advocate that cultural changes 
over recent years in how owners perceive their pets, especially as family members, warrants 
problematizing the use of ‘no pet’ covenants as a contributor to harm. My findings therefore 
support the case for changing the way ‘no pet’ covenants are perceived from being seen in a 
positive light as controllers of risk to being seen negatively as contributors of harm. This 
reconceptualization supports the need for Parliament intervention. The Government has 
recently stated its proposal to change the Model Agreement for an Assured Shorthold 
Tenancy in the private sector to allow tenants to keep well-behaved pets, recognising the 
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health benefits of pet ownership (MHCLG, 2020a). However, few private landlords use the 
Model Agreement, so these changes are unlikely to have a noticeable impact without the 
force of legislation to require compliance. 
1.12 Future research  
My Harm Assessment approach necessitates a priority ranking of conflicting interests but to 
do this there needs to be reliable data on the harm suffered by the relevant stakeholders. My 
empirical research provides evidence of the harm suffered by seven pet-owning tenants due 
to the use of ‘no pet’ covenants and this is valuable in calculating the magnitude of the 
possible harm to tenants. Further research, using my findings as a starting point, would be 
useful to gather data on a larger sample of tenants as this could provide information about 
the probability of harm to tenants. Understanding the harm to landlords and neighbouring 
tenants that can result from a legislative restriction on the use of ‘no pet’ covenants is 
identified as a significant area for future research. The existing literature is very limited, so it 
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Abstract This paper identifies the law’s failure to recognise and protect the human–companion 
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has striking similarities to human–human relationships in the socially supportive aspects of the 
relationship such as attachment, nurturance and reliable alliance. This contributes to the social life 
and sense of well-being of the owner. There is also evidence that the human–companion animal 
relationship can have physical health benefits such as lowering the risk of death by cardiovascular 
disease. It is clear that society benefits from the human–companion animal relationship, which many 
owners perceive as akin to family, in the form of healthier, less isolated people with better social 
networks. Yet in the key area of housing, the law does nothing to protect or even recognise this 
relationship. In consequence, every year thousands of tenants in both the public and private sector 
are faced with ‘no pet’ covenants in their leases and grapple with difficulties such as reduced 
housing options, higher rents or the traumatic decision to give up their companion animal for 
rehoming or euthanasia. This is especially prevalent amongst vulnerable people, like the elderly and 
mentally ill, who are more likely to need to move into supported accommodation. This article 
examines housing law in countries, such as France and Canada, that prohibit ‘no pet’ covenants in 
residential leases and provides arguments for the effective formulation and implementation of such 
law in the UK. 
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A Case Study: Bob and Darcie 
In April 2017 Bob, an 87 year old man from Scotland, left his residential care home after being 
threatened with eviction. He had been faced with a difficult choice—give up part of his family or give 
up his home. He chose, as many would, to keep his family together and leave his home. His family 
consisted of his companion animal, Darcie, a 10-year old Schnauzer dog whom Bob and his wife, 
Margaret, had taken into their lives and home as a puppy. To Bob, Darcie was part of the family and 
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when Margaret died in 2014, Bob and Darcie became the only remaining members of the family 
unit. The strength of Bob’s sentiment towards Darcie is displayed in his words “He means everything 
to me. Everything. He’s my life now”.1 Bob was forced to give up his home at the residential care 
home where he enjoyed the benefits of security, home support, meals and a sense of community 
with the other residents. For the love of Darcie, he gave all this up, and moved into private rental 
accommodation, based on the strength of the relationship he shared with his dog. A relationship 
that is currently ignored by housing law and policy. 
This article argues that legislation is needed in the UK to prevent landlords of residential properties 
from banning pets. The article proposes using an existing legal concept, that of treating animals 
differently at law depending upon how we use them, as a precedent for treating animals differently 
depending on the nature of our relationship with the animal. The article examines the origin of the 
legal status of domestic animals as property in order to differentiate our relationship with 
companion animals from our relationship with other animals based on notions of trust and 
domination. The article then examines some of the beneficial effects of a close relationship with a 
companion animal on the health and social well-being of the owner. To better understand how 
housing laws in the UK could protect our relationship with companion animals, the article examines 
legislation in other jurisdictions that prohibits landlords from having ‘no pet’ covenants in residential 
leases. Finally the article examines human rights law. Relying on the social nature of the relationship 
with pets and the physical and psychological benefits flowing from this relationship, and using 
human rights case law from Belgium as an example, the article argues that the human–companion 
animal relationship falls within Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights and considers 
the implications of this on housing law and policy in the UK. 
The Human–Companion Animal Relationship 
The scholarly discipline of human–animal studies seeks to understand how animals are socially 
constructed. Once an animal is incorporated into the human social world, it is assigned a category, 
usually based on how it is used by humans.  
This social category is more important than the biology of the animal in determining the status and 
treatment of the animal including at law (DeMello 2012). For example, a rabbit’s biology classifies it 
as a member of the species Oryctalygus cuniculus, but the treatment of the rabbit under English Law 
depends upon its use: is it a pet rabbit? (protected by the Animal Welfare Act 2006); or a rabbit bred 
for meat? (in which case the Welfare of Farmed Animals (England) Regulations 2007 also apply); or is 
it a rabbit used in scientific procedures as an experimental test subject? (which would exclude the 
provisions of the Animal Welfare Act 2006 and instead apply the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 
1986) or is it a wild rabbit? (which is deemed a pest and generally excluded from the protection of 
the law unless under the permanent or temporary control of a person). Consequently, it is the social 
category bestowed upon the rabbit that determines its treatment under the law. It is here suggested 
that this legal construct, of treating animals differently depending upon their use to humans, can be 
invoked to protect our relationship with companion animals. To do this, we first need to recognise 
the unique relationship humans share with their companion animals, which is akin to family (Serpell 
1996; Franklin 2006; Charles and Aull Davies 2008). I use the word ‘companion animal’ to 
differentiate those animals kept primarily for social or emotional reasons from those kept primarily 
 
1 Elderly people in struggle to keep pets in care homes, says charity. BBC news report, 9 January 
2017. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-38553 330/elder ly-peopl e-in-strug gle-to-keep-pets-in-care-
homes -sayschari ty (accessed 2nd November 2017). 
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for economic or work purposes (Serpell and Paul 1994). The term also better reflects the change in 
our relationship with these animals over the last 50 years, for example, dogs used to sleep in a 
kennel outside the house rather than in the owner’s bedroom. Franklin suggests that it was “after 
the 1970s that ‘pets’ changed to ‘companion animals’” (Franklin 2006). I use the word ‘family’ 
tentatively, aware of its limitations just as others have done in the context of research on lesbian, 
gay and bisexual relationships. The rise of the LGBT community led to new forms of relationships and 
the concept of ‘families we choose’ (Weston 1991). In her article ‘My Friends are my Family’, 
Westwood observes, “We simply do not as yet have a vocabulary to describe these new relationship 
forms” (Westwood 2013) so she uses ‘friendship’ in her article whilst recognising its limitations. 
Similarly, with companion animals we can observe the strength of the bond between an owner and 
an animal whilst acknowledging the limitations of labelling this relationship as family. This term is 
heavily laden with human associations and is not ideally suited for the unique relationship we share 
with companion animals but in the absence of alternative appropriate vocabulary, the terminology is 
borrowed with the caveat that companion animals are akin to family rather than being family. 
However, this distinction is undoubtedly very subtle and many owners, like Bob, will perceive their 
companion animal as a member of the family for everyday living purposes. 
Westwood argues that for many people, particularly in later life, friendships can be the most 
significant relationships, more important than family relationships (Westwood 2013). Yet in key 
areas of law and social policy, such as welfare benefits and medical decision-making, friendship is 
not recognised by the law. She argues that the law needs to keep pace with changing relationship 
forms and considers how its failure to do so impacts on equality for older people. There are parallels 
here with the relationship people develop with their companion animal and the failure of the law to 
recognise this relationship in the important area of housing. 
Companion animals are deemed property at law. There is a mismatch between their legal status as 
property and the way in which people socially construct their companion animal as part of their 
family. To use Bob’s words, Darcie is “my life”. These are powerful words to describe a relationship 
that in law is classified as property. This divergence of law and reality has also been noted in the 
context of pet custody disputes that can arise following a separation or divorce of a couple where 
both parties want the family pet to live with them. The courts have struggled at times to apply pure 
property law tests given the strength of the bond between the human and the companion animal 
(Rook 2014). By understanding the origin of the legal status of domestic animals as property, it is 
possible to differentiate our relationship with companion animals from our relationship with other 
animals. Statistically, in the USA, farm animals represent 98% of all animals with whom we interact 
(Wolfson and Sullivan 2004) and it is likely to be a similar figure in England. Thus the majority of 
human–animal relationships rely on our ability to use animals for our own purposes with little, or no, 
benefit to the animal, for example, intensively farmed animals are generally denied a natural 
environment and are killed prematurely and animals used for scientific procedures can be subjected 
to pain and suffering. However, our relationship with companion animals, such as the cats and dogs 
living in our homes, is different. In most cases, the companion animals benefit from their 
relationship with us. We do not need to harm their welfare for our own benefit. On the contrary, we 
often reap social and health benefits from the very act of fulfilling the animal’s welfare needs. This is 
unique in the human relationship with animals and justifies a unique approach in law, which both 




The Origin of the Legal Status of Domestic Animals as Property 
In the history of our relationship with those animals that we eat there have been conflicts and 
contradictions, arising from our desire to use the animals as utilitarian objects whilst simultaneously 
recognising them as sentient beings capable of pain and suffering. By tracing the history of this 
conflict and exploring human defence mechanisms and coping strategies, developed over time to 
defuse or hide the conflict and assuage any feelings of guilt or discomfort, it is possible to 
understand the origin of the property status of companion animals and thereby highlight its 
inadequacies. 
The origin of the legal status of domestic animals as property is thought to lie in the domestication of 
animals and the move from hunter-gatherers to pastoralists. The beginnings of livestock husbandry 
is dated approximately 9000 years ago starting with sheep and goats (Clutton-Brock 1994). However, 
our relationship with dogs is much older. The conventional view is that humans first domesticated 
their hunting partner, wild wolves, 10–20,000 years ago (Davis and Valla 1978; Beck and Katcher 
1996), however some suggest that it was much earlier, approximately 100,000 years ago (Morell 
1997). Using selective breeding to encourage the characteristics we desired—playfulness, 
subservience, dependence—dogs are the creation of humans. Beck and Katcher suggest “Our 
affection for dogs may simply be a way of expressing the love that a creator has for his or her 
creation” (1996: 171). They hypothesize that “the relationship between dogs and people is rooted in 
the evolution of both” (1996: 176). Given the long history we have with dogs, it is not surprising that 
dogs are our most popular companion animal and the animals with whom we develop some of our 
strongest bonds.2 
Studies of pets in primitive societies hint at a significant paradigm shift as humans progressed from 
hunter-gatherers to agriculturists. Ingold adopted an ‘indigenous perspective’ to understand our 
domestication of animals that were once wild. He sought to shed the dichotomies of ‘wild versus 
domestic’ and ‘nature versus humanity’ traditionally used in the West to tell the story of the history 
of our relationship with animals, and instead sought to understand the nature of the relationship 
between hunter-gatherers and animals from the perspective of the indigenous people (Ingold 1994). 
From their perspective, the natural world is not separate from, and inferior to, the human world. It 
does not have to be conquered or controlled. Instead, animals are fellow inhabitants of the same 
world as humans. Serpell observes that there is much consistency in how hunter-gatherer societies 
view animals as rational, sentient and intelligent beings with spirits or souls that can survive the 
body after death (Serpell 2000). For example, the Cree Indians of Northern Canada believe that 
animals intentionally present themselves to the hunter to be killed and on death the soul of the 
animal is released to become flesh again (Tanner 1979; Ingold 1994). The hunter must be respectful 
and not wasteful or the animal will remember the transgression and not present itself in the future. 
This means that the success of the hunter depends on establishing a continuing relationship with the 
animals; a relationship, Ingold argues, based on trust. For him “The essence of trust is a peculiar 
combination of autonomy and dependency” (1994: 13). The hunter is dependent on the animal and 
takes a risk that the animal, as an autonomous being, will act in the interests of the hunter and 
present itself to be killed. In return, the hunter is respectful of the animal; but this egalitarian moral 
ideology was clearly incompatible with the shift to agriculture and the domestication of farm animals 
for meat. According to Ingold the relationship the pastoralist has with animals is based on 
 
2 In 2017, 24% of households in the UK owned a dog compared to 17% of households with a cat. The 
total population of pet dogs was 8.5 million dogs compared to 8 million cats. Pet Food Manufacturers’ 




domination not trust. The animals are selectively bred to be dependent on humans and therefore 
are unable to exercise their own free will to present themselves to die. The animals have no control 
over their lives. This shift from human–animal relations based on trust to those based on domination 
necessitated seeing animals as objects rather than as subjects worthy of respect. Ingold observes 
that, “Domestication can be said to exist when living animals are integrated as objects into the socio-
economic organisation of the human group” (1994: 6). Thus, the advent of domestication of animals 
was dependent not just on biology but also on culture. Biology enabled us to adopt artificial selective 
breeding techniques to modify animals into what we wanted and culture enabled us to own the 
animals as property through the development of law and government. Arluke has explored the 
conflict in the treatment of animals in contemporary society—the fact that we shower our pets with 
love and treat them as one of the family but exploit and kill other domestic animals as utilitarian 
objects. He observes that “As with any cultural contradiction, these attitudes are built into the 
normative order, itself perpetuated by institutions that provide ways out of contradictions by 
supplying myths to bridge them and techniques to assuage troubled feelings” (Arluke 1994: 145). 
Thus our legal institutions, that objectify animals as property on a par with inanimate things, serve to 
justify our use of animals and relieve any associated guilt. 
The problem is that the law applies the same legal status to animals in two very different situations. 
Our relationship with farm animals is based on domination but our relationship with companion 
animals is based on trust. Interestingly, Medieval England recognised this distinction and was fearful 
of it. During the witch hunts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, legislation was passed in 
England creating the crime of ‘necromancy’ and the concept of a witch’s familiar was introduced 
(Hole 1977). In many of the witchcraft cases brought to trial in England, the accused was implicated 
by keeping companion animals (Serpell 1996). Cohen’s study of the medieval perception of animals 
demonstrates the importance attached to humanity’s separation and distance from animals. She 
notes how “The search for perfect humanity consisted in distancing oneself as far as possible from 
the animal [world]” (1994: 61). Due to the popularity of this view at the time of the witchcraft hunts, 
the closeness of the relationship between the human and their companion animal offended society. 
Serpell observes that “it was claimed that people were debased or dehumanized by the act of co-
habiting on such egalitarian and intimate terms with animals” (1994: 134). A relationship with 
domestic animals based on domination and superiority was acceptable, for example, keeping pigs 
for meat, but a relationship with a domestic animal, such as a cat living in the home, based on trust 
and equality was perceived as dangerous and consequently demonised. 
Clearly, we have moved a long way from the medieval witch hunts and their antiquated laws. 
Nowadays, many people share their homes with companion animals even their most personal and 
private spaces, such as their bedrooms and their beds. Yet whilst medieval laws at least appeared to 
recognise a distinction between the different relationships we had with animals based on 
domination or trust, the current laws show a distinct inability to differentiate these. The failure to 
acknowledge the close and unique bond some humans have with their companion animals is 
damaging to both humans and animals. The traumatic experience in 2017 of an 87-year old man 
having to leave his secure home in order to keep his beloved companion dog illustrates the need for 
urgent change. 
The Benefits of the Human–Companion Animal Relationship to Individuals and Society 
There are many disadvantages for those individuals living with a companion animal including the 
significant financial costs of food, veterinary care and insurance; time spent caring for the animal 
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which can be significant especially for dogs; cleaning up after the animal; concern arising from their 
destructive or anti-social behaviour; emotional distress when the animal is ill or dies; risks of bites, 
allergic reactions or other illnesses carried by the animal (Plaut et al. 1996). Companion animals 
provide no economic benefit, so given the significant disadvantages associated with them, what 
motivates people to acquire and keep a companion animal? 
Developing Social Relationships Through Living with a Companion Animal 
Obtaining a companion animal provides an opportunity to form a new social relationship and is a 
means of extending a person’s network of relationships (Harker et al. 2000; Bonas et al. 2000). Using 
Weiss’ theory of relational provisions (Weiss 1974), Harker et al. examined whether the function of 
the human–companion animal relationship was in part determined by relational provision available 
from other social relationships. Weiss identified six categories of relational provision that provide an 
adequate social life and sense of well-being: Attachment; Social integration; Opportunity for 
nurturance; Reassurance of worth; a sense of reliable alliance and Obtaining of guidance. Weiss 
argued that individuals need to maintain a number of different relationships to ensure all the 
relational provisions are met. Harker’s study used a ‘pet ownership questionnaire’ to examine 
Network of Relationship Inventory ratings (Furman and Buhrmester 1985) from two groups of 
adults: those who were seeking to obtain a pet and those who were not. It found that participants 
seeking to acquire a pet had expectations of positive relationship-like provisions—such as 
companionship, friendship, affection—which they believed would result from keeping an animal. 
The study found that “high levels of negative relational provision appear to be associated with the 
desire to own a pet” (2000: 206). Therefore, negative relational provision—conflict, antagonism and 
punishment—in human–human relationships may increase dissatisfaction with current life 
circumstances and acquiring a pet may be one strategy adopted by people to compensate for 
inadequacies in human–human relationships. However, a study by Bonas et al. which also used a 
survey based on Furman’s Network of Relationships Inventory and Weiss’ theory of relational 
provisions to investigate whether pet ownership can be usefully conceptualized as a social 
relationship, found no evidence to support the idea that pets are used to ‘plug the gap’ where social 
provisions are lacking in human–human relationships; “The idea that pet owners use provisions from 
pets to compensate for shortcomings in other human relationships does not receive support from 
this study” (Bonas et al. 2000: 233). Couples and families with children are just as likely to own a pet 
than single people adding support to the view that pets do not substitute human relationships but 
complement and augment those relationships (Serpell 1996; Beck and Katcher 1996). 
The study on social relationships by Bonas et al. gathered data on the participant’s relationship with 
their immediate human family as well as their relationship with their pets so that the data between 
the human–human relationship and human–companion animal relationship could be compared. The 
study found striking similarities in the nature of the relationships which adds “empirical weight to 
the view that human–pet relationships are similar in nature to human–human relationships and, 
perhaps more specifically, that the supportive aspects of the two kinds of relationships are broadly 
similar” (Bonas et al. 2000: 219). 
Further studies have also used Weiss’ conceptual framework of social provision to make sense of the 
human–companion animal relationship in different population groups especially vulnerable groups 
such as the elderly (Enders-Slegers 2000) or the homeless (Irvine 2013). Enders-Slegers’ study, which 
examined the bond between the elderly and their companion animals, identified the most important 
social provision derived from the relationship as ‘attachment’ followed by the ‘opportunity for 
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nurturance’ and ‘reassurance of worth’ (Enders-Slegers 2000). Another study examined the human–
companion animal relationship amongst people living with HIV in Australia and found support for the 
claim that companion animals can benefit an owner’s emotional, physical and social life by fulfilling 
one or more of Weiss’s six social provisions for psychological well-being (Hutton 2015). Hutton 
suggests that “a person’s belief in their animal’s supportive presence may be sufficient to “buffer” 
negative life challenges” (2015, 211). What is significant, therefore, is how a person perceives their 
relationship with the animal. 
These studies suggest that it is the relationship with the companion animal that motivates people to 
acquire and keep the animal. This social relationship provides relational provision especially 
attachment, nurturance and a sense of worth, which contributes to an adequate social life and sense 
of well-being. The benefits people enjoy as a result of the social relationship with their companion 
animal outweigh the significant cost of keeping the animal in their home. The reach of these benefits 
goes beyond the owner and the companion animal; research has demonstrated the “ripple effect” of 
companion animals on wider neighbourhood interactions and a sense of community (Wood et al. 
2007). 
The Health Benefits of the Human–Companion Animal Relationship 
Since Friedmann’s ground breaking research in 1980 that discovered that pet owners had better 
survival and recovery rates 1 year after discharge from a coronary unit than non-pet owners 
(Friedmann et al. 1980), there have been many studies attempting to measure the effects of pet 
ownership on health (Serpell 1991; Anderson et al. 1992; Friedmann et al. 2000, 2013; Levine et al. 
2013). The most recent research is a comprehensive study in Sweden involving 3.4 million people 
over a 12-year period (Mubanga et al. 2017). The study found that owning a dog lowered the risk of 
dying from cardiovascular disease, especially for single people who experienced a significant 
reduction in the risk of death from the disease. 
It is likely that it is the relationship people have with their pet that is significant to any physiological 
and psychological health benefits. It is because we socially construct the relationship as akin to 
family that the animal can protect our health and well-being. Mubanga’s study suggests that the 
social support that emanates from a close bond with a pet dog is likely to be a factor in reducing the 
cardiovascular risk as well as the increased physical activity that comes with dog ownership 
(Mubanga et al. 2017). Mere pet ownership is not sufficient to test the validity of the claim that pets 
are good for your health. The strength of the bond between the owner and the pet, as perceived by 
the owner, needs to play into the equation (Hutton 2015). Someone who owns a pet but has a 
distant, functional relationship with the animal is unlikely to reap the relational provision benefits 
(Weiss 1974) that come from a close human–companion animal relationship. 
The growing evidence that the human–companion animal relationship provides physical, mental, 
emotional and social benefits to individuals is strong but even where the strength of the medical 
evidence is disputed (Herzog 2011), the individual owner’s own perception of the benefits remains 
significant. Bob initially decided to get a dog because he had suffered a heart attack and a dog was 
recommended to help him keep active. Whether or not Darcie increased Bob’s chances of recovery 
at the time or decreases the prospect of another heart attack now, is less important to Bob than the 
close bond that has developed between them. Bob perceives this bond as akin to family and it 
provides many of the benefits of living with another human, for example, company rather than 
loneliness and a sense of purpose and responsibility in meeting Darcie’s welfare needs. Given that 
society benefits from the human–companion animal relationship, in the form of healthier, less 
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isolated people with better social networks, it is perplexing that law and social policy do so little to 
protect the relationship especially in the key area of housing. 
Housing Law and Companion Animals 
Our relationship with companion animals exists in the home environment. These animals share our 
home and form a significant part of our daily life routines. We spend more time with our companion 
animals than we do with human family members who do not live with us. Therefore, laws that 
govern housing significantly affect our relationship with companion animals. In the UK there is 
currently nothing to prevent a landlord including a ‘no pets’ covenant in a tenancy agreement. 
Restricting pet ownership in this way affects people from all walks of life as living with a companion 
animal is not limited by class, gender or ethnicity. However, within the housing arena, the 
inadequacy of law and social policy to protect the human–companion animal relationship, implicates 
class, disadvantaging those unable to afford to own their home. People on low incomes or those 
who are reliant on state benefits or are homeless, have fewer choices about where they live and are 
consequently subject to the whim of the property owner as to whether or not they can keep a 
companion animal in the property. 
Vulnerable People Moving into Care Homes or Supported Accommodation 
‘No pet’ covenants are especially draconian for the elderly and those with mental illness because 
these are groups of vulnerable people most likely to need to leave their home to move into 
supported accommodation. If the supported accommodation does not allow them to take their 
companion animal with them, or there is a change of policy once the person has moved in, as 
happened with the care home in Scotland where Bob and Darcie lived, the pet owner is left with the 
difficult choice to either relinquish their companion animal or lose their place in the supported 
accommodation. Given the nature of the close social bond the elderly develop with their companion 
animals (Enders-Slegers 2000), it is not surprising that the Blue Cross report that its Pet Bereavement 
Support Service receives calls from elderly owners who suffer grief after being required to give up 
their pet to move into a care home that has a ‘no pet’ policy.3 
A Private Member’s Bill in 2010 sought to address this problem in England and Wales. The Care 
Homes and Sheltered Accommodation (Domestic Pets) Bill 2009–10 received its second reading in 
the House of Commons in March 2010. This was preceded in 2009 by the Care Homes (Domestic 
Pets) Bill 2008–2009. Although both Bills enjoyed cross party support, and a consensus in the house, 
based on the acknowledged health benefits of pets for the elderly, especially as an antidote to 
loneliness, the progress of the 2010 Bill was halted in its tracks by a general election. The Bill sought 
to create a legal presumption that pets (of an authorised, non-dangerous, species) should be 
permitted in care homes and sheltered accommodation for the elderly and disabled unless their 
exclusion could be justified, for example, the safety of the other residents necessitated an exclusion 
or the welfare needs of the pet could not be met in the care home. It was unfortunate that the Bill 
ran out of time because the Secretary of State for Health stated that, “The Government understand 
and very much share the sentiment behind the Bill, and are sympathetic to its aims… We do not 
 




want there to be any ban on pets in care homes or sheltered housing. However … the parliamentary 
timetable will not allow the Bill to succeed”.4 
The positive reception of the Private Members’ Bills in the House of Commons shows there is strong 
support in England for legislation to allow the elderly to take their companion animals into care 
homes and sheltered accommodation based on the health benefits pets provide. It is a small step to 
acknowledge these health benefits for all people. It is not just the elderly who suffer cardiovascular 
disease, loneliness and depression. It is not just the elderly who face the prospect of having to move 
from their home to alternative accommodation and cope with the guilt and distress of giving up 
their companion animal, an integral part of their family. France and Canada illustrate that legislation 
prohibiting ‘no pet’ clauses in all residential leases is possible and not difficult to implement. 
All Tenants of Residential Property 
Thousands of people each year in the UK face the prospect of giving up their companion animals 
because they have to move into rental accommodation that prohibit pets.5 Pet owners face a 
restrictive choice of properties, which can lead to them having to rent a less suitable property in 
respect of location and affordability. Research carried out by the Dogs Trust in 2008 found that 78% 
of pet owners experienced difficulties finding a residential rental property that allowed pets and by 
2011 their research found that pet owners can take up to seven times longer to rent a home 
compared to non-pet owners.6 Research in Australia over a 10 year period to 2013 identified a risk of 
increased housing insecurity for pet owners, especially where tenants kept pets without the 
landlord’s knowledge and faced the risk of eviction (Powers 2017). 
Ontario, Canada, provides a case study of successful legislation to prohibit ‘no pet’ covenants in all 
residential leases. A blanket “no pets” clause in a lease is void under Sect. 14 of the Residential 
Tenancies Act 2006 which states, “A provision in a tenancy agreement prohibiting the presence of 
animals in or about the residential complex is void”. However, a landlord is permitted to refuse to 
rent to a person who has a companion animal.7 This apparent inconsistency in the law appears to 
encourage dishonesty on the part of the tenant, or at least a failure to disclose the truth, as it is 
better for a tenant not to admit to having a companion animal until they have signed the lease. 
Advertisements for rental properties that specify ‘no pets’ are not considered discriminatory 
because pet ownership is not protected under Canadian Human Rights laws. However, the position 
is different for people with disabilities who live with a service animal such as a guide dog for the 
blind. A landlord cannot refuse to rent to a person with a service dog unless there are exceptional 
circumstances that justify the refusal, such as the landlord living in the property and having a 
certified severe pet allergy. 
Once there is a tenancy agreement, the landlord cannot evict the tenant on the ground that he or 
she has a companion animal living in the property with them. The law allows tenants to keep pets on 
their property even if there is a ‘no pets’ covenant in the lease and even if the tenant signed an 
agreement at the outset that they would not keep a companion animal in the property. However, 
 
4 Hansard, 5 Mar 2010: Column 1177. 
5 Smith, R. 2011. Pet owners face struggle to find rented accommodation. The Guardian, 27 July 
2011 https ://www.thegu ardia n.com/money /2011/jul/27/pet-owner s-rente d-accom modat ion 
(accessed 12 January 2018). 
6 The Dogs Trust carried out research in 2008 and 2011 using online surveys to support their ‘Lets 
with Pets’ campaign, http://letsw ithpe ts.org.uk/media /resea rch (accessed 13 November 2017). 
7 Social Justice Tribunals Ontario. Landlord and Tenant Board, frequently asked questions. 
http://www. sjto.gov.on.ca/ltb/faqs/#faq8 (accessed 16 November 2017). 
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the tenant’s right to keep companion animals is not unfettered. Land law invariably has to balance 
the conflicting interests of parties so it is not surprising that there are conditions and exceptions. 
Under s.76 of the Residential Tenancies Act (2006, Part V) the landlord can apply to the Landlord and 
Tenant Board to evict a tenant with a pet where: 
(1) The animal has substantially interfered with the reasonable enjoyment of the residential complex 
for all usual purposes by the landlord and other tenants; or 
(2) The presence of the animal has caused the landlord or another tenant to suffer a serious allergic 
reaction; or 
(3) The animal is of a species or breed that is inherently dangerous to the safety of the landlord or 
other tenants. 
In respect of grounds (1) and (2), the Board shall only make an order for terminating the tenancy and 
evicting the tenant if it is satisfied that the animal kept by the tenant caused or contributed to that 
substantial interference or allergic reaction so the landlord will need to provide evidence of this. 
Therefore, a tenant cannot be evicted for keeping a companion animal in their property but could be 
evicted if that companion animal becomes a nuisance, for example, it causes unreasonable noise 
disturbances or damage to the property or where the landlord or another tenant has a severe 
allergic reaction to the animal. What amounts to ‘substantial interference’ in (1) will depend on the 
facts of the case but common sense and reasonableness prevail. For example, in respect of noise 
disturbance, it would be unreasonable to require absolute silence from a pet, so the occasional short 
period of barking from a dog is expected and neighbours will have to tolerate this as they would a 
crying baby. However, excessive barking at unsociable hours is likely to constitute a substantial 
interference with the reasonable enjoyment of the property by the landlord or other tenants and 
will make a tenant liable to eviction. The Residential Tenancies Act also provides that the 
commission of an “illegal act” is a ground for any tenant to be evicted. Within this context, an ‘illegal 
act’ is a broader concept than a criminal offence. Consequently, failure to abide by animal control 
by-laws applicable in the local jurisdiction, for example, any licensing or micro-chipping 
requirements or requirements to pick up dog faeces will constitute an illegal act and thereby 
constitute a ground for terminating the tenancy. 
France was the first country to implement legislation to prohibit ‘no pet’ covenants in residential 
leases. It enacted legislation in 1970 stipulating that any prohibition of pets in residential tenancies is 
deemed to be void (Article 10 of the Law of 9 July 1970). The right of the tenant to be able to keep a 
companion animal is subject to the requirement that the animal does not cause damage to the 
property or disturbance to the enjoyment of other occupants (including the landlord). A clause 
banning dangerous dogs is also permissible. Until recently it was thought that this law only applied 
to long residential leases, but in February 2011 the French Supreme Court ruled that Article 10 also 
applies to holiday rental properties so landlords cannot refuse to accept companion animals 
holidaying with their owners.8 
Article 8 and the Use of ‘No Pet’ Covenants in Residential Leases 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Art.8) encompasses a right to respect for a 
person’s family and private life and home. Interference with these rights can be justified in certain 
 
8 Association Union fédérale des consommateurs de l’Isère—Que Choisir v. Association Clévacances 
Isère—départementale des locations de vacances de l’Isère et autre. Arrêt n° 109 du 3 février 2011 
(0814.402)—Cour de cassation—Première chambre civile. 
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circumstances including the protection of the health, rights and freedoms of others. The grounds for 
interference are wide and the state is afforded a margin of appreciation on the basis that the state 
authorities are best placed to judge the need for the interference and how it is implemented 
(Handyside v UK).9 Art.8 covers family life and private life and whilst there is some overlap between 
these concepts, family life is a narrower concept. It is arguable that the fact that many owners 
perceive their pet as part of their family may be enough to bring companion animals within the 
concept of family life for the purposes of Art. 8 (Fox and Westwood 2017)10 but, if not, the broader 
concept of private life, which encompasses a variety of issues, could be utilised. The European Court 
of Human Rights has held that respect for private life includes “the right to establish and develop 
relationships with human beings”.11 In Botta v Italy, the court stated: “Private life, in the Court’s 
view, includes a person’s physical and psychological integrity: the guarantee afforded by Article 8 of 
the Convention is primarily intended to ensure the development, without outside interference, of 
the personality of each individual in his relations with other human beings”.12 Since relations with 
others fall within private life, it is arguable that a close and meaningful relationship with a 
companion animal also comes within the scope of this broad concept. Such relationships have been 
shown to provide physical and mental health benefits as well as building social relationships in a 
community. On this basis, it is difficult to justify excluding this significant relationship from the 
protection of Art.8. 
There are several ways in which Art.8 could impact on ‘no pet’ covenants in residential leases in the 
UK: 
(1) By preventing local authority landlords from implementing a blanket ban on all pets in residential 
rentals; 
(2) By the domestic courts interpreting ‘no pet’ covenants in leases in the private housing sector as 
unlawful for being in breach of Art.8 by means of indirect horizontal effect by virtue of the fact 
that the courts are a public body and must not act in contravention of Art.8; 
(3) By encouraging the English and Scottish Parliament to pass legislation to prohibit ‘no pet’ 
covenants in all residential leases (whether a public or private landlord) on the basis that such 
covenants constitute an unreasonable interference with human rights. 
Local Authority Landlords Cannot Impose a Blanket Ban on Pets 
Housing law and policy that allow ‘no pet’ covenants in residential tenancy agreements deny people 
the very act of living with a companion animal. In Belgium, the courts have held that a clause which 
prohibits a tenant from keeping a companion animal undermines the tenant’s private life contrary to 
Article 8 of the ECHR (the Convention was approved by domestic law in Belgium in 1955).  
This was first established as a principle in a case in 198613 and later cases demonstrate that courts 
will seldom enforce a ‘no pet’ clause in a lease, especially if a landlord has initially tolerated the 
 
9 (1979–80) 1 EHRR 737. 
10 Companion Animals as Family Members. 2017. Conference paper at ‘Animal Law, Ethics and Legal 
Education’, Liverpool John Moores University, September 2017. 
11 Niemietz v Germany (1992) 16 EHRR 97 at para.29. 
12 (1998) 26 EHRR 241 at para.32. 
13 Civ.Liege, October 21, 1986, J.L.M.B., 1987, 578. 
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presence of a companion animal on the premises but then changes his or her mind.14 However, an 
animal can be excluded where it is justifiable, for example, where the animal causes a nuisance to 
the landlord or other tenants, causes damage to property or is a dangerous animal. Therefore, a 
clause prohibiting pets that are dangerous or a nuisance or cause damage is permissible as a 
justifiable and proportionate interference with the tenant’s private life. In 2001 a court terminated a 
lease where a tenant kept two large dogs on the property in breach of a ‘no pets’ clause in the 
lease.15 The court accepted that a general ban on keeping companion animals affects the tenant’s 
right of integrity to private and family life under Article 8, but acknowledged that on the facts of the 
case the landlord had a legitimate reason for prohibiting certain pets. The court took into account 
the need of the landlord to avoid disputes with other tenants in the property due to the “special 
circumstances specific to the building”. The small size and layout of the property meant that it was 
unsuitable for two large dogs. Presumably it would have been permissible for the tenant to have 
kept a rabbit or a hamster. 
The doctrine of proportionality is a key consideration in Art.8 cases and requires that the 
interference is in proportion to the aim to be achieved and does not go further than is needed. Even 
if it could be argued that the ban on pets in residential tenancies was necessary in a democratic 
society to protect the health and rights of the other occupants living in close proximity, a blanket 
ban on all pets is disproportionate to the object to be achieved. Many companion animals have no 
adverse effects on neighbours, for example, a house rabbit, a hamster, even a well-behaved dog. 
The current legislation in Canada and France demonstrates that it is possible to have proportionate 
interference that permits pets to be banned in certain circumstances, for example, if the pet causes 
a nuisance or a severe allergic reaction. 
In England, public authority landlords must not act in violation of Convention rights when fulfilling 
their role as a landlord (s.6, Human Rights Act 1998). The Supreme Court has held that Art.8 is 
engaged in possession proceedings where a local authority landlord is seeking to evict a tenant.16 If it 
is accepted that ownership of a companion animal falls within ‘family and private life’ under Art.8 
and that having a blanket ban on all pets in a residential lease is a disproportionate interference with 
those rights, then the public authority landlord will be acting in contravention of the Convention 
rights if it enforces the ‘no pet’ covenant in the lease. 
The Duty of the English Courts as a Public Body to Respect Private Life 
The scope of Art.8 does not stop with public authority landlords. The case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights shows that Art.8 imposes positive obligations on states to adopt measures that 
secure respect for private life even in the sphere of private relations such as between a tenant and a 
private landlord (Rook 2001). This refers to ‘indirect horizontal effect’ where legal relations between 
private parties are indirectly affected by relying on another cause of action—in this case, 
repossession of let property—as a vehicle by which the Convention rights can have an impact 
(Clayton and Tomlinson 2009). Under s.6, Human Rights Act 1998 the English court, as a public 
authority, is required not to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right.17 There is 
consequently an argument that if a private landlord seeks a repossession order in an English court, 
 
14 Y. Merchiers, Les baux, Le bail en general, Larcier, 1997, p. 210, who quotes Civ. Termonde, 
February 20th 1989, R.W., 1990–1991, p. 216 and J.P. Lennik, January 25th 1988, R.W., 1989–1990, 
p. 161. 
15 Justice of the Peace of Couvin, 14 June 2001. 
16 Manchester CC v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45, [2011] 2 AC 104. 
17 Campbell [2004] 2 WLR 1232. 
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on the basis of a tenant keeping a companion animal in breach of a covenant in the lease prohibiting 
pets, the court would be able to declare the ‘no pets’ clause as contrary to Art.8 and consequently 
unlawful. Thus, a private landlord would not be able to evict a tenant solely on the basis of their 
keeping companion animals on the property. Whilst the English courts have been reluctant to apply 
Art.8 to possession proceedings between private individuals in the private housing sector,18 
Ramshaw argues that there are strong reasons for changing this approach.19 In respect of ‘no pet’ 
covenants, Belgium provides a useful example of how Art.8 can be used by the domestic courts to 
prevent a tenant from being evicted for keeping a companion animal but the problem is that this 
approach doesn’t prevent ‘no pet’ clauses from being included in a lease agreement in the first 
place. This means that many tenants, unfamiliar with the intricacies of the law, will assume the 
covenant to be valid and believe they cannot keep a companion animal at the property. If a tenant 
does introduce a companion animal and the landlord brings an action in court to evict the tenant, it 
will be up to the court, on a case by case basis to determine whether the tenant can be evicted. 
Legislation by Parliament 
There is considerable regulation by the state in the sphere of rentals by private landlords. Laws have 
often recognised the unequal bargaining strengths between landowners and those seeking to find 
somewhere to live and have consequently sought to limit the power of landlords to impose 
unreasonable conditions or restrictions (for example the Rent Act 1977 prohibited unreasonable 
rents). The need to regulate the power of private landlords is especially significant in the current 
economic climate of austerity, in which home ownership is declining and rental accommodation is in 
high demand. Housing is a fundamental human need and society has a responsibility to adopt laws 
that protect tenants from arbitrarily losing their home. Bob faced eviction because a new manager 
of the residential care home did not want him to keep his dog, Darcie. No law protects Bob’s 
relationship with Darcie even though for Bob, Darcie is akin to a family member. The decision to own 
a companion animal and enjoy the health benefits and expansion of social networks that 
accompanies this decision arguably falls within a person’s family and private life under Art.8. 
Therefore, it is appropriate for the state to pass a law prohibiting ‘no pet’ covenants in residential 
leases since a blanket ban on pets constitutes an unreasonable interference with a person’s private 
life. 
Conclusion 
In Canada the Law Commission has recognised the need for the state to identify and support a 
variety of close relationships, especially in the LGBT community (Westwood 2013). Their report 
recommended, “the state must provide adequate legal structures that support the relationships that 
citizens develop” (Law Commission of Canada 2001). The Law Commission was not talking about 
companion animals but nevertheless it is a recognition by an important institution of law reform that 
the law needs to keep pace with changes in society in how we construct social relationships with 
‘significant others’. Whether the significant other is a human or a companion animal does not 
detract from the strength of the bond and its significance to that person. The law’s failure to 
recognise and protect this relationship can put people at risk, for example, owners of companion 
 
18 McDonald v McDonald [2016] UKSC 28, [2016] 3 WLR 45; Malik v Fassenfelt [2013] EWCA Civ 
798, [2013] 28 EG 84. 
19 Ramshaw, A. The role of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights in public and 
private sector possession proceedings. PhD thesis, 2016. 
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animals having to leave supported accommodation or taking a lease beyond their financial means or 
in an unsuitable location just to be able to maintain their relationship with their companion animal. 
We already have a precedent for treating animals differently under the law depending on the way 
we use them and the social category we give them. This legal construct can be invoked to protect 
our relationship with companion animals. By understanding the origin of the legal status of domestic 
animals as property, it is possible to differentiate companion animals from other animals. The key to 
this is to differentiate animals on the basis of our relationship with the animals. It is the nature of the 
relationship that is significant and not the fact of ownership. Domestic animals are owned by 
someone whether it is a pig being raised for meat or a dog living in the home and treated as a family 
member. The concept of ownership is the same in these two examples, but the essential difference 
is the nature of the human–animal relationship. One is based on domination and the other is based 
on trust. One is a relationship of ownership in which the pig is used for the benefit of humans 
regardless of the detrimental effects on its welfare, whereas the other is a social relationship which 
benefits both the dog and the human and creates a close bond of mutual companionship. The law 
should recognise this difference and better protect the human–companion animal relationship. 
Nowhere is this more important than in the housing arena, since restrictions in allowing tenants to 
keep pets in residential properties denies them the opportunity to extend their social networks by 
acquiring and maintaining valuable social relationships. The fact that this social relationship is with 
an animal and not a human is irrelevant as both provide benefits to social wellbeing and health. It is 
here advocated that the human–companion animal relationship falls within the perimeters of 
‘private life’ in Art.8 ECHR and therefore should be respected under English and Scottish law. The 
best way to ensure this protection is by legislation to prohibit ‘no pet’ covenants in residential leases 
in all properties, whether in the public or private housing sector, subject to reasonable exceptions 
such as the health and wellbeing of other occupants. 
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ABSTRACT 
There is evidence to suggest that many owners see their pet as a family member. It is unsurprising then that 
family lawyers are being asked to advise on pet custody matters. Since pets are personal property, such 
disputes fall within divorce financial proceedings. An examination of reported cases in the USA and Israel show 
that two distinct tests have emerged to resolve pet custody disputes: first, the application of pure property 
law principles and secondly, the application of a ‘best interests of the animal’ test. The cases show that while 
the courts are quick to emphasise the property status of pets, apply the property law test, and dismiss the 
‘best interests of the animal’ test, nevertheless other factors are not without influence in the courts’ decisions. 
The unique nature of pets as living and sentient property gives rise to two factors in particular: the emotional 
bonds that exist between the pet and carers and the interest the pet has in avoiding physical harm. It is 
advocated that these factors should be relevant considerations and may prevail over property law 
considerations. The extensive literature on children’s rights and the ‘best interest of the child’ test is 
harnessed to support and justify a new approach to resolving pet custody disputes – one which recognises the 
unique nature of this living and sentient property. 
I was married with two dogs. We had lived together prior to getting married and had shared ownership in the 
two dogs…We decided to split up and came to a settlement agreement. It was decided that I would get to 
keep the dogs in exchange for me signing over my Mercedes Benz SLK 2006 model (worth around 15,000GBP 
at the time)…other than these two items, we mostly split things 50:50. So in my valuation, keeping the dogs 
without any bickering or nastiness cost me around 15,000GBP and he never once asked about them 
afterwards. He has since got another dog 
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(same breed). I don’t regret the decision for a second. A car is just a thing, it can be replaced. I couldn’t live 
without the two dogs! (SLSA conference delegate).1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A survey in 2011 in the UK revealed that 20 per cent of separating couples with pets have sought 
legal advice and fought for custody of their pet when their relationship broke down.2 This survey 
supports earlier surveys undertaken in 20073 and 20054 both of which demonstrated a growing 
number of legal battles in the UK concerning the custody of pets. In law pets are personal property 
and consequently pet custody disputes arising from a divorce fall within the financial provision 







inappropriate use of the family courts and a drain on its time and resources the evidence shows that 
pet owners do not feel that way. The 2005 survey found that 87 per cent of the dog owners surveyed 
viewed their dog as a family member and 15 per cent of them would pay over £10,000 to secure 
custody of their dog on separation from their partner. These statistics show that pet custody 
disputes are already a part of our society and with an increasing number of households in the UK 
owning pets5 combined with a high percentage of marriages ending in divorce6 such disputes are 
likely to become more prevalent. 
The aim of this article is to examine the tests currently used to resolve pet custody disputes and to 
establish the best approach. Because of the distinct lack of judicial precedent and academic 
discussion on pet custody in England and Wales, the article analyses countries where the courts or 
legislature have already tackled these disputes namely the USA and Israel, where there are a number 
of reported cases, and Switzerland which has amended its Civil Code to specifically govern the issue. 
While these three legal systems are distinguishable (varying in their common law and civil law 
approach), the issues raised in relation to pet custody are similar and permits comparison. From this 
analysis it will be shown that two distinct tests for resolving pet custody disputes in family courts 
emerge – first, the application of pure property law principles arising from the status of pets as 
property and secondly, the application of a ‘best interests of the animal’ test. Under a property law 
test, the pet is given to the person who has the better claim to title of the property so the parties 
need to provide evidence of that claim to title. This may be relatively straightforward if there is a 
receipt of purchase or adoption certificate from an animal shelter. However, in the absence of this 
the parties can adduce evidence addressing matters such as: Who pays the veterinary bills? Who 
purchases the pet food? Who pays the insurance premiums for the pet insurance? The second test, 
the ‘best interests of the animal’ test, has been compared to the ‘best interests of the child’ test a 
standard used in many countries to determine the residency of children in disputes between 
parents. The analysis of the cases in this article will show that the property law approach is the 
favoured approach however the ‘best interest of the animal’ test has been considered in some cases 
and has at times influenced the decision of the court. 
There has been some academic discussion of the ‘best interest of the animal’ test and its links to the 
‘best interests of the child’ test. Lerner (2010) believes that there are useful comparisons to be made 
in Israel between the ‘good of the child’ and the ‘good of the animal’ tests but recognises the 
importance of respecting the distinctions. Animals are not children and there cannot be a blanket 
application of the same considerations. Huss (2003) uses child custody law in America as a 
framework to advocate new statutory provisions to govern pet custody disputes, while Gregory 
(2010) argues that comparisons with child custody laws are inappropriate and unnecessary as the 
property law test favoured by the American courts remains the best approach to resolve disputes. 
There are no published articles examining pet custody in the light of child law in England and Wales 
and yet there are interesting analogies to be drawn especially in relation to the historical 
development of the law governing the residency of children. 
There have been significant changes in this law over the last 150 years and along this time line of 
changes there have been a number of shifts in approach. The law has moved from protecting a 
father’s pecuniary interest in his child, to protecting the interests of the child itself and in response 
to this shift there has been a move away from court reliance on strict rules to greater judicial 
discretion in the use of the ‘best interests of the child’ test (Eekelaar, 1986; Mnookin, 1975). Over 
the years, there has been extensive academic critical analysis of the ‘best interests of the child’ test 
and the rights of children. A number of these seminal articles now provide valuable theoretical 
models for analysing the best approach to adopt in pet custody disputes especially some of the older 
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articles where the shifts in approach were first analysed. It is arguable that we are currently on the 
verge of a shift in approach in resolving pet custody disputes – a move away from the application of 
pure property law towards an approach that recognises the interests of animals. 
The examination of the case law will demonstrate that a pure property law test is not always 
appropriate to resolve a pet custody dispute and understanding why this is the case leads to some 
interesting conclusions. The legal status of domestic animals is that of property but they constitute a 
unique type of property; animals are living and sentient property and this is the crucial factor. This 
article adopts the terminology ‘pet custody disputes’ as opposed to ‘pet ownership disputes’ 
because it better acknowledges the nature of animals as living and sentient property. There are 
important consequences that flow from this recognition. First, as a sentient being this type of 
property has ‘interests’, eg, the interest in not being physically abused and treated cruelly (Singer, 
1995). Secondly, strong emotional bonds can develop between the property and its owner. In fact, 
pet custody disputes only arise because of this emotional bond. Either both parties genuinely love 
their pet and both want to keep it or one party feels this way and the other party is merely using the 
pet as a bargaining chip in order to get a better financial deal. 
Either way it is the emotional bond between the pet and at least one of its human carers that 
triggers the dispute. It is the irreplaceability of this special relationship that means that the dispute 
cannot be resolved by simply buying another pet of the same breed and type. ‘A car is just a thing, it 
can be replaced. I couldn’t live without the two dogs!’ illustrates the strength of feeling that can 
exist. It is arguable that this bond will be stronger in respect of pets that live in the home such as cats 
and dogs than in relation to animals that live outside such as horses and donkeys but no blanket rule 
can be applied as owners form strong bonds with all kinds of pets. However, emotional bonds are 
unlikely to be relevant in situations where animals are kept for purely commercial purposes rather 
than as a pet. A large horse riding stables owned as a commercial enterprise by a divorcing couple 
could be an example of this. It is here advocated that these factors – the existence of ‘interests’ and 
special relationships – requires the adoption of a test unique to pet custody disputes, a test which is 
based on property law but also borrows theoretical tools used in child law. 
II. THE PERCEPTION OF PETS – PROPERTY OR FAMILY? 
Domestic pets are treated as personal property in the eyes of the law.7 This is in sharp contrast with 
the perception of many pet owners who see their pet as a member of their family.8 In 2008, an 
empirical study in Swansea to explore family formation and kinship networks found that ‘the species 
barrier is no obstacle to pets being defined as kin’ (Charles and Davies, 2011). This was an 
unexpected finding because the researchers did not explicitly ask about animals but nevertheless 
almost a quarter of those interviewed spontaneously included their pets as part of their kinship 
network. The accidental fashion in which these data were ascertained – on the initiative of the 
interviewee without any prompting from the interviewer – strengthens the robustness of these 
findings. It confirms earlier research which advocated ‘that the vast majority of western pet owners 
regard their pets as members of the family’ (Serpell, 1996). However, due to their property status, 
pets fall within the law governing financial provision and property allocation on divorce. They are 
collated with other matrimonial property such as the family car, television, and Wii. Clearly, there is 
an inconsistency here and this is apparent when decisions of the courts are examined. 
1. Two Divergent Approaches – ‘property law’ Versus 
‘best interests of the animal’ Test 
105 
 
In the USA, there have been a number of reported pet custody cases and a wealth of academic 
debate around these decisions (Britton, 2006; Gregory, 2010; Huss, 2003; Morgan, 1999; Stroh, 
2007). Since the law governing divorce is a state matter dependent upon the applicable jurisdiction, 
it is not surprising that there are conflicting decisions. However, the majority of the decisions share 
the same underlying inconsistency between the courts’ insistence that animals are personal property 
and their reluctance to rely on property law principles alone to resolve the dispute. A brief 
consideration of some of the main cases will demonstrate this and reveal the growing willingness of 
some courts to recognise the unique nature of this property as living and sentient. 
In Arrington v Arrington9 in 1981, a Texas trial court emphasised that pets are property and refused 
to apply a ‘best interest of the pet’ test. Interestingly, the judge in this case suggested that pets 
benefit from their property status as they escape the harm suffered by some children who are ‘used 
by their parents to vent spite on each other’.10 However, despite the court’s emphasis on the 
property status of the animal, it nevertheless awarded custody to the wife and visitation rights to the 
husband. This is at odds with the judge’s insistence that pets are property since visitation rights are 
not awarded in relation to personal property. The judge clearly struggled with using a pure property 
law test to resolve the dispute and consequently awarded visitation rights to the husband in 
recognition of the strong emotional bond existing between him and the pet. The 1984 case of Re 
Marriage of Stewart11 is another example of the court rejecting a ‘best interest of the animal’ test 
and emphasising the property status of animals but then reaching a decision at odds with the 
application of property law principles. The Iowa trial court stated that, ‘a dog is personal property 
and while courts should not put a family pet in a position of being abused or uncared for, [they] do 
not have to determine the best interests of a pet’.12 The court gave custody of the dog to the 
husband, with whom he had remained after the couple separated, despite the fact that the husband 
had given him to his wife as a gift. If the case had been decided on property law alone the wife 
would have been awarded custody since she was given the dog as a gift and therefore had the better 
claim to title. Once again there is a recognition here that this property is like no other. Since it is 
sentient and capable of suffering, there are special factors for the court to consider and in this case it 
led to custody being awarded to the person with the weaker claim to title. 
The case of Bennett v Bennett13 in 1995 adopts a strict property law approach but it is the reason for 
this that is of particular interest. The Florida District Appeal Court said that there was no authority 
allowing trial courts to award custody or visitation in relation to personal property. At first instance, 
custody of the dog was given to the husband and the wife was awarded visitation rights. On appeal 
the award of visitation rights was reversed. The appeal court did recognise that ‘a dog may be 
considered by many to be a member of the family’ but nevertheless emphasised its property status 
and held that there was ‘no authority which provides for a trial court to grant custody or visitation 
pertaining to personal property’.14 What is significant is that the court is adopting a pragmatic 
approach based on the logistics of policing visitation rights. It is not that the court rejects the unique 
status of animals as living and sentient property but just that the extension of visitation rights to pets 
would not be feasible because the court system would be unable to cope with the influx of cases for 
enforcement. The appeal court observed that ‘Our courts are overwhelmed with the supervision of 
custody, visitation, and support matters related to the protection of our children. We cannot 
undertake the same responsibility to animals’.15 
There are a number of cases which illustrate the court’s sympathy towards a ‘best interests of the 
animal’ test. The case of Raymond v Lachman16 in 1999 concerned two flatmates rather than a 
divorced couple. The New York appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court which had 
awarded custody of a pet cat to its legal owner – the person with the better claim to property title. 
Instead the appeal court took into consideration the age and life expectancy of the 10-year old cat 
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and allowed it to ‘remain where he has lived, prospered, loved and been loved for the past four 
years’. In some respects, this is a remarkable decision as it is a clear rejection of a pure property law 
approach. While there is no open admission that the court is applying the ‘best interests of the 
animal’ test it is difficult to see how this could be interpreted as anything else. A similar approach 
was taken by a Virginia trial court in Zovko v Gregory17 where the best interests of the cat meant 
that it was awarded to the roommate who did not own the cat. Significantly these cases concerned 
flatmates rather than divorcees. Such cases are usually decided purely on property law principles 
because, unlike in cases of divorce, there is no wider discretion available to the courts. Juelfs v 
Gough18 in 2002 is an example of a similar approach being taken in a family court. The Alaska 
Supreme Court upheld the award of sole custody of the family dog to the husband. The dog was at 
risk of serious physical injury at the wife’s residence because she had other dogs living with her 
which were deemed a threat to the dog. Therefore, the interest of the dog in avoiding physical injury 
prevailed over the application of property law principles. The Appellant Division New Jersey Superior 
Court confirmed this approach in the 2009 case of Houseman v Dare.19 It rejected the ‘best interest 
of the animal’ approach as a general rule but included a significant caveat; the test could apply in 
cases of animal abuse. Consequently, if the pet may be at risk of physical abuse and injury by the 
person with the greater claim to title, their property right can be overridden. 
Houseman v Dare is an excellent example of the court acknowledging the unique nature of pets as a 
distinct type of personal property. The Appellate Court held that specific performance was available 
to remedy a breach of an oral agreement between a separating unmarried couple over the custody 
of their dog. The oral agreement between the couple gave them joint possession of their dog on the 
basis of an alternating 5-week period. When one of them breached the agreement by refusing to 
share the dog, the other sought a court order for specific performance. Orders for specific 
performance in respect of personal property can only be made if the property is unique or rare and 
in the trial court the judge decided that pets ‘lack the unique value essential to an award of specific 
performance’ and instead awarded damages.20 But the Appellate Court overruled this decision and 
granted specific performance recognising the unique, subjective value attached to pets that 
distinguish them from most other types of personal property. In reaching this decision, it found 
similarities between the way people value their pets and other sentimental pieces of personal 
property such as a family heirloom. It has been suggested that this approach creates a model for 
courts to decide future pet custody disputes in a more uniform manner by adopting an analytical 
framework analogous to disputes over heirlooms and family treasures for which there are clear 
precedents (Kotloff, 2010). Such an approach requires the court to take into account the sentimental 
value people place on certain types of property. 
What all these cases show is that even though the courts are quick to affirm the property status of 
pets and are unwilling to adopt a ‘best interests of the animal’ test they struggle to resolve the 
dispute by property law principles alone. Instead the courts are often willing to acknowledge the 
special nature of this living and sentient property and to thereby take into account other 
considerations unique to this type of property dispute; specifically the close bond that can exist 
between a person and their pet and the interest an animal has in avoiding physical injury. 
Israel appears to have gone further than the USA towards adopting a ‘best interest of the animal’ 
test in pet custody disputes. The 2004 Israeli case of Ploni v Plonit21 concerned an unmarried couple 
who, during their relationship, rescued a street cat and an ailing dog. When they split up the woman 
left the couple’s home taking the cat and dog with her. Subsequently, the man petitioned the court 
for joint custody of the pets or for the two animals to be separated and each person to get one of 
the animals. The court adopted a ‘good of the animal’ test and heard evidence from an expert on 
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animal behaviour to reach its conclusion that both of the animals remain with the woman. At a 
practical level, the use of expert evidence on animal psychology/behaviour and the consequent 
increased time and resources this entails is likely to weigh against the use of such a test. Judge 
Shochet openly acknowledged the inadequacy of the law to resolve pet custody disputes, observing 
that ‘The concept of companion animals as property does not provide the legal system with tools to 
adjudicate and resolve the petitions and bring them to a suitable solution’.22 Judge Shochet quoted 
the American case of Corso v Crawford Dog and Cat Hospital in which a New York court stated that 
‘animals are not property, rather a unique construction existing somewhere between inanimate 
objects and humans’.23 However, subsequent American cases did not follow this interpretation of the 
status of animals and instead continued to treat pets purely as property. Although Judge Shochet 
quoted the Corso case, he nevertheless retained the category of personal property for animals with 
the caveat that animals should be distinguished from inanimate objects. 
Lerner (2010: 116) compares the ‘good of the animal’ test to the ‘good of the child test’ in Israeli law 
and observes that ‘the ‘“good of the animal” test provides a suitable framework to add 
characteristics that are appropriate for animals, but not the same characteristics that are 
appropriate for children’. In Israel factors relevant to the residency of a child include the educational 
environment, the religion, and lifestyle of the parents all of which are clearly irrelevant to a pet. 
Thus, Lerner argues that it is important to recognise the differences between the two tests and not 
try to equate pets with children. He appreciates the limitations of the ‘good of the animal’ test and 
identifies instances in which it will not be applied, eg, a child’s positive relationship with the pet may 
mean that the animal is given to the parent who has custody of the child even though the animal has 
a closer bond with the other parent. Thus, he argues the interests of the child outweigh those of the 
animal. Taking into account the interests of a child certainly adds to the complexity of the dispute 
and it is likely that parents and courts will take this consideration into account in appropriate cases 
where being with the pet is shown to have a positive effect on the wellbeing of the child. This gives 
further support to the need to recognise the special relationship humans can have with their pet and 
the need for this to be taken into account in the decision-making process. 
Unsurprisingly, given its record on animal protection laws, Switzerland amended its Civil Code to 
provide a test for deciding pet custody disputes that takes into account the interests of the animal 
(Michel and Kayasseh, 2011). In 2003, Article 651 of the Swiss Civil Code, which deals with the shared 
ownership of property, was amended and the new Article 651a provides a test which directs the 
court to give sole ownership of the jointly owned pet to the party ‘that, with regard to animal 
protection, ensures the better keeping of the animal’. The focus here is on what is in the best 
interests of the pet and Michel and Kayasseh (2011: 30) argue that ‘According to the legislative 
materials, an animal’s welfare encompasses not only its physical needs (e.g. basic daily needs 
including medical care) but also its psychological wellbeing’. It is particularly notable that exclusive 
ownership of a co-owned pet is awarded to one of the parties. Joint ownership is never an option. 
But the court can require the person who acquires sole title of the pet to pay adequate 
compensation to the other party. The amount payable is in the discretion of the judge but there is 
uncertainty over whether a judge can take into account the sentimental value a person attaches to 
their pet when calculating the compensation payable. Unfortunately, Article 651a is silent on the 
matter. 
From this analysis of the approaches taken in the USA, Israel, and Switzerland two divergent 
approaches emerge. On the whole, the cases from the USA favour the ‘property law’ approach which 
determines custody on the basis of who has the better claim to title of the property, Bennett v 
Bennett being a good example of this. Nevertheless, some of the courts have recognised the special 
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nature of this type of property, eg in Arrington v Arrington where the court awarded visitation rights 
to the husband in recognition of the strong emotional bond between him and the pet. No other type 
of matrimonial property would lead to an award of visitation rights. Clearly the award of visitation 
rights sits uncomfortably with property ownership but the fact that the courts have being willing to 
award visitation demonstrates the unique qualities of animals as property. Occasionally, the courts in 
the USA have gone so far as to allow the interests of the animal to prevail over property law 
considerations as in the cases of Raymond v Lachman and Zovko v Gregory. These cases illustrate 
the second approach to deciding pet custody cases known as ‘the best interests of the animal’ test. 
In Raymond v Lachman, the fact that the cat was an elderly cat was a significant consideration and 
led to the court’s decision to allow the cat to stay with the person it was currently living with though 
this person was not the owner of the cat. It was felt that to uproot the cat in its old age would be 
confusing and disorientating for it. The court was deciding the best environment for the cat on the 
basis of the cat’s own welfare needs. A similar type of test has been used in Israel with the ‘good of 
the animal’ test and in Switzerland with the ‘better keeping of the animal’ test. 
The cases demonstrate the courts’ reluctance on the one hand to decide cases on pure property law 
principles alone and on the other hand to acknowledge a ‘best interest of the animal’ test. A new 
approach is needed; one that fits within the existing property paradigm but nevertheless recognises 
the special nature of this living and sentient property and consequently permits consideration of 
factors that do not normally apply to other types of property such as the existence of strong 
emotional bonds and the interest of the animal in avoiding physical injury. To this end, theoretical 
concepts used in Child law to analyse the ‘best interests of the child’ test and the nature of children’s 
rights provide valuable support and justification for this new approach. 
III. DRAWING ON THEORETICAL TOOLS USED TO ANALYSE THE ‘BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD’ 
TEST 
Analogies have been made with the law governing a child’s residency (Huss, 2003; Lerner, 2010) and 
there are useful comparisons to be made in this respect. Children’s rights and ‘the best interest of 
the child’ test have been extensively analysed (Eekelaar, 1986; Eekelaar, 1994; Fortin, 2009; Herring, 
2005; Mnookin, 1975) and consequently the benefit of these theoretical models can be drawn upon 
to provide a better understanding of how to determine pet custody disputes. What is especially 
interesting is the change in the law’s characterisation of children and the parent–child relationship 
over the years. Freeman observes that ‘Throughout most of our history children were treated as the 
property of their fathers’ (Freeman, 2008). Children were not the property of their parents and could 
not be sold or destroyed but were nevertheless treated similar to property. Children, especially heirs, 
were primarily agents for the devolution of property and the law protected a father’s pecuniary 
interest in a child. Eekelaar (1986: 167) notes that ‘one might summarize the position in Blackstone’s 
day as being that the legal apparatus protected a father’s relationship with his legitimate children 
not primarily because the children’s interests were thought worth protecting in themselves but 
because it was in one way or another deemed beneficial to the father’. Child law has progressed 
significantly since then; now in England a family court must give the welfare of the child paramount 
consideration in reaching a decision over the residency of that child. Section 1 of the Children Act 
1989 provides a ‘welfare checklist’ specifying a non-exhaustive list of factors for the court to 
consider. 
This article does not advocate that pets are the same as children, nor that the law should treat them 
as such, but the extensive academic research carried out in relation to the ‘best interest of the child’ 
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test provides a useful eyepiece through which to view pet custody. Mnookin’s seminal article from 
the 1970s provides a critique of the ‘best interests of the child’ principle (the ‘principle’) and many 
critiques draw inspiration from his writings (Elster, 1987; Parker, 1994). He argued that the principle 
constituted an indeterminate test due to the speculative nature of trying to accurately predict 
human behaviour and also from a lack of social consensus about the set of values that should be 
used to decide what is in the child’s best interests. Should the decision be based on the child’s 
happiness, education, religion? He also agued that the principle encourages litigation because the 
outcome is difficult to predict compared to the application of a more definite and determinate set of 
rules. Over the years, the ‘best interests of the child’ principle has been both attacked and defended 
(Eekelaar, 2002; Herring, 2005) but that debate is outside the scope of this article. However, 
Mnookin’s article is valuable because in his attempt to overcome the inadequacies of the principle 
he devised two rules and these rules resonate with some of the pet custody decisions and could be 
used to formulate the best approach to decide pet custody cases. Eekelaar (1986: 45) explains: ‘In 
the sphere of private law, Mnookin suggested two “intermediate” rules which could partially replace 
the “principle.”’ One was that no action should be taken which would pose an immediate and 
substantial threat to the child’s physical health and the other that, in disputes between parents, the 
court should prefer the adult ‘who has a psychological relationship with the child from the child’s 
perspective’. 
The theoretical basis underpinning Mnookin’s alternative test lends support to the proposition that a 
similar test should be used in pet custody cases. The analysis of the cases from the USA and Israel 
demonstrates how the courts struggle to decide cases on property law principles alone and instead 
seem willing to take into account other considerations specifically the interest an animal has in 
avoiding physical injury and the close bond that can exist between a person and their pet. There are 
clear parallels here to the underlying justifications for Mnookin’s two intermediate rules which are 
two-fold: first, the fact that society seeks to prevent physical harm to children; and secondly, the 
recognition that children are capable of strong emotional relationships with others. These two 
factors apply to pets: first, society seeks to prevent unnecessary physical injury to domestic animals 
and has passed legislation to this effect, eg, in England it is a criminal offence under the Animal 
Welfare Act 2006 for a person to cause unnecessary suffering to their pet. Secondly, people develop 
strong emotional bonds with their pets as evidenced by the research on family kinship in which pets 
were spontaneously included in kinship networks (Charles and Davies, 2011). 
Therefore, the same underlying justifications exist and support the use of a test in pet custody 
disputes that takes into account two rules similar to those devised by Mnookin. First, custody of the 
pet will not be given to anyone who poses an immediate and substantial threat to the animal’s 
physical health. This rule stems from society’s recognition that domestic animals are sentient beings 
and pets have an interest in not enduring unnecessary suffering at the hands of their owners. This 
interest has been deemed so important as to be worthy of the protection of the law. This is 
discussed in more depth later. Secondly, the emotional bond between the human and animal (from 
the perspective of the human) should be a relevant factor and taken into account in determining the 
residency of the pet. Mnookin (1975: 286) referred to the affection-relationship between the adult 
and the child which could be inferred from evidence of ‘the continuity of the relationship between 
the child and adult in terms of proximity and duration; the love of the adult toward the child; and the 
affection and trust of the child toward the adult’. He felt that adopting a psychological best interest 
test could work where one of the parties was a psychological parent and the other was a stranger 
but he acknowledged that the test could not help to choose between the parties where both had a 
psychological relationship with the child. It is here suggested that the emotional bond that a person 
has with their pet should be a relevant factor in determining pet custody but in the majority of 
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disputes both humans are likely to have a strong emotional bond with the pet otherwise the dispute 
would not arise in the first place. However, in the rare case where one party has a strong emotional 
bond with the pet and the other party is effectively a ‘stranger’ to the pet, spending very little time 
with it, then a variant of Mnookin’s rule on psychological relationships could be adopted so that the 
emotional bond is taken into account and may prevail over a stronger claim to title. 
IV. ANALYSING THE ‘BEST INTERESTS OF THE PET’ TEST 
One of Mnookin’s criticisms of the ‘best interests of the child’ principle was the lack of social 
consensus about the set of values that should be used to decide what is in the child’s best interests. 
What should be the basis of the decision – the child’s happiness, their education, or religion? In 
relation to pets these matters are less contentious. If we look at Eekelaar’s concepts of 
‘objectivization’ and ‘dynamic selfdeterminism’ devised to explain what the ‘best interests of the 
child’ means in a way that reconciles the paternalism model with the idea of children as rights-
holders, we find a useful model to apply to pets (Eekelaar, 1994). He suggests that perceptions of a 
child’s best interests may be formed in accordance with two distinct methods: Objectivisation and 
Dynamic self-determinism. For pets, it is the objectivisation that is the relevant part of the equation 
since domestic animals never acquire the competence to make their own life choices. Eekelaar 
(1994: 58) explains that ‘In contrast to dynamic self-determination, objectivisation is often a process 
of crude generalization of how children’s well-being will normally be realised within the society in 
which they will live, founded on a global view of socialization or the demands of organisational 
necessity’. This part of the decision making process is similar to the process used in pet custody 
disputes and Eekelaar’s model demonstrates this. Most people have little scientific knowledge of the 
psychology and behaviour of domestic animals but nevertheless claim to know what is in the best 
interests of their own pet. Thus, they make crude generalisations about what is in their pet’s best 
interests such as, ‘it is better for Misty (the cat) to stay in the family home where she has lived all her 
life than to move her to a new home’. It was on this basis that the elderly cat in Raymond v 
Lachman24 was given to the person with whom he was living rather than to the person with the 
better claim to property title. Thus, it could be said that the court was making a decision on the basis 
of the interests of the cat using an objectivisation method. 
In England and Wales, the Animal Welfare Act 2006 introduced a new ‘welfare offence’, which 
imposes a positive duty on persons responsible for a pet to take reasonable steps to meet the 
welfare needs of their pets such as the need for a suitable diet and environment, the need to exhibit 
normal behaviour patterns, and the need to be protected from pain and suffering. There are even 
Codes of Practice, such as the Code of Practice for the Welfare of Dogs,25 which give advice on how 
to look after a pet. For example, the code recommends a pet dog be given daily exercise and regular 
opportunities for play with people or other dogs. Therefore, it is likely that most couples who 
genuinely care for the welfare of their pet will make a decision on custody based on these 
objectivisations. As with child custody, there will be a minority of hostile cases where the owners 
essentially put their own interests first. Research in 2005 on child residence and contact disputes in 
court found that some parents were unwilling to separate events that had occurred during the 
marriage from the question of the child’s residence so that fault, blame and revenge became 
relevant factors for these parents (Smart et al., 2005). Some pet custody disputes may be driven by a 
similar desire to punish the other party or to extract a better financial deal from them. In such cases, 
it is likely that the welfare of the animal will be subordinated to other interests. 
1. Drawing on Theoretical Tools used to Analyse Children’s Rights 
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There are important theoretical distinctions between a rights-based approach and a welfare 
approach, essentially based on who the primary decision-maker is: the child (a proxy, if the child is 
not yet competent) or another (Herring, 2005). However, it is clear that the two approaches do not 
have to be mutually exclusive; a rights-based approach is not necessarily devoid of any element of 
welfare (Fortin, 2004). The theory behind children’s rights has been extensively analysed to reconcile 
paternalism, arising from the inability of younger children to make rational and informed decisions, 
with the concept of a rights-holder (Eekelaar, 1994). The ‘choice’ or ‘claim’ theory of rights as 
espoused by Hart means that babies and animals cannot be rightsholders as they lack the 
competence to make choices and lay claim to their rights (MacCormick, 1982). However, the 
‘interest’ theory of rights is of more relevance in the context of animals and pet custody. According 
to Raz (1984: 5): ‘One justifies a statement that a person has a right by pointing to an interest of his 
and to reasons why it is to be taken seriously.’ Thus legal rights are legally protected interests; 
interests deemed so important as to constitute a sufficient ground for holding another to be subject 
to a duty. Children have interests that need protecting and this model avoids denying them rights 
until they are old enough to claim them. The challenge for this theory of rights is determining which 
interests can be translated into rights. Leaving aside the question of whether a domestic animal can 
have legal rights, it is nevertheless useful to examine the way in which children’s rights (sometimes 
called ‘interests’ because of the uncertainty over translation into rights) have been classified and it is 
here suggested that this can help shed light on the best approach to determine pet custody disputes. 
Pets as sentient beings have interests that need protecting; interests deemed so important by 
society that legislation has been passed to protect those interests, in particular, the interest a pet 
has in avoiding pain and suffering. 
A number of classifications of children’s rights have been formulated. Bevan’s model of children’s 
rights divides them into two broad categories: protective and self-assertive (Bevan, 1989). Assertive 
rights include a claim to adult rights such as freedom of expression and conscience and have no 
relevance here. However, ‘protective rights’ arise from a child’s vulnerability and dependence on 
others and this aspect draws parallels with pets which are also vulnerable and dependent on others. 
Fortin’s succinct summary of Bevan’s category highlights the underlying justification for these rights 
and in doing so demonstrates the similarities to the position of domestic animals: ‘Children’s 
“protective rights” arise from their innate dependence and vulnerability and an obvious need for 
nurture, love and care, both physical and psychological. These rights must include the right to 
protection from ill-treatment and the right to state intervention in order to achieve such protection’ 
(Fortin, 2009: 17). 
Eekelaar (1986) identifies three categories of children’s interests; basic interests, developmental 
interests, and autonomy interests. Basic interests arise from the physical, emotional and intellectual 
care, and well-being of a child. This is seen as the minimal expectation from the child’s carers, usually 
the parents, to meet the basic physical and emotional needs. Developmental interests relate to the 
claims of the wider community to maximise a child’s potential and autonomy interests concern the 
freedom of a child to choose his or her own lifestyle. In nineteenth century England the interests of 
the father prevailed over those of the child. Eekelaar states that in relation to basic interests 
however there was a reversal of this earlier characterisation of the parent–child relationship which 
subordinated the child to the parent. The criminal law protected children from severe physical injury 
even if perpetrated by the child’s parents. In R v De Manneville26 in 1804 a father claimed 
possession of his child but the court refused because of its concern of putting the child in danger of 
physical injury. To refuse the father his rights over his child was very unusual at that time; that the 
court was prepared to do so shows the strength of feeling towards preventing physical injury to 
children. Recognising this reversal of approach in relation to basic interests, Eekelaar (1986: 172) 
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observes that ‘This reflects not only the social recognition of the basic interests of the rightsholders 
as ends in themselves, but also a societal decision of the priority to be applied where those interests 
conflict with the interests of others, in this case, the parents. Even if respect for these rights may be 
conceived by the parent to be contrary to the parent’s own interests, those interests must give way 
to those of the child’. 
2. Protecting the Pet’s ‘Interest’ in Avoiding Physical Harm Something similar to this 
reversal is visible in those pet custody cases where the court subordinated the rights of the property 
owner to the animal’s interest in avoiding severe physical injury. In Juelfs v Gough27 the Alaska 
Supreme Court upheld the award of sole custody of the family dog to the husband on the basis that 
the wife’s other dogs were a threat to the dog’s life and the Appellant Division of the New Jersey 
Superior Court in Houseman v Dare confirmed that family courts must not give custody of a pet to a 
person who may subject the animal to cruelty in contravention of the criminal law. It is arguable that 
a similar principle should be applied in the family courts in England and Wales due to the effect of 
section 4, Animal Welfare Act 2006 (AWA, 2006). Under this section, a person commits an offence if 
by their act or omission they cause a domestic animal to suffer unnecessarily and they knew, or 
ought reasonably to have known, that their action would have that effect. 
There is considerable academic debate about whether animals can have legal rights (Francione, 
2000; Posner, 2004; Wise, 2000). There have been a number of recent international cases seeking to 
challenge the property status of animals: in 200528 and again in 201129 courts in Brazil were asked to 
consider whether a captive chimpanzee could be a legal person so that an order of habeas corpus 
could be granted; in 2012 a court in California was asked to consider whether captive Orca whales 
had constitutional rights to protection from slavery30 and more recently in 2013 a lawsuit was filed in 
New York State seeking an order of habeas corpus to remove a captive chimpanzee to a sanctuary.31 
It is fascinating that the legal status of animals is being debated in the courts but since the legal 
status of domestic animals such as cats and dogs is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, this 
article works within the confines of their current property status. There is widespread recognition 
that animals have interests (Singer, 1995) and as a sentient being it is in the interests of the pet not 
to suffer pain and injury. In a similar vein to Eekelaar’s classification of children’s interests, it is 
possible to classify different concerns relating to pets. The interest of a pet to avoid pain and 
suffering by avoiding injury, disease, and starvation can be seen as a basic interest. This means that 
the pet must not be subjected to unnecessary physical injury and must be fed an appropriate diet to 
avoid starvation and disease. As with a similar basic interest for children, this interest can be seen as 
reversing the usual owner–pet relationship in which the interests of the pet are subordinate to those 
of the owner. In creating laws that prohibit unnecessary cruelty to domestic animals society has 
prioritised this interest of animals over conflicting interests of the owner. Owners are not at liberty 
to promote their own interests at the expense of causing unnecessary suffering to their pet. An 
owner could smash their noisy radio if they were so inclined but not so their noisy dog. 
Mnookin’s analysis of child residency disputes demonstrates how the nature of the adjudication in 
pet custody has similarities with child residency and it is not always a simple matter of property 
ownership. Mnookin analyses how child residency disputes, under the ‘best interests of the child’ 
test, differ from traditional types of adjudication because they require ‘person-oriented’ as opposed 
to ‘act-oriented’ determinations. Person-oriented determinations require an evaluation of ‘the 
whole person viewed as a social being’, whereas normally adjudication of disputes involves 
‘application of act-oriented rules and thus avoids broad evaluation of a litigant as a social being’ 
(Mnookin, 1975: 251). Determining whether Ben has an easement over his neighbour’s land does not 
require the judge to make assessments of Ben as a social being (other than his credibility for 
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providing an honest testimony). There is no need to consider his education, occupation, work ethic, 
religion, etc. However, if we apply this analysis to pet custody disputes it can be seen that in some 
circumstances the disputes may require person-oriented determinations and consequently differ 
from other type of property disputes which are all governed by act-oriented determinations. The fact 
that the court may need to consider whether the person will harm the pet means the court must 
evaluate that person as a social being. This may not arise in many cases but nevertheless it serves to 
illustrate the complexity of pet custody disputes and the fact that they cannot always be resolved by 
a simple question of property title. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The nature of the law applied in child residency disputes has changed over the years. Mnookin 
(1975: 231) noted that ‘In the past two centuries, we have moved from a pattern of treating a child 
as a possession or a “thing” to be owned to a much more child-centered mode of analysis. Parallel 
with this, previously sharp rules have dissolved, and controlling legal standards have become less 
specific.’ He observed that as children’s interests were seen increasingly as worthy of protection in 
their own right, there was a dramatic movement away from strict rules to a highly discretionary 
application of general principles of law. Similarly, it can be argued that as we better recognise the 
special relationship we have with our pets and the fact that many owners see pets as members of 
their family, the law needs to adapt and apply more suitable rules in determining pet residence 
disputes. Applying a rule in all cases of ‘whoever adduces evidence of a better title to the pet will get 
custody’ is too narrow and restrictive. It fails to appreciate the special nature of this unique type of 
property; the fact that it is living and sentient property and it fails to appreciate the consequences 
that flow from this fact: the interests of the animal to avoid physical injury and the existence of 
strong emotional bonds between the property and its owner. There are no reported cases in England 
and Wales to indicate the courts’ likely approach but property law principles will undoubtedly play a 
significant role. This article has sought to identify ‘other’ considerations that are relevant to deciding 
pet residency disputes; considerations that may even prevail at times over property law principles. It 
has focused on the interest an animal has in avoiding physical injury and the close bond that can 
exist between a person and their pet although this is not an exhaustive list. By adapting theoretical 
tools from child law, this article has sought to demonstrate the underlying principles that justify 
these ‘other’ considerations. 
Significantly, the standards used to decide pet custody disputes do more than affect the outcome of 
the small number of disputes that reach the courts. It also influences private negotiations between 
individuals outside of the court system. Presently, the focus on applying strict property law rules 
gives considerable bargaining power in private negotiations to the person with the better claim to 
title even though that person may have little regard for the animal. A clear statement of the relevant 
factors that can influence a decision needs to be provided either by a court or by legislation to assist 
those engaged in private negotiations as well as those contemplating court proceedings. In 
advocating the benefits of the welfare principle in disputes concerning children, Herring (2005) notes 
that the welfare principle is ‘probably one of the most accurately understood legal principles among 
the general public’. Even though parents may disagree over what is in the best interests of their 
child, the very existence of the welfare principle serves to focus their minds on their child’s welfare 
rather than their own rights. The fact that the welfare principle is so well understood means that it is 
easy to transpose a similar test in pet custody disputes. Such a test will not be as broad as the ‘best 
interests of a child’ test, which can include the wishes and feelings of the child, but it will have a 
wider scope than the application of property law principles alone. Having a test that includes aspects 
of the animal’s welfare (at a minimum their need to be free of physical harm) will help owners to 
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focus on meeting the welfare needs of their pet rather than concentrating on their individual claims 
to title. Such a test more accurately reflects the status of pets as sentient beings who are valued 
companions and family members rather than mere items of property. 
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owners. 
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2.3 Challenges to the legal status of domestic and captive animals 
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The property status of domestic and captive animals 
The law distinguishes between ‘persons’ and ‘things’. Human beings are legal persons and in 
consequence enjoy certain fundamental rights such as freedom from torture and slavery. Domestic 
and captive animals are legal things and in consequence lack the capacity to possess legal rights. 
Legal personhood is not synonymous with human beings; it identifies those entities that are capable 
of having legal rights. Legal personhood can be a more restrictive category than ‘humans’ and has 
sometimes being denied to certain humans, for example, slaves, women, indigenous peoples. In 
other instances it can be a wider category which allows nonhuman entities to enjoy legal 
personhood; for example, a private company can be a legal person thereby allowing it to protect its 
property interests under the law. The question that has been asked recently in a number of courts 
across the globe is whether a captive animal such as an adult chimpanzee or orang-utan can be 
classed as a legal person. This is clearly a direct challenge to the current legal status of animals. 
There are also more indirect challenges arising in the courts; cases which highlight the fact that the 
current property status of domestic animals is inadequate to resolve certain disputes. Pet custody 
cases, to decide the residency of a family dog or cat following the breakdown of a relationship 
between a married or co-habiting couple, are an example of this. Using pure property law principles 
to decide the question of where the dog or cat lives is often inappropriate. Increasingly civil courts 
are been asked to recognise dogs and cats as a unique form of living and sentient property, different 
from inanimate property, and to thereby take the interests of the animal (not just the owners) into 
account. This also constitutes a challenge to the current legal status of domestic animals, but it is a 
more subtle and indirect challenge. 
Pet custody cases 
Cases to decide the residency of family pets, following the breakdown in a couple’s relationship, 
have been reported in a number of countries including the USA and Israel (Rook, 2014). What is so 
interesting about these cases is that they highlight the difficulty in applying pure property law to 
determine the question of a pet’s residency. Since the pet is property, the question of who gets to 
keep the pet will be decided on the same principles as who gets to keep the family TV or kitchen 
table. In some cases the courts have done this but in other cases the courts have recognised the 
unique nature of this living and sentient property and have taken other considerations into account. 
For example, in the case of Raymond v Lachman  in 1999 the appeal court in New York reversed the 
earlier decision of the trial court which had awarded custody of a pet cat to the person with the 
better claim to property title, the cat’s owner. Instead the appeal court took into consideration the 
age and life expectancy of the ten year old cat and allowed it to “remain where he has lived, 
prospered, loved and been loved for the past four years”(695 N.Y.S.2d 308, 309 (N.Y,App.Div. 1999)). 
This case appears to take into account the interests of the animal itself and not merely the status of 
the animal as property. Although the outcome of the case may seem reasonable and just to a 
layperson, the case has significant implications at law because of its challenge to the pure property 
status of domestic animals. There have been a number of cases since 1999 adopting a similar 
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approach and Switzerland has even gone so far as to amend its Civil Code to provide a test that takes 
the interests of the animal into account in pet custody cases (Michel and Schneider Kayasseh, 2011).  
Direct legal challenges to the property status of animals 
Law, ethics and science are intricately linked in the question of the legal status of animals. The law 
reflects, or in some cases, helps to lead, changes in moral thinking about animals. Changes in moral 
thinking can arise from our greater understanding of animal behaviour and welfare through scientific 
discovery. For example, science has given humans a greater understanding of the cognitive and 
behavioural characteristics of chimpanzees which in turn led to concerns over whether the use of 
great apes in research was ethical. In 2010 the EU banned the use of great apes in scientific research 
(Directive 2010/63/EU). 
Progress in scientific research has led to calls for a change in the legal status of some animals, such 
as great apes, from property to persons (Rook, 2009). However, others call for caution as the 
ramifications of granting some animals’ legal personhood will be significant. Wise supports a change 
in legal status and advocates that any being with mental abilities adding up to what he calls ‘practical 
autonomy’ should be entitled to the basic legal rights of bodily integrity and bodily liberty (freedom 
from torture and slavery). A legal thing does not enjoy rights so this change would involve granting 
legal personhood to the relevant being so that they become a legal person. Wise defines practical 
autonomy as evident where a being “can desire; and can intentionally try to fulfil her desires; and 
possesses a sense of self-sufficiency to allow her to understand, even dimly, that it is she who wants 
something and it is she who is trying to get it” (Wise, 2000). He examines scientific research findings 
in relation to the cognitive abilities of great apes (chimpanzee, bonobo, gorilla and orang-utan) as 
well as Atlantic bottle-nosed dolphins and discovers that they are self-conscious, possess some of, or 
all, the elements required for a theory of mind and can solve complex problems (Wise, 2002). He 
concludes that these animals possess sufficient practical autonomy to be entitled to basic legal rights 
of bodily integrity and bodily liberty. Wise has put his theory into practice and in 2013 the 
Nonhuman Rights Project (a group founded by Wise) filed three lawsuits in the USA in relation to 
four captive adult chimpanzees in the hope that the courts will recognise the chimpanzees as legal 
persons. The case of Nonhuman Rights Project v Lavery concerns a chimpanzee called Tommy who is 
privately owned by Mr Lavery and lives alone in a cage at a used trailer lot. The Project seeks a court 
order to have him removed to a sanctuary where chimpanzees live in groups on a number of islands 
in an artificial lake. To be able to remove Tommy from his owner (who is not in breach of any state 
of federal laws) requires the court to grant a writ of habeas corpus. This court order can only be 
given in relation to a legal person and is not available for a legal thing. It’s important to appreciate 
that in law a ‘person’ is not synonymous with a human being; it is a legal concept, not a biological 
one. For example, under English law a private company is a legal person and enjoys a right to the 
protection of its property under the Human Rights Act 1998. 
The case was rejected at trial but went on appeal to the Supreme Court, Appellate Division which in 
2014 also declined to grant a habeas corpus in respect of Tommy. The Supreme Court adopted a 
Contractualist approach which explains rights in terms of a social contract; a person enjoys the 
benefit of rights in return for submitting to societally-imposed responsibilities. Relying on the work 
of Cupp, the court held that “unlike human beings, chimpanzees cannot bear any legal duties, 
submit to societal responsibilities or be held legally accountable for their actions” (Cupp, 2012). This 
is only one interpretation of legal rights and other theories do not rely on the reciprocity of rights 
and responsibilities. The Non-human Rights Project is pursuing an appeal to New York’s highest court 
– the Court of Appeals. Wise draws hope from historical cases on the African slave trade to 
demonstrate how judges can make a decision to break the mould and permit the law to adapt to 
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changing moral climates. Tilikum is a bull orca whale who was captured off the East coast of Iceland 
in 1983. He was born wild and therefore was not property at birth; however, he became someone’s 
property when he was captured by humans for the purpose of providing entertainment in captivity. 
Tilikum has lived in captivity for over 30 years and in 2012, when living at SeaWorld Orlando in 
Florida, he became the subject of a court case. The case alleged that five wild-captured orcas, 
including Tilikum, were being held by SeaWorld in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States, which prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude. It was argued 
that orca whales engage in complex social, communicative and cognitive behaviours and that their 
confinement in unnatural conditions at SeaWorld negatively impacts on their welfare. The court 
examined the wording of the Constitution in its historical setting to ascertain the purpose of those 
who drafted it. On this basis the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument and stated that the 
Thirteenth Amendment only applies to humans because ‘slavery’ and ‘involuntary servitude’ are 
uniquely human activities which do not apply to nonhumans (Tilikum, Katina, Corky, Kasatka and 
Ulises, five orcas by their Next Friends, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, inc v Sea World 
Parks & Entertainment Inc (2012) 842 F. Supp.2d.1259).  
The recent proliferation of cases making a direct challenge to the current legal status of captive 
animals demonstrates the strength of feeling driving this debate and indicates that there are 
interesting times ahead in deciding whether an animal can ever be a legal person. 
The basis of a challenge to the legal status of animals - autonomy versus sentiency  
The USA is not the only country in which there have been legal challenges to the property status of 
animals. There have also been significant cases in Brazil, Argentina  and Austria. Interestingly the 
cases so far have all been in relation to animals that possess what Wise calls ‘practical autonomy’ 
(Wise, 2000). It seems that the complex cognitive abilities of these animals may engender stronger 
feelings in humans of the need to ensure justice for these intelligent animals. Wise takes a pragmatic 
approach and argues that we are more likely to dismantle the thick legal wall that separates humans 
and animals, if the animal has practical autonomy. For Wise it is the cognitive abilities of the animal 
that are crucial. Whereas for others, sentiency is enough. For Singer it is the sentiency of the animal, 
the fact that it can experience pleasure and pain, which is crucial (Singer, 1995). According to Singer 
sentiency is sufficient to require a rethink of how we treat animals. He develops the work of the 
famous 18th century philosopher, Bentham, who advocated the better treatment of animals and 
wrote: “the question is not, Can they reason? Nor Can they talk? But, Can they suffer?” (Bentham, 
1780). Like Bentham before him, Singer is a utilitarian. In simple terms a utilitarian makes moral 
decisions by weighing the costs of a particular action against the benefits or satisfactions and then 
takes the option which brings the best balance of total benefits over total costs. The principle of 
equal consideration is an important concept for utilitarians and it requires that the interests of 
everyone affected by an action are taken into account and given the same weight as the like 
interests of any other being. This principle of equality prescribes how we should treat each other; it 
is a moral idea not a factual occurrence. Singer applies the principle of equal consideration to 
animals. Just as a person’s IQ is irrelevant to their moral treatment – we don’t give less consideration 
to the interests of those with a low IQ compared to those with a higher IQ - Singer argues that the 
cognitive abilities of animals should also be irrelevant to how we treat them. It doesn’t matter 
whether an animal has complex intellectual abilities or not, what matters is whether it can suffer 
pain. Sentiency is a pre-requisite to having interests and if a being suffers, Singer argues that “there 
can be no moral justification for refusing to take any suffering into consideration”.  
Utilitarianism in practice 
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Let’s consider a simple practical example to illustrate this theory. Should someone living in the 
affluent West eat pig meat? This is a moral decision because the pig is sentient and has interests that 
can be harmed by being raised for meat, killed and eaten. For a utilitarian, making the decision of 
whether or not to eat pig meat involves weighing up the costs against the benefits to see if the 
benefits outweigh the costs. A difficulty soon becomes apparent; which costs and benefits are 
considered? The suffering of the pig is relevant; there is evidence that pigs suffer due to intensive 
farming practices, transport and pre-slaughter handling at the abattoir. But are there wider 
considerations such as the significant environmental costs of eating meat highlighted in the United 
Nation’s report ‘Livestock’s Long Shadow’ (Steinfeld et al., 2006)? Is this a relevant factor to be 
weighed in the balance when someone is deciding whether or not to eat meat or is this cost too far 
removed? What are the benefits of eating the pig? Where there are healthy alternatives to meat, as 
in the West, thereby removing the need to eat meat for a balanced diet, then the benefits appear to 
be taste and cost; a person enjoys the taste of meat and, where it is produced by intensive farming 
methods, it is relatively cheap. For Singer the suffering of the pig in terms of physical pain, stress and 
the frustration of not being able to display natural behaviours all outweigh the benefit to the human 
and consequently a utilitarian will most likely decide not to eat pig meat. For Singer the sentiency of 
the pig is sufficient to require equal consideration to be given to the suffering of the pig as would be 
given to the suffering of a person. Wise, however, would focus on the cognitive capacity of the pig 
and examine scientific research findings to ascertain whether a pig has practical autonomy deserving 
of the rights to freedom from torture and slavery. 
Singer and Wise have their critics and one of the arguments against their theories is the idea that 
humans and animals are different and we are justified in treating animals differently and favouring 
our own kind (Posner, 2004). Imagine seeing a polar bear in Alaska about to kill a young seal. If we 
had the means to do so, would we intervene to save the seal? Most people would not intervene but 
would accept it as a natural event. The polar bear must eat the seal to survive. But what would 
happen if we saw a polar bear about to kill a human child? Now our response is likely to be very 
different. We would intervene to save the child even though polar bears must eat meat to survive. 
What accounts for this different response? This scenario illustrates the extent to which we favour 
our own species and will act to prevent harm to other humans even at the expense of animal 
suffering.  
The concept of unnecessary suffering 
The law faces a dilemma. How to deal with what Francione calls our ‘moral schizophrenia (Francione, 
2004).  On the one hand, humans now recognise the sentiency of animals and there is a desire to 
protect animals from pain and suffering. But on the other hand, humans feel justified to use animals 
for our own benefit and as a consequence we accept what Francione calls ‘the institutionalised 
exploitation’ of millions of animals, for example, in factory farms, entertainment and scientific 
procedures. The law has developed a clever concept to deal with this dilemma; a concept whose 
success is demonstrated by the fact that it spans international boundaries. It is the concept of 
‘unnecessary suffering’ and it is a pivotal concept in animal protection law across the world. Many 
countries have criminalised cruelty to animals, making it an offence to cause domestic and captive 
animals’ unnecessary suffering.  The concept of ‘unnecessary suffering’ prohibits suffering that is 
unnecessary but permits necessary suffering. Thus the test of necessity is crucial as it determines 
whether an offence has been committed. The act of hitting an animal may be an offence if it is 
unnecessary but a legal act if it is necessary; for example, in the English case in 1999 in which it was 
alleged that Mary Chipperfield (of the then famous Chipperfield Circus) had caused cruelty to a 
camel by hitting it with a broom handle, the Magistrate said that the force Mary had used was 
120 
 
necessary to train the camel to perform. Notably, in assessing necessity the Magistrate was not 
prepared to consider whether it was necessary for the camel to perform in a circus in the first place. 
It was held that no offence was committed on the facts because the suffering caused to the camel 
was deemed necessary to train it to perform. 
Necessity as a balancing exercise 
In England and Wales, the Animal Welfare Act 2006 governs the offence of cruelty to domestic 
animals. Under section 4 a person is guilty of the criminal offence of cruelty if their act (or failure to 
act) causes a protected animal to suffer unnecessarily and he/she knew or ought reasonably to have 
known that it would have that effect. Vets and lawyers both have a part to play in the concept of 
unnecessary suffering; it is for the vet to decide whether suffering has occurred and it is for the 
judge to determine the question of necessity. Suffering is a pre-requisite to the offence; without it 
there can be no offence so the role of the vet is crucial. Once suffering has been established by the 
vet, there are a number of statutory considerations set out in the Act for the court to consider such 
as whether the suffering could reasonably have been avoided or reduced and whether the conduct 
was that of a reasonably competent and humane person. These statutory considerations 
encapsulate a test that had been developed through case law under the Protection of Animals Act 
1911, which preceded the Animal Welfare Act 2006. Case law established that there must be a 
legitimate purpose for the act which caused the animal suffering but a purpose on its own was not 
sufficient. There must also be proportionality between the purpose to be achieved and the means of 
achieving it. Proportionality is an important legal concept used in human rights law which involves a 
balancing exercise. In the case of Ford v Wiley in 1889 a farmer was alleged to have been cruel to his 
young cattle by cutting off their horns, close to the head, with a common saw. It was accepted by 
the court that the cattle suffered extreme and prolonged pain as a result of this procedure. The 
farmer justified his actions on the basis of cost and convenience. The court accepted that there was 
a legitimate purpose, but nevertheless cruelty was established because the purpose did not justify 
the means of achieving it. The court held that the suffering was completely disproportionate to the 
purpose and the practice was consequently found to be cruel and illegal. The problem with the 
concept of necessity is that it is subjective; it is for the court to decide on the respective weight to 
attach to the conflicting interests of humans and animals. In most cases a court is likely to give 
greater weight to the interests of humans.  
The Israeli case in 2002 of Noah v The Attorney General, et al. is an excellent example of the 
subjectivity involved in assessing necessity (HCJ 9232/01, 215 Israeli Supreme Court). This case is 
unusual because, in the balancing exercise to decide necessity, the interests of the animals 
ultimately outweighed those of the humans; in practice this is rare. The case concerned the practice 
of producing foie gras by inserting a tube into the oesophagus of geese and force feeding them until 
their livers become abnormally large and fatty. The court had to consider whether this caused 
unnecessary suffering. Interestingly in reaching its decision the court was willing to examine the 
literature on the ethical theories applied to our treatment of animals and referred to the work of 
Singer and Francione. The court weighed in the balance the suffering caused to the geese by the 
method of force feeding against the benefit to humans of a food delicacy. The majority view of the 
court was that the suffering was not justifiable for a delicacy and therefore the suffering outweighed 
the benefit. The minority of the court felt that the suffering was necessary because of the suffering 
that any ban on foie gras production would cause to the farmers who would lose their livelihoods. 
More than 500 tonnes of foie gras was produced in Israel every year at that time and hundreds of 
farmers were dependent on the industry. This is a significant case for the promotion of animal 
welfare in agriculture. The English courts have been less willing to attach weight to the suffering of 
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the animal. The case of Roberts v Ruggerio in 1985 concerned the use of the veal calf crate system. 
Under this system of intensive farming, calves were individually confined in a narrow stall, chained 
at the neck and denied access to roughage in their diet. Roberts was the director of Compassion in 
World Farming which advocated that the use of veal crates caused the animals’ unnecessary 
suffering and consequently the farmer was guilty of the offence of cruelty.  The court took the view 
that it would only consider suffering beyond that which is to be expected from the use of the veal 
crate. It would not challenge the use of the veal crate itself even though there was evidence that it 
caused the calves suffering and that alternative practices were available to produce veal that caused 
the animals less suffering. Fortunately the veal crate has since been banned as being cruel, first in 
England and Wales, and more recently in Europe. 
Property status and proportionality 
For Francione the property status of animals is the root of the problem. He advocates that the 
concept of unnecessary suffering does not protect animals because the weighting to be attached to 
the respective interests of the animals and humans has already been predetermined by the property 
status of the animals. He states that “The property status of animals renders meaningless any 
balancing that is supposedly required under the humane treatment principle or animal welfare laws, 
because what we really balance are the interests of property owners against the interests of their 
animal property” (Francione, 2004). Therefore for Francione the choice as to which interests prevail 
in the balancing act has already been predetermined by the property status of the animal and this 
can only be remedied by giving animals the right not to be treated as our property. The Israeli foie 
gras case however shows that the interests of animals can sometimes trump humans although this is 
relatively rare. 
Conclusion 
Law, ethics and science are intricately linked in the debate surrounding the legal status of domestic 
and captive animals especially in relation to animals with higher cognitive abilities such as the great 
apes. There has been a wealth of scientific discovery around the cognitive and social abilities of great 
apes since the ground breaking work of Jane Goodall in the 1960s in the Gombe National Park, 
Tanzania (Goodall, 1971). There has been an explosion of ethical theories relating to our treatment 
of animals since Singer’s ground breaking book ‘Animal Liberation’ in 1975 (Singer, 1995). The recent 
appearance and growth of legal challenges in the courts, both direct and indirect, to the property 
status of domestic and captive animals suggests that it is time for the law to respond and adapt to 
the developments in science and philosophy. It would seem that exciting times lie ahead for animal 
law.  
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3 PORTFOLIO COMPONENT 2 – Understanding my research 
methods and methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this component of my portfolio is to explain the research design and 
processes adopted to answer my research questions. I will explain and justify my decisions 
on the methodological approach adopted to generating and analysing data. Integral to this 
explanation is an appreciation of how I come to understand the world and how I come to 
know it (my ontology and epistemology respectively). As will become apparent, I believe my 
worldview shapes my methods of data generation and data analysis and it is important to 
acknowledge the role my values, underlying assumptions and inherent biases play in this. 
3.2 The story of my DLaw research journey 
Throughout the first year of my DLaw, I researched the topic of pet custody disputes with a 
proposed title ‘The Social Construction of dogs and cats as pets and the implications for 
resolving pet custody disputes in England and Wales’. Disputes over who gets to keep the 
family pet following the breakdown of a relationship are gaining prominence, yet there is 
practically no research in England on the topic, nor does it feature in family law student 
textbooks (for example, Herring, 2019) or CPD training for family law practitioners. Clearly, I 
had identified a significant knowledge gap. In 2014, before I started my DLaw, I published an 
article on pet custody disputes having become interested in the subject when lecturing on 
the legal status of domestic animals for my animal law module on the undergraduate law 
degree. Some of the pet custody cases in the USA and Israel challenge the legal status of 
companion animals as pure property (Ploni v Plonit (2004) Ramat Gan Family Court. FC 
32405/01; Houseman v Dare (2009) 966 A.2d 24, N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.) and I read a 
number of articles on the subject (for example, Britton, 2006; Stroh, 2007; Lerner, 2010). 
This led to me writing an article ‘Who gets Charlie? The emergence of pet custody disputes 
in family law: adapting theoretical tools from Child Law’ (Rook, 2014) in the International 
Journal of Law, Policy and Family. My article aroused media interest including The 
Independent newspaper (Swinburne, 2014; Carter, 2016) and the Royal College of 
Veterinary Surgeons online magazine (MRCVS). 
Given the lack of research on the topic especially in legal journals, I decided it would be an 
excellent subject for my DLaw. I spent my first year of the DLaw doing my literature review 
focussing on two areas: the human-companion animal relationship and pet custody disputes. 
In July 2017, I interviewed my first participant after she contacted me via my University email 
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having read about my article in a Northumbria University press release. She had been 
involved in a pet custody dispute and was keen to tell me about her experience. Over the 
summer of 2017, I tried in vain to find other research participants. I used social media, joined 
a number of pet forums (for example Petforum.co.uk and dogforum.co.uk and pet-
owners.org) where I posted invitations for participants, contacted solicitors who were 
reported in the media as having been involved in pet custody disputes and contacted 
solicitors who advertised pet custody on their websites. Unfortunately, my efforts were 
unsuccessful. It felt like I had hit a brick wall. 
A few months before this I had become involved in a social media campaign on change.org 
for an 87-year old man, Mr Bob Harvey, who had been told to give up his dog, Darkie, for 
rehoming or face eviction from the care home where he lived. I had already decided to 
interview Bob with a view to doing post-doctoral research on the topic of ‘no pet’ covenants 
in residential leases. Having got ethics approval I interviewed him in September 2017 and 
within a few months I had decided to change the focus of my DLaw research to the issue of 
‘no pet’ covenants. I still had no participants for pet custody disputes and I felt that it would 
be much easier to find pet-owning tenants willing to talk about their experience of ‘no pet’ 
covenants.  I could still use much of the literature review I had completed for the human-
companion animal relationship as well as my work on research methodology and I had the 
advantage of having taught land law for 20 years. At this time, I took advantage of an 
opportunity to contribute an article to a special Animal Law edition of a law journal having 
presented a paper on my animal law module at the first Animal Law, Ethics and Legal 
Education conference at Liverpool John Moores University in September 2017 where I met 
the editor. I decided to submit an article on ‘no pet’ covenants using Bob and Darkie as a 
case study. Due to the tight deadline for writing the article, I wrote it before doing any more 
interviews. My article ‘For the Love of Darcie: recognising the human-companion animal 
relationship in housing law and policy’ (Rook, 2018) was published in April 2018. In March 
2018, I was an invited speaker at the Society of Companion Animal Studies (SCAS) 
conference in Cambridgeshire and I presented a paper at the Oxford Centre for Animal 
Ethics summer school in July 2018. Both of these conferences led to the recruitment of 
research participants and I conducted five interviews over the summer of 2018. That 
summer, my article was cited in a petition to the Scottish Parliament calling for legislation to 
prohibit the use of ‘no pet’ covenants in residential leases. I subsequently became involved 
in the campaign, twice attending the committee meetings to observe their deliberations and 
helping the respondent to draft her responses to the committee (see Appendix 1 for the 
Parliamentary briefing paper citing my article). It is clear to me that my involvement in the 
Scottish Parliament petition influenced the direction of my DLaw at that time. I extensively 
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debated the arguments for and against legislation to regulate the use of ‘no pet’ covenants 
and became convinced of the need for legislation. At this time, I was on a research 
sabbatical and was undertaking data analysis of my interviews and a key theme to emerge 
from the data was harm. I spent time identifying the nature of the harm caused to the 
relevant parties and assessing the magnitude of the harm and its significance to the lives of 
those affected. As the theme of harm emerged, I reflected this in the wording of my research 
questions. Figure 4 shows how my research evolved and developed over time and the 
external influences on this progression.  
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Figure 4 - How my DLaw evolved and developed over time in response to external influences 
  2014: I published an article on pet 
custody disputes (which arose from 
teaching materials for my animal law 
module). 
2015-16: I completed an APEL 
portfolio on pet custody disputes 
leading to my DLaw proposal. 
2016-17: I undertook my DLaw literature review  
- Human-pet relationship 
- Research methods 
- Pet custody disputes 
 
June 2017: I interviewed 
someone involved in a pet 
custody dispute (but I was 
unable to find any more 
research participants). 
September 2017:  I 
interviewed someone 
adversely affected by a ‘no 
pet’ covenant (Bob). This led 
to a change of my DLaw topic. 
2017-18 Literature review 
- ‘No pet’ covenants 
October 2017: I was 
invited to submit an 
article to LLR for a 
special edition on 
animal law. 
March 2018: Conference 
paper – Society of 
Companion Animal Studies 
(SCAS). Met participant 
(Julia).  
April 2018 – my article 
on ‘no pet’ covenants 
published in the LLR. I 
developed my Human 
Rights approach in this 
article. 
Put in touch with participant 
(Kate) through contact made 
at the SCAS conference. 
July 2018: Conference paper 
– Oxford Centre for Animal 
Ethics. Met participant 
(Isabel). 
September 2019 – invited 
speaker at SCAS conference; 
presented at ‘Animal Law, Ethics 
and Policy’ conference at 
Liverpool John Mores University. 
I developed my Harm Approach 




2018 to November 
2019. I developed my 
arguments calling for 
new legislation to 




3.3 My research aim and questions 
There is an intrinsic link between the research aim/questions and the research design and 
therefore I start the methodology component of the portfolio by re-stating my research aim 
and research questions. 
The overarching aim of my research is to fill a significant gap in the legal literature by  
• understanding the lived experience of ‘no pet’ covenants for pet-owning tenants in 
residential leases in the UK and  
• critically analyse the current law around ‘no pet’ covenants in England with a view to 
evaluating any need for changes in housing law, policy and practice. 
The research questions to achieve my aim are as follows: 
1. How do people in the UK construct companion animals as family members in 
everyday practices? 
2. What do the stories of pet-owning tenants in the UK reveal about their lived 
experience of ‘no pet’ covenants? 
3. How can the insights from these stories develop and enhance a deeper 
understanding of the harm ‘no pet’ covenants cause to tenants and companion 
animals? (Knowledge that can be used by those involved in residential lettings - 
landlords, letting agents, lawyers, courts). 
4. If tenants perceive their cats and dogs as family members, can the human-
companion animal relationship come within ‘private life and family’ under Article 8, 
European Convention on Human Rights? 
5. In what ways, if any, does the existing law in England recognise and protect the 
human-companion animal relationship in the context of ‘no pet’ covenants in 
residential leases? 
6. Is there a need for change in housing law, policy and practice to regulate the use of 
‘no pet’ covenants in residential leases in England? 
To address questions 1-3 I undertook a literature review on the nature of the human-
companion animal relationship and the use of ‘no pet’ covenants as well as my own 
empirical research interviewing pet-owning tenants. I was then able to use the insights I 
acquired from the literature review and interview data analysis to address questions 4-6, 
which have implications for housing law in England. Answering questions 4 and 5 involved 
black letter law research – firstly, a critical analysis of the law relating to Article 8, European 
Convention on Human Rights to assess whether the human-companion animal relationship 
falls within family and/or private life. If it does, this would have significant implications for the 
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use of ‘no pet’ covenants by public authority landlords. Secondly, a critical analysis of the 
law in England on repossession by public landlords following a tenant’s breach of a ‘no pet’ 
covenant. My black letter law analysis of the existing law in order to answer questions 4 and 
5 led to an assessment of its adequacy. This was addressed in question 6 together with a 
consideration of the need for change in housing law, policy and practice to regulate the use 
of ‘no pet’ covenants. My findings can be used by housing practitioners to advise their clients 
(whether landlord or tenant) and therefore has practical use in the field. 
3.4 My literature review  
My literature review evaluates the current state of academic knowledge on ‘no pet’ 
covenants enabling me to identify the key contributions, identify gaps in the knowledge and 
demonstrate how my own research contributes to the literature. It allows me to corroborate 
and defend my knowledge claim that there is a distinct lack of research on ‘no pet’ 
covenants especially qualitative research that seeks to understand a tenant’s lived 
experience of ‘no pet’ covenants. Little is known about the effect of ‘no pet’ covenants on 
tenants and in the UK there is no empirical research in the existing literature. I carried out 
searches on electronic legal databases using selected key words such as ‘(pet w/2 
covenant*)’ and also ‘(no w/2 pet*)’ and covenant* and lease* or leasehold’ and also ‘(no w/2 
dog* or cat*) and lease* or leasehold’ in Heinonline. I know from experience as an animal 
law lecturer that Heinonline is a more useful database for animal law articles than Westlaw 
or LexisNexis, although I did searches on these databases too. I did not use any restrictions 
on year of publication or jurisdiction because so few articles have been published on ‘no pet’ 
covenants that I did not want to impose any restrictions. I found the snowballing effect of 
using references cited in articles very useful. I was confident I had a complete list when I 
kept finding references to the same articles, especially when the recently published articles 
from Graham et al (2018) and Fox and Ray (2019) revealed no new academic articles that I 
did not already have. 
Table 1 lists the academic articles I found on ‘no pet’ covenants. These are grouped into 
three categories: empirical research; scholarly research that relies on existing literature and 
finally research published by students. I have listed those articles published by students 
separately as these are less authoritative. The table lists the country where the research 
took place (as this becomes relevant when the law is considered). The scholarly discipline of 




Table 1 - Academic articles (published in English) on ‘no pet’ covenants from my literature review 












    
1988 Mahalski, P.A., 
Jones, R. and 
Maxwell, G.M. ‘The 
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The International 
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2017 Power, E. ‘Renting 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Year  Reference  
 
Country Discipline Research method Focus 
2018  Graham, T.M. and 
Rock, M.J. ‘The 
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Animal Law, 11,  pp. 
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legal issues that 
arise when 
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in the USA. 
2018 Rook, D. ‘For the 




in Housing Law and 
Policy’, Liverpool 




Law Scholarly research Focuses on legal 
challenges to the 
use of ‘no pet’ 
covenants in the 
UK and considers 
legislative 
options. 
2019 Fox, M. and Ray, M. 
‘No pets allowed? 
Companion animals, 
older people and 
residential care’, 
Med Hummanit, 45, 
pp. 211-222. 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Year  Reference  
 
Country Discipline Research method Focus 
 STUDENT RESEARCH     






Tenancies Act and 
No Pet Clauses in the 
Social Housing 
Context’ Sask. L. Rev. 
72, pp. 257-319. 
Canada Law 
student 
Student article Focuses on 
housing law in 
Canada and uses 
‘no pet’ 
covenants as a 
case study to 
demonstrate the 
unfair treatment 
at law of public 
sector tenants.  







Atlantic J. on L. & 
Pub. Pol'y, 2,  p. 101. 
USA Law 
student 
Student article Focuses on the 
legal barriers in 
the USA to 
renting with pets 
and the benefits 




The most useful empirical studies for my research are Power (2017) and Graham et al 
(2018), research studies from Australia and Canada respectively. Like my research, both 
use qualitative research methods to interview pet-owning tenants and use thematic content 
analysis to identify relevant themes arising from the interview data. Power’s (2017) study 
focuses on the concept of rental insecurity and examines the way in which ‘no pet’ 
covenants impact on a tenant’s sense of a secure home. I found this a very useful study and 
used the themes identified from the empirical research as starting points when analysing my 
own interview data. My research builds on this Australian study by examining whether pet-
owning tenants in the UK have a similar experience of ‘no pet’ covenants. My research also 
adds new insights because it explores beyond the concept of ‘rental insecurity’ to 
understand the whole of the tenant’s experience. The Graham et al (2018) study specifically 
focuses on the experience of young tenants who own dogs. The article was published after I 
had already started doing my interviews but I found its findings insightful at my data analysis 
stage. I used the themes from this research as starting points to explore their relevance to 
my participants. My research builds on this Canadian study by comparing the experience of 
pet-owning tenants in the UK with those in Canada. In addition, my research participants are 
not limited to young tenants with dogs so my research has a broader scope. Neither of these 
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studies analysed the relationship the tenant had with their companion animal but instead 
relied on the existing literature to show that tenants often see their pets as family members. 
Drawing on Michael’s (2000) concept of the co(agency) my research goes further than 
Power and Graham et al because it adopts the hybrid or assemblage of 
human+animal+home+lease (Huanihomse) as the research subject recognizing how the 
constituent parts interconnect and influence each other to form a distinct whole. To examine 
the constituent parts in isolation may mean researchers miss something that is only apparent 
when the hybrid is examined.  
I decided to exclude a number of articles from my literature review. Firstly, I exclude a 
number of articles, all from the USA and often written by students, that specifically focus on 
the housing needs of disabled people who live with service animals. Disabled people and 
their service animals have particular housing needs and share a unique relationship that 
differs from those tenants in my research. My participants lived with their dogs and cats as 
companion animals not as working animals. Disabled people with service animals also have 
protection under anti-discrimination law that is not available to non-disabled tenants with 
pets. Secondly, I excluded two articles, (Herbster, 2000; Kight, 2012) from the USA and 
written by law students, that examined whether a pot-bellied pig and miniature horse 
respectively could be deemed a pet and thereby exempt from zoning laws that prohibit farm 
animals living in households.  
While my literature review provides valuable resources to develop my understanding of the 
research topic, enabling me to see where my original contribution fits within the bigger 
picture, it is my theoretical assumptions that steer the direction of my research and underpin 
the practical decisions I make about data collection and analysis. My theoretical 
assumptions as a social constructionist were explained in section 1.2 of the commentary and 
justify my reliance on qualitative research methods.  
3.5 My decision to use qualitative research methods 
A qualitative approach aligns with my social constructionist worldview because it seeks to 
explore the social world through the experiences of people, their relationships and the 
significance of their meanings. Qualitative research emphasises the importance of context 
and connects context with explanation (Mason, 2002). I believe there is no single reality that 
can be observed and understood separate to the people who experience it. To understand a 
version of reality as it exists for a particular person or group (such as pet-owning tenants), 
we must find the meaning that those people give to experiences and social situations 
(Gergen, 2015). For this reason, a qualitative research approach, using in-depth interviews, 
that seeks to achieve depth rather than breadth of understanding is well-suited for my 
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research. It provides rich, contextual and in-depth material that facilitates my understanding 
of meanings and interpretations.  
There is no unified set of techniques for qualitative research but Mason (2002) identifies 
some common elements: firstly, qualitative research is grounded in an interpretivist 
philosophy that is concerned with how the social world is interpreted and experienced; 
secondly, the methods of data generation are  
“flexible and sensitive to the social context in which data are produced”(Mason, 2002, 
p. 3);  
thirdly, the methods of data analysis involve understanding complexity, detail and context. 
Finally, qualitative research acknowledges reflexivity – the extent to which the researcher’s 
own thoughts, actions and decisions can shape what is seen in the data. I drew on these 
commonalities in designing my research method. My interviewing technique (which was 
mainly unstructured) allowed the participants to tell their story in their own words. My 
combination of thematic content analysis and narrative analysis ensured a holistic approach 
thereby enabling an understanding of the complexity of the issues and a recognition of the 
co-construction of the interview data.  
Interview data provides a ‘situated accounting’,  
“that is, particular versions of affairs produced by particular interlocutors on specific 
occasions” (Roulston, 2010, p. 61).  
It is researcher-provoked data (Silverman, 2014), a result of an artificially created 
conversation that involves a two-way dialogue in which data is created. This data is 
inevitably influenced by my presence and what the person knows about me in advance of 
the meeting. For me, this is an important recognition and I am consciously aware of how I 
may be altering the data in the very process of its creation during an ‘active interview’ 
(Holstein and Gubrium, 1995). All but one of my interviewees (David) knew prior to our 
meeting that I had a particular view of pets and ‘no pet’ covenants. Julia, Lucy, Josh and 
Isabel knew that I had published an article challenging the use of these covenants under 
human rights law and Julia, Lucy and Isabel had heard me present a paper on my article. 
How did this prior knowledge of my views affect what they said to me in the interview? As a 
Social Constructionist, I believe that a person’s identity is not fixed but instead people have 
multiple voices and present different aspects of themselves in different contexts. 
Interviewees may filter out part of their experience that may show them in an undesirable 
light (Polkinghorne, 2007) or conversely may exaggerate events and sentiments that show 
them in a good light. Could their prior knowledge of my views influence how they portrayed 
themselves in the interview? It is possible but I never got the feeling that the interviewees 
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were particularly bothered about pleasing me. They were more concerned that their story 
was told because they felt they had experienced an injustice and had been treated unfairly. I 
think that their prior knowledge of my sympathies encouraged a confidence between us that 
allowed them to talk openly to me and thereby arguably contributes to the trustworthiness of 
what they told me about their relationship with their companion animal and the effect of ‘no 
pet’ covenants on their life.  
I do not think I can extract my values and biases from the research process. For example, I 
have lived with dogs most of my life and in reading the literature (Fox, 2006) I realised I had 
taken-for-granted assumptions about dogs being capable of emotions and having individual 
personalities with their own quirks and traits. These assumptions meant that my participants 
did not need to convince me of their pet’s subjectivity nor feel wary of using 
anthropomorphized accounts of their pet’s behaviour. However, did my assumptions affect 
my interpretation of the interview data? I acknowledge that my interview data reflects a 
moment in time of the participant’s experience and a version of events created for me and 
influenced by me. I am aware of my own subjectivities that influenced the questions I asked, 
the interaction during the interview and the way in which I interpreted the interview data 
afterwards. Roulston argues that exploring an interviewer’s subjectivities  
“entails examination of one’s personal experiences and biography as a researcher” 
(2010, p. 58).  
Hence section 3.2 ‘The story of my DLaw research journey’ and figure 4 ‘How my DLaw 
evolved and developed over time in response to external influences’ are integral 
components of my explanation of my methodology. I am not an impartial, neutral researcher 
looking at something on which I have no views. Instead, I am very passionate about animal 
law and the human treatment of animals and I am passionate about keeping people and 
their pets together in rental housing. My view undoubtedly colours the way I see things when 
I am co-constructing data in interviews and interpreting the interview transcripts. It is 
important that I am transparent in acknowledging my values, assumptions and biases.  
A good example of this can be found in comparing my research findings to those of Fox 
(2006) who conducted qualitative interviews with pet owners in Britain. The purpose of Fox’s 
research was to assess theoretical post-humanist attempts to deconstruct Cartesian human-
animal binaries by applying the theory to the lived experience of pet owners in Britain. 
Therefore, Fox’s research explored the liminal position between pets as ‘human’ and ‘animal’ 
and both the researcher and participant were aware of the importance of this boundary. 
Fox’s findings focus much more on the way owners rely on popular animal psychology to 
use an animal instinct model in their relations with their pet. This had little relevance to my 
research findings and yet both Fox and I were engaged in examining the nature of the 
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human-companion animal relationship within everyday practices. Why was animal agency 
and anthropomorphism more evident in my participants’ interviews and my findings while an 
animal instinct model, which was very relevant to Fox’s research, virtually absent in my own? 
One factor may be the way in which the views of the researcher and the participant’s prior 
knowledge of the purpose of the research influence the findings. My research explored the 
harm caused by ‘no pet’ covenants and my participants had all being adversely affected by 
the covenants. My participants and I were therefore all focusing on the close bond the tenant 
has with their companion animal and emphasising the similarities – the human-like qualities 
of the animals - rather than the differences that separate them. Julia was the only one of my 
participants to make reference to a dominant, hierarchical relationship between her and her 
dog, Annie, and talked about the instincts of Annie as a Basset hound. Julia had worked all 
her life with dogs including at an animal shelter, as a dog trainer and as a dog home border 
and this undoubtedly influenced how she related to dogs. This example demonstrates the 
social constructionist assumptions that underlie my methodology in showing how the views 
of the researcher and the participant’s prior knowledge of the research project may affect the 
research findings. 
3.6 My sampling technique 
Quantitative research uses random and representative sampling techniques in order to 
achieve a representative microcosm of the population to be studied thereby enabling wide 
generalisations to be made about the whole population (Silverman, 2017). Since qualitative 
research focuses on depth, nuance and complexity a different sampling strategy is used; a 
strategy that is based on the link between sampling and theory, rather than sampling and 
population (Mason, 2002). Bryman observes that  
“the issue should be couched in terms of the generalizability of cases to theoretical 
propositions rather than to populations or universes” (1988, p. 90 quoted in Mason, 
2002).  
I therefore used a strategic sampling strategy known as theoretical or purposive sampling 
which seeks out  
“groups, settings and individuals where ... the processes being studied are most 
likely to occur” (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994, p. 20 quoted in Mason, 2002).  
thereby constructing a sample that is meaningful theoretically. Given my research aims to 
inquire into pet-owning tenants’ lived experience of ‘no pet’ covenants and to understand the 




(i) a person who was currently, or had been, a tenant of residential property in the UK; 
and  
(ii) had been adversely affected by a ‘no pet’ covenant/policy in their tenancy 
agreement.  
In my research ‘Harm’ emerges as a key theme from the data but given my selection of a 
sample of tenants adversely affected by ‘no pet’ covenants, this is not surprising. However, 
understanding the character and magnitude of that harm became a key focus of my 
research. By sampling strategically I am able to use the detailed understanding of ‘no pet’ 
covenants I acquired from my research participants more widely to make theoretical, as 
opposed to empirical, generalizations. Their stories are a window on the  
“social and cultural environment that shaped the story’s life events and the meaning 
attached to them” (Polkinghorne, 2007, p. 483). 
Consequently my narrative analysis of their stories demonstrates “what is possible” (Mason, 
2002, p. 196) allowing me to reflect on lessons for other settings.  
I used a number of purposive sampling methods to find my interviewees: 
(i) The use of social media  
Social media is a valuable tool for accessing members of the public who are pet owners and 
tenants (Graham et al, 2018) and I found three of my interviewees in this way. My interest in 
this topic started when I signed a petition on social media about an elderly man being 
evicted from his care home because he had a dog. I signed the petition and left a comment 
offering support. Shortly afterwards I was contacted by someone leading the campaign. 
Ultimately, this led to me interviewing the elderly gentlemen, Bob Harvey. At the time, I 
thought it would be useful for post-doctoral research but later it became the focus of my 
DLaw. Using a ‘snowball sample’ technique, I acquired two other interviewees, Kate and 
Emma. Three people (including Kate and Emma) were recommended to me by others 
involved in Bob’s campaign. These pet-owning tenants had separately used facebook to 
highlight the injustice of having to choose between their dogs and securing a new home for 
their family. I contacted two of them through facebook and the other through a contact I 
made with those involved in Bob’s campaign. All three people initially agreed to be 
interviewed but unfortunately, one of them later stopped replying to my emails before I could 
interview her. 
(ii) A presentation of my research  
Three of my interviewees (Julia, Isabel and Lucy) were recruited through my presenting a 
paper on my research. Although I did not set out intending to recruit interviewees, the 
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conference setting gave me access to people with an interest in animals many of whom 
were likely to be pet owners. I was invited to give a paper at the Society of Companion 
Animal Studies (SCAS) conference in March 2018. At the end of my presentation, a member 
of the public (together with her dog) approached me to tell me her story of her experience of 
‘no pet’ covenants. She agreed to be interviewed as part of my research so I took her 
contact details and we eventually met four months later. Another interviewee heard my 
presentation at the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics summer school in July 2018. She was 
an international student at Oxford University and approached me after the presentation to 
share her experience of ‘no pet’ covenants in England. There was no opportunity to talk 
further at that time and she returned to Spain thereafter, but she kindly shared her 
experience, via email, by answering my written questions to her. Finally, I recruited an 
interviewee from my animal law undergraduate students. I gave a talk on my research in one 
of my animal law teaching sessions and one student shared her experience of ‘no pet’ 
covenants with the whole seminar group. A few months later, after she had completed her 
studies (she was a final year student), I emailed her to ask if she would be willing to be 
interviewed and she agreed. I chose not to contact her until after she had graduated and left 
the University so she would not feel any sense of pressure to participate based on our 
student/lecturer relationship. In fact, the primary pet owner was her boyfriend, so I 
interviewed them both together.  
(iii) Observation of the public  
I decided to talk to someone who was homeless and living with a dog on the streets to hear 
of their experience of ‘no pet’ covenants. Existing research in the USA suggests that the use 
of ‘no pet’ covenants contributes to homelessness (Irvine, 2013a). I knew from previous 
visits to Oxford that there are many homeless people with dogs in the city centre so when in 
Oxford for the animal law conference in July 2018, I took the opportunity to talk to a 
homeless pet owner. I observed David begging on the street with his Jack Russell dog and I 
approached him, explained my research and asked if I could interview him. He 
acknowledged that he had been adversely affected by ‘no pet’ covenants which contributed 
to his homelessness and agreed to be interviewed. 
 
Therefore my choice of whom to interview was influenced by the experience of my research 
participants (they were all part of a group of people who were, or had been, pet-owning 
tenants adversely affected by ‘no pet’ covenants) and their easy access (in terms of finding 
and liaising with people through social media or in person at specified events and settings). I 
agree with Mason that qualitative sampling can be an “organic practice” (2002, p. 125) that 
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grows throughout the research process as the shape of the project develops and therefore I 
did not need to decide on a definitive number of research participants at the start. Using 
purposive sampling over the course of a year gave me seven in-depth interviews. I found 
that due to the high level of homogeneity amongst my participants, data saturation occurred 
at an early stage with no new themes arising in the later interviews. Homogeneity arose from 
the fact that all of my participants were tenants of residential leases and all had very close 
relationships with their companion animals, akin to family, which meant they all shared an 
adverse experience of ‘no pet’ covenants that resulted in harm often of a similar character 
and magnitude. Guest, Bunce and Johnston (2006) also experienced early data saturation in 
their research study on reproductive care in Africa. They had a sample of 60 women but 
found that 34 of their 36 codes developed in their study came from the first six interviews. 
They suggest that for studies with a high level of homogeneity among the population  
“a sample of six interviews may [be] sufficient to enable development of meaningful 
themes and useful interpretations” (2006, p. 78).  
My experience supports this view. I found seven interviews were enough to cause data 
saturation with no new themes emerging and in consequence, I chose not to interview any 
more tenants. 
My interviewees were of a variety of ages and were of both sexes as demonstrated in Table 
2 below. Some of this was a result of a deliberate strategy and other was due to chance. 
After interviewing an 87-year old man with no family who fitted the ideal candidate for a 
lonely person desperate for the company of his dog (Serpell, 1996), I was keen to find 
younger people who had fulfilling human relationships who may therefore be less likely to 
view their dog/cat as a family member. I interviewed three pet owners who were in long term, 
happy relationships as well as a pet owner who had a young family (a husband and two 
young children). These could be seen as ‘deviant’ cases (Silverman, 2014) where the close 



























80+  Alone 
Julia Dog (Basset hound) 
 
Annie 60-70 Alone 
Kate Two dogs (Labrador and 
Staffordshire bull terrier) 
Honey and 
Roxie 





Simba 20-30  Couple 
David Dog (Jack Russell) 
 
Mack 30-40 Alone 
Isabel Two cats Badger and 
Marmite 
20-30 Couple 
Emma Dog (French bulldog) 
 
Anton 40-50 Couple 
 
3.7 My interview technique 
I chose to use predominantly unstructured in-depth interviews to allow the participants 
freedom to tell their story in their own words. The use of unstructured interviews fits with my 
epistemological position that a legitimate way to generate data is to talk interactively with 
people and to analyse their language and meanings. My view is that knowledge is situational 
and contextual. I concur with Mason that  
“meanings and understandings are created in an interaction, which is effectively a co-
production involving researcher and interviewees” (2002, p. 63).  
I was conscious that I could be co-constructing the idea of the dog or cat as a family 
member. Could the interview dialogue lead the participant to think about their relationship 
with their dog in a particular way (e.g. as a family member) that they had not previously 
thought about? With this in mind, I sought to ask open questions to allow participants to 
explore their own interpretations and not to provide my own preconceived views. For 
example, Could you tell me the story of your pet? What words would you use to describe 
your relationship with your pet? (Interview Guide, Appendix 4). I wanted to see what 
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language they chose to use. My interviews were flexible and conducive to emergent 
reflections. Mason observes that,  
“It is a much more complex and exhausting task to plan and carry out qualitative 
interviews than, for example, to develop and use a structured questionnaire for 
asking a set of predetermined questions” (2002, p.  67).  
I needed to think on my feet in the interview and make on-the-spot decisions about the 
questions, sequence and probes. On the whole I tried not to interrupt the flow of talk and 
was generally reserved in contributing to the talk preferring the participant to take the lead 
allowing me to follow them “down their trails” (Riessman, 2008, p. 24) . I sought to be an 
attentive listener. All the face-to-face interviews lasted approximately 1.5 hours except for 
the one with David, the homeless man I interviewed while he was begging on the street. 
David’s interview was very short because he gave short answers to all my questions and did 
not want to elaborate or tell stories. I found this the hardest interview to do especially as it 
was the end of a long day of listening to presentations at a conference and I was tired. I was 
not fully prepared for David’s unresponsiveness and on reflection I wanted to speak to him 
again to delve a little deeper into his answers but I never saw him again. All my other 
interviews, involving direct dialogue, were “an exciting and enriching experience” (Kvale and 
Brinkman, 2009, p. 123). My participants seemed to enjoy the opportunity to share their 
experiences with such an attentive audience and I enjoyed listening to them.  
Mishler (1995) distinguishes between the ‘told’ and the ‘telling’ and whilst my data analysis 
focuses on the ‘told’ it is also worth considering the ‘telling’ – how a narrative is created - in 
particular, the audience and the local context that generates the narrative.  In each of my 
interviews I let the interviewee choose the location of our meeting, some took place in their 
homes or a place with a special connection to the pet (see Table 3 - Context of the 
interview). Giving an interview, especially when it involves signing a lengthy ethics consent 
form at the start, is not an ideal environment for persuading someone to speak openly about 
something personal to them. I wanted the interviewee to be on their own territory to help 
them feel comfortable, preferably in the presence of their pet. In most cases, the interviewee 
had prior knowledge of my views on companion animals and ‘no pet’ covenants; some had 







Table 3 – Context of the interview and participant’s prior knowledge of my views 
Interviewee 
(pseudonym) 




of my views on 






Yes Yes – friend 
of Bob 
Yes 
Julia Local park where she 
walked her dog 
No  No Yes 







Yes No Yes 
David Street (where he was 
begging) 
Yes No No 
Isabel Email exchange 
 
NA NA Yes 
Emma Telephone conversation (at 
home) 
Yes No Yes 
  
In re-telling the story of their experience of ‘no pet’ covenants, participants are interpreting 
their own past (Riessman, 2008). The story of their experience is dependent on the context – 
it could be different at another time and place and for a different listener. Most of my 
interviews were conducted after the crisis event so that the problem caused by the ‘no pet’ 
covenant had been resolved, for example, Bob had found a new home that accepted his 
dog. Re-telling their story required the participants to look back on the unpleasant event from 
a safe distance. However I interviewed Julia while she was in the middle of a crisis event 
(her dog had recently died and the local authority landlord would not allow her to have 
another dog in her flat) and her story was one of pain. One of the strengths of narrative 
inquiry is its ability to encompass the temporality of experiences and the shifting 
interpretation of events over time (Bell, 2002). Julia’s pain was still evident when I met with 
her one year later but her story was different by that time and she was emerging as a fighter 
of injustice rather than a victim of loss and grief. That the narrative is context-dependent and 
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interpretations can change over time does not detract from the validity of the interview data 
because I do not seek a realist description of some objective truth but instead the meanings 
attached to the individual’s experience. Portelli observes  
“Oral sources … are not always reliable in point of fact… Rather than being a 
weakness, this is however, their strength: errors, inventions and myths lead us 
through and beyond facts to their meanings” (1991, p. 2, quoted in Bell, 2002). 
After explaining the consent form and getting the participant to sign the form, I decided to 
start my interviews with very open, unstructured questions, for example, tell me the story of 
your dog? The interview took the form of a conversation in which I would comment or ask 
questions as and when I felt it appropriate. All of the face-to-face interviews (except for Bob 
and David) involved the participant showing me a photograph of their pet. Prior to the 
interview, I had asked them to choose one or two photographs that showed their relationship 
with their pet that they would be willing to show me. This acted as an excellent icebreaker as 
everyone loves to show photographs of their pet but it was also a useful visual tool to get the 
participant to think about the nature of their relationship with their pet in advance. In planning 
my methodology, I had considered using the photographs for data analysis using visual 
methodology (Rose, 2016) but subsequently felt that I had sufficient data from the interview 
conversation alone. However, drawing on existing research (cited in Sliverman, 2017) I may 
use the photographs in post-doctoral research on the human-companion animal relationship 
(within the ethical approval period). The photographs helped to build rapport at the start of 
the interview, which is important so participants feel they can share their experiences openly. 
In most cases, I had already had contact with the participant prior to the interview either in 
person or through email so I had already worked at building some rapport even before the 
interview. I did have a pre-prepared interview schedule with some questions I could use if 
needed (see the Interview guide, Appendix 4) but I was guided by the individual 
conversation and did not use all these questions in every case. I assumed an “open listening 
stance” (Polkinghorne, 2007) to give the participants freedom to explain their relationship 
with their dog or cat and their experience of ‘no pet’ covenants in their own words and not to 




Table 4 - The general format of my initial interviews 
Sequence  What  How and why 
1 Opening - consent form; 
ethics; complaints 
procedure 
I explained the aim of the research and nature of the 
interview process. We talked through the contents of 
the Researcher Information Sheet which includes a 
consent form and I explained whom to contact in the 
event of complaints. I asked if I could audio record the 
interview (all consented to this). 
2 Photographs of companion 
animal 
Prior to the interview I asked the participant to find 
one or two photographs of their pet that showed 
something about their relationship with their pet. We 
discussed the photographs the participant had chosen 
to show me. This was an excellent icebreaker, helped 
to build rapport and was a very enjoyable part of the 
interview. 
3 Questions on the human-
companion animal 
relationship  
I asked very open questions about the participant’s 
relationship with their companion animal including 
everyday routines and practices of the pet within the 
home. These questions generated rich data often in 
the form of stories. 
4 Questions about the 
participant’s experience of 
‘no pet’ covenants 
I asked questions about the ‘no pet’ covenants. Some 
of these questions were more structured as I needed 
specific information about the type of lease, type of 
landlord, wording of the ‘no pet’ covenant, but I also 
wanted to give participants the chance to explain their 
experience of ‘no pet’ covenants in their own words 
so used some open questions too. 
 
 All the initial interviews were audio recorded with the participant’s consent (with the 
exception of the one interview by email exchange). By transcribing most of the interviews 
myself I was able to get close to the data early on and reflect on both the data itself and the 
method of its generation while the interview was still fresh in my mind. Transcription is also 
an interpretation, for example, in deciding where to put the grammar and whether to include 
pauses or laughter (Elliot, 2005). Overall, I tried to transcribe verbatim and to indicate 
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pauses and laughter. I also wrote notes in my reflexive journal straight after the interview 
with reflections on how the interview went and what the participant was like and I found that 
it was useful to refer back to these notes during my data analysis. 
With a number of my participants, the interview created an association that continued 
afterwards. Bob and I became friends and my family and I visited him on a number of 
occasions. Both Julia and Kate have kept in touch with me; I helped Kate draft a letter to her 
local MP complaining about the use of ‘no pet’ covenants and advised Julia when her local 
authority landlord proposed to implement a blanket ban on pets in housing for the elderly. 
The fact that I have a continued association with these participants made it easier for me to 
send them the stories I crafted from their interviews and to meet them again one year after 
their initial interviews to discuss my data analysis (Bell, 2011). This iterative process of 
returning to the participants allowed them to give me honest feedback on my interpretations 
of the data and strengthens the trustworthiness of my analysis (Lincoln and Guber, 1985; 
Polkinghorne, 2007). 
3.8 My methods of data analysis 
Data analysis has been characterised as the most complex phase of qualitative research 
(Thorne, 2000; Nowell et al, 2017). I adopt a mixed analysis approach to my research with 
three phases of analysis: firstly, thematic content analysis of seven in-depth interviews; 
secondly, narrative analysis of four of those interviews and thirdly, black letter law analysis of 
the relevant law in England relating to ‘no pet’ covenants.  
I started with thematic content analysis which is a highly flexible and accessible form of 
analysis, particularly useful for those new to qualitative research because it is relatively free 
of prescriptions and procedures (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Thematic analysis is 
“a method for identifying, analyzing, organizing, describing, and reporting themes 
found within a data set” (Nowell et al, 2017, p. 2)  
and allows me to compare and contrast the perspectives of all my participants highlighting 
similarities and differences between them (Braun and Clarke, 2006). I used Computer Aided 
Qualitative Data Analysis software NVivo 12 to initially code the interviews to help me make 
sense of the data and identify broad themes. I already had a number of themes from my 
literature review so it made sense to start the analysis by considering the relevancy of these 
themes to my interview data. This proved to be very useful but I wanted to dig deeper so I 
chose to use narrative analysis as a second stage of analysis. 
I read about narrative analysis in preparing my DLaw proposal and it resonated with me 
because it fits my Social Constructionist worldview, acknowledges that people make sense 
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of random experiences by imposing story structures on them and recognises that stories do 
not exist in a vacuum but are shaped by cultural narratives (Bell, 2002). I was particularly 
drawn by Riessman’s (1990) book Divorce Talk because at that time I was researching pet 
custody disputes arising from a couples’ separation or divorce so the book was especially 
relevant. Narrative analysis has its origins in literary criticism (Bell, 2002; Earthy and Cronin, 
2008) and while it has been used extensively to explore people’s experience of education, 
illness, death and identity (Clandinin and Connelly, 2000; Bell, 2002; Thomas, 2012; Lee et 
al, 2013; Thomas et al 2018) it is relatively unknown in legal research, an exception being 
Amsterdam and Bruner (2000) who demonstrate the significance of narrative within the 
context of the law: 
“Law lives on narrative … For one, the law is awash in storytelling. Clients tell stories 
to lawyers … As clients and lawyers talk, the client’s story gets recast into plights and 
prospects… This endless telling, casting and recasting is essential to the conduct of 
the law” (Amsterdam and Bruner, 2000, p. 110).  
What makes narrative analysis a particularly attractive method of analysis in my research is 
its focus on understanding people’s experience of the social world. I read numerous studies 
which demonstrated this including the recent study by Thomas et al (2018) on palliative care 
which sought to understand the experience of family carers looking after terminally ill adults 
in the home. More relevant to my research topic was Irvine’s study on homelessness. She 
uses the narratives of 75 homeless people to explore how their relationship with their dog or 
cat affects their personal identity, for example, some people construct their dog as a life-
changer or life-saver through a story of redemption (Irvine, 2013a; 2013b). Subsequently, 
Carr used the narratives of the homeless people in Irvine’s study to revaluate the concept of 
care in the context of homelessness (Carr, 2016). 
Personally, I find stories a powerful way to understand the social world. In 2016, I visited 
Dachau Concentration Camp in Germany. There was an overwhelming volume of data about 
the camp. I was bombarded with facts and statistics, which seemed to bounce off me, but 
what touched me most were the individual stories that seemed to bury themselves into my 
consciousness and force me to feel, empathise and understand. A participant of the 
Remembrance Book Project at Dachau observed that  
“The history of the world is formed by the stories of individual people” (2011, p.1).  
This conforms with my view of the social world of humans, that there is an 
interconnectedness between narrative and human experience. I agree with Sabrin that,  
“human beings think, perceive, imagine, and make moral choices according to 
narrative structures” (1986, p. 8).  
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Therefore, one of my research’s original contributions to the field is the use of narrative 
analysis to help critically assess the relevant law and evaluate the need for legal reform in 
housing law. 
In Divorce Talk Riessman adopted a similar dual approach of thematic analysis followed by 
narrative analysis. First, she coded her interview transcripts using grounded theory that 
enabled her to develop themes to conceptualise the taken-for-granted assumptions about a 
companionate marriage. Her use of grounded theory proved useful but also had its 
limitations,  
“the method necessitates fragmenting the interview text into codable chunks that 
share a common content area or topic” (1990, p. 229).  
She wanted to read the data holistically rather than breaking it up so she also used narrative 
analysis for those parts of the transcripts that included a narrative. This led to new findings 
that were not apparent from the grounded theory analysis. I decided to adopt a similar 
process of dual analysis of the interview transcripts but, like Thomas et al (2018), in their 
palliative care study I used a deductive thematic content analysis rather than grounded 
theory. Figure 5 shows my research process and demonstrates the links between my three 




Figure 5 - My DLaw research process (years 2 and 3) demonstrating the links between my three 




- pets as family.  
- ‘no pet’ covenants. 
- research methods. 
Carry out seven interviews 
(audio record) 
Write reflexive journal 
Transcription of interviews 
Coding using NVivo 
Data analysis using 
THEMATIC CONTENT ANALYSIS 
Write up content analysis Data analysis using  
NARRATIVE ANALYSIS       
(four stories created ) 
Meeting three participants to 
discuss their narrative and the 
themes I had identified 
Write up narrative analysis 
Practical application of research findings to housing law, 
policy and practice using BLACK LETTER LAW ANALYSIS 
In reality my research process was not as linear as the above diagram indicates because of my flexibility in 
responding to external factors. For example, I wrote an article for the Liverpool Law Review (animal law special 
edition) and submitted a response to the Scottish Parliament Public Petitions Committee before I completed my 
data analysis. This meant engaging with the black letter law analysis at an earlier stage in the research process 
than the diagram shows but returning to it later. This is not uncommon in qualitative research where the stages of 
data collection, analysis and writing up may be interrelated and occur concurrently as the researcher moves back 
and forth between the stages (Nowell et al, 2017). 
167 
 
3.8.1 Phase one: Thematic content analysis of seven in-depth interviews using 
NVivo 12 
I found NVivo 12 a useful tool to help me sort and organise my interview transcripts into 
codes (Bazeley and Jackson, 2013). The software programme helps researchers organise 
their data, but provides no help with the intellectual process of conceptualising codes 
(Thorne, 2000). Saldana describes a code in qualitative research as  
“a word or short phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-
capturing, and/or evocative attribute” (2009, p. 3) 
for a portion of data. Initial codes were generated deductively based on existing research 
from my literature review, for example, ‘rental insecurity’ (Power, 2017) and others emerged 
from the interview data itself, for example, ‘detrimental changes to everyday practices’. I 
allocated virtually the whole transcript of each interview to codes and individual extracts of 
data could relate to many different codes (Braun and Clarke, 2006). I used the codes cross-
sectionally across my whole data set. During coding I used my reflexive journal to reflect on 
how my ideas and thoughts about the codes emerged and evolved over time as I engaged 
more deeply with the data. This first stage of coding was time consuming as I repeatedly 
listened to and read the transcripts to immerse myself in the data “in an active way” (Nowell 
et al, 2017, p. 5) to search for meanings and patterns. I enjoyed the creative process of this 
initial stage of coding in which I sought to generate as many codes as possible without 
preconceptions about which would prove to be the most useful. I embraced the intuitive 
nature of the analysis, 
“what is unique about thematic analysis is that it acknowledges that analysis happens 
at an intuitive level. It is through the process of immersion in the data, considering 
connections and interconnections between codes, concepts and themes that ‘aha’ 
moments happen” (Savin-Baden and Major, 2013, p. 440).  
I was aware of the subjectiveness of my choosing particular codes over others, for example, 
I used a code for “anthropomorphic model” in which I collated participant’s accounts of 
companion animals attributed with human emotions such as jealously (based on Fox, 2006). 
Another researcher may have coded this same data under “animal emotions”. Codes are 
rarely simple representations; they are invested with meanings. Saldana observes,  
“Coding is not a precise science; it’s primarily an interpretative act” (2009, p. 4).  
I appreciate that coding is “a process of reflection” (Nowell et al, 2017, p. 5) so I documented 
my thoughts about potential codes in my reflexive journal. After coding two interviews I had 
43 codes and found that the remaining five interviews provided only two new codes (See 
Appendix 3 for a full list of the initial codes and the link between these codes and my final set 
of themes). This evidence of data saturation early on suggested to me that there was no 
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need to do any further interviews for such a homogenous group (Guest, Bunce and Johnson, 
2006). The homogeneity of the group arose from my purposive sampling because it meant 
each member of the group had a very close bond to their pet that led to their experience of 
‘no pet’ covenants being a harmful one.  
After this first phase of open coding to generate my initial codes, I undertook a phase of 
sorting, collating and comparing codes to make connections between them and identify 
themes. A theme is an abstract entity that links portions of data together to bring meaning 
and captures something important in relation to the research question (Nowell et al, 2017; 
Braun and Clarke, 2006). Saldana noted the importance of this stage of data analysis 
“coding is not just labelling, it is linking” (2009, p. 8).  
This involved a process of amalgamation, reducing the expansive set of first stage codes to 
a smaller and a more focused set by making links and connections between codes and 
ultimately identifying themes (Braun and Clarke, 2006). For example, a number of codes, 
such as ‘emotional benefits’, ‘physical benefits’, ‘safety’, ‘trust’, ‘caring practices’ could all be 
amalgamated under the theme ‘Support’. Similarly, I amalgamated my three codes ‘everyday 
routines’, ‘sleeping arrangements’ and ‘access to home spaces’ into a single ‘Everyday 
Practices’ code which eventually became part of the ‘Agency’ theme. I used mind maps and 
diagrams to help me interrogate the codes and creatively think about how they fit together 
allowing me to visualise the links between them to identify themes. Figure 6 gives examples 




Figure 6 - Examples of mind maps in my reflexive journal 
(a) Reflecting on the links between codes/themes relating to ‘no pet’ covenants demonstrated 
the importance of the Mental Health theme  
 
(b) In this mind map I am thinking about the links between codes/themes for 
the human-companion animal relationship  
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Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggest the accuracy of the themes can be tested by returning to 
the raw data and comparing the data to the themes to make sure the findings are firmly 
grounded in the data. Once I had my themes, I repeatedly read my interview transcripts to 
ensure the themes I had identified would clearly fit with the data. I thought carefully about 
naming themes – some arose from existing research, others from the data itself. I sought to 
give a name that clearly encapsulated what the theme was about (Braun and Clarke, 2006).  
I identified seven key themes across the seven interviews. These key themes are: 
1. Agency  
2. Social support 
3. Ambivalence  
4. Rental Insecurity  
5. Lack of Choice 
6. Powerlessness in Negotiations and perceived Discrimination  
7. Mental Health 
Next, I defined each theme and reflected on how it would fit into the overall story of the 
complete data set in relation to the research questions (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Nowell et 
al observe that  
“Part of telling the story was ordering the themes in a way that best reflected the 
data” (2017, p. 10). 
I ordered the themes into two distinct sections: first, themes relating to the human-
companion animal relationship and second, themes arising from the tenant’s experience of 
‘no pet’ covenants. I created a mind map for both sets of themes to help me think about links 
in the themes and their importance in my final analysis. For example, my mind map on ‘no 
pet’ covenants showed that the ‘Mental health’ theme is a key theme because most of the 
other themes link to it (see figure 6 – examples of mind maps in my reflexive journal).  
My write up relied extensively on direct quotes from participants in order to aid 
understanding, give readers a flavour of the original texts (Nowell et al, 2017) and convince 
readers of the trustworthiness of my analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Once I had 
described the themes and their patterns of interconnectedness, I progressed to 
‘interpretation’ allowing me to theorise the significance of the patterns and their broader 
meanings by reference to the existing literature and in relation to my research questions. By 
intertwining my findings with the current literature, I was able to show where my findings 




3.8.2 Phase two: Narrative analysis of four interviews 
The reductionist approach in my phase one analysis facilitated insights into the interview 
data and provided a framework of broad themes. However, it focused solely on the content 
of what the interviewee said. Narrative analysis provides a  
“window into people’s beliefs and experiences” (Bell, 2002, p. 209)  
allowing me to explore the socially constructed nature of the interview data recognising that 
it is not necessarily a true representation of the participant’s experience of ‘no pet’ 
covenants. It represents what they chose to tell me at that moment in time and in the context 
of a research interview involving two-way dialogue between two strangers. Their story may 
have been different at a different time, in a different context, to a different person. The 
attention narrative inquiry gives to the “temporal unfolding of human lives” (Polkinghorne, 
2007, p. 472) is one of the key strengths of the method. Narrative analysis enables me to 
acknowledge this, which is an important aspect of my epistemological approach located 
within the Social Constructionist paradigm.  
The sorts of questions I ask from a narrative perspective include: 
“’What is the purpose of the story?’, ‘Why does it occur at this point in the 
conversation?’, ‘How have the researcher or others present influenced the 
narration?’, or ‘How does this excerpt fit with the other parts of the interviewee’s life 
story as narrated during the interview as a whole?’” (Earthy and Cronin, 2008, p. 
21.4). 
In explaining my use of narrative analysis, it is important to appreciate from the start that 
there is 
“no single narrative method, but rather a multitude of different ways in which 
researchers can engage with the narrative properties of their data” (Elliot, 2005, p. 
37).  
Lieblich et al (1998) identified four combinations of the ‘unit of analysis’ and the ‘focus of 
analysis’ in narrative analysis. I chose the ‘holistic-content’ combination as opposed to the 
‘holistic-form’, ‘categorical-content’ and ‘categorical-form’ combinations (Lieblich et al, 1998, 
p. 13).  Adopting the ‘holistic-content’ combination means that my ‘unit of analysis’ is the 
narrative as a whole and I use a holistic approach to understand how a section of the 
interview text is part of the life story of an individual. Since I aim to explore the effects of ‘no 
pet’ covenants especially the character and magnitude of the harm on the life of the tenant, 
this approach is particularly well suited for my research. My ‘focus of analysis’ is on the 
content as opposed to the form of the interview encompassing both surface content (for 
example, what happened? when? who was there?) and latent content (what were the 
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motives of the participants? What is the meaning of the story for the narrator?) (Earthy and 
Cronin, 2008, p. 21.5.2). In this way, my inquiry goes beyond storytelling to allow  
“an analytic examination of the underlying insights and assumptions that the story 
illustrates” (Bell, 2002, p. 208).  
Riessman (2008) observes that this sort of thematic narrative analysis focusing on the 
content of the interview is the most common method of narrative analysis. She notes it is 
often confused with grounded theory in the literature but there are key differences. Most 
notably, narrative analysis adopts a holistic reading of the text and keeps the story intact by 
theorising from the individual case enabling me to identify narrative threads that run 
longitudinally through each interview, whereas grounded theory analysis breaks down the 
data into thematically coded segments and ignores the sequence of the data. Analysis 
based on grounded theory theorises from categories across cases whereas narrative 
analysis is case centred. 
Savin-Baden (2004) recommends writing a biography of each participant. Instead of a 
biography I decided to craft a story for four of my participants (Bob, Julia, Kate and Lucy); 
the story of their experience of ‘no pet’ covenants. The story emerges from the interviews 
and provides a chronology and structure to the otherwise messiness of the dialogue, but 
attempts to stay true to the voice of the participant by my commitment to “letting stories 
breathe” (Irvine, 2013a, p. 21) and incorporating participant quotes so that the authentic 
voice of the participant is not lost (Clandinin, 2006). I repeatedly listened to the audio 
recording, read the transcript and read the notes I made in my reflexive journal during and 
immediately after the interviews, and from this I created a story of each participant’s 
experience of ‘no pet’ covenants. The process of writing (and rewriting) each story was a 
form of analysis and through it I gained valuable insight into the participant’s experience of 
‘no pet’ covenants. Each time I had to really think about what was happening, how the 
participant felt, what it meant to them and how the story was being co-created by the 
narrator and audience. The stories are interspersed with my words as well as the 
participant’s words but I try to use the participant’s own words wherever possible in order to 
keep the story as authentic as possible. In addressing my research questions, it is important 
to hear the voice of the pet-owning tenant. I agree with Riessman that,  
“Meaning is ambiguous because it arises out of a process of interaction between 
people: self, teller, listener and recorder, analyst and reader. Although the goal may 
be to tell the whole truth, our narratives about others’ narratives are our world 
creations” (1990, p. 15).  
These four stories are my ‘world creations’ inevitably influenced by my own values and 
biases but I hoped to capture each participant’s meanings. After I had crafted the four 
stories, I gave each of the four participants the opportunity to read their own story and to 
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meet to discuss it to ensure I stayed true to their meanings. I visited Bob in his home in April 
2019, I met with Kate in a café in June 2019 and I met with Julia at the Society of 
Companion Animal Studies conference in September 2019. I sent the participants their story 
in advance of the meeting together with a list of themes or “narrative threads” (Thomas et al, 
2018, p. 952) I had identified. During the face-to-face meetings, I asked them about their 
thoughts on the story and the themes. I made contemporaneous notes of the meeting in my 
reflexive journal and used the opportunity to dig deeper into some of the issues I had 
identified as significant. These meetings, one year after the initial interviews, were extremely 
informative but also acknowledge the temporal notion of experiences and their meaning, this 
being one of the advantages of narrative analysis (Bell, 2002). Bob, Julia and Kate were all 
happy with the story I had crafted and agreed with the themes. Julia thanked me for creating 
such a sympathetic story that captured her experience. She had shown the story to her 
friend because she felt it explained how she felt in a clear and concise way that her friend 
could understand. Unfortunately, Lucy and Josh did not respond to my emails so I did not 
benefit from their feedback on my analysis of their initial interview. This process of data 
triangulation (Roulston, 2010), in the form of more than one interview over a period of time to 
check the researcher’s understanding of views and to compare findings from earlier 
interviews, strengthens the trustworthiness of my data analysis (Polkinghorne, 2007). 
I did not use narrative analysis for three of the interviews (David, Isabel and Emma) because 
I did not feel there were sufficient narratives in these interviews to support this method of 
analysis. David was homeless and begging on the street when I interviewed him and his 
interview was very different from the others because he answered my questions with brief 
one-sentence answers. He did not elaborate or tell a story. I was unprepared for such short 
answers and it was hard work to keep the conversation flowing. However, there is still some 
very rich and insightful data from his interview not least because he had such a close 
relationship with his dog, Mack, that he was prepared to sacrifice shelter in order to retain 
that relationship. The other two interviews were carried out without a face-to-face meeting; 
one by email exchange and another by telephone. This may have reduced the number of 
narratives in these interviews (Irvine, 2011). Although some scholars argue that it is possible 
to generate rich narrative data from telephone interviews (Drabble et al, 2015) my own 
experience left me favouring face-to-face interviews. 
The holistic approach adopted in narrative analysis is especially useful in understanding 
complexity, detail and context (Webster and Mertova, 2007). Riessman’s (1990) holistic 
reading of her interview transcripts on divorce, uncovered new findings that were not 
apparent from her grounded theory analysis. A poignant example of this comes in the form of 
Tessa. She told of her dominant and abusive husband who raped her. Using grounded 
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theory a researcher may identify the complaint ‘marital rape’ as the cause of her divorce. 
Narrative analysis, which examined her story holistically, taking into account the way she 
chose to organise and make sense of her experience, found a more complex cause for the 
divorce. She was raped a number of times by her husband but did not leave him. It was only 
when she herself became violent that she left him. Through narrative analysis, Riessman 
discovered that  
“The point is that Tessa can no longer contain her own aggression; this is the turning 
point. She has taken on the identity of a survivor, rather than that of a victim” (1990, 
p. 93).  
 
Ultimately, the reason for Tessa’s divorce was marital rape so using grounded theory 
analysis to code it as this is not inaccurate but it fails to appreciate the complexity of the 
situation. It was Tessa’s own violence, in response to that of her husband’s, which instigated 
the divorce.   
In the same way, using a holistic narrative analysis allowed me to recognise and 
acknowledge the complexity of Julia’s social situation. After referring to the death of her dog, 
Julia said, 
“I’m just lost. I’ve just absolutely nothing. I’ve worked with dogs all my life. I’ve lived 
with dogs all my life”.  
A method of analysis that breaks up the data into components may identify this sense of loss 
as solely attributable to the dog’s death because the words immediately followed a reference 
to her dog’s death. However, when put in the wider context of what was happening in Julia’s 
life at that moment, and reading the transcript holistically and temporally, showed more 
complex reasons for her overwhelming sense of loss. Shortly after her dog’s death (and 
partly as a result of it) her son separated from his partner. The split was acrimonious and the 
ex-partner restricted Julia’s access to her young granddaughter. Narrative analysis allowed 
me to take into account the wider context of her words and thereby acknowledge the 
complex and interrelated reasons for her intense sense of loss. Experience and context are 
inextricably linked so to understand Julia’s experience of loss, I need to appreciate the 
context of it. I need to know what was happening in Julia’s life at that time and how she 
perceived it. Webster and Mertova observe, 
 “Narrative is not an objective reconstruction of life – it is a rendition of how life is 
perceived” (2007, p. 3).  
 
This means that the interview data is specific to those participants at that moment in time, 
and provides little scope for generalisations to predict how others will respond to a similar 
event. However, that does not mean that the data is of no wider value to society. On the 
contrary, people do not exist in a social vacuum and  
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“meanings are not only a private construction – the property of individuals – but have 
a collective counterpart, representing history and cultural understandings” 
(Riessman, 1990, p. 13).  
 
Just as Riessman was able to use private accounts of the divorcees she interviewed to 
uncover background knowledge and taken-for granted assumptions about the modern family 
that many people in America shared at that time, so too my participants’ private accounts of 
their experience of ‘no pet’ covenants, allow me to uncover wider cultural themes and 
assumptions about our relationship with pets and the effect of ‘no pet’ covenants in England. 
Irvine talks of “the Cultural Shaping of Narrative” that revealed culturally specific 
assumptions about the human-animal relationship in twenty-first century America through 
her analysis of the narratives of homeless pet owners (2013a, p. 164). My participant’s 
private accounts are what Riessman calls “cultural products” because 
“individuals create personal understandings out of the materials that are available to 
them, including publicly available meanings” (1990, p. 68).  
These meanings are culturally and historically specific. Therefore, the close bonds pet-
owning tenants in the UK share with their dogs and cats can be viewed as ‘cultural products’, 
evidence of changing societal views of companion animals that allows them to be seen as 
valued family members. 
 
3.8.3 Phase three – black letter law analysis 
My thematic content analysis of all seven interviews and my narrative analysis of the four 
stories I crafted sought to address my research questions 1-3 about the nature of the 
human-companion animal relationship and the lived experience of ‘no pet’ covenants for pet 
owning tenants in the UK. Phase three of my data analysis involved black letter law analysis 
(using the insights I gained from answering research questions 1-3). To answer the legal 
issues in my research questions 4-6, I critically analysed the relevant law in England. As 
there is no specific legislation regulating the use of ‘no pet’ covenants, I turned to contract 
law, specifically the Consumer Rights Act 2015, to consider the legality of including ‘no pet’ 
covenants in tenancy agreements. Thereafter, I examined housing law to critically analyse 
the enforcement of ‘no pet’ covenants in possession proceedings between landlords and 
tenants. Finally, I evaluated the need for new legislation to regulate the use of ‘no pet’ 





3.9 Research quality 
The theoretical assumptions underpinning narrative analysis renders the realist assumptions 
of how to measure research quality problematic. A realist sees research validity as being 
able to demonstrate the ‘truth’ of what you found but as I believe there is no one truth out 
there to be observed or measured I cannot validate my research by its ‘truth’.  
Polkinghorne advocates that validating knowledge claims is an “argumentative practice” to 
convince readers (2007, p. 476). Different kinds of knowledge claims require different kinds 
of evidence to validate the research. He argues that to validate knowledge claims about 
understanding human experience requires evidence  
“in the form of personally reflective descriptions in ordinary language and analyses 
using inductive processes that capture commonalities across individual experiences” 
(2007, p. 475). 
To convince readers of the validity of my knowledge claims about the meaningful 
experiences of pet-owning tenants I need to provide “sufficient justification” (Polkinghorne, 
2007, p. 476) by recording and presenting my evidence and argument to the reader with an 
“auditable decision trail” (Nowell et al, 2017, p. 3) that allows them to make their own 
judgement as to the validity of my claim. Therefore, if I claim that Julia’s story of ‘no pet’ 
covenants is one of suffering I need to convince my reader of the validity of that knowledge 
claim by the transparent communication of my supporting evidence and argument. I do this 
by means of presenting “thick descriptions” (Nowell et al, 2017, p. 3) using the participant’s 
own words in my analysis chapter together with a detailed description of my interpretation of 
that evidence and, in Julia’s case, her own feedback on my interpretation. This allows the 
reader to retrace the steps in my argument to judge the plausibility of my interpretation. The 
use of extensive quotes and detailed descriptions of interpretations and auditable decision 
trails is vital for ensuring the quality of my research but is difficult to reconcile with restrictive 
word limits for publications (Bell, 2002) and doctoral theses. Consequently, I have found it 
challenging to keep within the indicative word limit for my thesis. 
The validity of my research focuses on the ‘trustworthiness’ of my analysis which requires 
that I  
“render transparent the process by which the interpretation of the narrative and 
stories have been reached” (Earthy and Cronin, 2008, p. 21.4).  
Lincoln and Guba (1985) introduced four practical criteria for establishing ‘trustworthiness’ in 
qualitative research: credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability. Table 5 
addresses the quality of my research by demonstrating how it meets Lincoln and Guba’s 
trustworthiness criteria. More recently, Tracy (2010) proposed a more expansive model 
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using eight criteria to evaluate quality: worthy topic, rich rigour, sincerity, credibility, 
resonance, significant contribution, ethics and meaningful coherence. However, I chose to 
use the original Lincoln and Guba concept of trustworthiness because it is  




Table 5 - The quality of my research based on Lincoln and Guba’s trustworthiness criteria 
Trustworthiness 
criteria 
Explanation of the criteria Evidence of my research addressing the criteria 
Credibility The ‘fit’ between the 
participant’s views and the 
researcher’s 
representation of those 
views (Tobin and Begley, 
2004). 
Prolonged engagement with the interview data 
over the course of more than a year. 
Triangulation of different data collection modes 
(interview transcripts; reflexive journal entries; 
public domain sources such as newspapers and 
websites; primary sources of law; existing 
research from my literature review) (Nowell et 
al, 2017). 
Participant engagement with my 
interpretations. I sent the narrative I crafted to 
each of the relevant participants for their 
feedback and in three cases we met in person to 
discuss my analysis and where necessary I 
amended my interpretations in the light of their 
comments. 
Transferability  ‘The generalizability of 
inquiry’ (Nowell et al, 
2017) that allows for the 
findings to be transferred 
to other areas. 
In my data analysis chapter I provide “thick 
descriptions, so that those who seek to transfer 
the findings to their own site can judge 
transferability” (Nowell et al, 2017:3). 
Dependability The research process is 
logical, traceable, and 
clearly documented (Tobin 
and Begley, 2004), for 
example, by providing an 
audit trail which provides 
evidence of the decisions 
and choices made by the 
researcher. 
I have kept records of the audio interview data, 
interview transcripts, a reflexive journal 
recording observations immediately after the 
interviews and at other contact points, an audit 
trail of code generation, notes and mind maps 
about my decisions for linking codes and 
hierarchies of themes. 
Confirmability The researcher’s findings 
are clearly derived from 
the data. This is 
established when the 
other three criteria are 
met. 
I have explained my reasons for theoretical, 
methodological and analytical choices 
throughout the research so others can 





Reflexivity is a central component to the decision audit trail (Nowell et al, 2017; Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985) and my reflexive journal helped me to document the rationales for my decisions 
as well as recording personal reflections of my thoughts and values as data collection and 
analysis progressed and my ideas crystallised. I also used my reflexive journal to make mind 
maps and diagrams to make sense of theme connections and develop hierarchies of themes 
(Nowell et al, 2017) (Figure 6 – examples of mind maps in my reflexive journal). 
3.10 Limitations of my empirical research 
 
A limitation of my empirical research is that I only interviewed pet-owning tenants who were 
adversely affected by ‘no pet’ covenants and not landlords who benefit from the covenants. 
Therefore, my findings only provide an understanding of one aspect of the wider debate on 
the regulation of ‘no pet’ covenants. My empirical research is best viewed as a pilot study for 
a more comprehensive study to follow that will recruit research participants from all the 
relevant stakeholders affected by any legislation to regulate the use of ‘no pet’ covenants. 
A further limitation of my empirical work comes from the fact that I only had seven research 
participants and only four of these provided data suitable for narrative analysis. This is a 
small number of participants for a thematic content analysis study, although such small 
numbers is more common for studies using narrative analysis. For example, Thomas et al 
(2018) used only four case studies in their narrative study and responded to concerns about 
the low number by observing that,  
“it is in the nature of narrative analysis that individual cases are explored in detail, 
and therefore, we concentrate on data depth rather than data breadth” (2018, p. 
957).  
It is one of the strengths of my narrative analysis that it provides an in-depth understanding 
of the participant’s experiences of the human-companion animal relationship and ‘no pet’ 
covenants. This is only possible when exploring individual cases in such detail. The number 
of research participants I recruited was not governed by any pre-determined figure. Instead, I 
was receptive to the data which I started analysing as soon as I had transcribed each 
interview. It was clear that data saturation occurred at an early stage of analysis, meaning no 
new themes arose in the later interviews, and therefore I chose not to interview any more 
pet-owning tenants. Early data saturation can occur where, as here, there is a high level of 
homogeneity amongst the research population (Guest, Bunce and Johnson, 2006) as 
discussed in section 3.6 above. However, reliance on such a small sample can make it 
difficult to extrapolate the findings more widely. My empirical research therefore provides a 
valuable exploratory pilot study pathing the way for a larger study to follow. 
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3.11 Conclusion  
In this component of my portfolio, I have explained the theoretical underpinning of my 
research design and process. As a social constructionist, I am interested in understanding 
the social world of pet-owning tenants through their experience, the meanings they attribute 
to those experiences and the relationships through which those meanings arise. For this, I 
need to adopt a qualitative approach; one that gives the participants freedom to explain their 
experiences in their own words, to “let the tellers have their say” (Irvine, 2013a, p. 6) hence 
my use of unstructured and semi-structured in-depth interviews. Giving pet-owning tenants 
an opportunity to explain in their own words the nature of their relationship with their 
companion animal and the effect of ‘no pet’ covenants on their lives is a valuable step in my 




4 PORTFOLIO COMPONENT 3 - Ethics 
 
4.1 Ethics process and documentation 
 
Initially approval was sought from the University Ethics Committee for my research relating 
to pet custody disputes and this was granted on 17 January 2017. Full ethical clearance was 
granted in accordance with ethical guidelines of Northumbria University which adheres to the 
SLSA Statement of Principles and the British Psychological Society. When successfully 
operationalised, as was the case with my research, these practices aid the gathering of more 
reliable and valid data. In August 2017 I applied for permission to interview pet-owning 
tenants so that I could interview Bob Harvey with a view to doing post-doctoral research (a 
copy of the application form is below). This demonstrates that my research on ‘no pet’ 
covenants came within the Amber category (now known as the medium ethical risk category) 
because it involves collecting personal data from non-vulnerable adults. Shortly after this I 
decided to change my DLaw topic from pet custody disputes to ‘no pet’ covenants and I 
sought an amendment to my application. This was approved on 9 November 2017.  
4.1.1 Informed consent 
The research was conducted in line with the research ethics policies of Northumbria 
University. All participants were given a Research Information Sheet (RIS), which included a 
consent form, (a copy is provided below) at the start of the interview and I talked through the 
contents of the document, which we both signed, before turning on the audio recording 
device. The RIS outlines the purpose of the research, the role of the participant, what will 
happen to the data and the opportunity for the participant to change his/her mind or 
complain. This is important to ensure informed consent (Silverman, 2017) by providing 
adequate and appropriate information about the research. No coercion or undue influence 
was exercised over the research participants. I even waited until the participant who was a 
law student had graduated before asking her to participate to make sure she felt no undue 
influence to participate due to our relationship as lecturer/student. All my participants were 
adults so no concerns over capacity or competence arose. With the exception of one 
participant, anonymity was assured and maintained. Bob’s story was already in the public 
domain having been reported on the BBC news and on social media sites and he was happy 
for me to use his real name.  
4.1.2 Data protection and storage  
 
My research involved collecting personal data from living individuals and therefore I 
complied with duties under the General Data Protection Regulation by only using the data for 
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the purposes set out in the RIS and taking appropriate measures to store personal data 
confidentially. Where personal data is held on a computer, it is password protected to make 
sure only I can access the documents. I always ‘lock’ the computer when I leave the office. 
Any hard copy records such as paper documents are stored in a secure place - a lockable 
drawer in my office to prevent unauthorised access. The interview data will be retained for 3 
years following completion of the professional doctorate or relevant publication whichever is 




4.1.3 My Northumbria University Ethics application form (2017) 
 
Research Proposal Form for AMBER projects 
Depending on your research study, you may need to include supporting documentary 
evidence as part of this form. Please refer to the University Research Ethics and 
Governance handbook, or those provided by your Faculty or Service Department for 
information about the type of evidence you need to provide. 
Project title: Pets in Housing - the social construction of cats and dogs as 
pets and the implications for housing law/policies 
Submitter information 
Name: Debbie Rook 




Principal Supervisor (if relevant): Ray Arthur 




Tick all relevant boxes that apply to your proposed research and then make sure that you 
also complete all of the relevant sections. 
1. People and/or personal data of a living individual X 
Participants are defined as including living human beings. This also includes human data 
and records (such as but not restricted to medical, genetic, financial, personnel, criminal or 
administrative records including scholastic achievements). Personal data is defined as any 
identifiable information that affects a person's privacy such as information which is 
biographical in a significant sense or has the relevant individual as its focus rather than 
some other person or some transaction or event. This includes video/audio and 
photographic materials. 
PLEASE COMPLETE SECTIONS: 1, 6, 7, 8, 9  
_________________________________________________________________________ 
2. Secondary data (not in public domain)  
Secondary data involves the use of existing data (not in the public domain) with the 
permission of the Data Controller for purposes other than those for which they were 
originally collected. Secondary data may be obtained from many sources, including surveys, 
computer databases and information systems.  




3. Environmental Data  
Any outdoor fieldwork in rural, coastal, marine or urban environments and the temporary or 
long term effects the research study may have on people, animals or the natural or built 
environment.  
4. Commercially sensitive information  
 
 
1. PEOPLE AND/OR PERSONAL DATA 
If you are involving human participants, or are gathering personal data about a living 
individual then please complete all of the sub-sections in section 1.  
A: RESEARCH AIMS 
State your research aims/questions (maximum 500 words). This should provide the 
theoretical context within which the work is placed, and should include an evidence-based 
background, justification for the research, and clearly stated hypotheses (if appropriate): 
This research is being undertaken at the same time as my Professional Doctorate in Law and is 
likely to have relevance to it. 
 My research will examine the following questions: 
1. How pet owners construct stories about their relationship with their pet dog/cat?    
 
2. How pet owners feel about housing law/policies that fail to take their relationship 
with their pet into account 
I am defining my research problem using a Constructionist model of reality. I am more drawn to 
a Constructionist model than a Naturalist model which views reality as a substantive truth. The 
Naturalist model assumes that interview responses are giving direct access to a person’s 
experiences and feelings which are taken to be inside their heads, whereas the Constructionist 
model sees the interview responses as “actively constructed ‘narratives’ involving activities 
which themselves demand analysis” (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995). This means that I’ll be 
examining “the active ‘work’ that interviewees do in producing their answers.” (Silverman, 
2013). 
 
B: STUDY DESIGN AND DATA ANALYSIS 
Please provide a description of the study design, methodology (e.g. quantitative, qualitative), 
the sampling strategy, methods of data collection (e.g. survey, interview, experiment, 
observation), and analysis 
I will be using unstructured and semi-structured interviews with a small number of people.  
The method of enquiry best suited to answer my questions is interviews to gather rich data on 
people’s meanings and experiences. I want to understand the personal meanings people give to 
the relationship with their pet and not to rely on predetermined definitions of my own. 
Therefore, I need to use unstructured interviews to give the person a lot of freedom to talk 




epistemological position that a legitimate way to generate data is to talk interactively with 
people and to analyse their use of language. My view is that knowledge is situational and 
contextual. My epistemological position, that interviews are social interactions between the 
interviewee and researcher, means that having a set of standardised questions as a way to 
control bias, is inappropriate as bias cannot be controlled or eradicated. It is better to 
understand the complexities of the interaction. I plan to open the interview with an open-
ended request e.g.,” tell me the story of your dog?”  
I will be using a narrative analysis of the data. Narratives give meanings from the perspective of 
the people involved and are inherently social. Narrative research gives voice to the unheard and 
is particularly useful for marginalised social groups. Pet owners, who develop a strong 
relationship with their pet, are not necessarily a marginalised social group but may nevertheless 
feel that others don’t appreciate the strength of the relationship they have with their pet and 
therefore trivialise it 
I am considering employing respondent validation techniques to check my findings by taking the 




Provide details of the sample groups that will be involved in the study and include details of 
their location (whether recruited in the UK or from abroad) and any organizational affiliation. 
For most research studies, this will cover: the number of sample groups; the size of each 
sample group; the criteria that will be used to select the sample group(s) (e.g. gender, age, 
sexuality, health conditions). If this is a pilot study and the composition of the sample has not 
yet been confirmed, please provide as many details as possible.  
I will be interviewing a relatively small sample of participants who are pet owners but have 
encountered problems with obtaining or retaining housing due to their having a pet. 
I already have one person willing to be interviewed. An 87-year-old man who is threatened with 
eviction from his care home because he won’t give up his 10-year-old dog. I am keen to 
interview him over the summer 2017.   
 
Cii If you will be including personal data of living individuals, please specify the nature of this 
data, and (if appropriate) include details of the relevant individuals who have provided 
permission to utilise this data, upload evidence of these permissions in the supporting 




Describe the step by step process of how you will contact and recruit your research sample 
and name any organisations or groups that will be approached. Your recruitment strategy 
must be appropriate to the research study and the sensitivity of the subject area. You must 
have received written permission from any organizations or groups before you begin 
recruiting participants. Copies of draft requests for organizational consent must be included 
in the ‘Supporting Documentary Evidence’. You must also provide copies of any recruitment 
emails/posters that will be used in your study.  
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I will recruit members of the public using social media and press releases. 
 
Will you make any payment or remuneration to participants? 
 Yes X No 
 
If yes: Please provide details/justifications. Note that your Faculty may have specific 





Please indicate the type of consent that will be used in this study:  
X Informed consent 
Please include copies of information sheets and consent forms in the ‘Supporting 
Documentary Evidence’. If you are using alternative formats to provide information and /or 
record consent (e.g. images, video or audio recording), provide brief details and outline the 




 If using an alternative consent model (e.g. for ethnographic research) 
Provide a rationale that explains why informed consent is not appropriate for this research 
study and detail the alternative consent arrangements that will be put in place. Add any 





Please identify any risks associated with your project and how these risks will be managed. 
If appropriate refer to any Risk Assessments (RA) you have consulted to ensure the safety 
of the research team and your participants. Please state the level of risk for each RA.  
I will be undertaking one-to-one interviews will members of the public who I do not know. I will 
therefore arrange to meet with them at the University or at a public place such as a café or in 
the presence of a third party. 
 
F. TASKS AND ACTIVITIES FOR RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 
I. Provide a detailed description of what the participants will be asked to do for the 
research study, including details about the process of data collection (e.g. completing 
how many interviews / assessments, when, for how long, with whom). Add any 
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relevant documentation to the ‘Supporting Documentary Evidence’ section of this 
form.  
I will interview the participants in person. The length of the interview will be 
determined by the participant but I anticipate up to 2 hours. 
 
II. Provide full details of all materials that will be used (including consent 
documentation). If you are using newly developed or unpublished materials these 
must be provided as Supporting Documentary Evidence 
Research Information sheet and Informed Consent form (copies are provided in the 
supporting documentary evidence) 
 
III. If the task could cause any discomfort or distress to participants (physical, 
psychological or emotional) describe the measures that will be put in place to reduce 
any distress or discomfort. Please give details of the support that will be available for 
any participants who become distressed during their involvement with the study. 
There is a possibility that the participant may become upset or angry as they tell their 
story of what happened. I will be empathic and supportive in my responses wherever 
possible. I have experience of supporting upset clients at a foodbank where I volunteer. 
If the participants become upset they will be given the option of a break (and a cup of 
tea) or postponing/terminating the interview. 
 
 
2. DATA FROM SECONDARY SOURCES 
If your research will be using data from secondary sources (i.e. data about people that has 
not been gathered by you from the research sample and which is not in the public domain) 
then the following sections must be completed. 
 
A. DATA SOURCE 
What is the source of your data? 
 
 
Describe any measures that will be put in place to meet the supplier’s terms and conditions. 
(Note: arrangements about anonymising data, data storage and security should be provided 
in section 6). Where permissions are required to access data, provide evidence of the 
relevant permissions you have obtained in the supporting documentary evidence.  
 
 
If your research involves the cooperation of external organizations then relevant 






3. ENVIRONMENTAL DATA 
If your research study involves taking samples from the urban or natural environment (e.g. 
(soil, water, vegetation, invertebrates, geological samples etc) all of the questions in this 
section must be completed.  
 
A. SITE INFORMATION 
List the locations where the data collection will take place including, where appropriate, the 
map reference. State if the location is protected by legislation (e.g. Area of Outstanding 
Natural Beauty (AONB), Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI), National Park etc).  
 
 
B. PERMISSION AND ACCESS  
Do you need permission to include the location(s) in the research study or to gain access to 
the site(s)? 
 Yes  No 
 
If yes:  State the job title and contact details (address and telephone number) of the person 
you will contact to request permission. If you have already received permission, please 





Provide details of: the type of sample(s) you will collect (soil, water, vegetation, invertebrates 
etc); the size of each sample; and the spread of sampling across the location(s). Explain 
how the samples will be disposed of after the research is complete 
 
 
Briefly explain why collecting the sample(s) is essential to the research study.  
 
D. COLLECTION  
Describe how you will reach the site and any potential pollution, noise, erosion or damage 
that could occur. Detail the measures you will take to reduce any impacts.  
 
Detail any impacts caused by extracting the sample (e.g. disturbance of animal or bird 
populations; use and disposal of chemicals in the field; trampling or removal of vegetation; 
visual or aesthetic impacts caused by markers left on the site). Detail the measures you will 





4. Commercially sensitive data 
 
5. Data security and storage 
 
A. ANONYMISING DATA 
Describe the arrangements for anonymising data and if not appropriate explain why this is 
and how it is covered in the informed consent obtained.  
Each participant (and their pets) will be given a pseudonym in the dissertation and any 
publications/presentations. Addresses will not be published. 
 
B. STORAGE 
Describe the arrangements for the secure transport and storage of data collected and used 
during the study. This should include reference to ‘clouds’, USB sticks.  
Where personal data is held on a computer, there will be a password applied to that computer 
to make sure that only the researcher can access the documents. I will also lock my PC when 
leaving the room by pressing “Ctrl, Alt and Delete” and selecting “Lock Computer”. 
Hard copy records such as paper documents, tapes, photographs or removable media (memory 
sticks etc) will be stored and indexed in appropriate secure containers such as lockable filing 
cabinets or drawers to prevent unauthorised access. 
 
C. RETENTION AND DISPOSAL 
Describe the arrangements for the secure retention and disposal of data when the research 
study is complete.  
The interview data will be retained for 3 years following completion of the professional 
doctorate or relevant publication whichever is the latter and will then be destroyed. 
 
6. Intellectual property  
Please provide details of any Intellectual Property issues or commercial implications arising 
from the proposed study. Please describe the agreements that are in place to protect / 





Proposed start date of data collection: 01/05/2017 




8. Supplementary information 
Please tick the boxes that relate to the supplementary documentation that you will attach as 
part of your submission: 
 
X Participant information sheet 
  
X Consent form(s) 
  
 Debrief sheet 
  
 Participant recruitment email/poster 
  
 Unpublished (in-house) questionnaire(s) 
  
 Interview / observation / focus group schedules 
  
 Risk Assessments / Standard Operating procedures 
  
 Permission letters (e.g. from school, organization, team etc) 
  








4.1.4 Research information sheet 
 
Pets and housing 
This research is being carried out by Debbie Rook, a Principal lecturer at Northumbria University, 
School of Law, as part of her Professional Doctorate. The data gathered from the interviews will be 
used by Debbie in her doctoral thesis and will also be used in any conferences and publications in 
which Debbie discusses her doctoral research. 
This sheet tells you all about the research. You are invited to take part in the research and this sheet 
helps answer questions you might have about it.  Once you’ve read the sheet, or talked about it with 
Debbie, you can decide whether you’d like to take part or not.  
 
What are you trying to find out? 
I am researching pets and housing and specifically examining the effect of ‘no pet’ covenants in 
residential leases. I’m interested in investigating pet owners’ experience of having a ‘no pet’ 
covenant in their lease. For example, being in fear of, or threatened with, eviction or having to give 
up pets in order to move into rental property. The relationship a person has with their pet is an 
essential aspect of this research and I’m interested in finding out how owners view their pet. 
What will happen as part of the research? 
I would like to interview people who have experience of a dispute or difficulty arising from a ‘no pet’ 
covenant/policy in their lease. I am interested in hearing their story about their relationship with 
their pet and their experience of trying to resolve the dispute and the effect it had on them.  
Why do you want me to take part? 
I would like to hear from you because you have been affected by a ‘no pet’ covenant in a residential 
lease or have been involved in a dispute with a landowner arising from your relationship with your 
pet. 
What if I don’t want to take part?   
You don’t have to take part in the research.  Just tell me that you’re not interested.  It’s up to you 
whether or not you take part in the research.   
What if I change my mind? 
If you change your mind about taking part, that’s OK.  You might have started off wanting to talk to 
me, but you don’t now.  Or perhaps first of all you didn’t want to talk to me, but now you do.  It is 
fine, just let me know.  
You said you’re going to take notes/record the interview.  Will you write down things that I say? 
Yes, I will be audio recording the interviews and I will also write down things that you say about your 
experiences and how you’re feeling.  This is because I think that it’s useful and interesting and that it 
will help me write my doctoral dissertation.  I won’t use your name in the thesis or in any 
subsequent publications.  
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I will also take a copy of the photograph of your pet (if you’re happy for me to do so).  
If you change your mind and decide you no longer wish to be involved, we can discuss whether any 
material produced using your information will be immediately destroyed or can be relied upon by 
the research. It will depend on how integrated your material is in the research. If you change your 
mind shortly after the interview, so that the material is not incorporated into the thesis, it can be 
easily destroyed. However, if you change your mind some time after the interview and the material 
is integrated into the doctoral thesis and can’t be easily extracted, the material will still be used in 
the research in its anonymised form. 
Will anyone know I’ve taken part in the research? 
The research project involves interviewing a small number of people and looking in detail at their 
narratives. Each participant (and their pets) will be given a pseudonym in the dissertation and any 
publications/presentations. Addresses will not be published. However, some personal data may be 
included at a general level such as male/female, age group, occupation type and there may be some 
more specific details such as length of time of owning the pet that will be included. 
How do I know that you’re going to keep my information safely? 
Where personal data is held on a computer, there will be a password applied to that computer to 
make sure that only the researcher can access the documents. I will also lock my PC when leaving 
the room by pressing “Ctrl, Alt and Delete” and selecting “Lock Computer”. 
Hard copy records such as paper documents, tapes, photographs or removable media (memory 
sticks etc) will be stored and indexed in appropriate secure containers such as lockable filing cabinets 
or drawers to prevent unauthorised access. 
The interview data will be retained for 3 years following completion of my professional doctorate 
and will then be destroyed. 
What’s going to happen after you’ve done all this research? 
The interviews will be used by me to write my doctoral thesis. I may also use extracts from the 
interview transcripts and/or findings from the interview data at academic conferences and/or 
include it in publications such as journal articles.  
OK, I think I want to take part 
On the next page there’s a consent form to sign.  
You should keep this information sheet, just in case you have any questions.  
I want to know more about the research 
You can ask Debbie whenever you see her about the research.  She will be happy to answer your 
questions.  You can also contact her at debbie.rook@northumbria.ac.uk.  
I want to complain about the research or report something about the research I’m unhappy with 
You should tell Debbie if there’s something you’re not happy with.  If you’re not happy to do that, 





Research Consent Form (participant) 
Name of project 
Pets and housing  
 
Organisation supporting the doctoral research 










• I confirm that I have been supplied with and have read and understood an Information Sheet for 
the research project and have had time to decide whether or not I want to participate. 
• I understand that my taking part is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, without 
giving a reason. 
• I agree with Northumbria University recording and processing this information about me. 
• I understand that this information will only be used for the purposes set out in the information 
sheet. 
• I agree to copies of the photographs being taken by Debbie and used for the purposes set out in 
the information sheet. 
• I have been told that any data generated by the research will be securely managed and disposed of 
in accordance with Northumbria University’s guidelines. 
• I am aware that all recordings will remain confidential with only the research team having access to 
them. 
• My consent is conditional upon the University complying with its duties and obligations under the 




Signature of Participant                                                        Date 
   
 
 
I can confirm that I have explained the nature of the research to the above named participant and 
have given adequate time to answer any questions concerning it. 
Signature of Researcher                                                                                                          Date 







4.2 Ethical considerations arising during the research 
 
Bell recognises that there are serious ethical concerns with narrative inquiry because 
researchers take the participant’s personal story and impose meanings on it and   
“the effects of this imposed re-storying can be powerful” (2002, p. 210).  
I was sensitive to this in my crafting of the four narratives and tried to stay as close to the 
participant’s own words as possible. I also encouraged them in face-to-face conversations to 
give me honest, critical feedback on my analysis so they did not feel bound by my 
interpretations of their lives. I did not feel the need to negotiate an exit from the relationship 
with the three participants (Bob, Kate and Julia) with whom I had developed a relationship 
because I am happy to continue the friendship in each case. Shir-Vertesh (2012) talks of 
long-term connections and lasting friendships being formed during her research on pet 
owners. This avoids the ethical dilemma identified by Josselson of the need of  
“withdrawing gradually and gracefully in a way that leaves the participants feeling 
honoured and not exploited” (2007, p. 545).  
 
Given the subject matter of the interviews, and the fact that some of the participants risked 
losing their companion animals or their homes, it was important that I was sensitive to the 
emotional needs of my participants. Two of them (Bob and Julia) cried during the interviews 
and I drew on my training and experience as a volunteer working with homeless people to be 
a sympathetic listener and give supportive responses. I followed up Julia’s interview by 






5 PORTFOLIO COMPONENT 4 - Analysis of Interviews 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This component of my porfolio consists of two sections: section 1 contains the findings of the 
thematic content analysis of the interview data from all seven of my research participants 
and section 2 contains the narrative analysis from the four narratives I crafted from the 
interviews of four of my participants.  
Section 1 is broken down into two parts: Part I analyses how humans construct companion 
animals as family members in everyday practices. It seeks to answer my research question 
1 (‘How do people in the UK construct companion animals as family members in everyday 
practices?’). There are a small number of existing research studies and these are analysed 
in the light of my research which builds on their findings. Part II of Section 1 analyses how 
people experience a ‘no pet’ covenant in their residential lease and the strategies they 
devise to deal with its adverse effect on their lives. It seeks to answer my research questions 
2 and 3 (‘What do the stories of pet-owning tenants in the UK reveal about their lived 
experience of ‘no pet’ covenants?’ and ‘How can the insights from these stories develop and 
enhance a deeper understanding of the harm ‘no pet’ covenants cause to tenants and 
companion animals?’). There is very little published academic literature on the use and effect 
of ‘no pet’ covenants especially in the UK, but I refer to the few articles that exist and explain 
how my research builds on the existing literature to provide an original contribution.  
In Section 2, I adopt a narrative approach to analyse four of my interviews in greater depth. 
Narrative analysis takes a holistic approach and keeps the story intact enabling researchers 
to understand complexity, detail and context. Temporality of experience and meaning is 
examined, acknowledging the way in which meanings may change over time. My purpose in 
section 2 is to address my research questions 1-3 by uncovering additional findings that 
were not evident from the thematic content analysis. 
One of the ways in which my research is original is how it views the assemblage of 
human+animal+home+lease as the relevant subject for analysis (Michael, 2000) thereby 
questioning the research participants on both the role of companion animals in family 
practices and the effect of ‘no pet’ covenants. None of the existing empirical studies have 
done this. My approach allows for the acquisition of a deeper and more insightful 




5.2 Section 1, Part I Thematic Content Analysis- How people in the UK 
construct companion animals as family members in everyday practices 
There is extensive research to show that many people consider their companion animals as 
family members (Cain, 1983; Fox, 2006; Franklin, 2006; Charles and Davies, 2008; Power, 
2008; Shir-Vertesh, 2012; Irvine and Cilia, 2017). My research builds on the existing 
empirical research on ‘pets as family’ from Britain (Fox, 2006), Australia (Power, 2008) and 
Israel (Shir-Vertesh, 2012) to consider the continued relevancy of the themes identified in 
these studies and to identify any further themes.  
5.2.1 Conceptualising pets as family members 
 
Section 1.6 of the commentary critically analysed the question of companion dogs and cats 
being recognised as family members within the disciplines of sociology and law. A number of 
studies have found similarities between the human-companion animal relationship and the 
parent-child relationship (Beck and Katcher, 1996; Serpell, 1996; Paul, 2000) and Power 
devised a ‘Parent-Child’ model in the context of her research on the human-dog dyad. It has 
been observed that, 
“Pets are usually not just any member of the family, however. They are children” 
(Beck and Katcher, 1996, p. 41). 
Shir-Vertesh’s (2012) focus on a parent-child model needs to be understood in the context of 
her research participants (all young, Jewish couples from a relatively affluent and educated 
part of Israel that is very family orientated). My research participants comprise a very 
different population, generally older.  Nevertheless, Shir-Vertesh’s categories of “prechild” 
and “child substitute” are relevant to some of my participants (2012, pp.423-424). 
Emma (in her mid-40’s) and was not able to have children. Her relationship with her dog, 
Anton, appears to correlate to Shir-Vertesh’s child substitute model, 
“Not all of us can have children, you know and that’s a way of our maternal instinct you 
know to show our motherly side and our motherly love if you can’t have children and 
just because I can’t have children why shouldn’t I have something in my life that will let 
me still be motherly”. 
She goes on to say she and her partner call Anton their “son”. 
Isabel (a student in her 20’s) sees her two cats as her children  
“Now, I spend most of the day at home and being with them feels like being a mum. 
They are both so … sweet that it´s like having two lovely toddlers around”. 
When Kate (in her 30’s) talks about her and her husband’s decision to get a dog, she refers 
to the seriousness of the decision and compared it to having a baby  
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“It wasn’t a decision we took lightly, you know. It was as serious a decision in my 
opinion as having another baby”. 
Later she made a clear reference to the parent-child model in relation to their two dogs 
 “We just thought of them as extra kids”. 
Lucy (in her 20’s) also described her relationship with their cat, Simba, in parent-child terms  
 “he’s my baby [laughs]”. 
It is clear that Emma, Isabel, Kate and Lucy all see the relationship they share with their 
companion animal as a family member, but significantly, it is couched in terms of a parent-
child relationship which is consistent with existing research (discussed in section 1.6.3). 
Parent-child relationships are usually perceived as very close bonds grounded in concepts of 
dependency, vulnerability and relations of care (Power, 2008).  
Not all of my participants fitted the parent-child model. David (a homeless man in his 30’s) 
refers to his dog, Mack, as his family but does not specify the nature of the family relationship. 
 “Researcher - Have you got family that you see? 
 David – Yeah, Mack. 
 Researcher – Have you got human family that you see? 
 David – Yeah, Mack”. 
Existing research demonstrates the strong bond that can develop between a homeless 
person and their companion animal (Irvine, 2013a; Carr, 2016) and it is clear that David sees 
Mack as equivalent to human family. David does not mention any other family members 
throughout the interview. 
Section 1.3 of the commentary identified the problems of my using the term ‘family’ which is 
heavily laden with human associations. Power (2008) found that ‘family’ served as an 
“umbrella term” capturing a diverse range of human-dog relations including hierarchical 
relations (2008, p. 540). Some of my participants were reluctant to use family terminology in 
describing their relationship with their companion animal. Bob and Julia (both retired and in 
their 80’s and 60’s respectively) and Josh (in his 20’s) described the animal as being a 
‘companion’ or ‘friend’ rather than a family member. However, it appears that the label used 
to describe the relationship does not always reflect a difference. For example, Lucy refers to 
Simba as her “baby” while Josh calls Simba his “companion” but analysing the reality of the 
relationship suggests that Josh may have a closer bond to Simba. Josh was the original 
owner, relies on Simba for emotional support and generally spends more time with him. 
Similarly, Bob and Julia both have very close bonds with their dogs, and as will be discussed 
later, there is evidence that the relationship exists in practice as akin to human family. 
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Having identified that many of my research participants perceive their pets as family 
members, I seek to address my research question 1 to examine how people in the UK 
construct companion animals as family. I identified three key themes from the existing 
research: Agency - Minded Social Actors (Fox, 2006; Power, 2008); Social Support and 
Health (Irvine, 2013a; 2013b); Ambivalence (Shir-Vertesh, 2012; Irvine and Cilia, 2017). I 
found all three themes to have continued relevance in the UK and consequently they 
constitute part of my findings in this chapter. My first theme is Agency and figure 7 illustrates 
the various sub-themes encapsulated within this overarching theme. The sub-theme 
‘Detrimental changes’ arose directly from my interview data and is not considered in the 




Figure 7 - AGENCY theme arising from research question 1: ‘How do people in the UK construct 
companion animals as family members in everyday practices? 
  
AGENCY 
 dogs/cats as minded social actors who can influence household 
activities/decisions 
EVERYDAY PRACTICES 
The act of doing routine 
everyday practices 
constitutes family. 
Dogs/cats take part in 
everyday practices e.g. 




Dogs/cats as individuals 
with their own desires 




Dogs/cats can affect how 

























e.g. where to live 
and where and when 
to go on holiday 
DETRIMENTAL CHANGES TO 
EVERYDAY PRACTICES 
Dogs/cats can cause changes 
to everyday practices that 
are detrimental to the owner 
e.g. sleep deprivation 
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5.2.2 First Theme – AGENCY: Everyday Practices 
Power’s (2008) research on the nature of the relationship between new dog owners and their 
dogs identified ‘Agency’ as a key theme and she deduced the ‘Agency of the Animal’ model 
recognising how family is shaped by the agency of the dog. My research takes Power’s ‘Dog 
Agency’ theme and examines its relevance in the UK (Power’s study was in Australia) to 
cats and dogs (Power’s study was specific to dogs) and to long-established relationships 
(the participants in Power’s study were all new dog owners).  
Section 1.6.2 of the commentary explains how in theorising pets as family members, I draw 
on Morgan’s concept of ‘family practices’ (2.5, My theoretical assumptions). For Morgan 
(1996; 1999; 2011) ‘family practices’ are concerned with the routine and trivial matters of 
everyday life such as eating, sleeping, leisure and intimacy. These practices are orientated 
to another family member and endorse their membership, showing “the circularity between 
practices and membership” (Morgan, 2011, p. 3.4). Therefore, these are not just activities 
that family members do; instead, the act of doing them constitutes family. I encouraged my 
participants to share stories about their daily routines involving their companion animals to 
explore ways of constructing pets as family members within these everyday routines. I found 
that early morning and late night routines largely revolved around companion animals. Both 
Bob and Julia are retired and live alone with their dogs and it was clear that their dogs 
actively influenced their everyday practices. It was not just the case of the dog fitting into a 
pre-existing routine; the dogs actively shaped Bob and Julia’s routines: 
“First thing in the morning you get out of bed, take Annie out, especially being in a flat 
and then a few hours had passed you know, take her for a walk …  so my day would 
end usually about 10 o’clock I’d take her out for the last time” (Interview with Julia). 
“He’ll give me a bark in the morning wanting out, so I’ll get up, I’ll let him out, and he’ll 
come back to bed and sometimes I lift him up and err, he’ll lie awhile and then he’ll 
go down to the back of my leg and lie and err we’ll get up say mebbe  9 o’clock or 
whatever and I’ll have me breakfast and err I’ll let him out again” (Interview with Bob). 
Even in a busy young family, the dogs made their own mark on the everyday routine 
ensuring Kate or her husband went for a long walk each day, 
 “…either myself or my husband would get up first thing in the morning. Roxie was 
incredibly lazy and she just wouldn’t budge. She would just stay in her bed and look 
at you and groan and go back to sleep. Honey would be standing … in the kitchen 
tail wagging, you know, dancing because she would need to go outside for the toilet. 
Let them out, leave the back door open, do all the breakfasts ready for school, 
whatever, then one of us would take [daughter] to school and then typically about 10 
o’clock or so usually [husband] would take them out for their walk and they’d be away 
for sometimes an hour and a half, two hours”. 
While cats do not need to be walked every day, they are just as capable of asserting 
themselves on their owner’s everyday routines. Lucy and Josh’s young cat, Simba, ensures 
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he is given affection, food and play as soon as they wake up each morning. Meeting Simba’s 
needs has become a part of their everyday morning routine. Josh observes 
“I switch the alarm off and then he runs straight in. He’s onto the bed, we stroke 
him … for about 10 mins and it’s either we’ll get up or he’ll get fed up and want some 
food so I’ll get up I’ll do what I need to - brush teeth, toilet, get some clothes on, I’ll 
come in, I’ll feed him, he’ll be around my legs, he’ll be meowing away mainly fishing 
for snacks because he likes Dreamies … if I’ve played with him a little bit I’ll start 
getting ready for work he’ll go in and watch Lucy like put make up on, and sort her 
hair out and he’ll clean while she’s doing that which I think is kind of cute”. 
Emma’s dog, Anton, is a big part of her home life. Outside of work, she spends all her time 
with him. She describes the routine of a typical workday, which includes waking up early to 
walk Anton before work and leaving work promptly to rush home to Anton, 
“We get up very early, we have a long walk, I go to work … I come home and take him 
out again and then we settle in … he’ll eat, I always have to put a little bit of cheese on 
his food for him to eat it.  He loves cheese and then we’ll settle down watch a bit of 
TV”.   
Morgan (2011) shows how sleeping arrangements in the home both constitute, and derive 
from, notions of family and proper conduct between family members. Since the 1950s, dogs 
kept as companion animals have moved from sleeping outside to inside the home (Franklin, 
2006; Power 2008). This has resulted in new family practices of sleeping arrangements with 
pets. A national survey of pet owners in Australia found that over 50% allowed pets in their 
bedroom (the figure was higher for the elderly and single people) (Franklin, 2006). Franklin is 
keen to emphasise the significance of this finding, 
“The symbolism of household space needs to be emphasized here. Bedrooms are 
largely highly private spaces, the inner sanctum of privatized societies” (2006, p. 
145).  
With adults, only a restricted group of intimates, principally family, have permission to use 
their bedrooms. The majority of my research participants gave their companion animal 
access to their bedroom at night and some animals slept on the bed with the owner.  Emma 
did initially try to keep Anton off the bed but he kept sneaking on when she was asleep so 
she now allows him to stay,  
“He does sleep with us though, he sleeps in the bed which is probably a bit naughty 
but you know [laughs]”.  
Lucy and Josh allow Simba to sleep anywhere he wants. He rarely sleeps on the bed with 
them at night-time but seems to join them sometimes in the early hours of the morning. They 
like it if he chooses to sleep on their bed: “I’d love it if he slept on the bed with us” (Lucy). 
Josh talked about when he and Simba first moved into Lucy’s flat, 
203 
 
“I mean, when I first moved in Lucy went to Africa for three weeks and I was only 
here a week and every single night without fail I would go to bed he would come in 
and he would like sit around, I guess to say goodnight ...  I would wake up about two-
ish roughly and he would be hitting me in the face wanting me to move out of his spot 
or something like that and he would be with me until I woke up then”. 
Isabel’s cats sleep on the bed with her and her partner. Marmite is  
“a huge sleepy-head who spends the entire night lying next to me, his back against 
mine” and “Badger always sleeps at my feet (a strategic position for a toe-nibbler)”. 
When I asked Bob if Darkie slept on his bed he said  
“Occasionally he does, aye, but he can’t jump up. I have to lift him up cause I’ve a 
high bed, worse luck”.  
Darkie has his own dog bed on the floor of Bob’s bedroom and usually sleeps there unless 
lifted onto Bob’s bed. 
Kate was the exception because her two dogs did not sleep in the bedroom. The dogs slept 
in a utility room downstairs where they had their own dog beds,   
“it was quite dark and comfy and they had a big bed each so they would go in there 
and that was their space to chill out but they had the run of the house as well. They 
weren’t confined to that area in any respect but they quite liked chilling out in there”.  
Kate admitted that this arrangement was because they had a small child at the time and had 
it just been her and her husband she would have allowed the dogs to sleep on their bed with 
them,  
“They weren’t allowed to sleep besides us just because if it had been me and my 
husband then probably it would have been fine but because [daughter] was still quite 
young and we just thought it would be better at night time to have us both and, with 
them being downstairs”. 
It is not just sleeping arrangements that are relevant to family practices. Access to home 
spaces, especially private spaces such as the bathroom, is significant (Franklin, 2006). 
Isabel’s cat, Marmite is allowed to invade this highly private and personal space, 
 “He even gets into the bath-tub when I´m having a shower!” 
Sitting together on a sofa watching TV or playing on the x-box is a shared family practice in 
many households. It is something that many of my participants share with their companion 
animals: 
“I’ve literally put the world to rights watching TV and she’d just sit next to me on the 
settee and put her head on my lap” (Interview with Julia).  
“I like to sit close to the tv while playing stuff. He’ll jump on the back of the couch and 
he’ll lie there” (Interview with Josh). 
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Talking about her evening routine with Anton, Emma said “we’ll settle down watch a bit of TV 
and snuggle up”. Anton has been excluded from the new sofa (in a bid to limit dog hair getting 
everywhere) but interestingly Emma now watches TV on the floor to be with Anton. 
“Right now I’m sitting on the floor with him. He’s not allowed on the sofa but I end up 
sitting on the floor all night because of it so he can sit on my lap”. 
This exclusion rule appears to be a practical solution to maintain the quality of the new sofa, 
rather than to assert hierarchical dominance over Anton.  
A number of studies show that pet owners experience their companion animals as ‘minded 
social actors’ (Sanders, 1993) that can influence family and household decisions and 
activities (Fox, 2006; Power, 2008; Shir-Vertesh, 2012). These studies  
“urge a re-thinking of human-animal family relations that is attentive to the everyday, 
embodied encounters between people and animals and suggest that animals may 
actively shape the ways that family and home are lived in the everyday” (Power, 
2008, p. 537).  
Isabel gives an example of Badger ‘asking’ to play a particular game,  
“I spend a lot of time playing with him. He loves it when I run after him, like if I´m trying 
to hunt him, and calls for this game with a strange pigeon-like meowing”. 
The cat knows its own mind and instigates playing the game it wants to play. 
My findings show that just as in Australia (Power, 2008) and Israel (Shir-Vertesh, 2012) 
companion animals in the UK are social actors who actively shape everyday family practices 
in the home. Morgan (1999) identifies a number of agencies who play an important role in 
constructing family. One such agency is the social actors whose activities are involved with 
family. He takes a humanist stance and lists parents, spouses and children as the relevant 
social actors but subsequent research, including my findings, show that companion animals 
are also social actors that can influence family activities (Fox, 2006; Power, 2008; Shir-
Vertesh, 2012). The themes of fluidity and change are key to Morgan’s family practices 
approach and he observes that,  
“Notions of ‘family’ are rarely static but are constantly subjected to processes of 
negotiation and re-definition” (1999, p. 18). 
As new research expands our knowledge and understanding of who influences family 
practices, Morgan’s category of social actors needs to expand to include companion 
animals. 
5.2.2.1 Agency: Influencing household decisions 
The perceived needs and preferences of companion animals are taken into account in 
decisions about everyday family activities such as holidays and day trips or more significant 
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decisions such as where to live thereby securing their place as influential social actors within 
the family (Franklin, 2006). 
Josh explains how Simba is considered in any decisions relating to the house and household 
activities especially moving house but even something as basic as new furniture,  
“Any major decisions I have always involve Simba … Anything, anything that I have 
to make my mind up on it’ll always involve some sort of aspect for Simba even if it’s 
just something as small as getting something new for the place like how will Simba 
react to it?  I am thinking about getting some book shelves for Lucy’s books … I’m 
thinking as well how will it affect Simba?  Will he jump on it?  Will he pull that down?  
Is it going to be something he’s going to have an issue with? See, even small stuff 
like that”. 
Earlier I considered how Lucy’s relationship with Simba comes within Power’s Parent-child 
model. In describing how Simba influences household decisions, such as moving house, 
Lucy compares him to a child, 
“just like what you probably would with a child, if you’re moving with a child you think 
is there a good neighbourhood to bring a child up in. When we were moving and 
everything is there enough room for Simba?... If we wanted to let him outside can we 
let him outside?”  
The context of this dialogue is significant. She was justifying her description of Simba as a 
family member, specifically as a child. For Lucy, Simba influences important household 
decisions, such as where to live, in the same way that a child does. For example, Simba 
influenced the size of the property they were moving to 
“We literally got a spare bedroom in the new place because we thought if he wants to 
be away from us he can actually go there”. 
Here Lucy demonstrates Fox’s “animal instinct” model (2006, p. 529). Simba’s perceived 
need to have his own space, possibly grounded in popular animal psychology of cats being 
solitary and independent animals, influences their decision to rent a larger property.  
For many households, holidays are an important aspect of family life and it was clear that the 
companion animals influenced decisions about holidays for a number of my research 
participants. Kate observed that once they had dogs they changed their pattern for family 
holidays,  
“We never took holidays or anything because we didn’t want to leave them with 
anyone”.  
Prior to having dogs they took family holidays in Scotland and Ireland by combining a holiday 
with visiting family but after they got the dogs, they no longer did this. Instead, Kate took her 
daughter, Jess, to Ireland for two weeks to stay with her parents while Lewis stayed home 
with the dogs (reflexive journal entry, June 2019). 
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Isabel also referred to the problem of leaving the cats when going on holiday, 
“If we go on holiday, we´re always worried about their wellbeing and hurry up to get 
back home as soon as possible”. 
This was a similar concern for Josh and his cat Simba, 
“Like I’m going on holiday in September is he going to be ok for the two weeks we’re 
away?”. 
Both Bob and Emma said that they only ate at dog-friendly pubs and restaurants because 
they will not go for a meal without their dog. Thus even relatively small and trivial household 
decisions, such as, where to eat is influenced by the presence of the dog. 
 
5.2.2.2 Agency: Detrimental Changes to Everyday Practices 
Most of my research participants referred to detrimental changes in their everyday practices 
caused by their companion animal. It was evident that the participants generally played 
down the detrimental effect of these changes and accepted them as part of life with a 
dog/cat. This sub-theme emerged from the analysis of my interviews and provides a 
valuable insight into understanding how companion animals are constructed as family 
members in everyday practices. As social actors within the family household, companion 
animals can cause changes in routines that are detrimental to the people with whom they 
live but which are tolerated as an inevitable consequence of living with the animal. 
Interference with sleep and sleep deprivation was a recurrent example from my participants 
that illustrates this phenomenon.  
Emma, Isabel, Julia, Bob, Lucy and Josh all referred to being woken in the early hours of the 
morning due to their pet snoring, meowing, playing or whining. Emma complained  
“he’ll put his head on my neck and snore in my ear really loudly so while it’s very cute 
that he’s got his head resting on my jaw or my neck, being a Frenchie he does snore 
quite badly so that wakes me up”.  
She justifies this disruption to her sleep by observing that sharing your bed with a human 
can be equally disruptive, 
“but I don’t care I mean some things you get used to don’t you? Your partner can 
wake you up tossing and turning all night”. 
Isabel complained of similar interruptions from her cat, Badger, 
“He would spend every single night meowing non-stop for hours and we started to 
develop trouble sleeping. It literally felt like having an eternal, naughty new born at 
home”.  
When talking about Simba causing interruptions to her sleep, Lucy observed  
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“I think I’m used to it if it happens once on a night. I’m used to it and I can fall back 
asleep but sometimes if it happens two or three times a night that’s when I, I do get a 
bit grouchy”. 
For Julia the detrimental changes to sleep routines occurred as Annie got older and needed 
to go to the toilet more regularly which was difficult as they lived in a first floor flat. She 
explained, 
“because she was a very clean dog right to the end if she woke me in the middle of 
the night I got up, got dressed and took her out because I didn’t want to compromise 
her.  She had the decency to wake me so I didn’t want to be in a situation where I 
ignored her. So I would be stood outside on the street at 3 o’clock in the morning in 
the dead of Winter, you know, just to make sure that she was, because she was, you 
know  I believe in dignity with dogs”. 
Bob also got up in the night to let his elderly dog, Darkie, go into the back garden to relieve 
himself (reflexive journal entry during second interview, April 2019). 
Lucy and Josh describe an unusual change in household practices that arose from Simba’s 
own quirky preferences. They do not shut doors in the flat because Simba does not like it.  
“We can’t even shut doors either because he has some sort of fear with doors being 
shut”.  
This includes the bathroom door, which is clearly an inconvenience to them. Concerns for 
Simba’s safety mean that they no longer open windows at home because Simba once fell 
out of an upstairs open window. 
“Josh: We can’t even open the windows either.  Last time we opened a window, we 
left it open at night and it was at my parents place he walked out of the window and 
onto the windowsill outside and he fell... 
 Lucy – it was two floors as well … we’ve never opened the windows since”.  
When I visited them at their home, it was an unusually hot summer’s day and it was very 
warm inside the first floor flat but they did not open any windows for fear of compromising 
Simba’s safety.  
This sub-theme ‘Detrimental Changes to Everyday Practices’ is a significant theme in the 
context of ‘no pet’ covenants because it illustrates the extent to which people will suffer 
detriment for the sake of their continued relationship with their dog/cat. My findings (detailed 
in Section 1, Part II, 5.3.2 Lack of Choice) demonstrate that pet-owning tenants will endure 
detriment and harm arising from ‘no pet’ covenants in order to protect and maintain this 
relationship. For example, Bob left the care home where he had lived for over four years in 
order to continue to live with Darkie and Isabel gave up valuable PhD places and 
scholarships with Oxford and Cambridge University in order to live with her cats,  
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“The no-pets policy of these two universities was certainly decisive. Had we been 
pet-less, I´m certain we would have run the risk [Brexit and health checks] and 
moved to the UK”.  
Both David and Julia lived in very poor quality conditions as a direct consequence of wanting 
to live with their dogs. Julia said,  
“I was nearly homeless trying to keep hold of Annie because every time I went to them 
they said how old are you? Well get rid of the dog and we’ve got something for you 
and I was like ‘no’.  So, I went into private lodging.  I lived in a shed in a garden, a shed 
in a garden”.  
David admitted that at times he slept on the street rather than sleep in a shelter that 
excluded his dog, Mack. He said that Mack is always with him,  
 “I don’t go where he’s not allowed”.  
Detrimental change to existing everyday practices is not considered in the existing literature 
on pets as family but arose from my interview data as a very significant theme in the context 
of ‘no pet’ covenants. It is evident that pet-owning tenants are prepared to endure 
considerable inconvenience and detriment, even harm, for the sake of their companion 
animals. Getting up at 3am, getting dressed and taking the dog outside, in the middle of 
winter, to relieve itself is a considerable inconvenience but giving up career and housing 
opportunities is life-changing. 
Shir-Vertesh’s concept of ‘flexible personhood’ arose from her discovering the way in which 
some of her participants excluded their pets from family membership as a result of changes 
in their lives especially the birth of a baby (2012, p. 428). One of her case studies concerns a 
couple who initially treated their dog, Albert, as their baby and showered him with love and 
attention but over the years as they had children, Albert was excluded and ignored until at 
the age of 11 years he disappeared. The couple were not unduly concerned and assumed 
he was dead. Shir-Vertesh acknowledges that people extend kinship ties to include their 
companion animal but says,  
“this bond does not necessarily mean durability, resilience and permanence” (2012, p. 
427).  
My findings demonstrate a different perspective to the effect of life changes. When life 
circumstances changed, my participants suffered detriment and endured hardship for the 
sake of their companion animal, sometimes life changing detriment and this strengthened 
rather than terminated the animal’s family status. In rationalising these detrimental changes 
to their lives, people emphasised the importance of their companion animal and affirmed 
their kinship ties. 
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5.2.3 First Theme - AGENCY: Anthropomorphic model 
Agency is reflected in the way that people see their companion animals as ‘minded beings’ 
(Sanders, 1993) with individual intentions, desires, plans and emotions (Anderson, 2003). By 
co-habiting with companion animals and living intimately in a confined space on a daily 
basis, owners come to know the individual personality of their animals seeing them as 
subjective beings (Fox, 2006; Power, 2008) thereby demonstrating their 
“liminal position on the boundaries between ‘human’ and ‘animal’” (Fox, 2006, p. 
526). 
Owners may ‘talk’ for their pets and explain to other humans how their pet feels (Charles and 
Davies, 2008; Power, 2008; Shir-Vertesh, 2012; Irvine and Cilia, 2017).  
Julia described Annie as a laid-back dog. She sometimes took Annie’s voice to demonstrate 
this, 
“I could never walk without people stopping and people with kids and they’d go “do 
you mind if my child talks to your dog” and Annie would just stand there and go ‘yeah 
whatever’.” 
In speaking for Annie, Julia acknowledges her ability to share mental states with her dog 
(Irvine and Cilia, 2017) demonstrating Annie’s subjectivity. Attributing human-like 
characteristics to his cat, Josh perceived Simba as having the emotion jealousy. He 
described Simba as “extremely jealous” of Lucy.  
“If Lucy stayed over or if she stayed for an extended period of time he would get 
jealous and he would attack. If we walked downstairs to get food or get a drink or 
something he would like he would chase after us and he would bat her.  I mean it 
looked like he was you know playing around but it’s definitely something where he’s 
like ‘I don’t like you’”. 
Anthropomorphising their pets, by attributing human qualities to them, has the advantage of 
helping people to explain patterns of behaviour by the pet and thereby predict future actions.  
Characterising Simba’s actions as jealousy helps Josh to interact with Simba. Since we have 
not evolved a set of psychological processes specifically to serve our relationships with 
companion animals (Collis and McNicholas, 1998), it is not surprising that people draw on 
psychological processes that they use in human-human relationships. Thus, such emotions 
as jealousy come to be associated with human-pet interactions. 
Talking about her dog, Honey, Kate said, 
“she was just this strangely human dog … Honey was more human than I’ve ever 
seen a dog”. Her husband agreed. “I don’t think that Honey knows she’s a dog.  I 
think she thinks she’s a person”.  
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Kate referred to Honey’s gentle nature, tolerance of everything and love of people to explain 
what she meant by her ‘humanness’. Some scholars are sceptical of understanding animals 
through anthropomorphised accounts of animal behaviour but appreciate the owner’s 
attempt to understand their animals rather than simply labelling the behaviour as mere 
animal instinct (Haraway, 2003). 
Animals as minded individuals is especially apparent where children have a close 
relationship with a pet. Research shows that pets can occupy important places in the lives of 
children (Tipper, 2011) and may be considered as siblings (Power, 2008). Irvine and Cilia 
observe,  
“Children’s close relationship with their pets, their communication with their pets, and 
their tendency to define pets as siblings reveal both their conception of a flexible 
human-animal boundary and how it intersects with their ideas about family” (2017, p. 
6).  
Only one of my research participants, Kate, lived with children and her seven-year-old 
daughter, Jess, had a close bond with their dog, Roxie. When asked if Jess talked to Roxie, 
Kate said  
“Oh yeah, like a person. And if she was upset she would just go. You would 
frequently hear her chatting to [Roxie] complaining about us or different things like 
that”. 
Kate’s experience supports Power’s (2008) finding of dogs performing a sibling role for 
children. 
5.2.4 First Theme - AGENCY: Affecting human-human interactions 
The way in which companion animals affect human-human interactions is particularly 
relevant because the use of ‘no pet’ covenants is often justified as preventing conflict 
between tenants. Therefore acknowledging the effect companion animals have on human-
human interactions, both negatively as a source of conflict and positively as a social 
lubricant, is relevant to my research. 
(i) Causing conflict 
Companion animals, especially dogs, can sometimes disrupt the harmony of social 
relationships causing tension and conflict within families and between neighbours (Charles 
and Davies, 2008; Power, 2008). Power (2008) observed that challenging behaviours such 
as dog aggression, toilet training and destructive behaviour like chewing sometimes caused 
tension within the families she interviewed. 
Annie was a source of conflict between Julia and her daughter-in-law, because the daughter-
in-law wanted to keep Annie away from her child and asked Julia’s son to intervene, 
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“For the first 12 months Annie was not allowed near [granddaughter] as a baby 
because of germs so my son was saying “Please blah, blah, blah” so it was always 
[granddaughter] would just look at her and smile at her or whatever, and because 
Annie wasn’t licky or fussy Annie was quite happy to just sit there and then when I 
first moved here Annie was allowed in the house. She had a blanket on the sofa no 
problem and then one day my son said “do you mind not bringing Annie in anymore”.  
Shortly after Annie died, her son split with his partner and Julia believes that Annie’s death 
was a catalyst for the separation,  
“Annie dying and him worrying about me and her coldness towards me was the 
catalyst, not the reason they split up, but kind of like ‘what sort of person are you?’. 
He said ‘I wanted to come and be there for you but she was like this is your family’.” 
Bob also experienced conflict because of Darkie. A change in management at the care 
home led to a new manageress who did not like Darkie and wanted Bob to rehome him: 
“Bob - Then there was a chap fell and they tried to make out that the dog tripped him 
but the ruddy dog wasn’t even near him, aye, so, no, 
Friend - They got very nasty to Bob they did. They were bullying him, harassing him 
and,  
 Bob - So I thought I would just be on the move”. 
Roxie and Honey were the source of a conflict with Kate’s new neighbours. She said that her 
husband, Lewis, no longer trusts the neighbours because he knows that one of them 
complained to the landlord about them having dogs (reflexive journal entry from second 
interview, June 2019).  
(ii) Social lubricant  
Dogs can facilitate the creation of social networks in neighbourhoods and help owners to 
make links within the community (Wood, Giles-Corti and Bulsara, 2005; Wood et al, 2017). 
Charles and Davies observe that,  
“The social networks that animals help to create and in which they play an active part 
can be conceptualised in terms of bonding social capital” (2008, p. 8.8).  
Social Capital has been defined as the 
“connections among individuals, social network and the norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness that arise from them” (Putnam, 2001, p. 19 quoted in Wood et al, 
2017). 
A comprehensive study involving 2,600 people in Australia and the United States found that 
pet ownership increases social connectedness within local communities creating higher 
levels of Social Capital (Wood et al, 2017). Irvine (2013a) and Carr (2016) observe how a 
homeless person’s companion animal can act as a medium through which the homeless 
person and the domiciled population can connect. 
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(a) Within the family 
Annie’s close relationship with the other members of Julia’s family was important to Julia, 
“It was all dependent on everything else so, how [granddaughter] was with Annie, 
how Annie was with [granddaughter], how she adored my son, how I adore 
[granddaughter], and I adore my son and Annie was constant”.  
Kate talked about the very close bond between her young daughter, Jess, and their staffie, 
Roxie. She describes them as “best friends”,  
“They were just inseparable. If Jess was on the sofa Roxie was on the sofa, If Jess was 
playing outside Roxie was playing outside. Even if she was just lying on the ground, 
Roxie was lying on the ground near where she was but that’s just what they were like, 
they were each other’s shadow really”. 
In each case, the dogs formed part of the dynamic relationship within the family. They were 
not just passive recipients of care but active contributors to the rich network of family 
relationships. The fact that Annie was both loved by those closest to Julia and loved them in 
return better integrated her into Julia’s “inner circle” of relationships.  
(b) Within the wider community 
Julia recognised how Annie helped her to talk to other people in her local community,  
“the thing that I found with dog owners as well is it also leads to you having a 
conversation with somebody because they like your dog”. 
Julia is retired and prior to Annie’s death, three months before our initial interview, she lived 
alone with Annie in sheltered housing. She loves walking but feels she cannot go out into the 
local parks without a dog,  
“I’m not going to sit on a bench, well I’d feel odd if I sat on this bench now, I could but 
when you’re sat with a dog it gives you permission to do all sorts of things you just 
wouldn’t do on your own”.   
Without the link to the local community that Annie provided, Julia feels ‘entombed’ in her flat 
and is becoming increasingly isolated. 
After my initial interview with Bob, we went to a cafe near his home and I observed that a 
number of local people came over to talk to Bob in order to meet Darkie (reflexive journal 
entry, September 2017). 
5.2.5 Conclusion to Agency theme 
Agency was a dominant theme to emerge from Power’s (2008) empirical study of new dog 
owners and their relationship with their dogs. Power found that for some dog owners the 
idea of dogs as family was 
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“shaped by the agency and activity of individual dogs” (2008, p. 541). 
The theme acknowledges how dogs are active in family-making through forming routines 
with existing family members. My findings demonstrate the relevance of Agency in 
understanding how people in the UK construct dogs and cats as family members. For 
Power’s participants ‘pack relations’, in which owners emphasised the importance of rules, 
leadership and human-dominated hierarchy, played a prominent role in family relations. I did 
not find this to be the case with my participants. With the exception of Julia, who previously 
worked as a dog trainer, none of my participants talked about dominance and leadership. 
This may be explained by Power’s sampling strategy because she interviewed new dog 
owners recruited from a dog training class that used ‘pack’ psychology methods, whereas 
my participants had all lived with their pets for a number of years. Power refers to dog 
agency being asserted within everyday family relations as  
“slippages and ruptures to these hierarchical relations” (2008, p. 546). 
Whereas with my participants the agency of the animal appeared as a normal part of daily 
life having been established over a number of years through everyday encounters and close 
interactions between the owner and their companion animal, each developing growing 
knowledge of the other. In this way, the agency of the animal was an integral part of daily life 
and not a mere slippage.  
The companion animal is not a passive recipient moulded to fit existing routines but instead 
is an active contributor in shaping and changing everyday practices that constitute family. 
Significantly for my research on ‘no pet’ covenants, my findings illustrate how pet owners 
endure detrimental changes to household practices, especially in relation to sleep, in order 
to live with their companion animal. This resilience to hardship for the sake of their pet is 
evident when pet-owning tenants are faced with ‘no pet’ covenants and choose to endure 
hardship, such as poor quality housing, rather than relinquish their companion animal. 
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5.2.6 Second theme: Social Support 
Scholars identify the social support provided by companion animals as a relevant factor in 
the owner’s perception of the animal as kin (Charles and Davies, 2008: Irvine, 2013a). One 
of the themes from a study on families and kinship networks in Swansea, Wales was the 
Cultural Construction of Kinship, 
“It seems clear … that family and kinship are socially constructed and that different 
rationales are used to justify the choices made” (Charles and Davies, 2008, p. 9.3).  
The study found that a key factor in constructing kinship was the level of support provided by 
others; with a clear correlation between giving high levels of support and being classed as 
kin. This is significant to understanding how pets are constructed as family because there is 
extensive literature evidencing the ways in which companion animals provide valuable social 
support to their owners (see section 1.5.2 of the commentary; examples include Bonas, 
McNicholas and Collis, 2000; Enders-Slegers, 2000; Anderson, 2003, Irvine, 2013a). It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the researchers in Swansea found that many of the interviewees 
spontaneously included their pets as part of their kinship networks without any prompting 
from the researchers who had in fact not anticipated the inclusion of pets in kinship. My 
research participants provided clear evidence of their pets as care-givers and led me to 
identify ‘Social Support’ (a broad category to encompass emotional and social support as 
well as benefits to physical and mental health) as a key theme in my findings (see figure 8). 
Isabel was recovering from blood cancer when she and her boyfriend adopted Badger and 
she talked of the cat’s role in her recovery,  
“I now know that Badger was of great help for my recovery, despite the sleepless nights. 
He was always there and even looked to be aware of my emotional state sometimes, 
and tried to fix it”. 
Kate described how the dogs helped to calm her if she suffered a panic attack,  
“I used to get panic attacks quite frequently and both dogs were quite good that way.  
They would just instantly calm me down.  You know, Roxie would come over and she 
would do that thing with the paws up and Honey would just lie and let me pat her and 
just by patting her, my blood pressure would come down straight away, I would calm 
down you know”.  
The dogs also supported her husband, Lewis, who suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD),  
“they’ve been great with my husband, you know, he’s got his PTSD and things so 
they just seemed to know when he was feeling a bit low or whatever and they 
wouldn’t leave his side, at all”. 
Lucy described a time when Josh was unwell and Simba provided support,  
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“there was a time when Josh was extremely unwell and Simba literally didn’t leave 
his side. I actually picked him up at one point and brought him into the other room 
just to give Josh a bit of peace and he walked straight back to him and sat down next 
to him so I think it’s just nice to have an animal that cares about you”. 
Josh said that in his first year at University, he had severe anxiety attacks and Simba would 
not leave his side. Describing an incident when he came home drunk, Josh said 
 “This puts me in a bad light but I fell asleep on the bathroom floor and apparently 
[Simba] didn’t leave my side all the way through it”. 
Drawing on Charles and Davies’ (2008) concept of the Cultural Construction of Kin, it is likely 
that the high levels of support my participants receive from their companion animals 
contributes to their constructing them as family members. Power (2008) identifies caring 
relations as one of her three themes in understanding the human-dog relationship but she 
focuses on care-based encounters in which the dog is the recipient and does not explore the 
concept of the dog as a care-giver. Her ‘Caring’ theme therefore differs from my ‘Social 
Support’ theme which embraces the animal as a care-giver and emphasises ways in which 
companion animals support the physical, mental and emotional well-being of their owners. 
Research on homeless pet-owners in the USA and UK has also recognised the care-giving 
role of companion animals (Taylor, Williams and Gray, 2004; Irvine, 2013a and 2013b; Carr, 
2016). Being homeless and alone made my research participant, David, vulnerable and he 
relied on his dog, Mack, to provide valuable support, 
“he looks after me”. 
Given that the provision of support is important in defining family and given that companion 
animals provide valuable social support and care, it is not surprising that Charles and Davies 
conclude that,  
“This points to the importance of support and the quality of the relationship in defining 
who is and is not counted as family and makes it possible to include … non-human 
animals as family members” (2008, p. 6.2). 
My findings demonstrate that the social support and health benefits enjoyed through the 
human-companion animal relationship continue to play a role in the construction of pets as 
family members in the UK.  
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Figure 8 – SOCIAL SUPPORT theme arising from research question 1: How do people in the UK 
construct companion animals as family in everyday practices? 
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5.2.7 Third theme: Ambivalence 
The literature identifies the relationship between humans and animals as one of ambivalence 
(Arluke and Sanders, 1996; Serpell, 1996). It has been observed that the ambivalence that 
characterises our relations with animals permeates our relations with pets (Fox, 2006; 
Charles and Davies, 2008; Power, 2008; Smith, Johnson and Rolph, 2011; Irvine and Cilia, 
2017) and threatens their status within the family unit,  
“The ambivalence with which we regard animals raises the question of whether pets 
can truly attain full family membership” (Irvine and Cilia, 2017, p. 3).  
The large number of animals that are relinquished to rehoming shelters every year is seen 
as evidence of this ambivalence (Fox, 2008; Shir-Vertesh, 2012). For example, in 2018, the 
Dogs Trust National contact centre in the UK took 30,408 calls from owners wanting to 
rehome their dog (Dogs Trust Annual Review, 2018). Charles and Davies (2008) suggests 
that this continued ambivalence was evident in their interviewee’s embarrassment at 
including pets as kin,  
“Thus interviewees tended to ‘test the water’ to see how the interviewer would react 
to any revelations about animals as family members” (2008, p. 5.6).  
However, interviews with vet practitioners, who have the advantage of being able to reflect 
on many years’ experience of interactions with pet owners, found that in recent year’s people 
are much more willing to openly call their pet a substitute child (Franklin, 2006). As 
discussed earlier, for many of my participants their relationship with their companion animal 
came within the Parent-Child model (Power, 2008) and there was little evidence of 
embarrassment at this categorisation of the relationship.  
Both Julia and Emma were angry at suggestions by local authority housing officers that their 
companion animal was ‘only a dog’ that could be given up. Emma asked the council for help 
with finding pet-friendly accommodation,  
“I called our council … the lady told us “well you’ll have to get rid of your dog.” I went 
absolutely mad. I said to her “Would you give up your children because your landlords 
won’t allow them?  Would you give up your children? ... she goes ”Oh don’t be silly 
Emma.” And I said “no, I’m not being silly what you’ve just said is absolutely 
outrageous”.  
A manager at the council later called her back to apologise for the insensitivity of the housing 
officer. 
Julia was angry when the council officer suggested she get rid of her dog so she could find 
private rental accommodation more easily,  
“he said “Well, no you rented privately before, rent privately again”.  I said “It’s really 
difficult with the dog” and he said “Get rid of your dog” just like that.”  
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Far from accepting his perception of her relationship with Annie as trivial and disposable, 
Julia challenged his response with her own proposal of how to deal with the housing 
problem,  
“my parting comment was “do you know what?  I’m going to get a shopping trolley 
and a bin bag and a sleeping bag and I’m going to go and sit in Broad Street and I’m 
telling you now this dog will earn me enough money that by evening I’ll go into a 
hotel“ because I knew she would because she would just sit there all day looking at 
people and he was like “that’s your problem you silly old fool”. 
My findings suggest that the sense of embarrassment at seeing a pet as family, felt by 
participants in Charles and Davies’ (2005) study carried out in Wales in 2001-3, is gradually 
shifting as societal attitudes become more accepting of this terminology even encouraging it 
in some instances, for example, evidenced by High Street shops selling Mother’s Day cards 
from the dog (see Appendix 2). Julia and Emma felt entitled to have their relationship with 
their dog taken seriously by the local authority housing officers. Their reaction of anger 
rather than embarrassment suggests a tentative shift in how society views someone who 
sees their pet as a member of their family. There is a gradual shift away from a story of 
embarrassment to a story of acceptance as demonstrated in figure 9 ‘Ambivalence theme’. 
5.2.8 Conclusion to section 1, Part I 
In addressing my first research question, ‘How do people in the UK construct companion 
animals as family members in everyday practices?’ three key themes emerge from the 
thematic content analysis of my seven interviews: Agency, Social Support and Ambivalence. 
These three themes are closely aligned with themes arising from the existing literature on 
‘pets as family’, for example, Power’s (2008) empirical work on new dog owners identified 
themes of Canine Agency, Caring, Rules and Behaviours. Although our themes of Agency 
and Social Support/Caring are similar, demonstrating the similarities in how people construct 
companion animals as family members in Australia and the UK, there are notable 
differences. In contrast to my theme of ‘Social Support’, Power’s ‘Caring’ theme does not 
consider animals as carers only as recipients of care and her Agency theme does not 
include Detrimental Changes to Everyday Practices. This is a key sub-theme for my 
research because of its link to understanding the effect of ‘no pet’ covenants on tenants and 
the willingness of pet-owning tenants to endure hardship for the sake of continuing to live 
with their companion animal.  
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Figure 9 - AMBIVALENCE theme arising from research question 1: ‘How do people in the UK 
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(for example, Julia and 
Emma’s experience) 
AMBIVALENCE 
 Researchers have defined our relationship to animals as ambivalent (Serpell, 1996). This 




5.3 Section 1, Part II – Thematic Content Analysis: How people in the UK 
experience a ‘no pet’ covenant in their residential lease  
There is very little qualitative research on the effect of ‘no pet’ covenants on tenants. A 
recent human geography study in Australia examined the connections between companion 
animals and housing access and security for tenants (Power, 2017) and a recent study 
carried out in Canada by academics in human and veterinary medicine, examined the effect 
of ‘no pet’ covenants on young tenants with dogs (Graham et al, 2018). Both of these studies 
used in-depth qualitative interviews with pet-owning tenants and I found their findings 
valuable in my research. A particularly interesting finding from my research is the striking 
similarity in the experience of pet-owning tenants in Australia, Canada and the UK.  The two 
existing studies identified the following themes: Rental Insecurity, Low availability and Poor 
Quality Property, Discrimination and Powerlessness in Negotiations. I found all of these 
themes relevant to my data and consider them in more detail below. In addition, I added the 
themes of Lack of Choice (a more expansive version of the Low Availability and Poor Quality 
housing theme), Mental Health and Ambivalence.  
Neither the Australian nor Canadian study investigated the status of the companion animal 
within the research participant’s household. Each study relied on the existing literature to 
show that people often consider their companion animals as family. As explained in section 
1.3.1 of the commentary, it is the assemblage of human+animal+home+lease that is the 
relevant subject for my research (Michael, 2000). My research, therefore, builds on these 
studies by examining the status of pets within the households of those tenants who are the 
research participants. This approach allows me to understand the interconnections between 
the human-companion animal relationship, family practices and ‘no pet’ covenants thereby 
providing a more holistic and insightful appreciation of how tenants experience ‘no pet’ 
covenants in practice. 
5.3.1 Theme one: Rental insecurity arising from hiding undeclared pets 
Power (2017) carried out a 10-year study in Sydney, Australia exploring the impact of pet 
ownership on rental insecurity. In her study the concept of rental security  
“speaks to the capacity of renter households to create and maintain a sense of 
home” (Power, 2017, p. 338).  
She relies on the concept of ‘secure occupancy’, which is defined as  
“the extent to which households who occupy rented dwellings can make a home and 
stay there, to the extent that they wish to do so, subject to meeting their obligations 
as a tenant” (Hulse and Milligan 2014, p. 643).  
221 
 
Within this expansive concept of rental security, it is possible for a tenant who is currently 
living in a pet-friendly property to have a sense of rental insecurity based on “a reduced 
sense of control over their rental futures” (Power, 2017, p. 350). Their perception of the 
difficulty of acquiring pet friendly housing creates rental insecurity even though there may in 
fact be no risk of imminent termination of the tenancy. I am defining the concept of ‘rental 
insecurity’ more restrictively to exclude such tenants who perceive risk where none currently 
exists. I limit ‘rental insecurity’ to those situations where there is a realistic risk of the tenant’s 
eviction in the immediate future. Under English law there is always a risk of a no-fault 
termination of a lease by a private landlord under a s.21 notice (Luba, 2016) so I am not 
including this risk in my definition of ‘rental insecurity’ because that risk is ever present in 
private rentals. Therefore, my concept of rental insecurity applies to tenants who are at risk 
of being evicted because they are in breach of a ‘no pet’ covenant in their lease. This was 
relevant to a number of my research participants and can occur where a tenant fails to 
disclose a pet when they initially rent the property (as was the case for Kate) or where they 
later acquire a pet while already living in the property (which happened to Lucy). 
Power’s study examined the occurrence of undeclared pets. She found that the majority of 
the 679 responses to her survey (71%) declared some or all of their animals when applying 
for a lease (2017, p. 352). The statistical data showed that there was a relationship between 
respondent age, household type and type of pet and the likelihood of declaring a pet; older 
respondents declared pets more frequently than younger ones and those with children 
declared more often than those without. Power suggests the consequence of an eviction is 
more serious for older people and those with families, which could explain this difference. 
Dog owners declared more often than cat owners, which is likely to be due to the greater 
visibility of dogs in the community making them harder to hide (a problem experienced by 
Kate).  
Power observed that, 
“Alongside honesty, stress and worry associated with non-declaration was the most 
significant theme” (2017, p. 353).  
The stress and worry were prompted by the fear of eviction if the animal was discovered. 
Power found that the primary motivating factor for not declaring a pet was concern about the 
difficulty of finding pet-friendly rental housing. 
Two of my participants, Kate and Lucy, hid their pets from their landlord in breach of a ‘no 
pet’ covenant in their lease. The stealth strategy they adopted worked in part for Lucy and 
Josh because the landlord never found out about their cat but the whole process of hiding 
the cat was so stressful they eventually moved to a pet-friendly property. The stealth 
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strategy was unsuccessful for Kate because the landlord discovered the existence of the 
dogs and she and her family faced the prospect of eviction unless they rehomed the dogs 
quickly. 
Power (2017) found that tenants who failed to declare a pet to the landlord hid their pet 
during inspections of the property which proved to be complex, time-consuming and 
stressful. Lucy and Josh used various strategies to hide Simba during landlord inspections of 
the flat every three months. They usually put Simba in a cat carrier and moved him out of the 
flat for several hours which was a time consuming operation requiring careful prior planning. 
For example, Josh explains 
“there’s a pub downstairs. The person who runs the pub was kind enough to just let 
me in there...I took a couple of books down and just read and [Simba] was fine, he 
just fell asleep”. 
At other times Lucy took Simba to a nearby cafe. There is also the additional worry that 
neighbouring tenants may become aware of Simba if he is noisy and report his presence to 
the landlord. Lucy explains 
“We worry if other tenants know and other tenants maybe realise that we’re not meant to 
have a cat for any reason like maybe they’re not allowed pets. I don’t know if they would 
but I think I worry sometimes if they hear him meowing they’d be like report him”. 
My findings show the similarity between UK tenants and tenants in Australia (Power, 2017) 
and Canada (Graham et al, 2018) as tenants in all three countries adopted a stealth strategy 
to conceal their undeclared pets from their landlords. This can adversely affect the mental 
health of tenants due to the increased stress and anxiety associated with their dishonesty 
and the fear of being discovered and evicted. 
5.3.2 Theme two: Lack of Choice 
Power (2017) identified low availability of pet-friendly housing and poor quality housing as a 
sub-theme of Rental Insecurity. She examined the challenges pet owners face when 
searching for rental property in Sydney, Australia. In Sydney housing is scarce creating a 
very competitive market that gives landlords a large pool of tenants to choose from. She 
examined how these challenges created a sense of rental insecurity even for tenants who 
currently lived in pet-friendly housing. I use a narrower definition of rental insecurity and 
consequently categorise concerns over the quality and suitability of property under a 
separate theme of Lack of Choice. This theme also encapsulates the lack of choice that 
some of my participants felt when, due to the effect of the ‘no pet’ covenant, they were 
forced to take action they did not want to take such as moving home or rehoming their dogs.    
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5.3.2.1 Lack of Choice: The poor quality of pet-friendly housing due to its low availability  
The prevalence of ‘no pet’ covenants in private sector housing in the UK means there are 
limited numbers of pet-friendly properties available for let. A recent Government press release 
suggests that it may be as low as 7% of private housing that is openly advertised as pet-
friendly (MHCLG, 2020a). All of my research participants were adversely affected by this low 
availability; Emma faced problems searching for pet-friendly housing in the south of England,  
 “All of their adverts were no pets, no pets, no pets, everywhere we were looking was 
no pets, no pets and it was only by chance that I saw this house because it was two 
doors away from us and they had a big Irish Wolfhound in here and so it came up for 
rent and we had to snap it up and we begged and pleaded with the estate agents, 
letting agents to let us in otherwise we were going to be homeless”.  
She even applied for property where the listing stated that no pets were allowed, 
 “we still applied because we’ve learned that sometimes you just have to still apply just 
in case, besides you have no choice you have to, everything’s got no pets on it, 
absolutely, it’s very rare to get pets considered down here, very, very rare”. 
Lucy and Josh had a similar experience in the North of England when they decided not to 
renew their lease (due to the stress of concealing their cat from the landlord). They wanted a 
pet-friendly property in the right location and price range but encountered problems, 
“when I actually started ringing up people to arrange viewings and whatnot if they 
didn’t mention pets I would ask about it and they would usually say ‘no pets allowed’”. 
In Scotland, Kate found it difficult to find pet-friendly property near her daughter’s school and 
their work, 
“We’d trawled websites, adverts and everything. There was just nothing, there was 
just nothing in the area”.  
From her interviews, Power (2017) identified a number of compromises that pet-owning 
tenants made when searching for, and renting, pet-friendly property in Australia due to its 
low availability (p. 351): 
i. Quality and repair: accepting property in a poorer state of repair than the tenant 
would like; 
ii. Quality and cleanliness: accepting property that is in an unclean state; 
iii. Location: accepting property in an unsuitable location, for example, an unsafe 
neighbourhood; 
iv. Cost: accepting property at the top end of the tenant’s budget or even over-
budget, thereby causing financial stress.  
In Canada, Graham et al found similar concerns over the quality, location and cost of 
property for young tenants living with dogs observing that,  
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“To keep their dogs, younger adults had to make compromises over the quality of 
their rentals” (2018, p. 37).  
It is likely that where property is in a state of poor repair, the landlord sees any potential 
property damage by pets as less of a risk to the value of the property and therefore is more 
willing to accept pets (Power, 2017) especially if this enables them to charge an additional 
pet rent as is the current practice in England following the Tenant Fees Act 2019. One of the 
participants in the Canadian study complained of having to “pay $200 extra per month ($100 
per dog)” in rent in addition to a security deposit and non-refundable pet fee (Graham et al, 
2018, p. 5).  
Some of my participants had a similar experience of compromising on the quality of the 
property especially on the state of repair and cleanliness, in order to be able to live with their 
companion animals. Julia lived in a number of different places in order to keep her dog, 
Annie, with her. Her experience gives an insight into the difficulties of finding pet-friendly 
private housing in the south of England. Her examples include a garden shed, a 
summerhouse, a converted garage and a lean-to: 
 “I lived in a shed in a garden, a shed in a garden”. 
“I’ve got a summerhouse here which you can have for...” and next door to it there 
was a converted garage that had, when I had already moved in, a shower.  She said 
“your dog’s welcome” so I thought ‘beggars’ can’t be choosers’ so I moved in there” 
“A woman in Wokingham rang me. She said “I’ve got a converted garage” except it 
wasn’t a converted garage it was her garage with a double bed in and she‘d put a 
shower in.  Again, the dog was welcome.  It was horrific”. 
“I went into the room and I could see this lean-to and there was a single bed in it but 
it went through to the garden and the door was open so she said “yeah I’ll show it to 
you.”   She wanted £500 a month and I said “Where is it?” and she went “there” and I 
said “but you’re all walking through to the garden” and she said “yes but you can lock 
it at night””. 
I have included all of these examples here to better illustrate the sense of hopelessness and 
desperation one person can feel when faced with continual lack of choice over pet-friendly 
housing. It was not just a one-off experience for Julia. She endured numerous instances of 
poor quality housing over an extended period. The prevalence of short term, insecure lets 
(the Assured Shorthold Tenancy in the private sector promotes short term letting of 6-12 
months and makes it easy for landlords to terminate a lease) means pet-owning tenants may 
have to find new housing multiple times within the 10-15 year typical life expectancy of a dog 
or cat (Power, 2017). Emma also experienced problems with the poor quality of pet-friendly 
property in the south of England: 
 “Because we had a dog the places that we were shown before we settled on this one 
were just terrible, Debbie. I mean I actually, I cried in one of the houses because there 
was no kitchen, if they thought that was the kitchen... it was there was holes all along, 
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there was cupboards hanging off the wall, the oven looked like it was from 1960, you 
went upstairs into the bathroom, the floor was rotten … and these were the properties 
that we were shown because we had a dog”. 
These examples from my participants illustrate that the concerns pet-owning tenants in 
Australia and Canada had about the substandard quality of pet-friendly property apply to pet-
owning tenants in the UK. 
5.3.2.2 Lack of Choice: The effect of ‘no pet’ covenants on tenants 
Lack of choice is also evident in the effect a ‘no pet’ covenant can have on the tenant’s life 
and is closely connected to the theme of powerlessness in negotiations. A number of my 
participants felt that the ‘no pet’ covenant forced them into action they would not have taken 
by choice whether it be to move home, relinquish their companion animal or abandon career 
opportunities. 
When Bob was sent a letter from the landlord’s solicitor telling him to rehome Darkie or face 
eviction, he felt he had no choice but to move from the care home. He did not see 
relinquishing Darkie as an option  
“Well they said that I could stay on condition I got rid of Darkie but there was no way I 
was going to do that”  
and therefore the only action he could take was to move. He rented a bungalow in the 
private sector forcing him to give up the care, support and companionship he enjoyed at the 
care home. When I met with him for our second interview in 2019, he complained of the lack 
of home support he was receiving and the isolation of living in a town where he did not know 
anyone even his immediate neighbours. He was not happy he had moved there but felt he 
had no choice. 
Kate took a risk when she moved into a house with a ‘no pet’ covenant and failed to disclose 
the presence of her two dogs to the landlord. She felt she had no choice because of the lack 
of availability of pet-friendly property in the area. The landlord insisted Kate rehome the dogs 
when she discovered they were living in the house. Kate reluctantly complied because there 
were no alternative rentals available and she could not make her young family (including a 
three-month-old baby) homeless. The landlord  
“just put me under so much pressure that they just had to go”. 
Isabel was offered a PhD scholarship at both Oxford and Cambridge University but gave up 
this lucrative opportunity when she realised she would not be able to find affordable  
accommodation that would permit her cats to live with her, 
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“I declined my offer at Oxford in March, thinking that we might find something better 
in Cambridge, but the situation there, as we found out later, was very much the 
same. I couldn´t believe that both universities didn´t take into consideration that the 
concept of “family” could also involve animals. It felt as ridiculous and frustrating as 
reading a lease contract where it was stated that family accommodation allowed all 
members except babies”. 
David was homeless when I interviewed him and he explained that he had been offered 
accommodation in the past that he had refused because he was not allowed to take Mack 
with him: 
 “Researcher –So they offered you a flat? 
 David – They offered me a few flats.  Pets not allowed. 
 Researcher – So you chose not to take the flat? 
 David – It’s not a choice. Come as a team”. 
David’s words highlight the lack of choice he experienced. He could not rehome Mack – that 
was not an option for him and consequently he had no choice but to refuse accommodation 
that was exclusively for humans. David’s experience in England is similar to that highlighted 
by Irvine’s research on homeless people and their pets in the USA where she found 
numerous examples of homeless people refusing shelter in order to stay with their 
companion animal (Irvine, 2013a). 
The examples in this section illustrate the extent to which pet-owning tenants will make 
compromises and endure hardship to counteract the effect of ‘no pet’ covenants. My findings 
suggest a link with my sub-theme ‘Detrimental changes to everyday practices’ discussed in 
Section 1, Part 1, (5.2.2.2) where pet owners endure detriment, such as sleep deprivation, 
for the sake of their pet. These detrimental changes to everyday routines may provide 
‘practice’ for larger, life-changing events such as Bob moving home for his dog. Pet owners 
are accustomed to enduring some detriment for the sake of their pet and this gives them 
resilience when faced with the larger threats caused by ‘no pet’ covenants. Far from 
excluding pets from family membership (Shir-Vertesh, 2012), the response of my 
participants served to reaffirm their family status. Isabel gave up valuable university 
scholarships, which may be judged by others as unwise, but she rationalises her actions as 
keeping her family intact. Protecting family is a worthwhile cause and in this way, her 
justification for her action serves to confirm the status of her cats as family members. 
 
5.3.3 Theme three: Powerlessness in Negotiations and perceived Discrimination 
The housing crisis in the UK means that private landlords hold all the cards and tenants 
have little or no bargaining power (Arden, 2018). Graham et al (2018) interviewed young 
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tenants with dogs living in Canada and found that they felt powerless in negotiations when 
applying for housing advertised as ‘pets negotiable’. The landlords and property managers 
would allow one, small pet but not dogs and were not open to negotiation on the question of 
dogs. My research uncovered a similar sense of powerlessness in negotiations with private 
landlords in the UK. When Josh moved into Lucy’s flat with Simba, she was too scared to 
ask the letting agent if they could have a cat so she anonymously phoned the agent to ask 
about a similar flat for let in the same building, 
“I phoned up [the letting agent] myself under the premise I was looking for an 
apartment round here and I was like “what about pets?”  Saying “Is there any 
circumstance where they allow one and they were like “no, you’re not allowed one””. 
Lucy did not even try to negotiate because she knew she could be evicted for living with a 
pet in the flat and she did not want to alert the landlord to the possibility of them already 
having a cat.   
In my research the sense of powerlessness in negotiations extended beyond Graham et al’s 
population of young tenants with dogs and beyond the initial stage of searching for property. 
Two of my participants (aged 87 years and late 30s respectively) were already living in the 
property with a pet when they tried to negotiate with the landlord/manager. In these cases, 
the stakes are higher because the tenant faces an imminent risk of losing either their pet or 
their home if the negotiation fails. Bob was forced to either give up Darkie or give up his 
home. He tried to negotiate with the owner to reach a compromise that would allow him to 
have Darkie at weekends but was unsuccessful: 
“I tried to reason with him but err, no and then I tried to say to the owner if I could let 
him away so many nights a week could I have him at the weekends but err, that 
didn’t go down well, just like a brick”. 
Kate also tried to negotiate with the landlord to keep her two dogs but the landlord insisted 
on the dogs being rehomed. 
“We said we are quite happy for you to come and meet them. Come and have a look 
at the house to see that they are not in any way damaging it or destructive or 
anything like that and we’re quite happy to pay a pet deposit if that is needed. If that 
gives the landlady peace of mind and this that and the other but it was, but nothing 
was good enough”.  
In both cases, the tenants felt powerless in their negotiations with the landlord/property 
manager due to their lack of bargaining power. Both were aware that private landlords can 
easily find new tenants, due to housing shortages in the UK, and consequently there is little 
incentive to induce the landlord to re-negotiate the terms of the lease. In the light of this 
powerlessness, Bob and Kate felt they had no choice. Bob reluctantly moved out of the care 
home into a privately let bungalow in a new town where he knew nobody and Kate 
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reluctantly rehomed her dogs unable to rehome them together due to the urgency with which 
the landlord wanted them out of the property. Both felt ‘forced’ into taking action they would 
not choose to take. 
‘No pet’ covenants may engender feelings of discrimination on the part of pet-owning tenants 
arising from this sense of powerlessness in negotiations. Graham et al found that,  
“younger adults believed that landlords and property managers discriminated against 
them, especially if caring for large dogs or dogs of certain breeds” (2018, p. 36).  
They were either refused property or had to pay a non-refundable pet-surcharge, either way 
they perceived this as unjust differential treatment based on being a dog owner. Graham et 
al suggest there could be an alternative explanation based on landlords seeing younger 
tenants (especially students) as an economic risk  
“landlords and property managers may be using pet-related surcharges to screen 
younger adults with dogs, whereby those who agree to pay extra show further 
economic stability and are thus seen as worthy of tenancy” (2018, p. 41).  
My findings build on this research expanding its scope to include older tenants (including 
working professionals). I found that older people can also feel discriminated against based 
on their pet ownership. It suggests that the differential treatment of pet-owning tenants is 
more likely due to their pet ownership, and the perceived risk of property damage caused by 
the animal, rather than the financial stability of the tenant. 
Emma (a 46-year old manager in the insurance industry) felt that where the rental property 
was a house with a garden as opposed to an apartment, it was discriminatory to exclude 
tenants with pets. 
 “So why shouldn’t we be able to [own a dog] when the next door neighbour can have 
a dog because you know they own their house so it is discriminatory because they own 
and we rent”.  
Her reasoning is based on the nature of the property and whether it is suitable for dogs, 
rather than the ownership of the property. As long as she is paying the rent, she does not 
see any justification for the landlord to exclude dogs. She had this conversation with a 
housing officer at her local council who told her that excluding pets is not discriminatory 
because discrimination only occurs if based on specified characteristics such as sex and 
religion. Emma reasons that it is the perception of the differential treatment that matters 
rather than the legal definition,  
“You know they say discrimination is about sex, ethnicity, age, religion, you know, I 
suppose that’s the true meaning of discrimination but it still feels like discrimination”. 
She continued,  
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“It sure feels like discrimination. Perception is the truth at the end of the day you know... 
if it feels like it then surely it is to that person”. 
The housing officer limited the concept of discrimination to its legal definition, but as Emma 
observes, the perception of discrimination can be just as real for the person experiencing it. 
If pet-owning tenants suffer detrimental treatment in the availability and quality of housing, 
on the sole basis of being a pet owner, it is not hard to see how this creates a feeling of 
discrimination and a consequent sense of injustice. 
5.3.4 Theme four: Adverse effect on tenant’s Mental Health  
Creating a mind map of themes relating to the tenants’ experiences of ‘no pet’ covenants 
demonstrated the significance of the ‘mental health’ theme because all of the other themes 
linked to the tenant’s mental health. Figure 10 provides a map of the links to illustrate the 
interconnectedness of the themes. All of my participants reported that the existence of the 
‘no pet’ covenant in their lease had an adverse effect on their mental health causing stress, 
anxiety and in some cases, suffering and grief.  
The stress caused by the threat of eviction had a detrimental effect on Bob’s physical and 
mental health. He was not sleeping, eating and he was getting pains due to all the 
uncertainty of where he would live.  
“I was quite unhappy because I just didn’t know where I was going to end up”.   
Lucy and Josh found hiding Simba during inspections very stressful and they worried about 
neighbours hearing him moving around the flat or seeing him through windows. They also 
worried about finding a pet-friendly property and started searching months in advance of the 
termination of their lease. Lucy observed,  
“I used to get really panicked thinking we’re just going to get kicked out”.  
Julia, talked about the support she received from living with a dog and how she feels 
“disabled” by the ‘no pet’ covenant that prevents her from keeping another dog now that 
Annie has died. She feels “entombed” in her flat,  
“I feel entombed and that is the word I choose to use, when I go in to that flat now I 
feel entombed because I have no motivation to come out of it”. 
Referring to her experience of ‘no pet’ covenants and her reason for setting up an on-line 
petition against the use of the covenants, Emma said, 
 “I was just so angry and upset and stressed”.  
Kate talked about how upset she was when she rehomed her dogs,  
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“I was packing [Roxie’s] stuff in a bag and getting her stuff ready and I was really 
upset and [daughter] was really, really upset and Roxie knew something was wrong”.  
When I met with Kate a year later, she told me how she had received counselling for 
depression since we had last met and she believes the loss of her dogs played a role in her 
illness (reflexive journal entry, June 2019). 
Social Support was a key theme in Part I (5.2.6, Second theme: Social Support) arising from 
the considerable evidence that the human-companion animal relationship benefits the social, 
emotional and physical health and well-being of humans. To jeopardise that support by 
threatening the continuance of the human-companion animal relationship through the use of 
‘no pet’ covenants naturally has an adverse effect on the tenant’s mental health. Therefore, 
the themes of Support (in Part I) and Mental Health (in Part II) are clearly intricately linked 
(see Portfolio component 2, 3.8, figure 6 – Examples of mind maps in my reflexive journal, 
(c) the importance of the Mental Health theme). 
5.3.5 Theme five: Ambivalence to animals: a lack of understanding by housing 
officials  
Power (2017) observed that letting agents who told prospective tenants to give up their pets 
failed to recognise the significance of the relationship between the owner and their pet,  
“These agents did not recognise the importance of companion animals to applicants, 
instead viewing them as a form of property that could be disposed of as needed to 
secure a house” (2017, p. 350).  
Smith, Johnson and Rolph identified a “story of ambivalence” in the context of care homes 
for older people with many having to give up their pets even in the face of considerable 
evidence that companion animals contribute to their health and wellbeing (2011, p. 217). 
As discussed in section 1, Part I under the theme of ‘Ambivalence’, I did not find that my 
participants treated their companion animals in a contradictory way. Even Kate’s rehoming of 
her two dogs is not a sign of ambivalence on her part but rather a need to prioritise between 
different family members - her children over her dogs (see 5.4.2 Kate – a story of loss). 
However, there is evidence of ambivalence to animals in wider society and some pet-owners 
do treat their pets as disposable. The legal status of domestic animals as property 
exacerbates this problem. 
A number of my participants experienced similar insensitive suggestions to give up their 
companion animals in order to obtain housing. Julia and Emma experienced this with local 
authority housing officers, Kate experienced it with her private landlord and for Bob it was 
the manager of his care home. 
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“I called our council which, bearing in mind we’re paying £189 a month in council tax 
to them, the lady told us “well you’ll have to get rid of your dog.” I went absolutely mad” 
(Interview with Emma).   
 “I said “It’s really difficult with the dog” and he said “Get rid of your dog” just like that, 
so of course I really bristled” (Interview with Julia). 
“… nothing was good enough for them and it was a case of she’d ask that the dogs 
are removed as soon as possible” (Interview with Kate). 
“… he just come in and said what he had to, that the dog had to go or I could stay but 
the dog had to go” (Interview with Bob). 
These examples demonstrate the ambivalence of society towards companion animals.  
The dominant cultural framing of ‘good pet ownership’ requires a lifelong commitment to the 
companion animal. Government policy encourages pet owners to see their pets as “a major 
responsibility” and to accept a lifelong responsibility for the well-being of the animal, 
emphasising that dogs live “on average 12 years” (Defra, 2017, p. 1). In conflict with this 
framing of good pet ownership as a lifelong commitment, landlords and letting agents can 
require owners to relinquish their companion animals as if they are disposable possessions 
(Power, 2017). The theme of ambivalence is visible in these conflicting cultural messages. 
5.3.6 Conclusion to section 1, Part II 
In seeking to understand the lived experience of ‘no pet’ covenants for pet-owning tenants in 
the UK, five themes emerge from the thematic content analysis of my seven interviews: 
Rental Insecurity; Lack of Choice; Powerlessness in Negotiations and Perceived 
Discrimination; Mental Health and Ambivalence. That most of these themes arose in the 
recent studies from Australia (Power, 2017) and Canada (Graham et al, 2018) demonstrates 
the similarities in pet-owning tenants’ experiences of ‘no pet’ covenants in these three 
countries. My findings show that pet-owning tenants in the UK experience the same 
problems of low availability and poor quality of pet-friendly housing as their Australian and 
Canadian counterparts. There is the same ambivalence shown by landlords and letting 
agents and the same sense of a tenant’s powerlessness in negotiations with the landlord. In 
focusing on the mental health of tenants, my research shifts the focus from a tenant’s sense 
of ‘home’ (the focus of Power’s research) to the wider harmful effects of ‘no pet’ covenants 
on the lives of tenants which will be of particular relevance when analysing the law in 
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5.4 Section 2: Narrative Analysis 
My approach to narrative analysis drew upon the narrative research pedagogy of Mishler 
(1995), Riessman (1990; 2000; 2008) and Thomas et al (2018). Four of my interviews were 
rich in narratives and I decided to craft four stories from the data (Savin-Baden, 2004): a 
story of sacrifice; a story of suffering; a story of loss and a story of stealth. I use a ‘content-
holistic’ form of narrative analysis (Lieblich et al, 1998) to identify themes that allow me to 
read the data holistically, cognisant of context, complexity and temporality as well as the role 
I play in generating and analysing the data (Elliot, 2005). I identified a number of themes and 
each story together with their themes were then sent to the relevant research participant for 
comment. Thereafter, I met face-to-face with three of the participants to discuss my 
interpretation of their experience. This second meeting, one year after the initial interviews, 
enables me to acknowledge the temporality of experiences (Bell, 2011) and strengthens the 
trustworthiness of my evidence (Polkinghorne, 2007). Many of the themes I identified in my 
narrative analysis have already been discussed in depth in the previous section on thematic 
content analysis. Therefore, this section only includes the additional understanding that 
emerges from narrative analysis. 
5.4.1 Bob – A story of sacrifice 
 
Bob is an 89-year old man who lives in a privately rented one-bed bungalow in the North 
West of England with his 12-year old dog, Darkie. Bob moved into the bungalow in 2017 
after being threatened with eviction from the Scottish care home where he had lived for four 
years. He was served with an eviction notice saying that he must give away his dog for 
rehoming or be evicted. A group of people took up Bob’s cause and a petition on change.org 
amassed over 270,000 signatures. Bob’s predicament was reported in the local newspapers 
and on the BBC news and attracted a protest outside Parliament but even so the manager of 
the care home would not change her mind. Bob’s health was adversely affected by all the 
stress caused by the threat of eviction (he was not sleeping or eating well and he had 
unexplained pains) so he reluctantly decided to move into a bungalow 20 miles away from 
the care home after the owner contacted him and offered to lease it with permission for 
Darkie to live there. 
Bob and his wife Margaret were married for 57 years having known each other from 
childhood. They never had children although they would have liked children. “Aye, worst 
luck, aye, we would have liked children but it never happened”. Not long after they married, 
they bought a puppy, a corgi, which lived with them for 15 years. That was their only pet 
before Darkie. Bob worked as a farm labourer and Margaret (who grew up on a sheep farm 
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and loved dogs) worked in a mill and later she ran the village shop. In his early 40’s Bob 
suffered a heart attack and was told by the doctor that he could no longer work as a farm 
labourer. He got a job working with a seller of farm machinery. After he retired, he continued 
to help out there until he had an aneurysm in 2000. He almost died (in fact he was clinically 
dead at one point) and had a 7-hour operation. He survived but was left with no function in 
his kidneys so has had dialysis for the last 19 years. The hospital suggested he get a dog to 
help improve his physical exercise: “it was after I started to go to the hospital that they 
suggested we get a dog for to take me out for a walk sometime you know”. One of the 
nurses said “I think you should get a dog and to go on walks and good company for you 
both.” Aye, of course Margaret was chuffed with that, aye, yes”. 
After Bob gave up his job as a farm labourer, they moved to a small town in Scotland and 
rented a house there for over 30 years. They shared a passion for bowling and spent most 
days at the bowling green. At various times they each became President of the bowling club, 
Margaret being the first woman to undertake the role. They knew many of the residents of 
the town and enjoyed a strong sense of community while living there. 
Margaret became ill and they moved to the care home to give her the specialist care she 
needed. They choose somewhere that had a positive pet policy so they could keep Darkie 
with them. “You see the manageress that was there when we went says “both you and 
Margaret and the little dog will be here for life” and then of course, there was a dust up and 
the manageress left and she works up at Aberdeen now but err, she was all in favour of the 
dog, in fact, she used to take him away because she had two black dogs of her own and she 
was, she was err dog daft and they used to get on well  but then and she left of course it all 
changed, aye”. Margaret died and Bob continued to live there until he got the eviction notice. 
Bob thinks it was to do with money rather than the dog: “Well they said that I could stay on 
condition I got rid of Darkie but there was no way I was going to do that no but you see they 
were making rooms smaller adding bits on for to make more accommodation and err I had a 
fairly big room well they wanted me out because they were going to put the charge up that 
was all”. 
Bob describes his relationship with Darkie as “Very strong.  I couldn’t part with him.  In fact, I 
hope Darkie outlives me, yeah. That’s my big worry, yeah, but if anything happens to Darkie 
he’s to be cremated and he’s going to be buried with us. Aye and if he dies after I’m gone 
I’ve said to my, them that’s coming, that’s looking after my business I want that little dog 
buried on my grave but it will have to be done very discreetly because I think maybe they’ll 
get into bother I don’t’ think they’ll allow that”. When asked about the benefits of living with 
Darkie, Bob says: “Well company, good company for one thing and love, I love him and err I 
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think he returns his love back, I’m sure he does, aye, I love my little dog”. This is especially 
important bearing in mind how much he misses Margaret: “life’s been quite good but err I 
miss Margaret terribly”. Darkie helps alleviate the sense of loneliness. Bob sees Darkie as a 
life-long commitment: “I would class him as my best friend. I just hadn’t the heart for to part 
with my lovely little dog.  No, no, no, that little dog as far as I’m concerned is with me until 
either he goes or I go, yeah”. 
Caring for Darkie is a big part of Bob’s daily routine, for example, letting him into the garden, 
feeding and brushing him. Darkie acts as a social lubricant both in the care home (with the 
other residents who all liked Darkie) and when Bob moved into the bungalow in a new town 
he didn’t know. I witnessed this first hand after the first interview, which took place in Bob’s 
home, when we went to a local café. Several strangers approached Bob to talk to him about 
Darkie and he was really pleased to have the opportunity to talk to local people. In addition 
to the chance to talk to strangers outside, a number of dog walkers (volunteers with the 
Cinnamon Trust) visit Bob at home during the week to walk Darkie so Bob gets the benefit of 
interaction and conversation with these people: “she’s very good, very good indeed aye and 
her mother sometimes comes and we’ll have a nice blather you’d say and err no I’ve been 
very, very fortunate in getting people for to come and take the dog”. 
5.4.1.1 Additional understanding of Bob’s experience from a narrative analysis 
Bob’s story of his experience of ‘no pet’ covenants is a story of sacrifice. The word sacrifice 
means,  
“surrender of something of value as a means of gaining something more desirable or 
of preventing some evil” (Collins English Dictionary).  
He surrendered his comfortable home in the care home where he had security, support, 
friends and practical everyday care such as meals “as a means of gaining something more 
desirable” that being the continuance of the close social relationship he shared with his dog, 
Darkie. He valued the relationship he shared with Darkie more than his home. In trying to 
understand why he made the sacrifice to move home (which at 87 years was a stressful 
upheaval to his life) something struck me; he had made a similar sacrifice for his wife, 
Margaret, several years earlier. This only came to me during the second interview when we 
discussed the story I had crafted from his initial interview. During this meeting, Bob talked 
about this episode in his life in detail (previously he had only mentioned it in passing). When 
Margaret became ill she moved into a specialist care home. Bob and Margaret had been 
very happy in the home they rented for over 30 years near the bowling green where they 
spent most days enjoying their shared passion for bowling. They knew many people and 
enjoyed being part of the bowling community. Bob said he regretted leaving this home but he 
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moved to be with Margaret. He surrendered a home and community he loved to continue to 
live with Margaret. Having once surrendered his home for Margaret, he later did it again for 
Darkie. What does this tell me about his relationship with Darkie? During the second 
interview he said, 
“The little dog fills Margaret’s shoes to a certain degree. Not exactly”.  
He explained that Darkie was a “great help” in alleviating the loneliness he felt now that 
Margaret was gone. It was clear that Bob feels lonely living in the bungalow; having lived 
there for two years, he still does not know any local people even his neighbours. However, 
Darkie does more than provide companionship to alleviate loneliness; he is a final link to 
Margaret. Bob and Margaret were married for 57 years and, being unable to have children, 
they focussed on their relationship as a couple and were very close. She knew and loved 
Darkie and the three of them shared a life together before her death. There is a complexity 
present here that is indicative of a dynamic, reciprocal and social relationship between Bob 
and Darkie that is intertwined with Bob’s relationship with Margaret. Darkie is the final link 
with Margaret (McNicholas, 2014; Fox and Ray, 2019) and this is pivotal in understanding 
why Bob gave up his home to live with his dog. 
In our interviews, Bob never used the word ‘family’ to describe Darkie. Whenever I asked 
him about family he always talked about not been able to have children, 
“I would have loved to have a family”. 
He called Darkie his ‘companion’ and ‘friend’. From knowing Bob’s background and history, I 
can understand his reluctance to use the word ‘family’ for a dog. He was bought up by his 
grandparents, and his grandfather (who died young) was a shepherd. His father-in-law was 
also a shepherd, as was Margaret for a time, and Bob worked as a farm labourer for most of 
his working life. Therefore, he is used to seeing dogs as working dogs on a farm and this is 
likely to shape his perception of dogs. While he can accept dogs as pets that live in the 
home, it is a giant leap to see them as family so he calls Darkie his ‘companion’. However, 
looking behind the label Bob chooses to describe their relationship there is a closeness that 
others could describe as familial. Darkie is part of the everyday practices in the home, such 
as sleeping and eating, and is a social agent who influences routines and decisions. 
Significantly, Bob is concerned that Darkie is laid to rest with him when he dies. At our 
second interview, Bob talked at length about the arrangements when he and Darkie die and 
has even met with a vicar specifically to discuss this. If Darkie dies before Bob, he will keep 
Darkie’s ashes and arrange for them to be laid beside Bob when he dies. If Darkie dies after 
Bob, a cousin has agreed to lay Darkie to rest on Bob’s grave. Bob is almost 90 years and 
Darkie is 12 years so it is understandable that Bob thinks about death. The fact that he 
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worries about Darkie being buried with him is indicative of a very close relationship that 
could be seen to be closer to family than friendship. This suggests that giving a pet owner a 
survey and asking them to tick a box if they see their dog as (A) a family member or (B) a 
companion, may be misleading if you are seeking to understand the nature of the 
relationship the person shares with their dog as opposed to the label the person gives that 
relationship. Some people, like Bob, may be reluctant to call their dog a family member but 
when the nature of their relationship is examined, it indicates a close relationship similar to 
that of human family members. 
At our first interview, Bob told me a story about his uncle’s dog: 
“Well I had an uncle, he was a shepherd and he sold an old dog  and it went away … 
this little, this collie it went way up away up above Lockerbie I would have said it must 
have been about, I’d have said thirty mile away way out in the country and err it was 
an oldish dog it was, you know, by working on the hill and this farmer had got it away 
above Lockerbie and one night through the night he heard this whimpering noise and 
he went to the door and here was the old dog with its tail wagging come all that way 
back and it went in the dark. Now how did that dog find its way back? aye and the 
farmer wanted it back and Tommy says “Oh no”  he says “if that old dog was that 
fond of me” he says  “there’s no way I’m going to part with him now”, aye”. 
Bob told me this story twice (at the initial interview and at the follow up interview over a year 
later) which made me realise the significance of the story. Each time it was in the context of 
why he gave up his home to live with Darkie. The story of the uncle’s dog is not about Darkie 
but it tells me about how Bob sees dogs – as loyal, trusting, determined and intelligent. His 
uncle made a mistake of giving away his dog to another farmer. The loyal dog returned on 
his own accord and the uncle vowed never to part with the dog again. This story from Bob’s 
youth is important to him and he remembers it after many years. He will not make the same 
mistake as his uncle. He will not give Darkie away,  
“because he shows his love as much as I give him yeah, yes.  No, he’s a, he’s a 
super little dog, no, no but err, friendship’s a big thing you know, with a dog”. 
Bob’s experience of ‘no pet’ covenants is a story of sacrifice. It tells of the strength of the 
bond between an owner and his companion animal but also of its nature as a dynamic, 
reciprocal and social relationship that can be intertwined with human-human relationships 
between the owner and others, often family members with whom they live. It tells of the life-
changing consequences of ‘no pet’ covenants/policies that can force an owner into giving up 




Figure 11 - The different themes arising from using content and narrative analysis: Bob and Darkie 
  
THEMATIC CONTENT ANALYSIS 
How Bob constructs Darkie as a 
close friend in everyday practices  
Bob’s experience of a ‘no pet’ 
policy in his lease 
 
(i) AGENCY: 
(a)  Everyday Practices 
e.g. morning routine 
and bedtime routine 
(b) Influences decisions 
such as where to eat 
out 
(c) Detrimental change - 
getting up in the 
night to let Darkie out 
in the garden;  
(d) Darkie acts as a social 
lubricant helping Bob 
to interact with the 
community; Darkie 
was the source of 
conflict with the new 
manager 
 
(ii) Social support e.g. Darkie 
helps to combat loneliness and 
has improved Bob’s physical 
health over the years 
 
(iii) Ambivalence e.g. the new 
manager told Bob to rehome 
Darkie even though they had 
lived together for 10 years 
(i) Rental Insecurity – 
the care home 
changed its policy on 
pets 
 
(ii) Lack of Choice – Bob 
felt he had no choice 
but to move out of the 
care home. There 
were no alternative 
local care homes with 
positive pet policies 
for him to move to 
 
(iii) Powerlessness in 
negotiations – the 
manager was not 
prepared to negotiate 
 
(iv) Mental health – Bob 
suffered severe stress 
following the threat of 
eviction 
 
(v) Ambivalence – the 
new manager told Bob 
to rehome Darkie 
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  NARRATIVE ANALYSIS 
Bob has a story of sacrifice. He gave up his home to keep his dog. Why? 
Narrative adds a different dimension to the content analysis 
 
Why did Bob give 
up his home for 
Darkie?  
He had made a 
similar sacrifice for 
his wife, Margaret. 
He gave up a home 
he loved to be with 
her in a care home.  
Later he gave up 
his home at the 
care home to be 
with Darkie. 
It was easier to 
make the decision 
to give up his home 
at the care home 
having done it 
before. 
Why is Darkie so 
important to Bob? 
Bob’s wife, 
Margaret, had a 
loving relationship 
with Darkie before 
her death.  
Darkie is a final link 
to Margaret. There 
is a complexity in 
the social, dynamic 
inter-relationship of 
the three parties. 
Narrative examines the 
sequence of events and 





Narrative is holistic and considers 
context  
Why does Bob 
refer to Darkie as a 
friend but not 
family? 
Bob was a farm 




grew up with 
working sheep 
dogs around him. 
In this environment 
a dog was not 
referred to as a 
family member. 
However, Bob has 
made 
arrangements for 
Darkie’s ashes to 
be buried next to 
him. This suggests 
a relationship 
closer to that of a 
family member 
than just a friend. 
Why did Bob not 
rehome Darkie? 
There is a family 
story from Bob’s 
youth that seems 
to have influenced 
his view of dogs. 
His uncle gave 
away a loyal 
sheep dog. The 
dog endured 
considerable 
hardship to find 
his way back to 
Bob’s uncle. Bob 
will not make the 
same mistake as 
his uncle. Bob will 




5.4.2 Kate – a story of loss 
 
Kate is married with two children. The family live in Scotland. At the time of the initial 
interview her daughter was 7 years and her son was 4 months. Kate’s experience of ‘no pet’ 
covenants was traumatic because it involved the loss of her two dogs, Roxie and Honey, 
whom she viewed as “extra family members”. She said “we just thought of them as extra 
kids”. Her sense of loss and grief motivated her to write to her Member of the Scottish 
Parliament (MSP) to complain about the use of ‘no pet’ covenants in leases. 
In 2014 Kate, her husband, Lewis, and young daughter, Jess, who was 3 years at the time, 
moved into a rented house with a garden. Previously they had rented flats and lived several 
storeys high so when they rented the house with a garden they saw having a dog as “just a 
natural thing” to do. Both Kate and Lewis had grown up as children with dogs in the home 
and wanted their young daughter to have that experience. They researched the type of 
breed they wanted (a Staffordshire bull terrier) to make sure it was safe with young children 
and in late 2015 adopted a puppy from a rescue centre. It was a thorough adoption process 
that involved time and money (including agreeing to have the dog spayed and undertaking a 
course of puppy classes). Kate referred to the seriousness of the decision to adopt Roxie, “It 
was as serious a decision, in my opinion, as having another baby”. Honey, a Labrador, came 
to live with them by a very different route. She belonged to their neighbour and because he 
worked at weekends, he asked Kate to look after Honey from Friday to Sunday night. After a 
while, he asked if she would adopt Honey full time because of his work and family 
commitments. Kate said the decision was “just a no brainer”. Honey was 5 years old when 
she went to live with Kate in early 2016. 
The dogs “immediately connected with each other”. Honey was a gentle and “natural 
motherly dog” and was very tolerant of the younger, Roxie, who was very excitable and more 
domineering. Both Kate and Lewis acknowledged the special character of Honey that was 
almost humanlike. “Honey was more human than I’ve ever seen a dog” describing her as a 
tolerant, gentle giant who loved being with people and seemed to understand every word 
said to her. 
Over the 3 years she lived with them, Roxie developed a particularly close bond with Kate’s 
young daughter, Jess. Describing their relationship Kate said, “they were just inseparable”, 
“they were each other’s shadow really”. Jess talked to Roxie “like a person”, “you would 
frequently hear her chatting to [Roxie]”. 
The dogs were part of the everyday routine of the household. The average day started by 
letting the dogs into the garden before breakfast and after Jess had gone to school the dogs 
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would go for long walks usually with Lewis sometimes lasting several hours. In the evening 
Roxie liked her own space and went to her bed, which was in a utility room at the back of the 
house, but “Honey would sit beside you on the sofa or lie on the floor by your feet”. At night 
the dogs did not sleep in the bedrooms because Jess was quite young and Kate felt it best 
to keep the dogs downstairs at night.  
The dogs supported the family in a number of ways. Kate felt secure knowing the dogs were 
guarding her, “I felt completely safe all the time”. Referring to Roxie, Kate talked of “her 
usual stance with me, very guarded, very sort of protective … when I was first pregnant with 
the baby she used to sit with her paws across my tummy on the sofa” and Kate was used to 
Roxie “guarding me just making sure no one’s coming up to the front door”. Kate 
acknowledged the ways the dogs improved her and Lewis’ mental health and well-being, 
helping to calm her anxiety and panic attacks “They would just instantly calm me down”. 
Lewis suffers from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and the dogs provided valuable 
support; sensing when he was low, “they wouldn’t leave his side at all”. The dogs helped 
provide a sense of daily routine and purpose for Lewis because he knew he was responsible 
for walking them each day. 
From 2014 to 2018 they lived in the rented house with the garden where the landlord 
allowed pets with consent. They had regular housing inspections and no concerns were ever 
raised about the two dogs. In January 2018 Kate and Lewis received a notice to quit the 
property giving them eight weeks to leave. This was a no-fault eviction permitted under the 
law. Kate felt “panic” because eight weeks “seems like a really long time but it’s not really, 
not when there isn’t really any housing in the area”. They immediately went to see the 
council as they feared they would be made homeless but the council “couldn’t give us an 
appointment to just speak to someone until 10 weeks later” which was too late so they had 
no choice but to look for a private rental. There was a sense of urgency because the first 
house they found in the area “was just snapped up” the morning they were due to see it. 
They found a house but felt “this was our last resort to keep our daughter in the area, with 
her friends, with her school” so they chose not to mention the dogs to the agent. Kate 
justifies the concealment on the basis of the sense of urgency and pressure she felt, “we 
were under so much pressure to move and we had so little time left … I suppose on our part 
we should have maybe mentioned the dogs straight away but we didn’t because, well we 
thought ‘they’re no trouble, what harm are they going to do?’ So we never mentioned it to the 
agency”. Kate knew the dogs had caused no problems in the previous house so could not 
foresee any problems in the new house especially as it was unfurnished and there were no 
downstairs carpets. What harm could the dogs do? There was a rigorous process to be 
accepted as a tenant including a credit check, references and providing a guarantor. 
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The family moved into the house in March 2018 and lived there with the dogs for two months 
with no problems. Then in early May they received an email from the agent saying a 
neighbour had complained about a barking dog. Kate knew it was not Honey or Roxie as 
they rarely barked but she had to admit to the agent that she had dogs living in the house. 
The landlord, who lives in Surrey, insisted that the dogs were rehomed as soon as possible. 
She said that her husband “was highly allergic to dogs” so she did not want the hairs to 
become embedded in the wooden floors. Kate suggested the agents come and meet the 
dogs to see that they were not causing any damage to the property and she also offered to 
pay a pet deposit “but nothing was good enough … We did get told that the landlady 
sympathised but that it was very clear in the lease that they didn’t want pets”. Kate and 
Lewis now had a difficult choice. Did they keep the dogs and find somewhere else to live or 
rehome the dogs and stay in the house? They soon realised that there were no other rentals 
available in the area so if they kept the dogs they would have to move away from Jess’s 
school and friends and from their work. “There was just nothing in the area. There was 
nothing to rent and nothing coming up to rent.” They made the difficult decision to rehome 
the dogs. Sadly Kate felt under pressure to rehome them quickly, “I tried to get them 
rehomed together but they just put me under so much pressure that they just had to go and 
we had to separate them, which was worse for them as well because they’d both been 
together for as long as they have”. 
Honey was rehomed through Kate advertising on facebook. A family friend, who lived nearby 
with his two dogs, contacted Kate offering to foster Honey until she could find somewhere 
else to live with a pet friendly policy. She told him there was nowhere else to move to in the 
area so Honey needed to be rehomed, so he agreed to meet Honey to see how the three 
dogs got on. That evening Kate “walked her just down to the river and she met his two dogs 
and they all clicked immediately which I knew they would, they’d be fine. So he and his wife 
just completely fell in love with her straight away”. Honey went to live with them and “she’s 
absolutely loving it”. Kate keeps in touch with the couple so she knows how Honey is, “We 
talk regularly and they send me photos”.  
With Roxie, the rescue centre where Kate got her from were involved with the rehoming and 
found a family for her. The new family had a daughter the same age as Jess. The family 
came to visit to meet Roxie and Kate asked them to take her away immediately so as not to 
prolong Roxie’s distress, “we can’t drag this out anymore because Honey had already left 
three days before so Roxie was here by herself and she was getting really, really confused. 
She was pining”. Roxie is happy in her new home and the owners keep in touch, “Roxie’s 
quite happy in her new family as well. They keep in regular contact too”. For Kate it is really 
important that the dogs are happy in their new families and that she receives reports about 
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them, “It’s quite nice to see how they’re both getting on as well and to know that they’re 
being really well looked after which is good, you know, because I wouldn’t have, I just would 
have refused to give them up if I had to do it through someone I wouldn’t have known 
forever. So they would have had a bit of a fight on their hands”.  
When the dogs left, the family were upset at their loss “I was really upset and Jess was 
really, really upset”. When Roxie left, Jess was “distraught. She cried for most of the 
evening”. Jess has a photo of the dogs in a frame in her bedroom, “she’ll always have that 
connection with them”. The bond Jess has with Roxie outlasts the period of the pet 
ownership. At the time the dogs left, Jess was only 7 years and could not understand why 
the dogs had to be rehomed. To Jess the house was their home so why couldn’t the dogs 
live with them? “She thinks that this is our house. She’d go ‘what do you mean, we’re not 
allowed to have the dogs? But we own this house, we live here. This is our house’”. It was 
hard for Kate to explain this to Jess. 
Following the loss of the dogs, Kate wrote to her MSP to highlight the injustice she had 
experienced due to the ‘no pet’ covenant. 
5.4.2.1 Additional understanding of Kate’s experience from a narrative analysis 
A few days before Kate and I met in a cafe in Edinburgh (in June 2019), I emailed her a copy 
of the story I had crafted from her interview. The meeting was an opportunity to talk through 
her story and discuss the themes I had identified. She was happy with the story and the 
themes but the meeting gave me the opportunity to dig deeper to better understand her 
experience of ‘no pet’ covenants especially the reason why she gave away her dogs whom 
she viewed as family members. From the time of the first interview, I felt there was an 
inconsistency in Kate’s story because she said the dogs were “like extra kids” yet she gave 
them away. How could this be reconciled? Using narrative analysis to analyse the data with 
the sequence of events intact and taking context into account, the idea of the ‘hierarchical 
ranking of family members’ reconciles the concept of dogs as family with giving the dogs up 
for rehoming. This is not an example of the ambivalence to animals that Shir-Vertesh (2012) 
witnessed with some of her participants who rejected their dogs once they had a human 
child, because Kate and Lewis would have put the needs of the dogs before their own needs 
and would have moved to a different area or moved into a hostel rather than relinquish the 
dogs. However, they had two young children and they prioritised their children’s needs over 
the dogs. The dogs were part of the family but on a hierarchical ranking of family members, 
the dogs were lower than the children. On the question of where to live, Kate and Lewis 
would put the dogs’ needs above their own needs but the children’s needs above the dogs’ 
needs. The sequence of events is crucial in understanding the act of rehoming the dogs. 
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Kate says she was breastfeeding her 9 week old baby at 2am on a cold day in January when 
she first read the email from the letting agent telling her that the landlord wanted to sell the 
house and they had 8 weeks to move out. Kate said she felt immediate panic,  
 “it felt like someone had put a hand around my throat”.  
She started looking for houses straight away but there was nothing available. The first house 
they were due to view was “snapped up” before they could see it, heightening Kate’s sense 
of urgency and panic. Understanding the context of her decision to rehome the dogs is 
important. She had a new baby and with that a strong protective need to provide a stable 
home for the baby. She had a 7-year old daughter settled at school whom she did not want 
to uproot.  
Kate said the decision to rehome the dogs was “really difficult”, “something we had to weigh 
up on all sides”. One factor to weigh was the possibility of finding good homes for the dogs 
so they would continue to have a happy life with new owners. Kate is making an assumption 
here that a dog can be happy with a new owner. She had not grown up with the story of an 
Uncle’s loyal dog - a story that played a part in Bob’s decision to keep Darkie. Bob sees a 
dog as being loyal to its owner so the dog will return to the original owner if it can. In 
contrast, Kate felt that a dog can have a good life with a different owner, Honey showed that 
this was possible having previously lived with their neighbour. It was important to Kate that 
she found the right home for the dogs and one that would remain in regular contact with her,  
“I just would have refused to give them up if I had to do it through someone I wouldn’t 
have known forever”. 
Narrative analysis helps to understand why Kate and Lewis chose to conceal the dogs from 
the letting agent. The sequence of events and context are both crucial in understanding their 
decision. The fact that Kate had a baby, felt panic at the lack of available rental property and 
felt a sense of urgency as the 8-week period before their eviction was passing quickly. 
Ultimately, her decision to remain silent about the dogs even though there was a ‘no pet’ 
covenant in the lease was because she undertook a harm assessment. She knew about the 
‘no pet’ covenant but she said that all rental houses said ‘no pets’. In Kate’s mind the ‘no pet’ 
covenant was just a standard term of the lease which would only be called upon in a 
situation where a dog caused a problem in the house such as a nuisance to the neighbours. 
She already knew that Roxie and Honey were well-behaved dogs in the house and would 
cause no damage to the property nor nuisance to any neighbours. Kate could see no harm 
to the landlord in having the dogs in the house especially as the house was unfurnished and 
there were no carpets. Kate did not know that the owner’s husband had a severe allergy to 
dog hair but as the landlord and her husband lived in Surrey and the house Kate rented was 
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in Scotland it may not have changed the outcome of Kate’s assessment of the harm of 
keeping dogs in the property in breach of the ‘no pet’ covenant. 
Meeting with Kate almost one year on from the initial interview gave me the opportunity to 
consider how her decision to rehome the dogs had affected her personally. Kate admitted 
that it has been a hard year. She had just finished a course of counselling for post-natal 
depression, which she says was made worse because of the dogs leaving. She struggled 
with regret and guilt over her decision to rehome the dogs. She felt it  
 “was like giving a baby up for adoption”.  
She still cannot let go even though more than a year has passed. She needs to know the 
dogs are doing well. In October 2018 (about 7 months after she had rehomed the dogs), 
Honey became very ill. The new owners contacted Kate who rushed to the vets to be with 
Honey as there was a chance she would die. Fortunately Honey made a good recovery but 
the fact that Kate dropped everything and rushed to the vets to be with Honey even though it 
was 7 months after she had rehomed the dog, demonstrates Kate’s inability to let Honey go. 
Kate said she felt guilty for their decision to rehome the dogs and the week before Roxie left 
(Honey had already left by this time) she and Lewis sat each night on the sofa crying and 
stroking Roxie, apologising to her for what was about to happen. Jess still misses Roxie, 
even after one year has passed. She still has a photo of the dogs in her bedroom and she 
asks to visit Roxie. Kate said her motivation for writing to her local Member of the Scottish 
Parliament (MSP) was grief. The loss of her dogs caused her grief (Charles, 2008; 
McNicholas, 2014; Redmalm, 2015). Taking some form of direct action (in the form of a letter 
to her MSP) was part of her grieving process and helped her cope with the sense of regret 




Figure 12 - The different themes arising from using content and narrative analysis: Kate, Roxie and 
Honey 
  
THEMATIC CONTENT ANALYSIS 
How Kate constructs the dogs as 
family in everyday practices 
Kate’s experience of a ‘no pet’ 
covenant in her lease 
i. AGENCY:  
(a) Everyday Practices e.g. 
morning routine and 
bedtime routine 
 
(b) Influencing decisions 
such as holidays  
 
(c) Dogs were the source of 
conflict with the new 
neighbours 
 
ii. Social support e.g. the 
dogs help with Kate’s 
anxiety/ panic attacks and 
with her husband’s PTSD; 
they give the husband 
exercise as he takes them 
for long walks everyday 
 
 
iii. Ambivalence e.g. the new 
landlord told Kate to 
rehome the dogs and to 
do it quickly 
i. Rental Insecurity – 
she concealed the 
dogs from the 
landlord and risked 
eviction 
 
ii. Lack of Choice – there 
were no alternative 
properties in the area 
that allowed pets 
 
iii. Powerlessness in 
negotiations – the 
landlord would not 
negotiate to allow her 
to keep the pets even 
though she offered to 
pay a pet deposit and 
to get the house 
cleaned when they 
left 
 
iv. Mental health – Kate 
suffered stress, regret 
and grief from having 
to rehome her dogs 
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  NARRATIVE ANALYSIS 
Kate has a story of loss. She rehomed the dogs she called family members. Why? 
Narrative adds a different dimension to the content analysis 
 
Why did Kate rehome the 
dogs she called family 
members? 
Hierarchical ranking of 
family members 
Kate had recently had a 
baby and felt panic at 
having to move out in 8 
weeks’ time. When a 
house became available 
to rent it was snapped up 
before they could even 
see it, increasing her 
sense of urgency and 
panic 
She saw the dogs as 
family members. She was 
willing to put the dogs’ 
needs above her own but 
she prioritised the 
children’s needs over the 
dogs. There was a 
hierarchical ranking of 
family members that led 
to the decision to rehome 
the dogs 
Why did Kate conceal 
the dogs from the 
letting agent? 
Harm Assessment 
Kate carried out a 
harm assessment 
when deciding to keep 
the dogs in the house 
in breach of a ‘no pet’ 
covenant. She could 
not see any harm to 
the landlord because 
she knew the dogs 
would not damage the 
property nor cause any 
nuisance to the 
neighbours 
Narrative examines the 
sequence of events and 
keeps the story intact and 
considers context 
 
Narrative deals with 
complexity and detail 
 
Narrative is holistic 
and acknowledges 
temporality 
How did Kate’s 
decision to rehome 
the dogs affect her? 
Anger and grief -  
She wrote to her 
local MSP as part of 
her grieving process 
Regret and guilt –  
She felt guilty for 
rehoming the dogs. 
In time she needed 
counselling for post-
natal depression and 
she believes the guilt 
and grief at losing 
the dogs was a 
contributory factor 
to her depression 
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5.4.3 Julia – a story of suffering  
 
Julia is retired and currently lives alone. Originally, from a Northern City she moved south to 
be near her son. When she first moved south, Julia lived in a two-bed house rented from a 
Housing Association with a positive pet policy. She lived there with her sick mother and a 
number of dogs. After her mother’s death in 2011, she continued to live there and by this 
time had only one dog, Annie, as her older dogs had died.  
In 2015 she gave up her tenancy with the Housing Association to move into an annexe of a 
large house in the countryside that was owned by some friends. She paid £650 per month 
for the annexe, however, the council served an enforcement notice on the owners because 
they were not allowed to privately rent the annexe and Julia had to leave. She used 
sparerooms.com to find private accommodation that would accept Annie. She moved into a 
“shed in a garden” (with use of a shower in the garage) which she described as “awful” but 
she took it because “beggars can’t be choosers”. After six months, the council found out and 
served a notice on the owner to stop renting out the shed. Next, she moved into a garage for 
four months because it was pet-friendly and there were no alternatives. She described the 
garage as “horrific” but once again the council found out and served a notice on the owner. 
She went to the council for help but because she had not lived in the borough for the 
requisite length of time, they had no duty to house her. They told her to rent privately and 
when she explained that it is difficult with a dog, they told her to “get rid of your dog”. This 
was not an option for Julia.  
Julia “tried everything” to find a pet friendly property. She realised that landlords are taking 
advantage of pet owners desperate to keep their pets and forced to take substandard 
property:  
“I went into the room and I could see this lean-to and there was a single bed in it but it went 
through to the garden and the door was open so she said “yeah I’ll show it to you.” She 
wanted £500 a month and I said “Where is it?” and she went “there” and I said “but you’re all 
walking through to the garden” and she said ”yes but you can lock it at night” and I said 
“where’s the bathroom and that?” and she said there’s a little downstairs toilet and a basin 
there” and she wanted 500 quid so I started to realise that these were the people that were 
really, they were dodgy because they weren’t doing anything. They were just saying “oh she 
wants to keep her dog.” 
Luckily, a flat in council owned sheltered accommodation for older people became available 
and as Julia was on the list, she was offered the flat. Given her bad housing experiences 
over the preceding year and the limited options available to find a pet friendly property she 
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felt desperate to accept the council flat “when I drove to look at it I thought “I don’t care what 
it’s like, where it is, I can take the dog””. However, when she arrived at the flat she 
discovered there was a mix up because dogs are only allowed in the ground floor flats and 
this was a first floor flat. Julia was ready to leave but the manager agreed that she could 
keep Annie in the first floor flat on condition that when Annie dies, Julia will not have another 
dog in the flat. In her desperation Julia accepted this arrangement “and because I was 
clutching at straws I went “yeah, yeah whatever””. After a year and two months in the council 
flat Annie died (aged 12.5 years) and Julia faced the prospect of living without a dog for the 
first time in her life. 
Julia has always lived with dogs – both as a child and as an adult. She had also worked with 
dogs for all her working life. Her first job was at a boarding kennels when she was 18 years 
old. After that other jobs included working for a dog food company, dog grooming, teaching 
dog grooming, breeder of specific pedigree breeds, home boarder for dogs, working at 
Crufts and other championship dog shows and working at a Dog’s Home in a City. Dogs 
have been a huge part of Julia’s life so the prospect of living without a dog had a massive 
impact on her. 
Living with Annie, and meeting her welfare needs, was a big part of Julia’s daily routine. 
Losing Annie, and being denied the opportunity to keep another dog, creates a major 
disruption to Julia’s daily routine and interrupts her sense of stability. She used to walk Annie 
several times a day but now she feels no motivation to walk. “I’ve said this to the housing 
officers and I said “because I’m in sheltered accommodation now which is age specific will I 
ever get out of  here?” because I feel entombed and that is the word I choose to use, when I 
go in to that flat now I feel entombed because I have no motivation to come out of it”. Julia 
feelings are raw and she admits she is struggling with her grief: “I don’t mind bringing mental 
health in because you know what, I feel on odd days that I’m going to crack, I’m going to 
break and then it plateaus for a bit.  But I don’t think I’m dealing with it very well because as I 
said I feel this brick...on one occasion after Annie died I cried and my neighbour beneath me 
said “I heard you crying last night” and that totally inhibited me so I get in my car and I cry 
and I scream and I rant and then I get out of my car and if I pass someone I go “Hello.”  
Because I don’t know how to grieve, you know, I don’t know how to grieve”. 
Julia describes her need for a dog as an emotional need and likens it to an invisible disability 
“when they say not all disabilities are visible, they actually put that on disabled toilets now 
because obviously people look at people and say “you’ve just gone in a disabled toilet and 
you’re okay”  and I looked at it and I thought ‘but not all needs are physical needs’.  My need 
is - it is an emotional need.  I love walking but there is no way I’d walk along here on my own 
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in the evening like I did with the dog, go in the woods.  No way I would go in the woods on 
my own.  So all the things I enjoyed doing I won’t do anymore”. Julia feels frustrated that the 
landlord doesn’t understand her need for a dog “nobody’s going to listen and say I need to 
go into a ground floor flat because I want a dog.  Their attitude is “Tough” you know and as a 
dog person I don’t get it”. 
The ’no pet’ covenant denies her a sense of choice. She feels that she has no choice: “I 
need to get myself in a position of strength where I can get a dog on my terms not because 
some pen pusher has said “oh go on then but don’t get a big one” because that’s the other 
thing ‘don’t get a big one’.  I would like a German Shepherd and my right’s gone. I grew up 
with German Shepherds … It’s that, it’s choice. I feel like that part of my life where I have 
choices are over and gone unless I get out of there”.   
Annie provides valuable support, “I probably off loaded on the dog when I was upset or if I 
wanted to rant about something without this particular dog ever being anything but constant 
in her temperament so if I cried she nudged my arm”. She connects Julia with the community 
by facilitating conversations with others, demonstrating Annie’s role as “Social Capital” 
(Charles and Davies, 2014). 
For Julia an important facet of her relationship with Annie is trust because she has “trust 
issues” with some people. Annie was a placid dog with a calm temperament and Julia 
trusted Annie even with her sick mother and her young granddaughter. Julia’s mother had 
dementia and Annie’s calm presence through this difficult time was important to Julia. 
The relationship Annie has with Julia’s son and granddaughter is important to Julia: “it was 
the relationship between them because from being born that dog was rock solid with 
[granddaughter], I mean absolutely rock solid”. Annie is part of Julia’s inner circle of close 
relationships that encompasses her son, her granddaughter and her dog: “My inner circle 
would be my son, [granddaughter], Annie because we spent…I mean, she was always with 
me”. Time spent together seems to have been a key factor: “we just went everywhere 
together”. Her son’s partner did not relate to Annie and excluded her from their house and 
tethered her in their garden creating a source of conflict between her and Julia. Annie’s 
death appears to have been a catalyst for her son’s separation from his partner due to her 
coldness to Julia at that difficult time. It was an acrimonious split and the partner stopped 
Julia from seeing her granddaughter for a while which was very difficult for Julia. 
Talking about her relationships with others made Julia realise that how she related to other 
people was influenced by Annie: “it’s weird because it’s making me think now that I’m 




Julia is not sentimental and never thought of Annie as a ‘fur baby’. She describes herself as 
a ‘black and white dog owner’ who saw Annie as a hound dog and gave her appropriate 
boundaries. Even so Julia saw Annie as “my mate” and enjoyed her companionship and 
“unconditional love”. The relationship with Annie meant that Julia was prepared to change 
her daily routine to her detriment to meet the changing welfare needs of Annie as she got 
older: “I had to slow down because she was slowing down … if she woke me in the middle of 
the night I got up, got dressed and took her out because I didn’t want to compromise her”. 
Julia wants to feel useful. She wants to foster and train a Guide Dog for the Blind puppy and 
feels that she has ideal credentials for the role given her long career working with dogs. She 
is applying to the council for a ground floor flat so she can foster a puppy and explains “the 
reason I want to do this is for my mental health as well, make me feel a useful member of 
society again.  I can give something to society with a guide dog”. 
Julia has her own ideas about how to resolve the issue of ‘no pet’ covenants. The 
underpinning assumption is that a relationship with a living, sentient being is more important 
than bricks and mortar: “I don’t care if somebody’s got a ratty Jack Russell and they love it to 
bits and it’s their life why should they be made to either end that dog’s life or get rid of it 
because of stupid rules?   It’s only a place to live isn’t it?”. Having prioritised the loving 
relationship people have with their dogs over the landlord’s property rights, she suggests 
that the way forward is to have a dog owner’s code – a list of rules which permits responsible 
dog owners to live with their dogs: “The way forward that I’d like to see with councils and 
housing associations is to have a code of ethics for dog owners, rules one to twenty, obey 
them and you can have a dog or a cat”. This would allow landlords to deal with antisocial 
behaviour and irresponsible pet owners whilst allowing responsible pet owners to live with 
their pets. 
5.4.3.1 Additional understanding of Julia’s experience from a narrative analysis 
Julia’s story is one of suffering. She cried during our first interview and spoke of her grief for 
Annie’s death but her suffering was still evident over one year later at our second interview. 
There was emotion in her voice and eyes as she talked about her continuing grief (reflexive 
journal entry, September 2019). In the initial interview Julia spoke of her invisible disability, 
this being her emotional need for a dog and the presence of the ‘no pet’ covenant in the 
lease making her feel ‘entombed’ in the flat. The literature recognises the loss of a dog as 
“grief” (Charles, 2008, p.7.3; Redmalm, 2015) and “bereavement” (McNicholas, 2014; Fox 
and Ray, 2019, p. 211) and this is certainly Julia’s experience. However, the sequence of 
events in her life is important in understanding how the ‘no pet’ covenant had such a 
devastating effect on Julia following Annie’s death. Shortly after Annie’s death, Julia’s son 
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separated from his partner who then prevented Julia from spending time with her young 
granddaughter with whom she had a very close relationship. This was devastating for Julia 
and exacerbated the loss she felt from Annie’s sudden death. The cumulative effect of 
Annie’s death, the son’s separation and the exclusion of her granddaughter meant that the 
negative impact of the ‘no pet’ covenant, in denying Julia the chance to live with another 
dog, was significantly aggravated.  
Understanding Julia’s past history also helps explain why the existence of the ‘no pet’ 
covenant was especially difficult for her to accept. She grew up with dogs as a child and 
worked with dogs all her working life from the age of 18 years. Having lived and worked with 
dogs all her life she had never experienced a day without some canine interaction and 
consequently the effect of the covenant left her feeling “disabled”. At our second interview, 
Julia was still without a dog. She had moved into a ground floor flat but the absence of an 
enclosed garden prevented her from fostering a puppy for the Guide dogs for the Blind 
charity. Her lease permits dogs with the landlord’s prior consent but her “terrible fear” of the 
landlord refusing consent was ironically preventing her from acquiring a dog. 
Julia had a very close bond with Annie and although she never referred to Annie as a family 
member, she places Annie in her “inner circle”. Her inner circle consists of her son, her 
granddaughter and Annie and therefore suggests that Annie is seen as part of her close 
family. Like Bob, Julia does not feel comfortable talking of a dog as a family member. This 
may be because of her background as a dog trainer and working in kennels. She was the 
only one of my participants to refer to ‘pack’ psychology and the need for dogs to understand 
and obey rules. However, when we look behind the label of ‘companion’ to explore the actual 
nature of the relationship between Julia and Annie, it appears to be closer to family than 
friend. She places Annie, together with her son and granddaughter as her inner circle, “If I’m 
being totally honest my son, [granddaughter] and Annie were the only important things in my 
life”. The interlinking of relationships between the dog and other family members is important 
for Julia; the fact that Annie adores Julia’s son and granddaughter and they in turn love 
Annie is relevant to Annie’s status in Julia’s eyes. She describes this interconnectedness 
between the four of them (Julia, her son, her granddaughter and Annie) as “symbiosis” with 
all being dependent on each other. This demonstrates the complexity of the human-
companion animal relationship and the way this social and dynamic relationship links with 





Figure 13 - The different themes arising from using content and narrative analysis: Julia and Annie 
  
THEMATIC CONTENT ANALYSIS 
How Julia constructs Annie as 
family/friend in everyday practices 
Julia’s experience of a ‘no pet’ 
covenant in her lease 
 
i. AGENCY:  
  
(a) Everyday Practices - 
morning routine and 
bedtime routine 
(b) Detrimental changes - 
Julia got up in the night to 
take Annie out as Annie 
got older;  
(c) Annie was a social 
lubricant with the outside 
community and a source 
of conflict with her son’s 
partner 
 
ii. Social support e.g. Annie 
gave emotional support 
when Julia was looking 
after her mother with 
dementia; Annie provides 
companionship and 
combats loneliness; Julia 
walked for miles with 
Annie improving her 
health and well-being 
 
iii. Ambivalence e.g. the 
Council housing officer 
told Julia to rehome 
Annie in order to find 
private rented housing 
 
i. Lack of Choice – it was 
very difficult to rent 
privately with a dog so 
she had to accept very 
poor quality housing  
(a shed in a garden!) 
in order to keep Annie  
 
ii. Powerlessness in 
negotiations – Julia 
tried to negotiate 
moving into a ground 
floor flat so she could 
have a dog but the 
council housing officer 
did not recognise her 
need 
 
iii. Mental health – Julia’s 
mental health was 
adversely affected by 
the ‘no pet’ covenant 
because it prevented 
her from living with a 
dog. She felt 
‘entombed’ in her flat 




  NARRATIVE ANALYSIS 
Julia has a story of suffering. She lived in poor quality housing in order to live with 
Annie and was later denied the opportunity to have a dog because of a ‘no pet’ 
covenant in her lease. 
 
Why was Julia’s suffering 
so intense after Annie’s 
death? 
Julia grieved Annie’s 
death but the loss of 
Annie was intensified due 
to: 
Having a ‘no pet’ 
covenant prevented her 
from getting another dog; 
and  
The split between her son 
and his partner prevented 
her from spending time 
with her granddaughter. 
Annie’s death was a 
catalyst for the separation 
and it happened shortly 
afterwards. As a 
consequence, Julia’s 
access to her young 
granddaughter, with 
whom she was very close, 
was restricted. 
How did Julia view her 
relationship with Annie?  
Symbiotic relationship 
interlinked with humans 
Julia talked of Annie 
being a companion. She 
did not use the word 
family 
However, she talked of 
her son, her 
granddaughter and 
Annie being her “inner 
circle”. She talked of the 
relationship between 
the four of them being 
interlinked.  
Narrative examines the 
sequence of events and 
keeps the story intact and 
considers context 
 
Narrative deals with 
complexity  
 
Narrative is holistic and 
considers the history of 
the participant 
Why did the ‘no pet’ 
covenant cause Julia to 
suffer? 
The existence of the 
covenant prevented her 
from getting another dog 
after Annie’s death. Julia 
had always lived and 
worked with dogs from 
the age of 18 year. She 
lived with dogs as a 
child, throughout her 
working life and now in 
her retirement. She said 
she had never previously 
had a day without 
interacting with a dog. 
Knowing Julia’s 
background and history 
helps explain why she is 
so adversely affected by 




5.4.4 Lucy and Josh – a story of stealth 
 
Lucy and Josh, a young couple in their 20’s embarking on professional careers, lived in a 
rented flat in the private sector with their cat, Simba. Their experience of ‘no pet’ covenants 
was one of stealth due to concealing Simba’s presence from the landlord and having to 
adopt creative strategies to hide his presence during inspections of the flat by the managing 
agents. At the expiration of their lease, they chose to move to a pet-friendly property but 
experienced difficulties finding one in the relevant part of the North East. 
Josh purchased Simba when he was a 7 week old kitten. His motivation for getting Simba 
was for company, “when I got to Uni I just wanted a little bit of company so I decided to get 
him”. Josh’s Grandma had had cats as Josh was growing up so “cats are my primary choice 
of pet”. Simba seemed to trust Josh from the start and that was important to Josh because 
he knew it is difficult to get cats to trust people. This sense of trust between them is an 
important aspect of their relationship for Josh. 
On a daily basis their morning ritual starts with the alarm and Simba runs in and sits on the 
bed and has some fuss until Josh gets up to feed him. Simba is assertive in asking for food, 
“he’ll be around my legs. He’ll be meowing away, mainly fishing for snacks”. As soon as 
Josh and Lucy return from work Simba is there to greet them, “I’ll scoop him up and hold him 
like a little baby because he seems to like that. It’s like instant purr”. In the evening, when 
Josh is playing games on the TV Simba stays near him on the sofa. When they make their 
evening meal Simba meows around their feet. When they go to bed, he plays a hunting 
game with their feet, “and the minute you turn the light out he’ll hunt you and he’ll get your 
feet and we’ve got some nice holes and scratches from that … I think he thinks it’s a game 
to get us before we get onto the bed. It’s quite terrifying”.  Simba generally does not sleep on 
their bed during the night but he has free run of the flat and can sleep on their bed if he 
chooses. He frequently disturbs their sleep, “he has a mouse on a stick that squeaks and 
he’ll drag it around the flat at three, four o’clock in the morning”. They compare this to having 
a young child.  
Lucy sees Simba as a family member and calls him her “baby” while Josh refers to the 
“genuine friendship” he shares with Simba. In rationalising her perception of Simba as 
family, Lucy explains the ways in which Simba’s needs are included in household decisions 
in a way that is similar to how a child would be included in households with children, “I 
suppose I just think ‘family’ because whenever I think of moving now or if we go on holiday 
or anything like that my first thought is ‘what can we do with Simba”. Josh also includes 
Simba in household decisions, “Any major decision I have always involves Simba … 
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Anything, anything that I have to make my mind up on it’ll always involve some sort of aspect 
for Simba”. Josh includes Simba in household decisions in the same way that Lucy does, but 
he does not equate this with family membership preferring to think of his relationship with 
Simba as “genuine friendship”. Both Josh and Lucy recognise Simba as a social agent with 
his own emotions, such as jealousy and talk of Simba being “in a huff” with Josh. 
Simba influences what happens in the household. Lucy and Josh do not have windows open 
nor shut internal doors because of Simba. Simba once fell out of an upstairs window when 
Josh was living with his parents and this event means they are too frightened to have any 
windows open in the flat in case Simba falls from an open window. Simba does not like any 
internal doors to be shut so they use a doorstop to keep the bedroom door open. 
Simba has a supportive role within the household especially for Josh. As well as providing 
company for both, “it’s nice to have someone around you”, Simba has also demonstrated 
care for Josh when he has been unwell, “it’s nice to have an animal that cares about you”. 
Josh suffered severe anxiety attacks during his first year of University and Simba provided 
valuable support, “I was having some quite severe anxiety attacks and I would find him 
coming into my bedroom and he would curl up with me and he’d keep me company”, “he just 
didn’t leave my side for the rest of the night”. 
Josh delayed moving into Lucy’s flat because of the ‘no pet’ covenant. He lived with his 
parents for the first 3 years of Simba’s life but was not happy living in that area and was 
keen to move away. In 2017 Josh moved into Lucy’s flat, having seen a cat in a window of 
the flat below them, “once I saw that cat downstairs it was like ‘we can do this potentially. If 
they can do it we can definitely do it’”. Josh would not have moved into the flat with Lucy in 
2017 if Simba could not have moved with him. They contacted the letting agents under the 
pretence of wanting to rent a vacant flat in the building and asked about cats but the agent 
stated that pets are definitely not allowed. For this reason they decided not to ask for the 
landlord’s consent, “I was really nervous about asking in case they just figured out that I had 
a cat”. 
Lucy has an Assured Shorthold Tenancy that bans all pets. Being in breach of the covenant 
made her anxious in case neighbours heard Simba moving around, “he does thud quite a bit 
from being so quick and I worry sometimes that downstairs can hear”. Lucy decided not to 
renew the tenancy when the fixed term ended. If it had just been her she would have stayed 
but they wanted more space for the two of them and Simba, “for the sake of Simba it was 
just easier to get a slightly bigger place”.  
Concealing a cat meant they had to think creatively and devise strategies for hiding Simba 
during the inspections by the managing agent that took place every three months. One time 
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Josh put Simba in his cat carrier and took him downstairs to a public house where they sat 
for the afternoon, Josh reading and Simba sleeping. He devised a cunning plan to ascertain 
if the inspection had taken place. He put a shoe close behind the shut bedroom door and 
periodically came up to the flat and used his phone to see if the shoe had moved. If it had 
moved the inspection had taken place and he and Simba were then safe to return to the flat, 
“I get a little creative with it just to make sure that I know that they’ve gone”. Another time 
they put Simba in his cat carrier and put it behind the sofa with a pile of textbooks around 
him and put on the TV with a programme that could disguise Simba’s presence if he 
meowed, “In case he meowed I put the TV on. We put ‘Come Dine With Me’ on and I 
bumped the volume up a bit so if she said “Did you hear that meow?” I’d go ‘Oh, it’s a cat on 
the tv’”. These strategies in stealth were necessary to conceal Simba’s presence because 
they kept him in the flat in breach of a ‘no pet’ covenant. However, none of the inspections 
identified the presence of a cat in the flat so it appears that Simba caused no nuisance nor 
damage to property.  
In looking for a new property to rent they were limited by location and budget but trying to 
find somewhere that allowed pets was really difficult. Lucy explained “there were either 
[properties] that said no pets or other ones that we did contact and then it didn’t say outright 
no pets but when we phoned up they said no pets … so it did actually really, really limit us 
and I used to get really panicked thinking we’re just going to get kicked out and we’ll have to 
move back home”. When they eventually found a suitable house they asked for the 
landlord’s consent to keep a cat, “I made the person I had been speaking to … email me to 
say that he was okay for us to have a pet, well to have Simba”. For Lucy it was important to 
get the landlord’s approval for Simba so they no longer had the stress of concealing a cat 
and the fear of eviction for breaching a covenant. 
5.4.4.1 Additional understanding of Lucy and Josh’s experience from a narrative analysis 
Their story is one of concealment and stealth, a situation they clearly felt uncomfortable with 
evident from their moving to a pet-friendly property as soon as the lease ended. They felt 
“we had absolutely no option” but to conceal Simba because the agent told them pets were 
prohibited in the apartment block without exception.  
The key theme to emerge from Lucy and Josh’s story is the low availability of pet-friendly 
property and the consequent effect of needing to conceal their cat from the landlord and 
letting agent. This falls within my themes of Rental Insecurity and Lack of Choice from my 
thematic content analysis (see 4.3.1 and 4.3.2). Their experience is similar to that of young 
pet-owning tenants in Canada who also felt the need to conceal their dogs due to the low 
availability and poor quality of pet-friendly rental housing (Graham et al, 2018). This low 
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availability caused Lucy to feel “panic” and adversely affected her mental health. This 
compounded the stress and worry she already felt from being discovered and evicted for 
keeping a cat in breach of the ‘no pet’ covenant. They underwent a number of inspections by 
the letting agent (every three months) and Simba’s presence in the flat was never 
discovered. The absence of any damage or nuisance helps to justify their deception in 
concealing Simba. Similar to Kate, they appear to have adopted a harm assessment 
approach to justify their deception. Since Simba’s presence in the flat causes no damage to 
others, there is no harm caused in concealing him. 
Unfortunately, I was unable to secure a second interview with Lucy and Josh. I sent Lucy a 
copy of the story I crafted together with the list of themes but she never replied to my emails. 
Without the benefit of that second interview, I found it difficult to identify additional themes 
that had not already arisen from my thematic content analysis. For example, I would like to 
know the reason for Josh calling Simba a companion rather than a family member. Simba 
was both a care-giver and care-receiver, supporting Josh when he suffered anxiety as well 
as combatting loneliness when Josh was at University. Such a supportive role can be a 
factor in owners constructing their pets as kin (Charles and Davies, 2008) but Josh does not 
define Simba as a family member. Without the second interview, I was unable to delve 
deeper to understand his reasons for the label he gave to his relationship with Simba. This 
shows the value of second interviews when conducting narrative analysis where the purpose 
is to identify additional themes beyond those emerging from an initial thematic content 
analysis. 
5.4.5 Key themes from the Narrative Analysis 
My purpose in using narrative analysis was to discover any additional themes that I had not 
already identified from my thematic content analysis. Three new themes emerge from the 
stories I crafted from the interviews with my participants: Symbiotic Relationships; Hierarchy 
of Family Members and Harm Assessment.  
(i) Symbiotic Relationships. The human- companion animal relationship is a social, 
dynamic relationship that can interconnect the owner with other humans. For 
example, Darkie was a final link to Bob’s dead wife, Margaret and Annie was part of 
Julia’s ‘inner circle’ because of the close bond between Annie and Julia’s son and 
granddaughter. Narrative analysis exposes the human-companion animal 
relationship in all its complexity and interconnectedness. 
  
(ii) Hierarchy of family members. Kate was the only one of my participants to have a 
young family consisting of two children and two dogs. She was also the only one to 
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rehome her dogs due to a ‘no pet’ covenant in her lease. Her actions could be 
explained by Shir-Vertesh’s concept of “flexible personhood” devised to explain how 
young Israeli couples could initially treat their dogs as their cherished babies then 
later abandon them when their circumstances changed and the dog became 
burdensome (2012, p. 428). Are Kate’s actions an example of flexible personhood 
working in the UK? Narrative analysis allowed me to explore Kate’s reasons in all 
their complexity and context, acknowledging the temporality of meanings by following 
her actions one year after the initial interview. Far from showing flexibility or 
ambivalence, Kate’s reasons for rehoming the dogs and her subsequent actions (in 
maintaining contact with the new owners) and emotions (her grief, regret and 
depression) demonstrate the importance of the dogs as family members but as lower 
ranking members than their two human children. This provides an alternative 
understanding to the act of an owner relinquishing a companion animal when their 
life circumstances change.  
 
(iii) Harm Assessment. This proved to be a particularly useful theme to emerge from the 
narrative analysis. When deciding to move into a house with a ‘no pet’ covenant in 
the lease, Kate carried out a harm assessment and used this to justify and rationalise 
her decision to conceal the existence of the dogs. She already knew that the dogs 
would not cause any property damage or nuisance so there would be no harm in 
keeping the dogs in the house. Lucy and Josh took a similar approach when 
concealing Simba in their flat. The fact that Simba’s presence was never discovered 
by the numerous inspections by the letting agent proved to them that Simba caused 




The findings from the data analysis of my interviews demonstrate my original contribution to 
the field. The thematic content analysis of my seven interviews identified a number of key 
themes and whilst many of these themes are considered in the existing literature they have 
never been considered together in the context of the co(a)gency of a 
human+animal+home+lease thereby enabling links between these themes to be identified.  
In addressing the question of how people in the UK construct their companion animals as 
family members, I identified the themes of Agency, Social Support and Ambivalence. In 
seeking to understand pet-owning tenants’ experience of ‘no pet’ covenants in the UK, I 
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identified the following five themes: Mental Health; Lack of Choice; Rental Insecurity; 
Ambivalence; Powerlessness in Negotiations and Perceived Discrimination. Analysing the 
links between these themes exposed the importance of mental health as a key theme. In 
contrast to the mental health benefits pets can provide to their owners evident in the Social 
Support theme, ‘no pet’ covenants bought about adverse effects on tenants’ mental health 
causing stress, anxiety, grief and feelings of powerlessness and discrimination. This 
provides valuable understanding of the type of harm ‘no pet’ covenants can cause to pet-
owning tenants and the serious nature of that harm. 
My findings identify a link between the sub-theme ‘Detrimental Change to Everyday 
Practices’ and the ‘Lack of Choice’ theme which proved to be particularly relevant in the 
context of ‘no pet’ covenants. Pet-owning tenants are accustomed to enduring detriment for 
the sake of their pet, for example, sleep deprivation, and this sense of sacrifice prepares 
them for greater sacrifices arising from the low availability and poor quality of pet-friendly 
housing in the UK.  
Ambivalence is a recurrent theme in both Parts of Section 1. Recent changes in societal 
attitudes to pets both reflect and promote the perception of pets as family members and 
government policy encourages responsible owners to see pet ownership as a lifetime 
commitment. However, in open contradiction to this, it is still deemed acceptable for 
landlords to request an owner to relinquish their pet thereby promoting the idea of pets as 
disposable property.  
The additional themes to emerge in Section 2 from my narrative analysis of four stories are 
Symbiotic Relationships; Hierarchy of Family Members and Harm Assessment. The Harm 
Assessment theme proves to be especially useful in critically analysing ‘no pet’ covenants 




6 PORTFOLIO COMPONENT 5 – Multi-species tenancies in 
England: a critical analysis of the current state of the law on ‘no 
pet’ covenants and recommendations for legal reform 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In this component of the portfolio, I use the findings from my literature review and interview 
data analysis to address my research questions 4, 5 and 6: 
4. If tenants perceive their cats and dogs as family members, can the human-
companion animal relationship come within private life and family under Article 8, 
European Convention on Human Rights? 
5. In what ways, if any, does the existing law in England recognise and protect the 
human-companion animal relationship in the context of ‘no pet’ covenants in 
residential leases? 
6. Is there a need for change in housing law, policy and practice to regulate the use of 
‘no pet’ covenants in residential leases in England? 
The black letter law analysis will show that the current law relevant to the existence and 
enforcement of ‘no pet’ covenants is complicated and confusing for both tenants and 
landlords. My analysis suggests courts may understate the importance of companion 
animals to pet-owning tenants thereby attributing insufficient weight to this relationship in 
possession proceedings. My findings suggest that a ‘Harm Assessment’ approach may be 
appropriate to address this. Such an approach underlies housing law repossession cases 
thereby allowing me to harness and manipulate existing tests, with which the courts are 
already familiar. My data analysis of the interviews helped to identify the character and 
magnitude of the harm ‘no pet’ covenants can cause to tenants, companion animals and 
wider society, and this can now be applied to a Harm Assessment. There is a noticeable 
absence of research on the harm to landlords if the use of ‘no pet’ covenants is restricted 
and this is identified as an appropriate topic for post-doctoral research. 
6.2 Relevant findings from my literature review and data analysis 
I start this component by reiterating key findings from my research that will feed into my 
analysis of the law: 
1. Our relationship with companion animals is varied and complex (Blouin, 2013) but 
many companion animals are perceived as family members and are actively 
engaged in ‘doing’ family through everyday practices in the home (Irvine and Cilia, 
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2017; Power, 2017). They are social agents who influence household routines and 
decisions, sometimes causing detrimental changes that owners are nevertheless 
willing to accept for the sake of the continuing relationship with their companion 
animal. This situation is at odds with the legal status of pets as property. 
 
2. Pet ownership has substantial benefits for individuals including contributing to a 
sense of well-being (fulfilling Weiss’s relational provisions), physical and mental 
health benefits and facilitating a sense of community (Bonas, McNicholas and Collis, 
2000; Mubanga et al, 2017). Pets can also detrimentally affect owners causing stress 
and/or disease and can have adverse effects on wider society such as illness caused 
by animal faeces, disease and bites (Plaut, Zimmerman and Goldstein, 1996). 
However, there are significant economic benefits to wider society especially savings 
for the National Health Service worth several billion pounds a year (Hall et al, 2016). 
 
 
3. ‘No pet’ covenants are extensively used in private sector housing by landlords 
motivated by risk avoidance who exclude pets in order to prevent the risk of damage 
to property and/or nuisance to themselves or neighbours. This conceptualisation of 
‘no pet’ covenants as controllers of risk has an adverse effect on human-companion 
animal relationships. Dogs and cats are perceived by landlords as problems to be 
avoided. The legal status of pets as property permits landlords to rationalise any 
request that pet-owning tenants relinquish their pets as mere property loss thereby 
hiding the true extent of the harm caused to the tenant. 
 
4. ‘No pet’ covenants are a social problem affecting millions of tenants. The covenants 
make it difficult for pet-owning tenants to find ‘pet-friendly’ housing leading to tenant 
concerns about the low availability and poor quality of such housing (Power, 2017; 
Graham et al, 2018).  Some pet-owning tenants resort to stealth techniques to hide 
their pets from their landlord thereby creating fear of discovery and eviction and 
perpetuating feelings of rental insecurity (Power, 2017). Such tenants may delay or 
forgo essential repairs in order to avoid the landlord entering the property (Graham 
and Rock, 2018) which is detrimental to both the tenant’s quality of living and the 
landlord’s financial interests in the property. 
 
 
5. ‘No pet’ covenants may force some pet-owning tenants to make significant sacrifices, 
for example, to move home, sleep on the streets, give up career opportunities or 
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surrender the close relationship they share with their companion animal. This can 
have life-changing consequences for the tenant.  
 
6. ‘No pet’ covenants deny tenants who are not currently pet owners the opportunity to 
live with companion animals and enjoy the benefits the relationship provides. 
 
 
7. ‘No pet’ covenants can directly result in tenants having to relinquish their dog or cat 
to a rehoming centre which adversely affects the welfare of the animal and generates 
a cost for rehoming centres and ultimately wider society. 
My research demonstrates the character and significance of the harm to tenants, companion 
animals and wider society that may result from the use of ‘no pet’ covenants.  
6.3 Two legal questions 
I limited my analysis of the law to England only. The use of ‘no pet’ covenants raises two 
practical issues at law: the existence of the covenant in the tenancy agreement and the 
enforcement of the covenant where a tenant breaches it. This raises two legal questions: 
• Is it fair and reasonable to include a ‘no pet’ covenant in a residential lease? 
• Can a breach of a ‘no pet’ covenant be enforced in the courts? 
There is no specific law that regulates the use of ‘no pet’ covenants and therefore it is up to 
the parties to negotiate the inclusion (or exclusion) of a ‘no pet’ covenant under the principle 
of freedom of contract. Given the current housing shortages, landlords enjoy far greater 
bargaining power in the negotiation and in most cases can dictate whether or not the lease 
will include a ‘no pet’ covenant. However, the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA 2015) 
applies to tenancy agreements and prevents landlords including unfair terms in the lease 
(s.62, CRA 2015). Therefore, the first legal question to address is whether ‘no pet’ covenants 
constitute unfair terms under the CRA 2015? The second question is whether a landlord can 
terminate the lease and repossess the property where a tenant is in breach of a ‘no pet’ 
covenant. The process of enforcing this leasehold covenant varies depending on the type of 
lease and the type of landlord (private landlord or a public authority). The final part of my 
analysis is to explore ways in which these legal questions can be addressed by Parliament 
enacting new legislation to regulate the use of ‘no pet’ covenants.  Figure 14 shows the legal 





Figure 14 - The legal issues arising from the use of ‘no pet’ covenants 
  
The EXISTENCE of ‘no pet’ 
covenants 
 
Legal issue = does the 
‘no pet’ covenant 
constitute an unfair 
term in the contract 
under the Consumer 
Rights Act 2015? 
 
The ENFORCEMENT of a ‘no pet 
covenant in a residential lease 
Can the landlord enforce the 
covenant where the tenant is in 
breach of the ‘no pet’ covenant? 
A court order is needed if the landlord 
wants to repossess the property.  Will 







Should Parliament enact legislation to govern the use of ‘no pet’ covenants in 
residential leases given the complexity of the current law and the legal problems that 
arise from this complexity? 
Absolute 











6.4 The first legal question: Is it fair and reasonable to include a ‘no pet’ 
covenant in a lease? 
In assessing fairness the wording of the covenant is crucial. Does the covenant exclude all 
pets (an absolute prohibition on any pets whatever the species) or is it a qualified covenant 
that permits only certain pets and with the prior consent of the landlord? Where a lease 
(whether in the public or private sector) includes a ‘no pet’ covenant that has an absolute 
prohibition on all pets, the covenant may be deemed unfair under the Consumer Rights Act 
2015 (CRA 2015).  
6.4.1  ‘No pet’ covenants as an unfair term under the Consumer Rights Act 2015 
The CRA 2015 provides a statutory framework to assess unfair terms in consumer contracts 
including tenancy agreements. It encourages fairness, reasonableness and transparency 
and seeks to redress the significant difference in the bargaining strength between landlords 
and tenants. This is especially important in the current housing climate in which the shortage 
of housing leaves tenants with little bargaining power to negotiate terms they deem 
important such as keeping pets. Under the fairness test a term is deemed unfair if, 
‘contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the 
parties’ rights and obligations under the contract to the detriment of the consumer’ 
(section 62(4), CRA 2015). 
In England, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) specifically included a reference to ‘no pet’ 
covenants in its guidance on unfair terms in tenancy agreements. It objected to a blanket 
exclusion of pets without consideration of all the circumstances stating that:  
‘Such a term has been considered unfair under comparable legislation in another EU 
member state because it could prevent a tenant keeping a goldfish’ (OFT, 2005, p. 
64). 
A similar approach was taken in Germany where an unrestricted ban on pets was held by 
the Federal Court to be ineffective because it was disproportionate in prohibiting all animals 
including budgies and fish (BGH 20.3.2013 – VIII ZR 168/12). 
In 2015 the OFT was replaced by the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) in relation to 
unfair contract terms. The OFT guidance was withdrawn and replaced with the CMA Unfair 
Contract Terms Guidance, 2015. Unfortunately, the CMA guidance does not specifically 
refer to the unfairness of an absolute prohibition of all pets. However, the CMA guidance 
makes it clear that the CRA 2015, 
“carries forward rather than changing protections provided to consumers under 
earlier legislation … The fairness and transparency provisions are effectively the 
same” (CMA, 2015, pp. 14-15). 
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Therefore, it appears that the OFT guidance on the unfairness of an absolute prohibition on 
all pets carries forward under the CRA 2015. However, the absence of any express mention 
of ‘no pet’ covenants in the CMA guidance creates uncertainty as to the current approach 
and there have been recent calls for clarification on this point of law (Battersea, 2018; Cats 
Protection, 2019).  
Many other countries also adopt the principle of good faith in consumer contracts including 
Anglo-Commonwealth countries (Tarr, 2015). The Indian case of Shri Ajay Madhusudan 
Marathe v New Sarvodaya Co-operative Housing Society Ltd (No.160/2008, State 
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Mumbai) offers an example of a policy that 
excluded pets from part of a residential building being challenged under consumer rights 
law. The dispute Commission held that the landlord acted unfairly when it passed a 
resolution preventing tenants from taking their pet dogs into the building’s lifts (Valpey, 
2018).  
Research suggests that few social housing landlords impose a blanket ban on pets 
(Battersea, 2018), but it appears to be more common with private landlords. A number of my 
participants (Kate, Emma, Julia, Isabel and Lucy and Josh) experienced absolute ‘no pet’ 
covenants that excluded all companion animals. In the private sector, landlords in England 
can ensure fairness and transparency (complying with CRA 2015) by adopting the 
Department of Communities and Local Government, Model Agreement for an Assured 
Shorthold tenancy (2016) which states, 
“The Tenant must not keep any pets or other animals at the Property without the prior 
written consent of the Landlord which must not be unreasonably withheld or delayed. 
If permission is given, it may be given on the condition that the Tenant pays an 
additional reasonable amount towards the deposit”.  
The reference to paying a reasonable amount towards a pet deposit is now out of date. The 
Tenant Fees Act 2019 capped deposits to five weeks rent in most leases, which means 
landlords cannot ask for an additional deposit to specifically cover potential damage to 
property caused by the pet.  
The accompanying guidance to the Model Agreement states,  
“the landlord cannot exercise a blanket ban on pets and should not turn a request 
down without good reason” (DCLG guidance, 2016, p. 24).  
In January 2020, the Government announced its intention to revise the Model Agreement  
“to remove restrictions on well behaved pets – to ensure more landlords are catering 
for responsible pet owners” (MHCLG, 2020a). 
267 
 
Although the Model Agreement ensures fairness and transparency, landlords are not 
required to adopt it and therefore the proposed changes may have limited impact in practice.  
While a blanket ban on all pets appears to contravene the CRA 2015, a qualified covenant 
that allows pets with the prior consent of the landlord is clearly lawful. It is likely that a 
landlord’s concern that cats and dogs may cause property damage and nuisance will be 
sufficient to constitute a reasonable refusal to allow a tenant to live with a cat or dog.  
6.4.2 The exclusion of dogs 
A covenant that specifically excludes dogs is likely to be deemed fair under the current law. 
The limited case law on the subject suggests that it is reasonable to prohibit the keeping of 
dogs especially in flats where there are communal areas. In Sheffield City Council v Jepson 
(1993) 25 H.L.R 299 the trial judge referred to the reasonableness of including a ‘no dog’ 
covenant for a lease in a block of flats with shared common parts and a common means of 
access, 
“The condition itself was eminently reasonable. Prohibition of keeping dogs about 
the place was the only way in which people in close proximity could possibly exist” (at 
p. 302).  
The Court of Appeal concurred with this view,  
“The condition itself was necessary, as the judge found, for the well-being of the 
tenants of the block” (at p. 303).  
The judicial review case of Victory Place Management v Kuehn [2018] EWHC 132(Ch) 
provides more recent insight into the reasonableness of including a ‘no dog’ covenant. The 
property in question was part of a gated residential development of 146 luxury flats held on 
long leases. The tenant management company, run by the tenants themselves, operated a 
strict ‘no pet’ policy and the lease included a covenant that no pets were permitted without 
their consent. Mr and Mrs Kuehn moved into a flat with their dog, Vinnie. The landlord gave 
consent for the couple to keep their dog in the flat but the tenant management company 
refused consent and sought an injunction to have Vinnie removed from the property. The 
Kuehn’s challenged the decision-making process by which the tenant management company 
reached its decision to refuse consent. The court held that it had acted reasonably in 
reaching its decision; the ‘no pet’ policy was not an inflexible rule predetermining the 
outcome of all applications because the management company was willing to give consent 
for a dog in special circumstances (Colby, 2018; Symons, 2018). The court’s decision is not 
surprising on its facts but what is interesting for my research is the tenant management 
company’s reason for its ‘no dog’ policy which was endorsed by the court as reasonable,  
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“Its members did not want dogs on the estate, based on reasonable concerns about 
them barking, chewing or defecating in public areas” (at para. 21). 
Such rhetoric reinforces a culture of fear grounded in problematic assumptions about dogs 
as unruly and contaminating (Serpell, 1995). The fact that the court found these concerns of 
barking, chewing and defecating in public spaces to be ‘reasonable’, even though there was 
no evidence of Vinnie herself causing any nuisance, typifies objections raised about dogs 
and reflects a broader cultural conception of dogs as disruptive, unhygienic and polluting 
(Fox and Ray, 2019). This conception of dogs fails to acknowledge the benefit they provide 
as Social Capital (Charles and Davies, 2008) facilitating a sense of community in wider 
society (Wood et al, 2017). 
While case law suggests that it is fair and reasonable to exclude dogs from communal 
residential property the position for a house, especially if it has a private garden, is less clear 
(Battersea, 2018). The fairness of a covenant that prohibits cats, especially in relation to 
house cats that never leave the property, is also unclear (Cats Protection, 2019).  
Therefore, the question of whether it is fair to include a ‘no pet’ covenant in a tenancy 
agreement depends on the wording used; if the lease stipulates a blanket ban on all pets the 
clause is likely to be deemed unfair and consequently void. An unfair covenant will be struck 
out of the lease (with the rest of the tenancy remaining intact). This leaves the landlord 
vulnerable to the risk of a tenant keeping pets on the property and there being no covenants 
in the lease to deal with pet related problems. However, it is not certain that the CMA will 
adopt the same approach as the OFT guidance. This means that the current position at law 
is uncertain and there is an urgent need for clarification. 
6.5 The second legal question: can a breach of a ‘no pet’ covenant be 
enforced in the courts? 
The enforcement of leasehold covenants in England is a complex area of law because 
various tests and procedures exist dependent upon the type of landlord (public sector or 
private sector) and type of lease.  
6.5.1 Public sector housing: Secure tenancy (council tenant) and Assured tenancy 
(Housing Association tenant) 
If a secure or assured tenant is in breach of covenant, the landlord can only repossess by 
obtaining a court order for possession. Schedule 2, Housing Act 1985 (HA 1985) sets out the 
grounds for repossessing a secure tenancy and ground 1 applies where a tenant is in breach 
of the terms of the tenancy agreement, for example, by keeping a dog or cat on the premises 
in breach of a ‘no pet’ covenant. However, s. 84, HA 1985 applies a reasonableness test, 
first introduced in 1980 (Carr and Cowan, 2015), meaning that the court can only grant a 
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possession order if it thinks it reasonable to do so. This raises an important question for my 
research: ‘Where the tenant is in breach of a ‘no pet’ covenant is the mere presence of the 
pet enough to make it reasonable to grant a possession order or will the court only permit 
repossession if the pet is causing damage or a nuisance or danger to others?’.  
6.5.1.1 The reasonableness test in repossession cases: identifying relevant circumstances 
The reasonableness test presents an additional obstacle for a local authority landlord in 
repossession cases. The court must address reasonableness even where the ground for 
possession has been satisfied and it is for the landlord to satisfy the court that it is 
reasonable to make a possession order (Luba, 2016). Reasonableness is a question of fact 
for the county court judge and an appeal court can only review the trial judge’s decision on 
the basis of an error of principle or if the decision is plainly wrong. The judge must take into 
account all the relevant circumstances at the date of the hearing and allocate weight 
according to what he/she considers right,  
“the duty of the judge is to take into account all relevant circumstances as they exist 
at the date of the hearing … in a broad, common sense way … giving weight as he 
thinks right to the various factors in the situation” (Lord Greene M.R. in Cumming v 
Danson [1942] 2 All E.R. 653 at 655).  
Significantly, for my purposes, the judge must consider the effect on the landlord and tenant, 
firstly, if a possession order is granted and secondly, if a possession order is refused. 
In Cresswell v Hodgson [1951] 1 All ER 710 Somervell L.J. said,  
“the county court judge must look at the effect of the order on each party to it. I do not 
see how it is possible to consider whether it is reasonable to make an order unless 
you consider its effect on landlord and tenant, firstly, if you make it, and secondly, if 
you do not” (at para. 96).  
When the Court of Appeal in Whitehouse v Lee [2010] H.L.R 11 took into account the effect 
of not making an order it realised that the landlord suffered no harm and consequently the 
possession order was set aside. I find this approach of assessing the harm to the respective 
parties of granting and refusing a possession order a valuable tool for further consideration 
in relation to the use of ‘no pet’ covenants and will return to it later (at 6.5.1.3). 
In ascertaining all the relevant circumstances there are a number of factors specifically 
relevant to ‘no pet’ covenants: 
• the human-companion animal relationship may come within private life and family in 
Article 8, European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); 
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• companion animals provide socially supportive relationships; 
• pet ownership has implications for society including economic benefits. 
Each factor is considered below: 
(i) the human-companion animal relationship may come within private life and 
family in Article 8, ECHR 
I argue that the human-companion animal relationship falls within the Art.8 rights of private 
life and family (at 6.5.2.1). If this is correct then the trial court should take the relationship 
into account under the reasonableness test because case law has made it clear that the 
court considers the same factors in the reasonableness test as it would in the human rights 
defence under Art.8. In Manchester County Council v. Pinnock [2011] 2 AC 104 the 
Supreme Court stated,  
“Any factor which has to be taken into account … for the purpose of assessing 
proportionality under Article 8(2), would have to be taken into account… for the 
purpose of assessing reasonableness under section 84 of the 1985 Act…” (at 
para.55).  
Any case that fails under Art.8 as disproportionate will also fail under the reasonableness 
test: 
“It therefore seems highly unlikely, as a practical matter, that it could be reasonable 
for a court to make an order for possession in circumstances in which it would be 
disproportionate to do so under Article 8” (Pinnock at para.56). 
Taking into account the familial character of the human-companion animal relationship and 
its significance to pet owners, and the fact that a particular animal causes no property 
damage or nuisance to others, the court may deem the enforcement of a ‘no pet’ covenant 
as causing disproportionate harm to the tenant. 
(ii) companion animals provide socially supportive relationships 
In Whitehouse v Lee, the private landlord sought to relocate the tenant (under the Rent Act 
1977) to suitable alternative accommodation. The tenants had lived in the flat for over 45 
years and were actively engaged in the close-knit local community. In applying the 
reasonableness test (an equivalent test exists in the Rent Acts) the court considered the 
“material loss to the tenants of their all-important, regular, informal contact with 
friends and neighbours” ([2010] H.L.R. 11 at para.38).  
The Court of Appeal said this ‘social and emotional’ support from friends and neighbours had 
not been given the acknowledgment it deserved by the judge in his decision to grant a 
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possession order. This approach has implications for the enforcement of ‘no pet’ covenants 
because there is a large body of research evidencing the socially supportive role that 
companion animals play in the lives of the humans they live with (see section 1.4.2 of the 
commentary). Whitehouse v Lee demonstrates how social support can be a significant factor 
in the reasonableness test and may tip the balance in favour of refusing the landlord a 
possession order. This suggests that the social and emotional support from a companion 
animal is a relevant factor in the reasonableness test. 
(iii) pet ownership has implications for society including economic benefits 
Cresswell v Hodgson provides authority for the public interest being taken into account as a 
relevant factor in the reasonableness test. There is a cost to society when a tenant is 
required to relinquish ownership of a companion animal both in terms of the extra costs on 
pet rehoming centres but also on the greater burden on the National Health Service that can 
arise when tenants, especially vulnerable people such as the elderly or isolated, are required 
to rehome their companion animals (Siegal, 1990; Hall et al, 2016). 
My analysis of the law indicates that these three factors constitute relevant circumstances in 
the court’s assessment of the reasonableness test in cases where tenants are in breach of a 
‘no pet’ covenant. The next section examines the actual approach taken in the small number 
of reported cases involving a breach of a ‘no pet’ covenant. 
6.5.1.2 The approach of the court to a breach of a ‘no pet’ covenant: existing case law 
There are three Court of Appeal cases specifically concerning a tenant’s breach of a ‘no dog’ 
covenant (Pawlowski, 1997; Aldridge, 2019, Woodfall, 2019a). These cases provide valuable 
insight into the court’s approach to the reasonableness of granting a possession order for 
the breach of a ‘no pet’ covenant.  
In Bell London and Provincial Properties Ltd v Reuben [1947] KB 157 the Court of Appeal 
held that the trial judge was justified in refusing to grant a possession order where the tenant 
was in breach of a ‘no dog’ covenant even though she intended to keep the dog and thereby 
continue to breach the covenant. Morton LJ said, 
“It is only in a very special case indeed that the court could properly refuse to give 
the landlord possession if a tenant broke that covenant and insisted on breaking it” 
(at p. 163).  
The facts in Reuben constituted a special case because substantial weight was given to the 
medical evidence of the tenant’s doctor that the dog was necessary for her mental health 
and well-being. She first acquired a dog on the doctor’s advice because she suffered from 
her nerves following a burglary at home. She relinquished that dog when the landlord 
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threatened eviction and her condition deteriorated so she acquired a second dog. The Court 
of Appeal observed that the tenant’s need for the dog (and hence the reasonableness of 
refusing possession) would only last as long as her medical condition. The landlord could 
seek a repossession order in the future if the tenant’s mental health improved. Morton LJ 
said  
“I think the learned judge may well have thought that the lady, having shown 
reasonable spirit, would part with the dog if and when it became no longer 
necessary” (at p. 165). 
This decision is not a recognition of the close human-dog relationship as at first appears. 
Instead, it is about the use of the dog as a guard dog to help the tenant feel secure in her 
flat. Once that use is no longer needed, the dog must be given up for rehoming. Therefore, 
Reuben is authority for the principle that the purpose of the dog within the household is a 
relevant consideration in the reasonableness test. In the 1940s when Reuben was decided, 
dogs were unlikely to be seen as family members (Franklin, 2006) so it is unsurprising that 
the court relied on the purpose of the dog as a guard dog providing security for the tenant. 
Nowadays, as evidenced by the data collected in this study, dogs are perceived as valuable 
members of the family providing social support, companionship and contributing to the well-
being of their owners and it is therefore arguable that this new socially supportive role of 
dogs can be taken into account in addressing the question of reasonableness.  
It is clear that the court will take the human-companion animal relationship into account 
where there is supporting medical evidence that the tenant’s health will be adversely 
affected by having to rehome their pet (I will refer to this as the medical evidence rule). In a 
first instance case, City of London Corp v Prior (unreported, 1996) the landlord sought 
repossession where the tenant kept a dog in breach of her tenancy agreement. The trial 
judge refused possession relying on expert psychiatric evidence that,  
“any enforced separation could result in tragic consequences” (Judge Byrt Q.C., 
quoted in Anonymous, 1997).  
Given the extensive literature on the physical and mental health benefits of pet ownership, it 
is arguable that courts should now take advantage of this evidence in all cases involving a 
breach of a ‘no pet’ covenant. 
The remaining two Court of Appeal cases both involved a local authority landlord, Sheffield 
County Council, enforcing a ‘no pet’ covenant and in both cases the court decided in favour 
of the council. The case of Green v Sheffield County Council (1994) 26 HLR 349 followed 
Reuben but, unlike Reuben, there was nothing on the facts to show a ‘special case’ scenario 
to justify refusing possession. The dog had been acquired many years earlier on the 
recommendation of a senior police officer to reassure the tenant’s wife due to her fear of 
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being attacked in the wake of the activities of the Yorkshire Ripper. At the date of the hearing 
the Yorkshire Ripper was no longer a threat and the tenant and his wife were divorced. In 
the eyes of the court, the purpose for keeping the dog no longer existed and the Court of 
Appeal stated, 
“there was no evidence before the judge that was capable of supporting the exercise 
of discretion in the defendant’s favour”(at p. 350).  
At the first instance trial, no evidence was adduced of the relationship between the tenant 
and his old dog nor as to the welfare of the dog in continuing to live with the tenant. 
However, the Court of Appeal judgement indicates that had the tenant submitted this 
evidence at the initial possession hearing it could have been relevant to the question of 
reasonableness.  Dillon LJ said that the tenant submitted evidence to the appeal court that 
the dog was his “old friend” and he could not face having the dog euthanized (as it would be 
difficult to rehome the dog due to his very old age). A substantial bundle of letters in support 
of the tenant and signed by other tenants was given in evidence to the appeal court. The 
appeal court’s response is significant:  
“If the judge had had all these testimonials supplied and the witnesses had turned up 
as necessary to explain that the dog was indeed harmless and a friend, then it might 
have had some effect on the judge, but it was not the evidence that was put before 
him” (at p. 353).   
This extends the medical evidence rule and suggests that any pet-owning tenant, not just 
those with serious medical conditions, can submit evidence of a close relationship with a 
companion animal as a friend or family member and such evidence can be considered by 
the court as a relevant circumstance in the reasonableness test. 
In Sheffield County Council v Jepson (1993) 25 HLR 299 the trial judge dismissed evidence 
from the caretaker of the block of flats, that the tenant’s dog was a nuisance by urinating in 
common parts, as hearsay and felt that it was unreasonable to evict the tenant (and her four 
month old baby) without admissible evidence of nuisance by her dog. The Court of Appeal 
said this was the wrong approach and that, 
“There is no principle that the council can only prove such a breach of such a 
condition as will justify the making of an order if it provides also that the forbidden 
dog has been shown itself to have been the direct cause of specific consequences 
constituting nuisance” (at p.303). 
This is an unfortunate decision as it suggests that if there is evidence of dogs on the council 
estate causing nuisance to other tenants then the judge may grant a possession order even 
if the tenant’s own dog is well-behaved and has caused no harm to others. If this is the 
correct approach then it appears to support a disproportionate response from the landlord 
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and fails to give sufficient weight to the harm a tenant may suffer if required to relinquish a 
companion animal deemed to be a family member. 
6.5.1.3 The reasonableness test and an assessment of harm 
The reasonableness test may, in appropriate cases, incorporate an assessment of harm to 
the parties. In a number of ‘no fault’ cases where a landlord sought a possession order to 
force a tenant to move to suitable alternative property, the court carried out a Harm 
Assessment as a vital component of the reasonableness test (Cresswell v Hodgson [1951]1 
All E.R. 710; Whitehouse v Lee [2010] H.L.R 11).  A key factor in Whitehouse v Lee was the 
absence of harm to the landlord if the possession order was refused compared to the 
substantial hardship to the tenant if the order was granted. On this basis, the Court of Appeal 
reversed the trial judge’s decision and set aside the possession order. This approach was 
applied more recently in a first instance case involving a companion dog. In Governors of the 
Peabody Trust v Lawrence (2015) LAG 43 the tenant succeeded to her mother’s secure 
tenancy of a three bedroomed property which was located on the ground floor with access to 
a garden. The Housing Association landlord sought possession of the property arguing that it 
was too large for the tenant and offered her alternative housing. The tenant opposed this on 
the grounds that the alternative housing only had one bedroom (which prevented her 
overnight carers staying with her) and there was no access to an outside space for her dog. 
The tenant had significant mental health issues and argued that the dog was an important 
source of support. The trial judge recognised the demand for family sized social housing in 
London but felt that in all the circumstances the risk of harm to the tenant if an order were 
granted outweighed the social benefit of making the three-bedroomed property available to 
others. On the basis of this harm assessment, the judge held that it was not reasonable to 
make a possession order on the facts. 
Significantly for my research the court has also applied a Harm Assessment approach to a 
continuing breach of a ‘no pet’ covenant. In Bell London and Provincial Properties Ltd v 
Reuben [1947] KB 157 the landlord argued that where a tenant deliberately breaches a 
covenant and intends to continue to breach the covenant it would never be reasonable to 
refuse a possession order. The Court of Appeal disagreed, observing that 
“If there was evidence in a case that a breach was doing no harm of any kind to the 
landlord or his interests, and if there was also evidence that the breach and its 
continuance was avoiding substantial hardship to the tenant, I am not prepared to 
say that in those circumstances there would be no discretion” (Somervell LJ at 
p.165).  
If we apply this same reasoning to a local authority tenant keeping a dog or cat in breach of 
a ‘no pet’ covenant where the animal causes no damage nor nuisance to others then it 
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would appear that the court could exercise its discretion and refuse to grant a possession 
order on the basis that the landlord suffers no harm if the order is refused whereas the 
tenant suffers significant hardship if it is granted.  
6.5.1.4 Summary of the reasonableness test as applied to ‘no pet’ covenants 
Case law on the reasonableness test shows that only in special cases can the court refuse 
possession where a tenant is deliberately in breach of the covenant and intends to continue 
the breach. Where a tenant is in breach of a ‘no pet’ covenant the socially supportive role of 
a companion animal can constitute a special case where the tenant has health problems and 
expert medical evidence is submitted to show the importance of the pet to the tenant’s 
health. The reasonableness test includes a harm assessment to assist judges in balancing 
the interests of the respective parties. Given the wealth of research demonstrating the health 
benefits of companion animals and the socially supportive roles they play for many people, 
not just those with severe mental health problems, I suggest that it is appropriate for the 
courts to recognise and protect the human-companion relationship through a Harm 
Assessment within the reasonableness test for all pet-owners facing eviction for breach of a 
‘no pet’ covenant. This would mean that in those cases where the specific companion animal 
causes no harm to property nor person, the landlord could be refused a possession order. 
6.5.2 Public sector housing: Introductory tenancy 
The reasonableness test does not apply to introductory tenancies (s.127(2), Housing Act 
1996). Introductory tenancies are used for new council tenants and effectively provide a 12-
month probationary period during which the tenant has no security of tenure. The aim of the 
introductory tenancy scheme (created by the Housing Act 1996) is to  
“test the tenant’s behaviour over a one year period in order to see whether he can be 
a responsible tenant” (Southend-on-Sea v Armour [2014] HLR 23 at 26). 
If a tenant under an introductory tenancy breaches a ‘no pet’ covenant and the local 
authority landlord seeks possession, could the human-companion animal relationship be 
protected under human rights using the Article 8 defence? This defence enables a tenant 
who is threatened with eviction to challenge the grant of a possession order on the basis that 
it will contravene his/her convention rights under Art.8 ECHR (Luba, 2016). This section will 
therefore consider two questions: first, does a tenant’s relationship with their companion 
animal come within private life and family under Art.8?; and second, should the court 




6.5.2.1 Does the human-companion animal relationship come within private life and family 
under Article 8 ECHR? 
I advocate that the human-companion animal relationship falls within private life and family 
under Art.8 ECHR as incorporated into domestic law under the Human Rights Act 1998 
(HRA 1998) (Rook, 2018, Portfolio component 1, 2.1).  Under Art.8  
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.  
The purpose of Art.8 is to 
protect the individual against intrusion by agents of the state, unless for good reason, 
into the private sphere within which individuals expect to be left alone to conduct their 
personal affairs and live their personal lives as they choose  (R (Countryside 
Alliance) v A.G [2007] 3 WLR 922, p. 10). 
The strength of the argument that the human-companion animal relationship comes within 
Art.8 lies in the character of the relationship. My research findings show that many people 
socially construct their pets as members of their family through everyday practices in the 
home and enjoy a socially supportive relationship with their companion animal that is similar 
to socially supportive human-human relationships (see section 1.6 of the commentary). In 
recent years, the concept of family has moved away from formal blood, adoption and 
marriage ties to recognise the Cultural Construction of Kinship (Charles and Davies, 2008) 
and embrace the idea of ‘families we choose’ (Weston, 1991). There is recognition of this 
shift at law, for example, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 recognises a 
lesbian co-parent as a ‘female parent’ akin to a father (Fox and Ray, 2019) and in 2001 the 
House of Lords held that a gay couple could be a family within the context of the Rent Act 
1977 by utilising the functional family approach (Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association 
[2001] 1 AC 27). Millbank (2008) shows how the functional family approach achieved legal 
rights for same-sex families in Canada, Australia, the USA and the UK.  This acceptance at 
law of the Cultural Construction of Kinship within the sociological concept of a ‘functional 
family’ could extend beyond the humanist approach to family and recognise the possibility of 
kinship between people and companion animals. Recently there has been some recognition 
of the importance of the human-companion animal relationship in legal circles.  
In Parliamentary debates on The Pets (Theft) Bill 2018, which proposes that pet theft 
become a criminal offence in its own right with appropriate sentencing to reflect the 
seriousness of the harm caused, it was stated  
“We are talking about the abduction of an animal – of what most pet owners would 
consider a central part of their family” (Hansard, 3 July 2018). 
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In 2016, the English court of protection held that the quality of life of an elderly woman, Mrs 
P, living in a nursing home, was adversely affected by the appointed deputy’s decision to 
refuse her access to her dog, Bobby (P v Rochdale BC [2016] 7 WLUK 412). The judge 
approved an order to appoint a new deputy to manage her finances; one of the reasons 
being the initial deputy’s failure to appreciate the importance of her dog to her well-being, 
‘…assessments made clear that the only living being with whom she shares any love 
or devotion is her dog, Bobby’ (at para.14).  
That the judge was prepared to give significant weight to this and recognise Bobby’s role in 
promoting Mrs P’s well-being, demonstrates the law’s attempt at recognising human-animal 
relationality (Fox and Ray, 2019) and is a small but symbolic step. This case led to a 
suggestion that the concept of family under Art.8 might include a hybrid animal/human family 
(Fox and Westwood, 2017). Fox and Ray (2019) developed this idea further using a 
function-based approach to family that incorporates companion animals as family members 
based on the reciprocal care-giving and companionship that characterises this interspecies 
relationship. 
Whilst recognising the difficulties in reaching a consensus on a definition of the family, 
Herring found certainty in one thing, 
“What is clear is that the definition of a family may change over time” (Herring, 2019, 
p. 5). 
The case of Gammans v Ekins [1950] 2 KB 328 illustrates how the legal definition of family 
has changed in England since the 1950s. In that case, the court stated that to say a co-
habiting heterosexual couple were a family was  
“an abuse of the English language” (at p. 331).  
Nowadays the leading case on the meaning of family in law is the House of Lords decision in 
Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association [2000] 1 AC 27. In this case the court held that a 
co-habiting gay couple were a family for the purposes of the Rent Act 1977 thereby enabling 
the surviving partner to succeed to the tenancy of the deceased. The court accepted that 
family is not limited to people linked by blood or marriage. Lord Slynn submitted that the 
characteristics of family life were 
“that there should be a degree of mutual inter-dependence, of the sharing of lives, of 
caring and love, or commitment and support” (at p. 32). 
278 
 
The definition of family in English law had clearly changed in the 50 years since Gammon v 
Ekins with the court adopting a functional family approach in cases where there is not a clear 
familial relationship marked by blood, marriage or adoption. 
That the definition of ‘family’ under Art.8 will develop with changing social norms is not a new 
idea and was observed by Feldman in the 1990s,  
“The right to respect for family life has protected a growing variety of relationships as 
changing social norms have broadened the range of arrangements regarded as 
falling within the term ‘family’” (Feldman, 1997, p. 267). 
It seems appropriate that as it becomes commonplace and acceptable for people to view 
companion animals as part of their family, the jurisprudence of human rights law should 
develop to expand the definition of family to include companion animals.  
If the courts are unwilling to define companion animals as family members, the broader 
concept of ‘private life’ under Art.8 may be invoked. The fact that the concept of ‘private life’ 
is incapable of exhaustive definition means that the case law has been allowed to develop to 
keep up with developments in society, for example, more enlightened views about 
homosexuality in the British armed forces (Smith and Grady v UK (2000) 29 EHRR 493). 
The interpretation of ‘private life’ under Art.8 has resulted in three broad categories of cases:  
“(i) a person’s physical, psychological and moral integrity, (ii) his privacy and (iii) his 
identity” (European Court of Human Rights, 2018, p. 20). 
Identity is itself a wide category and includes the right to personal development, and the right 
to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world 
(Niemietz v Germany (1992) 16 EHRR 97; Pretty v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 1). Private life 
encompasses matters of autonomy and self-determination including freedom to choose 
one’s personal relationships. Given that the nature of the close social bond people develop 
with their companion animals is akin to the close human-human relationships that are so 
clearly protected under Art.8, it is arguable that the right of a person to maintain and develop 
their relationship with their companion animal falls within Art.8 (Rook, 2018, Portfolio 
component 1, 2.1). Since ‘private life’ encompasses 
“a zone of interaction of a person with others” (Peck v UK (2003) 36 EHRR 41 at p. 
57) 
it is reasonable to suggest that ‘others’ is not restricted to humans but can include any living, 
sentient being that fulfils some of Weiss’ relational provisions necessary for human well-
being. Therefore, where a relationship already exists between a person and their companion 
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animal, Art.8 may be engaged if the state (in the form of a public authority landlord) 
interferes with that relationship by requiring the tenant to surrender his/her companion 
animal for rehoming. 
There is authority from Europe that contradicts my argument that the human-companion 
animal relationship falls within Art.8  (X v Iceland (1976) Application no.6825/74) but this 
decision of the Commission is outdated and out of line with recent research. In the 1970s, an 
Icelandic national challenged regulations in Reykjavik that prohibited the keeping of dogs in 
the city. In its brief decision, the Commission stated that the right to keep a dog did not fall 
within the scope of Art.8 and upheld the regulations. However, our relationship with dogs has 
changed significantly over the last 50 years (Franklin, 2006). For most dog owners, their dog 
no longer lives in an outside kennel but instead shares the most private and intimate spaces 
in their homes, even sleeping in the owner’s bedroom or on their bed (Power, 2008). In the 
1970s, there was a distinct lack of research on the nature of the human relationship with 
companion dogs and the Commission cited no research in its decision. As discussed 
previously, there is now a significant body of research dedicated to understanding the 
physical, psychological, physiological, therapeutic and social health benefits of this 
relationship (at section 1.4.2 of the commentary). The courts and Strasbourg institutions 
recognise that the Convention is a living instrument and that its jurisdiction  
“develops in accordance with the demands of changing social conditions” (Qazi v 
Harrow LBC [2001] EWCA Civ 1834 at para 47). 
The fact that in the 1970s the Commission did not think that keeping a dog came within Art.8 
does not prevent a different view being adopted almost 50 years later. Similarly, cases 
concerning gender identity have undergone a recent change in approach. In the 1980s and 
1990s cases in which transsexuals complained that UK law did not have a system for 
conferring an accurate legal status on them were unsuccessful (Rees v UK (1987) 9 EHRR 
56; Cossey v UK (1991) 13 EHRR 622; Sheffield and Horsham v UK (1998) Reports of 
Judgments and Decisions 1998-V, p. 2021) but by 2002 the court found a violation of Art.8 
owing to a clear and continuing international trend towards increased social acceptance of 
transsexuals. Taking into account these societal developments, the court reached the 
conclusion  
“that the notion of fair balance inherent in the Convention now tilts decisively in 
favour of the applicant” (Goodwin v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 447 at para 93). 
This demonstrates how the concept of private life is flexible enough to keep pace with 
societal developments which means that as our relationship with companion animals 
changes and develops, so too must the Art.8 case law. That the Belgium domestic courts 
have adopted this view is evident from a case in 1986 concerning a Persian cat. The court of 
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first instance in Liege held that the total ban on keeping any pets at the property without 
reference to any harm or nuisance caused by the pet  
“does indeed undermine, in the current state of social conceptions and habits, the 
right of the integrity of the private life, of the family and home life” (Civ. Liege 21 
October 1986, J.L.M.B., 1987) 
enshrined in Art.8. The court took into account societal changes in how people perceive their 
companion animals and interpreted the law to keep pace with these changes. It recognised 
how the integrity of a person’s private life is affected by having to relinquish a cherished 
companion animal.  
6.5.2.2 Should the court consider the human-companion animal relationship within the 
Article 8 defence in possession proceedings? 
Establishing that the human-companion animal relationship comes within Art.8 does not 
guarantee its protection in all circumstances. Art.8 rights are discretionary rights which 
means that state interference may be justified under Art.8(2) where it is “in accordance with 
the law” and provided that the interference is “necessary in a democratic society” in the 
interests of  
“public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others”.  
A local authority landlord can therefore interfere with a tenant’s right to private life and family 
if the interference falls within one of these exceptions, for example, protecting the health of 
other tenants. However, any interference must be proportionate to the legitimate aim to be 
achieved and excessive means are not permitted (Rook, 2001, Portfolio component 1, 2.3 
contains extracts from my book that examine the concept of proportionality in depth). 
Introductory tenancies are subject to mandatory possession procedures meaning the 
reasonableness test does not apply and the court has no discretion. Under s.127(2), HA 
1996 the court must make an order for possession unless it finds that specified procedural 
requirements have not been met. The decisions of the Supreme Court in Manchester City 
Council v Pinnock [2011] 2 AC 104 and Hounslow London Borough Council v Powell [2011] 
2 AC 186 established that Art.8 is engaged in mandatory possession proceedings and the 
court can consider whether repossession is a proportionate response under Art.8 (Woodfall, 
2019b). Therefore, where an introductory tenant has breached a ‘no pet’ covenant in the 
lease and the local authority landlord seeks to repossess the property the tenant can raise 
an Art.8 defence. The court should consider Art.8 summarily and only if it is satisfied that the 
defence is “seriously arguable” (Powell at para. 33) and could affect the order made will it 
adjourn the case to review proportionality further. Therefore, it is “only in very exceptional 
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cases” (Pinnock at para. 36) that the court will go beyond a summary assessment of 
proportionality and this is likely to succeed in only a very small proportion of cases (Madge, 
2011).  In Pinnock the Supreme Court stated, 
“Therefore, in virtually every case where a residential occupier has no contractual or 
statutory protection, and the local authority is entitled to possession as a matter of 
domestic law, there will be a very strong case for saying that making an order for 
possession would be proportionate. However, in some cases there may be factors 
which would tell the other way” (at para. 54). 
In a small number of cases the personal circumstances of the tenant may deem the grant of 
possession disproportionate. Southend-on-Sea v Armour [2014] HLR 23 is the only reported 
case where the Art.8 defence has been successful to date (Ramshaw, 2014). It concerned 
an introductory tenant whose anti-social behaviour at the start of his tenancy had 
significantly improved between the time of issue of the proceedings and the date of the 
hearing, one year later, that the trial court felt it would be disproportionate to evict him. A 
significant factor in the court’s decision was the aim of the introductory tenancy scheme, 
which is to provide a one-year probationary period to assess the behaviour of a new tenant. 
Since his behaviour for the preceding year had been acceptable, the Art.8 defence 
succeeded. However, in most cases an Art.8 defence will fail unless there are exceptional 
circumstances. Considerable weight is given to the local authority’s ownership rights and its 
public duty as a social landlord to allocate and manage its housing stock for the benefit of 
the whole community. This may be outweighed by personal circumstances in the case of 
vulnerable tenants such as those with a mental illness (Cowan and Hunter, 2012).  In 
general, the local authority landlord has a low threshold to cross to justify terminating an 
introductory tenancy bearing in mind the purpose of the introductory tenancy scheme and 
the procedural safeguards to protect the tenant. Therefore, it may seem futile to argue that 
the human-companion animal relationship falls within Art.8 as it is unlikely to have much 
practical effect in possession proceedings against pet-owning introductory tenants. 
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile establishing this because the argument can have a wider 
application. 
6.5.2.3 The wider application of bringing companion animals within Art.8 ECHR 
Human rights arguments could be usefully applied in the following situations: 
(i) Housing vulnerable people 
Human rights arguments can be relevant to housing vulnerable people where the local 
authority plays a role, for example, elderly pet owners moving into a local authority owned 
care home (Fox and Ray, 2019) or homeless people who own pets and want to be 
accommodated with their companion animal (Carr, 2016). In these instances, it can be 
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helpful for pet owners to establish that the close relationship they share with their companion 
animal falls within private life and family under Art.8 and therefore is protected from 
unjustified state interference. In recognising companion animals as vulnerable subjects with 
a potential claim to legal recognition as family members, Fox and Ray observe, 
“This opens up the possibility of human rights litigation as an avenue for redress for 
older persons forced to relinquish their animals” (2019, p. 217). 
The case of John Chadwick (see section 1.1.2 of the commentary) is particularly relevant 
here. In 2017 he was told by Maidstone local authority to give up his two small dogs and cat 
for rehoming or face being made intentionally homeless (Slater, 2017). If he kept his 
companion animals and became intentionally homeless the local authority would have no 
duty to house him under Part VII, HA 1996 and he would face life on the streets. He 
reluctantly relinquished ownership of his companion animals and sadly committed suicide 10 
days later. Had the human-companion animal relationship being recognised at that time as 
falling within Art.8 it would have strengthened his claim to be housed by the council in pet-
friendly accommodation. Being required to relinquish well-behaved pets, on which John 
relied for valuable support, could be a disproportionate interference with his Art.8 rights. 
(ii) Housing new council tenants who already own pets 
Human rights arguments could apply where a local authority requires a person to relinquish 
their companion animal when moving into local authority owned housing. In this case it is the 
inclusion of the ‘no pet’ covenant in the secure tenancy agreement that is at issue. A tenant 
could use human rights arguments under Art.8 to negotiate with the landlord to exclude or 
amend the ‘no pet’ covenant to permit them to keep their well-behaved companion animal in 
their new home.  
(iii) Persuading Parliament to enact new legislation to regulate the use of ‘no pet’ 
covenants 
Since politicians are familiar with human rights arguments and understand the need to 
protect an individual’s convention rights, establishing that the human-companion relationship 
falls within Art.8 strengthens the argument for legislation to regulate the use of ‘no pet’ 
covenants. Once the human-companion animal relationship is accepted as coming within 
Art.8, the legality of ‘no pet’ covenants becomes a question of balancing competing 
convention rights between landlords and tenants. Parliament is best placed to balance the 
tenant’s private life and family rights under Art.8 against the private landlord’s property rights 
under Article 1 of Protocol 1 (Art.1, Prot.1), ECHR and to enact legislation to reflect that 
balance (considered at 6.7.1.1). 
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6.6 Private sector housing: Assured Shorthold tenancy (AST) 
The majority of tenancies granted in the private sector in England are Assured Shorthold 
tenancies (AST). A key feature of ASTs is that the landlord is guaranteed the right to recover 
possession whether reasonable or not. Provided a landlord gives the tenant two months’ 
notice, in the prescribed form he/she can recover possession (s.21 and s,8, HA 1988). For 
s.21, no grounds for possession nor fault on the part of the tenant is needed and 
significantly, the reasonableness test does not apply. A private landlord can respond to a 
tenant’s breach of a ‘no pet’ covenant by simply terminating the lease under the s.8 
procedure (which can be used where a tenant is in breach of covenant). The Renters’ 
Reform Bill 2019-20 proposes to abolish no-fault evictions in England by removing s.21, HA 
1988 (The Queen’s Speech, 2019; Madge-Wyld, 2019) but no date has been set for placing 
the Bill before Parliament. 
Generally, tenants cannot rely on human rights challenges against private landlords 
(although scholars have speculated as to the scope of horizontal effect in this context, (Luba, 
2011; Pascoe, 2017)). The purpose of the ECHR is to protect citizens from infringement of 
their rights by the state and it is not intended to be directly enforceable between private 
individuals so as to alter their contractual rights and duties. This was recently confirmed in 
the context of a repossession by a private landlord in the case of McDonald v McDonald 
[2017] AC 273. The Supreme Court held that although a claim for repossession by a private 
landlord may engage Art.8, the judge could treat the issue of proportionality as already 
determined by the legislative provisions. The case involved a s.21 notice (HA 1988) and the 
court held this statutory regime left no room for individual assessment of the necessity or 
proportionality of the recovery of possession based on the defendant’s personal 
circumstances (Nield, 2017). The court acknowledged the convention rights of a private 
landlord observing that any delay in granting possession would interfere with the landlord’s 
right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions under Art.1, Prot.1 ECHR. It stated that the 
relevant legislation (Protection from Eviction Act 1977 and Housing Act 1980),  
“reflect the state’s assessment of where to strike the balance between the article 8 
rights of residential tenants and the A1P1 rights of private sector landlords when their 
tenancy contract has ended” (at para.40). 
Therefore, in the context of repossession by a private landlord there are clear legislative 
provisions in place in which a democratically elected legislature has already decided that the 
competing interests of the parties are properly balanced. In 2018, the European Court of 
Human Rights reiterated the English Supreme Court’s decision that tenants facing a s.21 
possession claim cannot invoke Art.8 (FJM v United Kingdom, App.No 76202/16). 
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In the absence of a reasonableness or proportionality test in possession proceedings in the 
private sector, pet-owning tenants have few options but to rehome their pets if they move 
into private rental housing with ‘no pet’ restrictions. Is it fair that tenants may be required to 
rehome a well-behaved dog or cat whom they view as part of their family and with whom 
they enjoy the benefit of a socially supportive relationship? Kate’s story demonstrates the 
significant harm that tenants may suffer when required to rehome their pets due to a ‘no pet’ 
covenant (see Portfolio component 4, 5.4.2).  Currently there is no law to govern the use of 
‘no pet’ covenants so it is effectively left to the landlord’s discretion. Given that ‘no pet’ 
covenants interfere with a right that is so important to many tenants, a right which arguably 
comes within Art.8 protection, it is appropriate for Parliament to decide how the balance 
between the competing interests of landlords and tenants is to be struck. In McDonald the 
court noted the policy reasons behind the introduction of ASTs and the role the HA 1988 
played in reinvigorating the private residential rented sector in England which suffered from a 
reduced supply of quality housing. This reduced supply was attributed at the time to the 
effect of the security of tenure provisions in the Rent Act 1977, which were seen to favour 
tenants at the expense of landlords. Parliament considered there was a pressing social need 
to limit security of tenure enjoyed by tenants in order to revitalise the private rental sector 
and thereby make more homes available for the benefit of tenants. In this way the statutory 
regime introduced by the HA 1988 sought to balance the interests of the parties. Those 
opposed to legislation to regulate ‘no pet’ covenants may argue that introducing a restriction 
on the use of ‘no pet’ covenants may have a similar effect on the availability of private 
rentals to that attributed to the security of tenure provisions of the Rent Act 1977. If private 
landlords are required by legislation to permit pets into their rental property it could lead to a 
reduction in the supply and quality of private rental housing. However, there is no evidence 
(one way or the other) to address this concern. There is no evidence from overseas that 
legislative restrictions on the use of ‘no pet’ covenants causes a depleted supply of housing 
but further research is needed to identify if this is a genuine concern in England.  A more 
complete assessment of the need for legislation to regulate ‘no pet’ covenants occurs later at 
6.7. 
To conclude my analysis of the two legal questions as to the existence and enforcement of 
‘no pet’ covenants, figure 15 summarises the position in England and thereby demonstrates 
the complexity and ambiguity of the existing law.   
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Existence of a ‘no pet’ covenant in the lease:  
- A covenant that is an absolute ban on all pets may be unfair and struck out 
of the lease by the court if the landlord seeks to enforce it - Consumer Rights 
Act 2015. A qualified covenant is reasonable. 
Local authority Landlord Housing Association 
Landlord 
Private Landlord 
Enforcement of a ‘no pet’ covenant: Where a lease includes a qualified ‘no pet’ 
covenant and the tenant keeps a pet without consent, the landlord may seek a 
possession order for the breach of covenant. Will the court grant possession? 
 
 
The court can only grant a possession order if 
the judge thinks it is reasonable to do so. The 
court can consider the tenant’s relationship 
with their pet and the social and emotional 
support provided. If the pet is well behaved   
there is no harm to the landlord if the 
possession order is refused 
Secure tenancy  Assured tenancy  
Landlords can use 
the procedure under 
s.21 or s.8 HA 1988 
to terminate the 
lease. Is this fair on 






For a well behaved 
pet it is arguable 
that the possession 
order should be 
refused 
For a pet causing 
property damage or 
nuisance, a 




The court is required to grant a 
possession order. Arguably a tenant can 
raise an Article 8 defence under the 
Human Rights Act 1998 due to an 
interference of the tenant’s right to 
private life and family but the defence is 
unlikely to succeed in practice 
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6.7 Assessing the need for legislation in England to regulate the use of ‘no 
pet’ covenants  
This section uses my findings to address my research question 6: Is there a need for change 
in housing law, policy and practice to regulate the use of ‘no pet’ covenants in residential 
leases in England? Harm is a key theme to emerge from my data analysis. Figure 16 
demonstrates the links between the law and theory examined in my research and shows the 
significance of the Harm theme. This is relevant to assessing the need for new legislation in 
this section. My black letter law analysis in sections 6.4 – 6.6 shows the complexity and 
ambiguity of the existing law in England relating to the existence and enforcement of ‘no pet’ 
covenants. Given the scale of the use of these covenants, affecting millions of people, and 
the importance of the human-companion animal relationship to many tenants who construct 
their pets as family members, the current state of the law is unsatisfactory. Fox and Ray 
acknowledge the “current regulatory gap” in relation to older people moving into care homes 
and propose legislation to make obligations explicit, detail legal remedies and set out clear 
enforcement mechanisms (2019, p. 217). They emphasise the importance of undertaking a 
comprehensive consultation process with all stakeholders. I concur with their view that, 
“the framing of responsive legislation must be informed by empirical research into the 
experiences of a range of stakeholders” (2019, p. 218). 
My empirical research focuses on pet-owning tenants only and thereby provides a useful 
pilot study that paths the way for a more comprehensive study to examine the experiences 




Figure 16 - Linking the law and theory and the significance of the Harm theme 
  
Multi-species tenancies – an assemblage of human, companion animal, residential 
property and tenancy agreement (Michael’s theory of co(a)gency (2000) 
Examining the character of the human-
companion animal relationship as family 
– using  a function-based approach to 
defining family and Morgan’s theory of 
family practices (1996) to identify ‘more-
than-human’ families (a post-humanist 
approach) (Irvine & Cilia, 2017) 




1995). Tenants with 
dogs/cats are perceived 
by landlords as 
problematic 
Human-pet relationship 
comes within private life 
and family in Art.8 ECHR 
Public sector housing 
I suggest that interference with 
the human-pet relationship is 
unlawful under human rights 
law unless justified 
Private sector housing 
My research shows that a 
forced separation with pets 
causes substantial harm to 
tenants  
Theme of HARM 
emergent from tenant’s 
stories. 
 HARM caused by use of 
‘no pet’ covenants to 
tenants, pets, society 
and landlords. 
Need a ‘priority ranking 
of these conflicting 
interests’ (Feinberg) 
The legal status of pets as 
property perpetuates the 
idea of pets as disposable 
items, which harms the 
animals and tenants. A 
relational approach could be 
adopted to overcome this 
(Fox, 2004; Kymlicka, 2017)  
Legal treatment of companion 
animals could be based on 
relationship as family member  
HARM is relevant to: (1) reasonableness test in possession proceedings; (2) proportionality 
test in Art.8 ECHR arguments; (3) evaluating need for legislation to regulate the use of ‘no 
pet’ covenants in England 
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My thesis proposes two frameworks for change either of which could be adopted by 
Parliament in assessing the need for legislation. 
6.7.1 Two Frameworks for Change  
My empirical work seeks to understand the experience of ‘no pet’ covenants for those 
tenants adversely affected by them. The overarching theme is one of significant harm to the 
tenants in numerous guises, for example, loss of home, loss of companion animal, poor 
quality housing and perceived discrimination with many of these harms linking to adverse 
effects on the tenant’s mental health. My findings encourage theorising the use and 
regulation of ‘no pet’ covenants from a Harm Assessment perspective. Significantly this 
approach is already used by the courts in assessing the reasonableness of granting 
possession orders (for example, in Whitehouse v Lee) and has been applied to a breach of a 
‘no pet’ covenant in Bell London and Provincial Properties Ltd v Reuben. In addition, the 
avoidance of harm (by preventing potential damage to property and nuisance to neighbours) 
is the basis on which most private landlords justify their use of ‘no pet’ covenants (NLA, 
2017). 
For the tenant, the harmful effect of ‘no pet’ covenants arises from the relationship he or she 
has with their companion animal, a relationship that is socially supportive, dynamic and 
constructed as family in everyday practices. My findings as to the character of the human-
companion animal relationship support theorising the relationship within the context of 
human rights, specifically Art.8 and the protection of ‘private life and family’ and 
consequently I suggest using a Human Rights Framework to explore the need for change in 
the legal regulation of ‘no pet’ covenants. However, human rights arguments have limited 
impact on contractual relations between private individuals and I propose a second 
framework for change, a Fair Housing Framework, to examine the need for a change in the 
law in the private rental sector. Figure 17 – Two Frameworks for Change provides a 






Figure 17 - Two Frameworks for Change 
Applying the frameworks to the use of ‘no pet’ covenants to assess the need for a change in the law 
 
  
Human Rights Framework 
 
Fair Housing Framework 
 
Human-companion animal 
relationships come within 
‘private life and family’ under 
Art.8 ECHR and deserve to be 
protected against unlawful or 
disproportionate interference by 
the state  
 
Current housing climate: 
Significant unequal bargaining 
power of landlord and tenant 
due to housing shortages. 
Growth of private renting sector 
due to economic austerity. 
More tenants renting privately 
for longer periods (some for 
life) 
Parliament is the appropriate 
body to balance the competing 
Convention rights of landlords  
(Art.1, Prot.1) and tenants (Art.8) 
to ensure neither suffers 
disproportionate harm 
Harm Assessment  
Identify harm to affected parties and decide 
the priority ranking of conflicting interests. 
Employ Feinberg’s mediating maxims and 
supplemental criteria. 
TENANTS 
Loss of a socially supportive, 
familial relationship  
Stories of sacrifice, suffering, 
grief and stealth 
LANDLORDS 
Risk of damage to property 
Risk of nuisance to other 
tenants  
Risk of allergic reaction  
SOCIETY 
Health concerns  
Increased NHS costs  
Economic benefits of 
pet industry harmed 
COMPANION 
ANIMALS 
Stress of separation and 
rehoming 
Euthanasia 
Pets are ‘doing’ family in 
everyday practices. They provide 




6.7.1.1 Human Rights Framework 
Section 6.5.2.1 sets out my arguments for the human-companion animal relationship falling 
within private life and family under Art.8. One of the benefits of this approach is that it 
elevates the importance of the human-companion animal relationship in the eyes of those 
who have little or no knowledge or understanding of it. My interviewees Julia and Emma both 
experienced local authority housing officers who dismissed their relationship with their dogs 
as trivial and disposable. However, politicians, landlords and local authority officials all 
appreciate the importance of protecting human rights and are likely to take the human-
companion animal bond more seriously if it is couched in these terms. Fox and Ray adopt a 
human rights approach in their study on the separation of older people from their pets in 
residential care homes and suggest that any new legislation would  
“need to be firmly anchored in human rights norms” (2019, p. 218). 
If the human-companion animal relationship comes within ‘private life and family’ under 
Art.8, interference by the state is justified provided it is lawful, in pursuit of a legitimate aim 
and ‘necessary in a democratic society’ which means that the interference is in response to 
a ‘pressing social need’ (Gillow v UK (1989) 11 EHRR 335 at para.132) and is proportionate. 
The principle of proportionality is important to my research because the use of ‘no pet’ 
covenants by local authority landlords can be seen to pursue a legitimate aim under Art.8(2), 
for example, the protection of the health or rights of other tenants, but even so the measures 
taken must be no more than are necessary to accomplish this legitimate aim. 
“No matter how worthy the legitimate aim being pursued, the state cannot interfere 
with a person’s human rights disproportionately” (Rook, 2001, p. 39). 
My book (Portfolio component 1, 2.3) provides a detailed examination of the principle of 
proportionality which is expressed in the case law as a ‘fair balance test’ (Sporrong and 
Lönnroth v Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35; Gillow v UK (1989) 11 EHRR 355). A fair balance 
cannot exist where a person has to bear an excessive and disproportionate burden. 
Therefore, some restrictions on the keeping of pets is justifiable by local authority landlords 
provided there is proportionality between the aim to be achieved and the means of achieving 
it. The rights of the pet-owning tenant to maintain and develop supportive relationships with 
‘others’ (whatever their species) needs to be balanced against  
(i) the rights of other tenants to protect their health and well-being (by prohibiting 
animals that cause a nuisance to neighbours or severe allergic reactions) and  




This means that a ‘no pet’ covenant that prohibits a pet causing harm or a nuisance to others 
is justifiable but a blanket ban on all pets is disproportionate to the legitimate aim to be 
achieved because it excludes well-behaved pets that cause no harm and therefore interferes 
with the tenant’s private life and family for no justifiable purpose.  
If Parliament proposes to enact new legislation that restricts the use of ‘no pet’ covenants in 
the private sector, landlords may seek to challenge this as contrary to their property rights 
under Article 1, Protocol 1 ECHR which states, 
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions”. 
The essence of Art.1, Prot.1 is that it is “guaranteeing the right of property” (Marckx v 
Belgium (1979) 2 EHRR 330) enabling an owner to own, possess, use or dispose of their 
property as they so desire without interference by the state. However, the broad terms of this 
guarantee are subject to a number of limitations and exceptions that dilute the strength of 
the guarantee. For the purposes of legislation to regulate the use of ‘no pet’ covenants, 
Art.1, Prot.1 protects  
“the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of 
property in accordance with the general interest”. 
Should Parliament decide to regulate the use of ‘no pet’ covenants it will constitute a control 
of the use of the landlord’s property under Art.1, Prot.1 (as opposed to a deprivation) and 
provided the control of use is justified and proportionate there will be no breach of Art.1, 
Prot.1 even though the landlord receives no compensation (Rook, 2001).  
Any new legislation to regulate the use of ‘no pet’ covenants will engage competing 
convention rights – the tenant’s private life and family rights under Art.8 against the private 
landlord’s property rights under Art.1, Prot.1. It is arguable that if new legislation is drafted in 
terms that allow tenants to live with well-behaved companion animals but enables landlords 
to exclude pets that cause damage or nuisance, Parliament’s control of use of the private 
landlord’s property is justified and proportionate. It is justified bearing in mind the significant 
benefits of pet ownership for individuals (as detailed in section 1.4.2 of the commentary) and 
wider society including strengthening social capital in local communities (Wood et al, 2017), 
significant savings to the National Health Service (Hall et al, 2017) and contributing to a 
healthy economy. In 2018 consumer spending on pets and pet related products in the UK 
reached £4.94 million (Office for National Statistics, 2019). Therefore, considering the 
competing human rights of landlords and tenants and taking into account the benefits of pet 
ownership to local communities and the wider economy, it is important to ensure that a fair 
balance is struck. Parliament is best placed to balance these competing interests to ensure 
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proportionality exists and consequently it should not leave the question of keeping pets 
solely to the landlord’s discretion. A private landlord is primarily motivated by personal 
financial investment and so it is for Parliament to take into account these wider societal 
benefits. 
6.7.1.2 Fair Housing framework  
Portfolio component 4, section 1, Part II (at 5.3) identified a number of themes (Rental 
Insecurity, Lack of Choice, Mental Health, Powerlessness in Negotiations and Perceived 
Discrimination) used here to demonstrate the need for the regulation of ‘no pet’ covenants. 
The current law leaves the use of ‘no pet’ covenants to the parties to negotiate under the 
legal principle of freedom of contract. However, the reality is that due to the changing 
housing sector, in particular housing shortages and the large rise of private rental housing a 
private landlord is free to dictate the terms of the tenancy agreement, 
“because scarcity means that there are other tenants available to whom to rent” 
(Arden, 2018, p. 3).  
England adopts a dualist rental market with lightly regulated private rental housing together 
with a smaller but more regulated social housing sector. There has been a significant growth 
in private renting (Beckett, 2014) with home ownership being increasingly unaffordable and 
social housing rationed to those most in need. This leaves low-income earners with little 
option but to rent long term from a private landlord. Given the state of the current housing 
market, is it fair for private landlords to enjoy so much freedom to exclude cats and dogs 
from tenants’ lives?  
My reliance on the concept of fairness as a rationale for regulatory change in the context of 
‘no pet’ covenants is not without concern. In contemporary times, the concept of fairness “is 
peculiarly complex and emotional” (Carr and Cowan, 2015, p. 85). In examining the rationale 
for introducing the bedroom tax in England in 2013, Carr and Cowan (2015) were critical of 
the Government’s reliance on the concept of fairness arguing that, 
“Fairness is, of course, a vehicular idea – it is entirely meaningless” (p. 83)  
referring to  
“the nature of its shallowness as a rationale”(p. 85) 
by demonstrating the way it was also being used to challenge the bedroom tax. The same 
concept of fairness provided both the rationale for the Government to introduce the tax and a 
“disruptive potential” to challenge and undermine the policy (2015, p. 85). Nevertheless, 
fairness is the basis of recent changes in housing law in England and I feel that used in the 
context of a Harm Assessment it can provide a useful framework for legislative change. A 
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pet-owning tenant may say it is unfair to exclude their companion animal from their home 
and the landlord may say it is unfair to be forced to allow a pet to live in their property with 
the consequent risk of damage, but using fairness within the Harm Assessment permits 
reference to Feinberg’s “mediating maxims” and “supplemental criteria” (1987, p.187) as 
discussed in section 1.10.1 of the commentary. The magnitude, probability and relative 
importance of the various harms to the parties can be weighed in the balance to determine 
which way the scales will tilt. 
In its White Paper ‘Fixing our broken housing market’, the Government relies on the concept 
of fairness for leaseholders to propose changes in the law (including the recently enacted 
Tenant Fees Act 2019). The rationale relies on the need to, 
“ensure that the housing market is as fair for those who don’t own their own homes 
as it is for those that do” (DCLG, 2017, p. 6).  
This would be a valuable rationale in the hands of pet-owning tenants seeking pet-friendly 
rental housing. The Government’s recent proposal to revise the Model Tenancy Agreement, 
to encourage landlords to permit well-behaved pets, champions the need for fairness in the 
light of the current housing climate in which more people are renting and for longer periods 
of time (MHCLG, 2020a). The Government states that it will be listening to tenants and 
landlords views on ‘no pet’ covenants,  
“to see what more we can do to tackle this issue in a way that is fair to both” 
(MHCLG, 2020). 
The need to ensure greater fairness in the changing housing sector recently led to the 
Renters’ Reform Bill 2019-20 the purpose of which is to deliver a “fairer rental market” 
(Queen’s Speech, 2019). In 2018, Australia (Victoria) cited fairness as the rationale for a 
legislative ban on the use of ‘no pet’ covenants in the private housing sector. Australia 
suffers from a similar shortage of rental housing to England (Pawson, Hulse and Morris, 
2017) and there has been a similar large growth in the number of households renting 
property resulting in significant unequal bargaining power discrepancies between landlords 
and tenants. Victoria’s legislative restriction on the use of ‘no pet’ covenants in residential 
leases sought to redress that imbalance. 
To avoid disproportionate harm to either party, my Fair Housing approach involves 
assessing the harm to all the relevant parties from the use of ‘no pet’ covenants but also 
from their restriction. As examined in section 1.10.1 of the commentary, drawing on 
Feinberg’s embellishment of Mill’s ‘harm principle’, I propose a Harm Assessment approach 
to justify the use of legislation to regulate ‘no pet’ covenants in housing law. Such an 
approach first identifies the harm that landlords, tenants, companion animals and wider 
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society may suffer from both the use and the restriction of ‘no pet’ covenants (see section 
1.10.1 and Figure 3 – The Harm Assessment Approach in the commentary) and then uses 
Feinberg’s concepts of priority ranking of conflicting interests and mediating maxims to 
provide the hypothetical legislator with a “sensibly mediated harm principle” (1978, p.194) to 
assess the legitimacy of state intervention.  
Recently the Government acknowledged this need to balance the interests of pet-owning 
tenants and landlords in the context of ‘no pet’ covenants, 
“The government is clear there should be a balance with responsible pet owners not 
being penalised … and… landlords’ properties should be protected from damage by 
badly behaved pets” (MHCLG, 2020a). 
This shows that the Government proposes to tackle the problem of ‘no pet’ covenants by 
balancing the interests of the parties to ensure a fair outcome is achieved and thereby adds 
credence to my Fair Housing approach which adopts a similar balancing exercise. The focus 
in my Fair Housing approach is on assessing the harm to the parties (this being landlords, 
tenants, companion animals and wider society) because harm arose as a significant theme 
from my empirical research. My research demonstrates the prospect of significant harm to 
tenants from the use of ‘no pet’ covenants in the form of sacrifice, loss, grief and risks to 
their mental health and this is especially so for vulnerable people such as older persons who 
rely on their companion animals for valuable social support. Similar to Feinberg’s notion of 
the aggregative nature of harm, my approach proposes that harm to animals and the harm to 
wider society be included in the relevant harm assessment. Taking the harm to the 
companion animals into account and weighing this against the landlord’s property rights is 
likely to be controversial but the use of a relational approach (see 1.7.2 of the commentary) 
enables the interests of the animals to be considered. Harm to wider society includes the 
economic burden of rehoming animals, curtailing the pet industry and increasing the costs 
on the health sector. Recent research estimated that pet ownership may reduce the cost to 
the National Health Service by almost £2.5 billion a year (Hall et al, 2016). There is currently 
very little research on the harm landlords suffer from allowing people and their pets to live 
together. Figure 18 identified a number of possible harms from the limited literature available 
(Carlisle-Frank, 2005; Battersea, 2018; Cats Protection, 2019) but further research is 
needed to accurately identify the type of harm to landlords and its magnitude and probability. 
Alternative ways of avoiding harm to the landlord’s interests should also be considered in the 
Harm Assessment, for example, the use of leasehold covenants to cover damage to 
property or nuisance to neighbours which would provide a remedy in those circumstances 
where a pet caused damage and/or nuisance. The Tenant Fees Act 2019 needs to be 
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reviewed to allow landlords to ask for a refundable pet deposit to cover the risk of damage to 
property.  
Figure 18 –The application of a Harm Assessment to ‘no pet’ covenants by courts and 
Parliament demonstrates the way in which the Harm Assessment approach can be used by 
the judiciary in the reasonableness test in possession proceedings and by Parliament in 
assessing the need for legislation to regulate the use of ‘no pet’ covenants in residential 
leases in England and indicates the contribution of my research to the Harm Assessment.   
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Figure 18 - The application by courts and Parliament of a Harm Assessment to ‘no pet’ covenants  
 
  
Assessing HARM to (i) landlords (ii) tenants (iii) animals (iv) society 
Reasonableness test 
Applied by the courts in repossession 
cases for breach of a ‘no pet’ covenant 
Fairness to leaseholders 
Applied by Parliament in 
considering new legislation  
Applies to Secure tenancies (local 
authority landlord) and Assured 
tenancies (Housing Association 
landlord) in the public sector 
ACTION BY COURTS 
Courts apply reasonableness test 
when landlord seeks a possession 
order for breach of a ‘no pet’ 
covenant. 
Is it reasonable for the court to make 
the possession order taking into 
account all the factors affecting 
landlord and tenant (and the interests 
of the public)?  
The judge to decide what weight to 
give to the various factors. 
A “broad, common sense, man of the 
world” approach needed. 
My research shows ‘no pet’ 
covenants can cause significant harm 
to tenants. It is here advocated that 
this harm should be given a 
weighting in the reasonableness test 
that reflects its severity. 
All tenants may be affected but  it 
is especially important for tenants 
in the private sector (because they 
cannot rely on the reasonableness 
test) 
ACTION BY PARLIAMENT 
Parliament needs to redress the 
imbalance in the bargaining 
strength of the parties (due to 
housing crisis and austerity 
measures) by passing legislation to 
govern the use of ‘no pet’ 
covenants in residential leases 
Parliament can assess the harm to 
landlords, tenants, animals and 
society caused by the use of ‘no 
pet’ covenants and weigh this 
against the harm caused by the 
regulation of ‘no pet’ covenants. 
My research shows significant 
harm to tenants as well as harm to 
animals and society. More research 
is needed to assess the harm to 
landlords. In any event alternative 
covenants can be used in leases to 
deal with property damage and 
nuisance caused by pets. 
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6.7.2 Legislation in other jurisdictions 
 
Comparison with the commonwealth countries of Canada and Australia provides useful 
examples of successful legislation that restricts the use of ‘no pet’ covenants in residential 
leases. In each case, the legislation provides exceptions to address the need to balance the 
interest of others especially the landlord.  
In Canada (Ontario) an absolute ‘no pet’ covenant is void,  
“A provision in a tenancy agreement prohibiting the presence of animals in or about 
the residential complex is void” (section 14, Residential Tenancies Act 2006). 
However, a landlord is permitted to refuse to rent to a person who has a companion animal 
(Social Justice Tribunals Ontario, n.d.). This apparent inconsistency in the law appears to 
encourage dishonesty on the part of the tenant, or at least a failure to disclose the truth, as it 
is better for a tenant not to admit to having a companion animal until they have signed the 
lease. Once there is a tenancy agreement, the landlord cannot evict the tenant on the 
ground that he or she has a companion animal living in the property. Private landlords who 
grant a tenancy after 30 April 2018 are required to use the standard form Residential 
Tenancy Agreement (Ontario Central Forms Repository, 2018). Part 15 of the standard form 
allows for the inclusion of additional terms agreed between the parties but gives examples of 
void and unenforceable terms, the first example being, terms that do not allow pets. 
The tenant’s right to keep companion animals is not unfettered and provisions exist to 
balance the conflicting interests of parties. The landlord can apply to the Landlord and 
Tenant Board to evict a tenant with a companion animal where: 
(i) The animal has substantially interfered with the reasonable enjoyment of the 
residential complex for all usual purposes by the landlord and other tenants; or 
(ii) The presence of the animal has caused the landlord or another tenant to suffer a 
serious allergic reaction; or 
(iii) The animal is of a species or breed that is inherently dangerous to the safety of 
the landlord or other tenants (s.76, Residential Tenancies Act 2006, Part V). 
Therefore, a tenant can be evicted if their companion animal becomes a nuisance, for 
example, causing unreasonable noise disturbances or damage to property or where the 
landlord or another tenant has a severe allergic reaction to the animal. In respect of grounds 
(i) and (ii), the Board shall only make an order for terminating the tenancy and evicting the 
tenant if it is satisfied that the animal kept by the tenant caused or contributed to that 
substantial interference or allergic reaction and the landlord will need to provide evidence of 
this. What amounts to ‘substantial interference’ in (i) will depend on the facts of the case but 
common sense and reasonableness prevail. For example, in respect of noise disturbance, it 
would be unreasonable to require absolute silence from a pet, so the occasional short period 
of barking from a dog is reasonable and neighbours can expect to tolerate this. However, 
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excessive barking at unsociable hours is likely to constitute a substantial interference and 
the tenant risks eviction (Rook, 2018). The Act also provides that the commission of an 
illegal act is a ground for a tenant to be evicted. Within this context, an illegal act is a broader 
concept than a criminal offence. Consequently, failure to abide by animal control byelaws 
applicable in the local jurisdiction, for example, any licensing or micro-chipping requirements 
or requirements to pick up dog faeces constitute an illegal act and thereby provide a ground 
for terminating the tenancy. The Ontario legislation provides a valuable example of how to 
regulate the use of ‘no pet’ covenants in a way that balances the competing interests of the 
respective parties (landlords, pet-owning tenants, neighbouring tenants, companion animals 
and wider society). It permits responsible pet owners to live with well-behaved pets while 
also addressing the needs of landlords and other tenants to protect their property or their 
enjoyment of their home environment. As with many laws there will be definitional hurdles for 
any new English law governing ‘no pet’ covenants, for example, 
“Defining what constitutes an ‘authorised domestic pet’ is unlikely to be easy, let 
alone framing exceptions to this general rule” (Fox and Ray, 2019, p. 217). 
 
However, drawing on the examples of existing successful legislation in commonwealth 
countries makes this hurdle less onerous. Australia (Victoria) passed legislation in 2018 
enacting a number of amendments to its Residential Tenancies Act one of which included 
giving tenants the right to keep pets which came into force in March 2020. Tenants must first 
obtain the landlord’s consent which can only be refused by order of the Victorian Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal. The law includes similar exceptions to those in the Ontario 
legislation that protect the interests of landlords and neighbouring tenants. 
France was the first country to implement legislation to prohibit ‘no pet’ covenants in 
residential leases. It enacted legislation in 1970 stipulating that any prohibition of pets in 
residential tenancies is deemed to be void (Article 10 of the Law of 9 July 1970). The right of 
the tenant to be able to keep a companion animal is subject to the requirement that the 
animal does not cause damage to the property or disturbance to the enjoyment of other 
occupants (including the landlord). A clause banning dangerous dogs is also permissible. 
Until recently it was thought that this law only applied to long residential leases, but in 
February 2011 the French Supreme Court ruled that Article 10 also applies to holiday rental 
properties so landlords cannot refuse to accept companion animals holidaying with their 
owners (Association Union fédérale des consommateurs de l’Isère - Que Choisir v. 
Association Clévacances Isère). Although France has a very different legal system to 
England, the fact that the law restricting the use of ‘no pet’ covenants has existed there for 
50 years without the need to revoke it, and the fact that the scope of that law has been 
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recently extended to include holiday rentals, demonstrates that such legal governance of ‘no 
pet’ covenants can work in practice. 
 
6.7.3 Positive pet policies in social housing in England and overseas 
In considering the question of pets in social housing, public sector landlords have 
responsibilities to protect the interests of all their tenants. Therefore, the use of ‘no pet’ 
covenants as controllers of risk is not limited to the avoidance of property damage but also 
includes wider concerns such as the health and safety of all their tenants. This can be 
particularly relevant with older persons living in local authority care homes (Smith, Johnson 
and Rolph, 2011). Whilst acknowledging that social housing providers need to protect the 
interests of all tenants, not just pet owners, there is no reason why both cannot be achieved 
as long as laws, regulations and tenancy agreements are correctly drafted to ensure 
responsible pet ownership. Examples of countries where social housing adopts a positive 
pet policy include the USA and New Zealand; a blanket ban on pets is prohibited in the USA 
for all public housing that receives Federal funding (Housing and Urban Development 
Department, 2000) and in New Zealand the statutory corporation and Crown agent that is 
the largest provider of social housing, Housing New Zealand (now called Kāinga Ora), 
announced in 2018 its decision to implement a positive pet policy in all its housing, 
“Pets have benefits for our customers, particularly for the tamariki [children in Maori] 
in our homes and for customers who live alone. We have moved to a more 
permissive approach to pet ownership and now allow customers to have a pet in 
their home subject to certain conditions”  (Housing New Zealand Annual Report 
2017-18, p. 43). 
The change in policy was based on the desire to improve the quality of life for its tenants and 
relied on research demonstrating the numerous benefits of living with a pet especially for 
those living alone. Significantly for my research there are examples of positive pet policies in 
social housing in England. Research involving all the local authority landlords in London and 
the 30 largest Housing Associations there found that none of them impose a blanket ban on 
all their tenants but only 48% of local authority landlords allow all tenants to keep a cat and 
this falls to 24% for dogs (Battersea, 2018, p. 6).  However, there are examples of local 
authority landlords that allow all their tenants to keep pets including cats and dogs; 
Wandsworth Council and Harrow Council fall into this category and demonstrate that such a 
policy can work in practice. Wandsworth council has an Animal Welfare Service with a 
dedicated team of officers who manage dogs on the estate by implementing a dog 
registration scheme, enforcing dog byelaws, using anti-social behaviour orders where 




These examples show that positive pet policies can, and do, work in the social housing 
sector, especially where comprehensive policies are in place, preferably in a “stand alone 
document” (Battersea, 2018, p. 7) which promote responsible pet ownership, for example, 
restrict breeding, limit the number of dogs and cats in each unit, ensure the animals are 
vaccinated and neutered and meet the welfare needs of the animal. If permission to keep the 
pet is made conditional on the tenant complying with these standards then the interests of all 
parties (including the companion animal) are protected. 
6.8 Conclusion 
This component of the portfolio addressed my research questions 4, 5 and 6 and critically 
examined the current law affecting the existence and enforcement of ‘no pet’ covenants in 
England with a view to assessing the need for new laws to regulate their use. Using the 
findings from my literature review and the analysis of my interview data, I argued that the 
human-companion animal relationship falls within ‘private life and family’ in Art.8 ECHR and 
can therefore be protected under human rights law. In assessing the need for legislation to 
govern the use of ‘no pet’ covenants, I propose two frameworks for change: one based on 
human rights and the other on the concept fairness within a Harm Assessment calculation. 
Harm was one of the key themes to emerge from my data and is a relevant factor in both the 
reasonableness test in possession proceedings and the proportionality test in human rights 
arguments. It therefore has a valuable role in helping Parliament to assess the need for 






Appendix 1: Scottish Parliament briefing paper 
 
  
Briefing for the Public Petitions Committee  
Petition Number: PE1706  
Main Petitioner: Geraldine Mackenzie  
  
Subject: Keeping pets in rented and supported accommodation  
Calls on the Parliament to urge the Scottish Government to introduce a law to allow 
all Scottish residents who live in rented and supported accommodation to let their 
pets live with them.  
Background Benefits of pet ownership  
  
The Petitioner refers to journal article20 on the human-companion animal relationship 
in housing law and policy. The article cites evidence to suggest that owning a pet 
can reduce isolation and loneliness and can have physical health benefits such as 
lowering the risk of death by cardiovascular disease.   
  
Pets in rented and supported housing   
  
There is no legislation in Scotland which specifically ban pets from being kept in 
rented or supported accommodation.  
  
Tenants will have a tenancy agreement with their accommodation provider which will 
set out the rights and responsibilities each party. Whether pets can be kept in the 
property will depend on the landlord’s policy.  
  
 
20 Rook, D. 2018. ‘For the Love of Darcie: Recognising the Human–Companion Animal  
Relationship in Housing Law and Policy’ Liverpool Law Review: 29-46  
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For example, some landlords may place a general condition in their tenancy 
agreements that pets cannot be kept. However, in practice, how and whether this 
condition is enforced will vary.  Many tenants will keep pets and landlords will only 
seek to take action against them if the pets are causing a nuisance to neighbours.    
  
Some social landlords may have a specific pet policy which allows pets to be kept 
under certain circumstances. For example, some housing associations that 
specialise in providing housing for the elderly recognise the benefits that pets can 
bring for their tenants.21   
  
In some cases, tenants may have to seek permission from their social landlord to 
keep a pet.  Landlords may consider each application on its merits. If permission is 
granted to keep a pet, there may be conditions involved. For example, a condition 
could include that dogs can only be walked outwith the development grounds. In 
some cases, the landlord might impose a general rule such as that dogs cannot be 
kept in communal stair flats.  
  
The journal article22 the Petitioner refers to suggests that there are legal precedents 
which support legislation that bans ‘no pet’ covenants. The journal article gives 
examples of legislation in other countries, including France and parts of Canada, that 
prohibits the use of ‘no pet’ covenants. Such legislation also seeks to protect the 
rights of landlords and other tenants; for example, there may be exclusions for pets 
which are a nuisance or which cause severe allergic reactions.  
Scottish Parliament/ Scottish Government action   
  
In April 2018, it was reported in the media23 that Scottish Labour environment 
spokesperson, Claudia Beamish MSP, wanted the default position to be that pets 
should be allowed in rented, supported, or temporary accommodation, unless there 
is evidence that the animal is causing a nuisance.  
  
In response to this, a spokeswoman for the Scottish Government was quoted as 
saying:  
  
 "We want to ensure that all elderly and vulnerable people are fully supported in 
finding and keeping a home that works for them.  
  
"Decisions around keeping pets are for individual accommodation providers, 
however, we would encourage them to take a practical and considered approach 
 
21 For example, Hanover Scotland and Bield Housing Association will allow their tenants to keep pets 
in certain circumstances.   
22 Rook, D. 2018. ‘For the Love of Darcie: Recognising the Human–Companion Animal Relationship 
in Housing Law and Policy’ Liverpool Law Review: 29-46  




that removes any potential for distress or difficulties, and ensures elderly and 
vulnerable people have a positive outcome."24  
Kate Berry  
Senior Researcher, SPICe 19 
September 2018  
   
SPICe research specialists are not able to discuss the content of petition briefings with 
petitioners or other members of the public. However if you have any comments on any 
petition briefing you can email us at spice@parliament.scot   
Every effort is made to ensure that the information contained in petition briefings is correct 
at the time of publication. Readers should be aware however that these briefings are not 
necessarily updated or otherwise amended to reflect subsequent changes.  
  
Published by the Scottish Parliament Information Centre (SPICe), an office of the Scottish 
Parliamentary Corporate Body, The Scottish Parliament, Edinburgh, EH99 1SP  
   
  
 









Appendix 3: My process of coding – moving from codes to identifying key 
themes 
 
List of 45 NVivo nodes from my first stage of coding 
Ambivalence – embarrassed 
Ambivalence – flexible personhood 
Ambivalence – other people 
Animal instinct model 
Animal’s personality 
Balancing interests 
Caring practices – pet as carer 
Caring practices – pet as dependent 
Childhood pets 
Choice  
Coping with death 
Coping with loss 
Discrimination in housing 
Endowed with agency – anthropomorphic model  
Endowed with agency – changing everyday practice – positive 
Endowed with agency – changing everyday practice – detriment 
Family practices – access to home spaces 
Family practices – everyday routines 
Family practices – sleeping arrangements 
Hierarchical relations – dominance and submission 
Identity as a dog or cat person 
Impact of covenant on home 
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Impact of covenant on tenant’s mental health 
Landlord’s reasons 
Mental stress of covenant 
Motivation for acquiring a pet 
Pets influencing household decisions 
Poor quality housing  
Powerlessness in lease negotiations 
Provision of support – emotional benefits 
Provision of support – physical health benefits 
Provision of support – safety 
Provision of support – trust 
Relinquish pet 
Rental insecurity  
Searching for pet-friendly house 
Social actor – facilitate bonding within family 
Social actor – community and social lubricant 
Social actor – conflict 
Societal waste due to covenant 
Status of pet – as an animal (not a furry human) 
Status of pet – property model 
Status of pet – family (parent-child model) 
Status of pet – friend model 




The link between the 45 codes and the seven themes 
1. Agency  
Animal’s personality 
Endowed with agency – anthropomorphic model  
Endowed with agency – changing everyday practice – positive 
Endowed with agency – changing everyday practice – detriment 
Family practices – access to home spaces 
Family practices – everyday routines 
Family practices – sleeping arrangements 
Pets influencing household decisions 
Social actor – facilitate bonding within family 
Social actor – community and social lubricant 
Social actor – conflict 
Status of pet – as an animal (not a furry human) 
2. Support 
Caring practices – pet as carer 
Caring practices – pet as dependent 
Provision of support – emotional benefits 
Provision of support – physical health benefits 
Provision of support – safety 
Provision of support – trust 
Motivation for acquiring a pet 
Status of pet – family (parent-child model) 
Status of pet – friend model 
3. Ambivalence  
Ambivalence – embarrassed 
Ambivalence – flexible personhood 
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Ambivalence – other people 
4. Rental Insecurity  
Rental insecurity  
5. Lack of Choice 
Choice  
Poor quality housing  
Searching for pet-friendly house 
6. Powerlessness in Negotiations and perceived Discrimination  
Discrimination in housing 
Powerlessness in lease negotiations 
7. Mental Health 
Coping with death 
Coping with loss 
Impact of covenant on home 
Impact of covenant on tenant’s mental health 
Mental stress of covenant 
Relinquish pet 
Codes not attached to a theme 
Childhood pets. This was useful in providing background information about the participants. 
Hierarchical relations – dominance and submission. This was only relevant to one 
participant, Julia, who had worked with dogs all her life including as a dog trainer and in dog 
kennels. It did not have wider relevance so I excluded it.   
Identity as a dog or cat person. This was relevant to the participant’s identity and how they 
saw themselves. 
Landlord’s reasons. Since this data was provided by tenants and not the landlords I did not 
feel that it could be reliably used to explore the reasons why landlords prohibit pets. I used 
existing research on landlords reasons. 
Societal waste due to covenant. This was useful when thinking about the harm to society in 
my analysis chapter 
309 
 
Status of pet – property model. This code was deduced from the literature review but as 
none of my participants referred to their companion animal as property, no data populated 
this code. 
Welfare of companion animal – this was useful when thinking about the harm to animals in 




Appendix 4 - Interview Guide 2018 
 
The participant’s experience of a ‘no pet’ covenant in their lease and the effect of the covenant on 
them 
First = go through Research Information sheet and sign consent form 
Second = discuss photographs 
Topic 1: Nature of relationship with pet(s) - I am interested in hearing your story about your 
relationship with your pet. 
Could you tell me the story of your pet? 
For how long has this pet lived with you?  
Explain all the ways you interact with your pet on a typical day. 
How does your pet benefit you? 
What words would you use to describe your relationship with your pet? 
Why did you get this pet – motivation?  
Did you have pets as a child? (your history of pet ownership) 
 
Photograph (max.2)- choose photos that show me something about your relationship with your pet.  
Could you tell me more about this photo? (What is the story behind this photo?) 
Why did you choose to show me this particular photo?  
What does this photo say about your relationship with your pet? 
[Please can I take a copy of this photo?] 
 
Topic 2: Experience of the ‘no pet’ covenant 
History of lease  
What type of lease do you have and who is the landlord (private, public, housing assoc)? 
What is the length of term of the lease? 
History of the lease = what were the events that led up to signing this lease? 
Did you have problems finding a pet friendly property? 
What factors influenced you to rent this particular property? 
Did you know about the ‘no pet’ covenant prior to signing the lease? 
Interaction with landlord/letting agent 
Did you try to negotiate with the landlord to be allowed to keep pets? 
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If yes, what reasons did the landlord give for refusing to let you keep pets? 
If no, why did you decide not to negotiate with the landlord? 
What reasons influenced you to sign the lease (even with a no pet covenant)? 
Outcome 
What was the outcome of the dispute – where does the pet live now? 
How do you feel about the outcome of the dispute? 
What words describe how you feel (having to give up your pet/being unable to keep a pet)? 
Impact 
What impact did the ‘no pet’ covenant have on you? (e.g. hiding pet from landlord, insecurity from 
being caught) 
What impact did the dispute over keeping pets have on you at the time?  
Finding a new pet friendly property 
Do you plan to find a pet friendly property in the near future? 
What factors prevent or restrict you from moving into a pet friendly property? 
Overall experience 
What key words would you use to describe your experience of having a ‘no pet’ covenant in your 
lease? 
Background information (if not already covered in interview) 
Age group –  20-30; 30-40; 40-50; 50-60; 60+ 
Occupation –  
Any children?  
Length of time owning this pet –  
At the end of the interview: 
Thank you 
Give counselling details (if participant upset talking about losing pet) 
Take copy of photographs 
Ask if I can send them a transcript of the interview to allow them an opportunity to comment on the 
contents and add further details or clarify points made or even change their mind about something 
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